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ABSTRACT
LOOKING BEYOND THE RUBBLE TOWARD LOUVERTUREAN STATECRAFT:
THE POST-OCCUPATION STATE AND THE HISTORICAL FAULT LINE OF
RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT IN HAITI (1791-2016)
SEPTEMBER 2017
MOISE ST LOUIS, B.A., POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF
MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
B.A., AFRO-AMERICAN STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
AMHERST
B.A., SOCIAL THOUGHT & POLITICAL ECONOMY, UNIVERSITY OF
MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
M.A., POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph. D., POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Carlene Edie
This dissertation posits that the fragility of the Haitian state emerges from
a key disjuncture from the state crafted by Northern Louverturean elites during
and after the struggle for independence. Louverturean elites crafted a strong
state that incorporated and regulated all national cleavages and interests as the
basis for legitimacy and stability. This state secured their interests while
regulating their capacity to circumvent the interests of other cleavages. Most
importantly, it secured the rights of former slaves on whose exploitation other
cleavages depended. The destruction of the Louverturean state by neocolonial
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elites and imposition of a neocolonial national state estranged from the majority
of the population lacked the requisite legitimacy. The shift from the Louverturean
state to one diametrically opposed to the interests of the majority of its citizens
disregarded the integrative and protective measures upon which the
Louverturean state secured its legitimacy.
Despite multiple attempts to reconstitute the Louverturean state, it was the
neocolonial national state that was consolidated during the American occupation.
Following his election in 1957, Francois Duvalier returned to the Louverturean
state model by incorporating the Black masses and middle class, expanding the
public sector, protecting the sovereignty and autonomy of the nation, regulating
commerce, and breaking neocolonial Mulatto stranglehold. Though successful,
he was constrained by the existing state structure.
Arguing that the American Occupation consolidated, centralized, and
enhanced the state’s capacity to support neocolonial elites’ historical exploitative
schemes, this study suggests that by consolidating the neocolonial national state
historically deficient in legitimacy and popular support, the Occupation
accentuated its disconnection from the population and its institutional and
political deficiencies created the conditions for contemporary instability and state
failure.
Contemporary political studies of Haiti offer a linear, unidimensional, and
incomplete analysis of the Haitian state ignoring Louverturean statecraft.
Analyzing Haitian political history and state crafting before, during and after the
American Occupation is necessary to understand its contemporary challenges,

X

and its search for democratic accountability. Such an analysis demands an
understanding of the centrality of Louverturean statecraft.
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INTRODUCTION
Haiti is a relatively large Caribbean nation with a population of
approximately 10.6 million, located on the Western one-third of Hispaniola, the
island it shares with the Dominican Republic. Haitians are a mixture of Africans
(95%), Europeans, Mulattoes (a mixed population of Africans and Europeans),
with a recent influx of Middle Easterners, Asians, and Latin Americans. Like all
other Caribbean societies, Haiti is stratified along racial and class lines stemming
from plantation slavery. Often there has been a close correlation in the society
between color and class, with whites representing the top of the hierarchy in
terms of power, status, and wealth, Mulattoes in the middle and blacks at the
bottom with very high levels of deprivation. The post-emancipation period left the
color lines, the plantation legacy that privileged whiteness, and near-whiteness
intact, maintaining the cycle of color and class correlation still pervasive in the
Caribbean, Latin America and many other former plantation societies.
Post-revolution Haiti, on the other hand, upended the racial hierarchy that
persisted in most other post-slavery Caribbean societies, putting blacks at the
center of power as crafters and leaders of the state. Black leaders crafted a
defensive and legitimate state with the capacity to protect its black citizens, with
its legitimacy derived from its ability to balance and regulate the interests of all
racial groups and class cleavages. With the negligible European population that
existed after independence, competition for control of the state emerged between
Mulattoes and the black revolutionary elites over not just the state, but a
divergent conception or model of the state necessary for governing. Mulattoes
became a proxy for whiteness and the continuity of the colonial system of black
1

exploitation and subservience. This divergent conception of the state and the
competition between Mulattoes and black elites over the implementation of their
distinct model has resulted in a political conflict that has been played out over the
past two centuries. Haitian scholars have often characterized this competition as
simply the results of racial acrimony and intra-elite conflict, obviating the struggle
over state crafting and state models in which the competition is rooted.
Divided and unequal societies, such as those that emerged from colonial
rule in the Caribbean and Latin America, Africa and Asia, typically experienced
external domination, disharmony, ethnic conflict, political immobilism and
sometimes civil wars and the disintegration of the state. Haiti might have been
expected to follow that pattern after its independence in 1804. But Haiti had a
unique place in post-colonial studies as the nation that carried out the first
successful slave revolt in the western hemisphere. Despite the inherent divisions
and conflicts that existed in the colonial slave society of Haiti, after the revolution
that ended that system Toussaint Louverture managed to conceptualize and put
in place a stable, legitimate state that served the interests of the black majority
well, enjoyed their support, and protected the sovereignty of the nation against
foreign encroachments. The disintegration of that state, and its replacement by a
neocolonial state resulted in centuries of successive conflicts and ultimately the
subjugation of the state to the whims of foreign powers to the detriment of the
Haitian state and nation.
Contemporary studies lament Haiti’s decline since its glorious victory
against France in 1804, and in the comparative politics literature Haiti has now
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become synonymous with chronic underdevelopment, kleptocratic rule, political
instability, and external dependency. The earthquake that struck Haiti in Januray
2010 destroyed most of the capital of Port-au-Prince, killed over 300,000 people,
further immiserized the Haitian population, and destroyed most of Haiti’s state
institutions. Many questions emerged before and after that horrific experience.
For most Haitian policymakers and scholars, the central question facing Haiti
became: What kind of state should post-earthquake policies support? For the
majority classes who had lived their lives outside of the state’s protection since
the demise of the Louverturean state, the very existence of the state became the
focus: Where is the state? they inquired, openly decrying its absence and its
inability to protect their lives. These were certainly crucial questions to which
meaningful answers are needed.
Haiti was indeed at a crossroads in January 2010 and the post-earthquake
realities offered both Haitians citizens, policymakers, scholars, and members of
the international community a unique opportunity to address Haiti’s persistent
instability. The Haitian state had already collapsed before its structural
destruction by the 2010 earthquake. As Zanotti suggests, “the weakness of the
Haitian state was not created by the earthquake” (Zanotti 2010, 756). While most
commentators characterized Haiti as a “failed state,” there appears to be little
focus on the causes of that failure. Nevertheless, prescriptions for its
rehabilitation or rebuilding abound (R. J. Fatton 2010).
This dissertation seeks to contribute a state-centered analysis that can
illuminate the context of state failure in Haiti, and its predisposition to oppose the
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type of popular redistributive democracy the Haitian masses support. The
research question that guides this study is: what is the relationship between state
formation and democratic accountability in post-colonial states? Answers to that
question will be supported by the following arguments:
1) Initially crafted by Toussaint Louverture and other Northern revolutionary
leaders to manage divergent interests within the nation and secure its legitimacy
by protecting the rights of its newly free citizens, the state, which I refer to as a
Louverturean state, persisted, stable, responsive and strong. Its legitimacy was
firmly established on its interdependence with and reliance on the majority of its
citizens for its defense and its ability to protect their freedom, preserve their
interests, and prevent their return to slavery. The Louverturean state served both
as both a constraint on powerful established cleavages to prevent the
exploitation of its new citizens, and a protector of the interests of those cleavages
against uprisings and revenge attacks.
2) Until its demise and replacement by neocolonial elites whose power it
was designed to manage and constrain in order to secure the rights of the
majority of its citizens, the Louverturean state provided a model of governance
that was both accountable and legitimate – indispensable to all cleavages for
both constraints and protection. It served as the only national arbiter capable of
managing the interests of all cleavages without exclusion or favoritism. Its
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replacement by a new state, a “neocolonial state1” reestablished patterns of
colonial domination, and class and racial hierarchy by securing the power of
neocolonial elites to the detriment of the black majority. This shift created a
national schism that has undermined the prospects for stable governance.
Consequently, the neocolonial state imposed by neocolonial elites faced a
population and Northern Louverturean elites determine to oppose its operation
and consolidation, and curtail its ability to impose a national vision which
countered their interests (Ardouin 1860, P. Sannon 1905, Leyburn 1966, Barros
1984, Gros 2012). Until the American occupation, the neocolonial state was the
site of armed and unarmed contestations and conflicts, weak and illegitimate,
with only intermittent period of stability under Louverturean nationalist control.
3) The American Occupation pacified the armed opposition, disarmed the
population, eliminated Northern Louverturean elites, re-crafted, centralized and
consolidated the neocolonial state giving it the capacity to impose its will on the
nation while securing the power of neocolonial elites. This consolidated
neocolonial state failed to acquire the requisite legitimacy and state-society
interdependence of its Louverturean counterpart (Nicholls 1979, Gaillard 1984,
Laguerre 1993, Schmidt 1995). The consolidated state that emerged as a result
of the Occupation was predisposed against the majority of its citizens, and
unaccountable and impervious to pressures from them (Barros 1984, Betances

1

By neocolonial state, I mean a mean that preserve some of the colonial patterns of domination and
exploitation by neglecting the interests of the majority of its citizens, barely acknowledging them as full
citizens deserving of protection.
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1995, Casimir and Dubois 2010). The American Occupation provided
neocolonial elites with a consolidated state to preserve their institutional,
economic, and political dominance with the coercive capacity to maintain them.
4) The post-occupation state, crafted to support Neocolonial Mulatto
dominance and preserve commercial interests, became embroiled in racial
schism, which led to the rise of Francois Duvalier and the consolidation of his
Duvalierist regime under Noirism, a black nationalist ideology (Castor 1971,
Nicholls 1979, Dupuy 1989, B. Plummer 1990, Trouillot 1990). This centralized
and coercive post-occupation state became the vehicle for Duvalierist power
within the constraints of the post-occupation neocolonial state. Even the demise
and popular overthrow of “Duvalierism” in the 1980s, and the ensuing democratic
transition supported by the majority of the population did not succeed in changing
its orientation. The military-dominated state, crafted to constrain, if not oppose,
popular demands, forcefully opposed the democratic movement. At a time when
it needed to bolster its legitimacy by supporting the popular democratic
movement to ease the state-nation tension and intra-national conflicts that had
historically undermined institutional capacity and trust, and democratic
accountability, its action exacerbated them (Dalvius 1987, Dejan Mars, 1987, M.
S. Laguerre 1993, R. J. Fatton 2002). This post-occupation state’s historical
predisposition against popular accountability, forceful resistance to demands for
democratic accountability, and its failure to control the popular democratic forces,
resulted in its weakness and ultimate collapse.
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Theories of democratization have cohered around the elements required
for successful transitions to democratic states (Dahl 1971, O'Donnell and
Schmitter 1986, Peeler 2009, Howe, Popovski and Notaras 2010). To date, these
theories have not considered the cumulative effects of negative outcomes from
an earlier period, which shape the opportunity structure available to historical
actors at later times (Pierson 2000). On one hand, Haitian leaders bear
considerable responsibility for failing to advance a coherent, nation-building
project. On the other hand, their attempts, disagreements, negotiations,
compromises and battles, have never happened in a “neutral” political context,
but have rather taken place under conditions and structures accrued historically
and augmented by profound antagonism from international actors, and
asymmetrical power among relevant constituents.
5) The demise of the post-occupation neocolonial state creates the space
for a recalibration of analyses in search of a formula to state crafting and perhaps
and more importantly, a re-evaluation of the Louverturean state model and its
relevance to national stability and popular legitimacy. It is an opportunity to
account for, and challenge the nature of the centralized post-occupation state
that have led to subsequent failure of democratic governance in Haiti. Such a
formula can help conceptualize a state that is responsive to all competing claims,
and strong enough to balance and manage those claims in order to establish
stable and accountable democratic governance. Louverturean statecraft, to date
overlooked by Haitian scholars and policy-makers, can provide us with the
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analytical framework, and national model grounded in popular legitimacy to
address contemporary crises and democratic instability in Haiti.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This dissertation is a socio-historical study of the Haitian state and its role in the
democratization process. Most of the information was gathered through archival
research. Given that until the death of Dr. Francois Duvalier in 1971, prominent
Haitian intellectuals who addressed pertinent social and political challenges
faced by the nation were involved in the state system, their work encompassed
more than mere intellectual debates; they were policy formulations. One cannot
understand Haitian state policies outside of the dominant intellectual debates of
their time.
Archival Research: I engaged in archival research in the Five College library
system of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, and Mount Holyoke,
Smith, Amherst and Hampshire Colleges that housed microfiches of historical
documents dating back to 1797. Correspondence between the American Council
in Haiti and Haitian leaders, the American government, and other foreign
governments, were located in this library system as well as in the libraries of the
University of Vermont. I also compiled out-of-print manuscripts and documents
from the French website (http://gallica.bnf.fr) that are not found in the U.S. and
are no longer in publication. For documents pertinent to the U.S. Occupation
(1915-1934) and other documents on U.S. government policies towards Haiti, I
used the archives of the George Washington University and the Library of
8

Congress in Washington D.C. Archival research in Haiti was limited due to the
damages caused by the 2010 earthquake.
Interviews: Field research and interviews were conducted in Haiti from February
to April 2013, June to August in 2014 and 2015, and in the U.S. from 2013-2015.
The primary data gathered from the field research complemented secondary
sources such as books, journal articles, publications from international financial
institutions, national policy papers, published and unpublished manuscripts, and
seminar proceedings. Interviewees include some Haitian intellectuals and policymakers, including President Aristide, and various former ministers. Looking at the
policy patterns, political debates, and policy decisions of various state actors,
political elites, and ethnic factions should provide us with answers pertinent to
Haiti’s democratic challenges. It also helped to explain the historical legitimacy
challenge faced by the state.
Surveys: The dissertation made use of the 2005 World Value Survey questions
to assess how different segments of the Haitian population feel about institutional
legitimacy, trust, and confidence in their state and state actors. The World Value
Survey is one of the most important research instituions, and since 1980 has
been running comparative surveys that assess countries across the globe. I
selected specific questions from their questionnaire (see attaced survey
questions in the Appendix A) and they are divided into seven categories:
Population dynamics, Economic Confidence and Effectiveness, Political
Participation, Institutional Trust, Trust in Law and Order, Trust in State Actors,
and National Outlook. A series of open-ended questions are included to allow
9

respondents free range in addressing issues they deem to be important and offer
their own insights. (see attached in Appendix B). The target groups for the survey
are Haitians living in Haiti as well as abroad, and Haitian-Americans closely
associated with Haiti and NGO representaives working in Haiti. I had access to
various listserves that assisted me with survey distributions. I also utilized my
connections to NGO professionals, and former and current Haitian state
employees who responded to the survey. The respondents were 18 years and
older, and their socio-economic backgrounds ranged from working class to elites.
The target sample size was 500 with 342 respondents; a 68.4% participation
rate.
The surveys were distributed both online and in hardcopies at random in
different geographical locations in Haiti to ensure that a greater cross-section of
the population participated. Students from the Haitian State University assisted in
its distribution while Haitian scholars and consultants supported the effort as
volunteers and unpaid collegial advisors.

Organization
Chapter I presents a literature review of the dominant approaches that
have been used to analyze and understand the modern Haitian state. The
chapter provides a framework for understanding the emergence of the Haitian
state within the broader context of postcoloniality in the Caribbean and Africa.
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Chapter II analyzes the historical context of the emergence of the Haitian
state after the end of slavery and the implementation of the Louverturean state.
The chapter offers an original analysis of Haitan statecraft during a momentous
period in Haitian history that has been largely neglected in world history.
Chapter III analyzes the destruction of the Louverturean state and
collapse of the revolutionary northern politico-military governance as a result of
infighting and competition between Mulatto elites and black nationalists. This
chapter will provide a framework for understanding the role of the American
occupation in leading to the emergence of a client regime that was funded to
support both elites and American interests in Haiti.
Chapter IV explores the argument that the American Occupation
centralized and consolidated the neocolonial state, reorganizing the military as its
primary and most powerful institution. The military-centered state under the
control of neo-colonial elites began a process of entrenched struggle over military
control between Black nationalist and Mulatto elites. The role of the military in
that struggle has to be understood in the context of the American preference for
a state-controlled military-centered approach to governance not only in Haiti, but
also in Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic.
Chapter V focuses on the phenomenon of Duvalierism, following the
election of Francois Duvalier. Most studies suggest the rise of Francois Duvalier
to power as a predictable event given the trajectory of Haiti’s authoritarian
history. Departing from those studies, the chapter suggests a link between the
Occupation and the exacerbation of historical racial schism that facilitated the
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rise of the Duvalierist regime. Though symbolically Louverturean, the neocolonial
framework that was imposed and within which Duvalier evolved, limited his
capacity to protect the nation against foreign domination. The chapter ends with
an analysis of the failure of Jean-Claude Duvalier to maintain the stable
authoritarian state he inherited from his father, resulting in the creation of spaces
for a democratic movement to emerge.
Chapter VI examines the democratic transition in Haiti that begun after the
collapse of Duvalierism in 1984. The chapter addresses the eclipsing of the
post-occupation state for an NGO-run state and the need for state crafting to
develop a strong state to support democratic continuity. It argues that democracy
requires an effective state, and suggests that the Haitian citizenry have not been
in support of merely procedural democracy and the pattern of NGO dominance
but seeks an accountable state anchored in economic redistribution and socioeconomic rights as demanded by the majority. It uses survey results to
demonstrate that although the Haitian state suffers from a legitimacy and trust
crisis, it is widely seen as the vehicle that can support stable democratic
governance, and through which the popular democratic mandate to address
unsustainable inequality can be pursued.
In its conclusion, the dissertation raises questions about legitimacy and
the conditions necessary for democratic governance and democratic
consolidation in Haiti. It suggests that the Louverturean state model is most
conducive to securing the legitimacy and popular support necessary for
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democratic participation, and sustaining stable and responsive democratic
government.
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Chapter I
STATE FORMATION: LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK
Political studies of Haiti are frequently infused with baseless
mischaracterizations that reflect tendencies of a bygone era, and often defy
common sense. Recent discussions of Haiti have continued that pattern. When
faced with the challenge of explaining Haiti’s unstable democratic transition,
rather than offer substantive analyses of the Haitian state and historical
dynamics, too many scholars and political pundits are content with simplistic
cultural assumptions devoid of actual knowledge of Haitian society2. Those
assumptions range from the “prevalence of African cultural norms and
institutions,” the “absence of western culture,” to the “lack of cultural inclination
and leadership commitment and capacity necessary for stable democratic
politics”3 (Lawless 1992, P. R. Girard 2010, Brooks 2010). Unfortunately, these
statements reflect a historical bias faced by Haiti. Moreover, they obscure viable
scholarly analyses currently required. As Trouillot suggests, “the idea that the
Haitian political quagmire is due to some congenital disease of the Haitian
mind…make Haiti’s political dilemma immune to rational explanation and

2

A well-known scholar of the Dominican Republic observed in a lecture attended by the author in 1998
that Haiti’s challenges are due to its clan and tribal conflicts. Given that there are neither clans not tribes
in Haiti, his statement denotes the kind of misconceptions that saturate most American scholarships on
Haiti.
3

In his 2010 opinion piece in the NY Times, David Brooks articulated the most historically persistent
theme in westerners’ portrayal of Haiti as impeded by voodoo and African culture (Brooks 2010). Most
Haitian scholars see these pervasive notions as reflecting prevailing biases toward Haitians who dared to
challenge white supremacy to secure their freedom (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, R. Fatton 2007).
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therefore to solutions that could be both just and practical” (M.-R. Trouillot 1990,
121-23). Indeed, these biases contribute little to further understanding of the
Haitian State, its history and current crisis. They foreclose sensible explanations
of contemporary challenges, successes, and failures of democratization. These
characterizations reflect a historical pattern of attacks on Haiti since its
independence (Lawless 1992). Haitian scholars of all stripes have been
committed to defend Haiti against its detractors and address these attacks, and
this dissertation also hopes to contribute to the body of scholarship in that vein.
More serious scholarship on the state and Haitian democracy cluster around
two schools of thought: (1) the state as an organic set of institutions or regime
that embodies socio-political arrangements between national actors that
preceded state formation; (2) the state as an imposed inorganic and dependent
post-occupation regime that relies on national and international clientelistic
networks4 to secure the interests of elites and international capital at the expense
of the nation. After examining the strengths and weaknesses of the major
arguments of each school, I will offer a new conceptualization of the Haitian state
- the Louverturean state - as a useful tool for understanding Haiti’s contemporary
democratic challenges.

4

For analysis of clientelist networks in the Caribbean see (Stone 1980) and (C. J. Edie 1989, 1991).
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Nation-States as Organic Dependent or Semi-Autonomous Regimes:
In the Weberian and Althusserian sense, the state is defined as a
territorially bounded entity with an ensemble of repressive and ideological
apparatuses that allow rulers to exercise a monopoly over the use of force and
sustain the ideology to maintain their dominance (Althusser 1971, Weber 1978).
In other words, it is best to describe the state in terms of ‘state system’ or
‘regime’ – “a distinct ensemble of institutions and organizations whose socially
accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on a
given population in the name of their ‘common interest’ or ‘general will’ (Jessop
2007, 9).
While some scholars argue about the validity of this “general will and
common interests”, and others differ in their explanations of intra-state and interstate dynamics, state emergence, persistence, and failure, they agree on their
definition and typology of states. Analyses of the state through the nation-state
paradigm presuppose the presence of shared national culture within the territory
of the state and meaningful state-society relations that give the state its
existential legitimacy and identity – its ‘raisons d’être’. This static view of the state
as derived from a homogeneous nation and culture structured to maintain
established power relations obscures the diversity within those nations and
institutional development from which states can derive independent power.
Postulating such a static view of the state fails to recognize that state institutions
or regimes adjust, coerce, expand and contract to maintain the status quo or
create new ones with or without the acquiescence of the polis and rulers

16

(Althusser 1971, Gramsci 1971). In other words, states, regimes, and institutions
within states can act independently of both rulers and ruled to preserve their own
institutional interests and longevity. Thus, the notion that states’ persistence can
only be understood within the context of existing power relations between rulers
and ruled, and their ability to be responsive to them and adaptable to needs and
aspirations without changing the orientation of power is inadequate. Moreover,
little consideration is given to postcolonial nations, which lacks the cultural and
ethnic uniformity, and on which states and regimes are imposed. These states
and regimes can maintain their subjectivity and stunt their ability to evolve and
enhance their capacity and autonomy independent from the dictates and control
of their former colonial masters (A. D. Smith 1983, Ayoob 1995, J. S. Migdal
2001, Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2010)5. While these scholars assert that states
can be both internally and externally, dependent, interdependent, semiautonomous, or autonomous, postcolonial states face great constraints and are
less autonomous as a consequence of arrangements imposed prior to or at the
time of their independence by colonial powers (Cardoso and Faletto 1979,
Gellner 1983, C. J. Edie 1991, Spruyt 2002, Axtmann 2004, Silicon Africa 2016).
Thus, for scholars of the state, analyses of the state must account for both its

5

A very important contribution worth noting is the new State-nation approach (Stepan, Linz and Yadav
2010). Although it does not necessarily challenge the nation-state paradigm since nation-states can be
characterized by independent regimes to manage competition between powerful actors for stable
governance. These powerful national actors have the capacity to destabilize the nation-state if
unsatisfied.
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national (i.e., societal) and international limitations and the impact of those on
their autonomy and development, as well as state types.
Most early studies of nation-states consider a process of state formation
that gives apriori legitimacy to the state. In this vein, nation-states emerge by
virtue of a social contract among the people who wanted to unite, hoping that in
this way, they would be able to live safely and peacefully. As Charchula notes,
the state builds its power first of all for the sake of the welfare of its members
(Charchula 2010, 198-9). State formation or emergence, therefore, reflects the
codification and consolidation of a social contract governing norms that existed in
the nation between rulers and the ruled antecedent to its existence. States thus
secure their legitimacy by devising regimes capable of sustaining and managing
these pre-existing historical bargains or social contracts (Gellner 1983, Anderson
1991).
Thus, for these scholars, their emergence from organic arrangements
and processes and societal practices make them vulnerable to evolutions in
those arrangements or in the society itself. As those arrangements evolve,
expand and become more complex, so too does the need for more complex state
institutions or regimes. State crisis, therefore, is often a consequence of the
inability of state elites to adapt to evolving contexts and arrangements by
devising new accountable regimes (Herbst 2000, Riegl 2009). The longevity of
these states and the success of state elites, therefore, rest in their mutability and
capacity to build sustainable and adaptable institutions to manage changes and
evolutions in these pre-existing bargains (Hobbes 1991, XIX.94-100). In sum,
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whether measured by its various ‘Centers of gravity’ as Patrick Carroll suggests,
or ‘Centers of power’, these states are considered to be as strong as their
societal bargains and vice-versa, or more precisely as strong as their relations to
their citizens, and as stable as the arrangements they are tasked to secure
(Carroll 2009).
Although scholars contest this notion of an organic dependent state by
stipulating a more autonomous and disconnected state, this assertion of
interdependence between society and the state has acquired new life in recent
debates about democratization and state collapse (Skocpol 1985, Tilly 1990,
Gros 1996, Ayoob 2001, Stahler-Sholk, Vanden and Kuecker 2008). While the
role of social actors in state formation and persistence has been emphasized,
absent in this thesis has been the external factors that influenced intra and interstate relations, state autonomy, and more importantly, the role of state
institutions themselves in shaping its orientation and state-society relations
through institutional processes and coercion.
Furthermore, this early conception of an organic-dependent state with its
power and legitimacy measured by the degree of adherence to existing social
arrangements paid insufficient attention to issues of organizational culture and
institutional mutability (Mann 1984, Carruthers 1994). Changes in social
arrangements, power relations, organizational culture or the ability of institutions
once formed to self-perpetuate, expand, develop new rules, and dictate new and
different social arrangements are left unaddressed (Mann, 1984; Norlinger,
1988). Also absent are considerations for slave-based societies where social
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contracts, if they existed at all, existed between slaveholders themselves and not
between slaves and slaveholders. Slaves as properties could be disposed of,
sold, buried alive, quartered, burned alive, or worked to death and, as such,
Haitian revolutionary elites could not craft a post-slavery state based on preexisting social contracts from which they had fought to free themselves. They did
not experience the delayed freedom and re-structured subjugation that became
normative in the Caribbean colonies to avoid widespread revolts (Dookhan,
1975; Sunshine, 1988).
More than any of their counterparts, Haitian state crafters had to secure
the allegiance of former slaves upon whom arbitrary state power could no longer
be used having fought for and won their freedom. While state persistence
required institutional adaptation to changes in power relations, and states, once
they emerge, could evolve both due to changes in social contracts, and
institutional needs and development, the basis for state crafting, not emergence,
in the Haitian context, cannot be considered organic and autonomous, but rather
targeted, purposeful, and interdependent. In this vein, state legitimacy and even
its survival are based on its ability and that of its elites to maintain these new,
intentionally crafted, and interdependent social arrangements.
It is clear that Haiti, as a post-slavery and post-colonial society did not
have the historical and organic social contract within which the state could
emerge and maintain popular support and legitimacy. Scholars of the State, and
specifically scholars of the Haitian state, have to contend with the reality that a
new social contract had to be intentionally crafted to secure the legitimacy and
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survival of the Haitian state. More importantly, state elites had to be conscious of
the need to craft a state to that end. That they have not accounted for these
factors in their analysis reflects a major flaw in the study of the Haitian state.
Most scholars focus on the continuity of pre-existing social arrangements as the
basis for an organic emergence of the Haitian state and the source of its
deficiencies. Their claim that the Haitian state, since its inception, has
represented a set of regimes elaborated to maintain old power relations between
masters and slaves or exploiter and exploited under a new infrastructure, is
inconsistent with the patterns of relations established by Haitian state crafters
and requires re-evaluation (Price-Mars 1953, Pierre-Charles 1973, M.-R. Trouillot
1990, Lundahl 2011).

Nation-States as Imposed Inorganic Dependent Regimes:
Postcolonial theorists from the dependency school have challenged this
dependent nation-state narrative centered on cultural and societal uniformity.
They postulate a level of structural, political and economic dependency imposed
on postcolonial states, which hinders both their autonomy and development
(Rodney 1974, Blomstrom and Hette 1984, Ayoob 2001). The thrust of their
contention is that postcolonial states are not just internally dependent due to preexisting socio-cultural dynamics, they are nationally and internationally
dependent because their colonizers so determined and forcefully maintained that
dependence (Delince, 1979; Heinl & Heinl, 2005; Global South, 2015; Silicon
Africa, 2016). Thus, states that emerge from slavery and/or colonialism do not fit
neatly within this dominant nation-state paradigm since they reflect a different
21

kind of social arrangement. They often begin with a culturally, religiously, and
racially or ethnically heterogeneous population to manage diminished
sovereignty, impose regimes of debt and dependency, and deal with internal
power relations mitigated by the very external forces that lord over the institutions
that govern the international order. As such, they become part of an international
system in which they have limited political and economic power or leverage
(Frank A.-G. , 1966; Roniger, 2004).
Contrary to the organic-dependent thesis, Tilly offers a less sanitized and
more dynamic conflict-dominated analysis of state formation. For Tilly, wars
make and expand states, and postcolonial states do not experience the level of
external threat that could facilitate state formation and expansion. Moreover, their
coercive capacity is designed not for war making and territorial expansion, but for
internal control (Tilly 1990, 206-7). The postcolonial state in Tilly’s view is not a
protective state but a coercive one. Vu and Michelena suggest that rather than
resulting from social contracts, organic-independent nation states emerge in
“politically competitive environments in which established church and status
groups rivaled rulers and each other; bargains can occur or be sustained only in
this environment” (Michelena 1971, Vu 2010, 161). Consequently, states as an
assortment of regimes or a set of representative institutions emerge when a
stalemate exists between competing forces; when power differences between
dominant societal actors become negligible and the possibility of dominating rival
groups is nil (Waldner, 1999). Accordingly, this leveling of power between
competing societal forces, even if temporary, creates ideal conditions for states
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to emerge and sustainable institutions to develop. Needless to note that external
interference or the role of foreign powers in influencing and fomenting intra-state
conflicts is left unaddressed. For Waldner, Vu, and Michelena, states are
therefore relegated to being managers of social arrangements, creating ‘incentive
structures’, ‘constraining, giving opportunities to social groups’, and ‘undergoing
processes of institutionalization’, which determine their degree of continuity,
mutability, and power. For these scholars, states are involved in a “complex
interplay between state actors, popular groups, and foreign powers” (Kucukozer
2005, 232-5). States, therefore, can impose conditions for stability, manage intrastate societal conflicts, as well as set parameters for state-society interactions
and interactions with foreign powers. Their functionality and autonomy make
them simultaneously ‘the precipitate of conflicts of interests and power struggles’
between dominant societal groups, and the regulator of these groups (M.-R.
Trouillot 1990, 21). Therefore, according to these scholars, to the extent that
states have the institutional, coercive, and material capacity to withstand both
domestic and international pressures, they are autonomous (Skocpol 1985,
Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988, Carruthers 1994). Many scholars fault this
nation-state-centered approach for the absence of a more nuanced analysis of
state-society relations. They also challenge the lack of importance given to the
role of states in maintaining power relations that benefit some actors to the
detriment of others, and considerations for ‘individual agency’ and civil-society in
shaping or influencing state actions (Cardoso and Faletto 1979, Blomstrom and
Hette 1984, C. J. Edie 1989, Jackson 1990, Spruyt 2002). Post-slavery and
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postcolonial states have not had a high degree of autonomy and power in an
international system dominated by former slave-holding nations or controlled by
former colonial powers.
That post-colonial states have been given qualified access to an
international system already dominated by the same powers that allowed them
restricted and qualified political independence, or against whom they fought for
their independence should not be downplayed for it is an indication of their
limitations. Consequently, the claim of state autonomy in the international arena
without first accounting for its power, position, and ability to exert its influence on
other states sidesteps the constraints faced by post-colonial states, and the roles
powerful former colonial states play in permanently structuring the power,
positions, and autonomy of their former colonies. Given that these states
resulting from anti-colonial independence struggles were crafted to sustain
national and international social, political, and economic arrangements by their
former colonizers, any analysis of state autonomy that overlooks this reality and
their positionality and power can only be considered at best incomplete.

Critics of the Nation-State Paradigm:
Both organic-dependent and organic-independent schools conceptualize a
nation-state that is not an anathema to the general will of the population or that is
dependent, even if relatively so, to the general will or dominant interests within
their territory (Carruthers 1994, Ayoob 2001, Carroll 2009). They presuppose a
state that emerges out of a degree of national consensus rather than imposed by
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either local colonial elites or colonial powers themselves. Critics of the nationstate paradigm contend that state power or weakness can be explained not just
by its autonomy from or dependency on societal and foreign actors, but also by
the availability of national resources and its dependency on other states and
national elites (Edie C. J., 1991; Ayoob, 2001; Roniger, 2004). While some states
can emerge from organic processes, their power may well depend on their role in
the international order. Others can be imposed for purposes incompatible with
the needs, norms, and will of their populations, challenging both the organic and
autonomy claims of nation-state proponents (Rodney 1974, Cardoso and Faletto
1979, Stone 1980, Vu 2010). Congruently, postcolonial states do not emerge;
they are crafted and imposed on nations that have little initial influence in
delineating their functions. Speaking to the realities faced by post-colonial states,
Migdal and Frank noted that states imposed by neocolonial elites and/or colonial
powers begin with deficiencies in power, institutional density, and legitimacy (A.
G. Frank 1970, 1966, J. S. Migdal 1988, 2001, McAllister 2002).
However, although post-colonial states may be deficient in external and
internal legitimacy and autonomy they may not necessarily be deficient in power
or ability to impose their rules, and the will of state elites and foreign powers on
the population to benefit semi-national and national elites, and foreign interests
(Skocpol, 1985; Migdal J. S., 1990; Jackson, 1990; Edie C. J., 1991). Some postcolonial states may have a high degree of legitimacy from inception having
emerged out of resistance struggles against colonial powers, but may lack the
capacity to deal with a heterogeneous population or compete against their former
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colonizers. Moreover, they can hardly be conceptualized as nation-states, given
the heterogeneity of the populations and, for some, the saliency of their religious,
cultural and ethnic demarcations or the context in which they were crafted and
their institutions imposed or inherited.
Proponents of the nation-state paradigm continue to obscure the fact that
it is not applicable in all circumstances6, and that postcolonial states demand
new theoretical formulations (C. J. Edie 1991, McAllister 2002). The primary
features of these states outside of the nation-state paradigm are that they are
dominated by foreign interests, are coercive, multiethnic, and do not enjoy
common cultural and ethnic identities7 or legitimacy, and are challenged by
salient cultural, religious, and ethnic loyalties often residing across borders. They
lack a unified sense of nationhood and do not enjoy the bond of a social contract
that preceded their existence. If a common national identity exists in these states,
it is because they are forged, imposed, or facilitated by the former colonial power,
strong supranational institutions or neocolonial elites and is often not inclusive of
the entire population. Postcolonial Latin American states often leave large
segments, if not the majority of their indigenous and black populations outside
the state, barely protected as full citizens, which often lead to direct and indirect
military challenges against the state. State stability and/or persistence, therefore,

6

See Charles Tilly’s distinction between nation-states and “national States” (Tilly 1990, 43). Also, See
(Talentino 2004, 559). Most importantly however, the notion of a state-nation crafted to balance
competing interests between powerful national cleavages seems much more useful than the nation-state
paradigms that still dominate scholarships on the state.
7
Stepan, Linz and Yadav’s State-Nation thesis offers some important contribution in this area (Stepan,
Linz and Yadav 2010).
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will be to the extent that such states become strong enough to forge and sustain
a common national identity and allegiance of its differentiated populations by
crafting their inclusion, imposing its will through coercion, as well as shifting the
power relations with colonial powers (Ayoob 2001, Talentino 2004, 558).

Toward a New Conceptual Framework:
Studies of the Haitian state are not without nationalist and neocolonialist
polemics but all of them have adopted the nation-state paradigm to advance two
dominant theses. The first portrays the Haitian state as an unresponsive and
unstable organic manifestation of pre-independence socio-political arrangements
(Dupuis 1997, P. Girard 2010, Pierre-Etienne 2011, Gros 2012). For this
perspective, the Haitian state is but a continuitity of colonial exploitative
arrangements facilitated and governed by neocolonial elites to the ultimate
benefit of former colonial powers or their foreign replacements.They advocate for
a Haitian state with the capacity to serve as an arbiter between competing
national forces and as protector of national interests against foreign
encroachment without providing a vehicle for acquiring that capacity (L.-J.
Janvier 1886, R. J. Fatton 2010). Their advocacy and conceptualization of the
state “as arbiter or paterfamilias prevailed as the dominant folk theory of the state
in Haiti fitting into a larger perspective within which one can place all
‘paternalistic’ vision of the state” (Trouillot M.-R. , 1990, p. 20). For them, the
Haitian state emerges in post-independence Haiti as an unstable arbiter of preindependence arrangements that failed to account for the needs and aspirations
of the majority of its citizens. The state, rather than managing national cleavages
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and protecting national interests against international actors serves as the
facilitator of the exploitation of its citizens (Rotberg & Clague, 1971). It overlooks
both the post-slavery constitution and policies that crafted new regimes and a
state capable of regulating not past but new socio-political and economic
arrangements between citizens and national cleavages that safeguarded their
rights and infringements on their freedom8 (Sannon P. , 1905; Ott T. , 1973).
Their understanding of the Haitian state as a weak and unresponsive
nation-state is a misreading, if not a misrepresentation of the state that was
crafted following the revolution by Northern elites under the leadership of
Toussaint Louverture. Indeed, the state as crafted by Louverture and Northern
revolutionary leaders necessitated as a goal the establishment and preservation
of the rights and freedom of former slaves by redefining and constraining the
interests and power of powerful cleavages that existed prior to the revolution as a
source of its legitimacy. The level of threat the Louverturean state faced made
responsiveness to its citizens and their commitment to its defense requirements
for its survival and persistence. By conflating Louverturean policies as advanced
by Toussaint, Dessalines, and Christophe as perpetuations of French colonial
policies and control, these scholars mischaracterized, misread, or ignored the
constitutions promulgated by these revolutionary leaders, the nature of the state
they crafted as well as the state-society relations it demanded. These scholars

8

See (L.-J. Janvier 1886) for a copy of the 1801 constitution and an analysis of its deviation from colonial
policies.
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also misjudged their efforts to enlarge and strengthen the state’s capacity to
support the newly acquired rights of their citizens and ignored the policies that
afforded those citizens the right to property and self-determination9. This was a
departure from the slave system where they had neither the right to property, nor
the ability to have their personhood, rights, and interests protected, nevermind
their capacity for wealth accumulation supported.
Contrary to the assertions of these scholars, and as will be demonstrated
in subsequent chapters, the original framers crafted policies, and administrative
and legal regimes to upend the very colonial arrangements, which
disenfranchised all new citizens of the state, for a new social contract capable of
securing both the state and its citizens (Ardouin, 1860; Casimir & Dubois, 2010).
The original Louverturean state was neither unresponsive, nor weak, nor
unstable. It wielded considerable power to the benefit of all of its citizens, as well
as managed competing national and international interests.
The second thesis, advanced by most Haitian scholars concurs with the
first –namely that the Haitian state was an unresponsive and unstable organic
manifestation of pre-independence arrangements but postulates that a new state
emerged and became consolidated during the American occupation (PierreCharles 1973, Nicholls 1979, R. J. Fatton 2002, 2010). These scholars see the
post-occupation Haitian state as an imposed inorganic and dependent

9

Coincidentally, vestiges of this system still pervade the relationship between agricultural laborers and
landowners in the North known as “De Motye” or “two halves”.
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neocolonial nation-state whose institutions and elites rely on international support
to cultivate and expand a predatory relationship with its citizens. As such, they
see the Haitian state as a neocolonial regime that mirrors the socio-political and
economic dynamics of other postcolonial states, but one more estranged from its
citizenry, more unresponsive to their needs, and less vulnerable to their
pressures (Nicolas 1927, M.-R. Trouillot 1990, Gros 1996, 1997).
For these scholars, there is continuity between the state that emerged in
post-independence and post-occupation Haiti. Both lacked legitimacy and
accountability to the citizenry and were predisposed to exploiting rather than
securing the rights of citizens. However, although scholars from the first school
saw a weak state, unable to fully capture and impose its will on the population,
the second more dominant school suggests that the occupation managed to
strengthen the state’s capacity to impose its will on the population and secure the
control and dominance of the elites (Lundahl, 2011). For these scholars, the new
post-occupation Haitian state was re-structured, and imposed by occupation
forces precisely to secure the interests of neocolonial elites and international
capital at the expense of the nation and equipped with a military to support and
protect these new arrangements and manage new state-society relations
(Plummer B. G., 1988; 1992; Robinson, 2007).
Both schools approach the study of the Haitian State as a linear
development of an anemic10 nation-state. As will be demonstrated by this study,

10

By an anaemic nation-state, I mean one with low legitimacy, poor state-civil society relations, negligible
institutional and coercive capacity, the absence of adequate resources to foster national development,
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they attributed to the Haitian state a degree of colonial institutional continuity and
pre-independence social arrangements where none existed. The notion of
Haitian State formation as the linear evolution of a nation-state, and as a weak
and dependent nation-state, does not provide us with an accurate portrayal of the
history and trajectory of Haitian state formation and crafting. Without such
accuracy, we cannot understand the contemporary challenges facing the Haitian
State, nor facilitate its re-alignment with the nation and address its lack of
legitimacy. For an accurate understanding of the Haitian State, we must study
three distinct periods of Haitian state formation and craft, each with its own
characteristics, challenges, and patterns of state-society relations: The
Louverturean state, the contested neocolonial national state, and the
consolidated post-occupation neocolonial clientelist state.

The Louverturean State as a State-nation:
Faced with racial and cultural heterogeneity, powerful groups with
divergent interests, and powerful and hostile international actors determined to
curtail its power and sovereignty, the Louverturean state was crafted and its
transition prescribed not by colonial powers as most of its post-colonial
counterparts in the Caribbean and Africa have been. Its framers were victorious

and without the necessary international autonomy needed to project international power and protect its
international interests (Jackson 1990, Gros 1996). As is obvious here, Gros (Gros 1996) who first
introduced this definition does not account for the heterogeneity within the state and the divergent and
destabilizing interests and identities it foster that the state must manage. In such a context, rather than
an anaemic nation-state, a state-nation is a more appropriate characterization.
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revolutionary leaders and former slaves jealous of preserving their freedom and
the nation’s autonomy and fearful of the threat of re-enslavement. The
Louverturean State did not emerge out of societal dynamics. It was crafted with a
unique but necessary interdependence between citizens and state elites, and
between citizens and the state itself out of the need to safeguard their freedom
and survival against internal and external threats of re-enslavement. The survival
of the state and its citizens required a priori a strong centralized state capable of
commanding adherence to its laws and institutions. Unlike its counterparts that
were ab initio dominated by elites with prevailing quasi master-slave
relationships, the Louverturean state’s survival depended on a new state-society
and politico-social relations independent and antithetical to previous
arrangements that were based on slavery and subjugation.
Dominant nation-state theorists have not considered the type of state and
social contract crafted by Haitian revolutionaries to forestall the threats of
slaveholding powers from without and those of their allies from within, and
effectively manage divergent and competing cleavages and interests within the
nation. The interdependence reflected in state crafting in pre-independence and
immediate post-independence Haiti between revolutionary elites and former
slaves, and the state’s ability to manage the competing and divergent interests of
foreign nations, French colonials, Mulatto elites and former slaves were
indispensable to securing the freedom of its citizens. Elite state crafters,
revolutionary leaders, and former slaves alike were dependent on the existence
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and survival of the state to maintain their newly acquired freedom and secure
their lives.
The Louverturean state as it was crafted in post-slavery Haiti required a
more tightly structured and defended social contract that would commit its
citizens not only to lend the state legitimacy but also to protect it against internal
and external threats and assist it in maintaining a balance between salient and
powerful competing interests groups. Thus, Toussaint’s attempt to arm all
citizens for national defense was an indication of that interdependence. Crafting
a culturally heterogeneous former slave society into a cohesive state
necessitated particular arrangements that set Haitian state crafting and formation
apart from its counterparts. As some scholars suggest, the existence within a
society of significant political, cultural, linguistic, and in the case of Haiti, racial,
economic, and ethnic identities and interests within the national territory capable
of upsetting its stability, necessitated a state carefully crafted to secure, protect,
and balance the interests of each group and safeguard and augment the capacity
and power of the state itself11 (Stepan, Linz, & Yadav, 2010, p. 52). The
Louverturean State imposed a social contract that bound all citizens to each
other and itself, centering the state as arbiter and enforcer.
General Toussaint Louverture, his constitutional framers, and his state
crafters could not ignore the need to craft a state tailored to address the pre-

11

Rather than a nation-state, the Louverturean State had all the trappings and characteristics of a statenation (Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2010, 50-2).
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national, national, and international realities. Their lives and those of the new
citizenry depended on their ability to craft a state that could meet the internal
challenges produced by powerful competing interests and identities, as well as a
global environment dominated by slave-holding powers determined to re-assert
their control and re-impose slavery. The Louverturean state was crafted to
secure the rights of its citizens and to be powerful enough to deter national and
international challenges to its rule. Its ability to manage and balance competing
claims and maintain stability fostered national prosperity and enhanced its
legitimacy and capacity. The Louverturean state12, faced ab initio multiple
dominant groups with divergent identities and interests, and a polarized
environment – one that requires, a priori, a strong state to allay conflicts and
maintain stability. It did not emerge from pre-existing bargains between
competing groups or from pre-independence arrangements but was intentionally
crafted to meet the pronounced needs for stability, security, conflict reduction,
and legitimacy (P. Sannon 1905, James 1963, T. Ott 1973). It implemented
policies that recognized, respected, and protected “multiple but complementary
socio-cultural identities” and competing ethnic-based interests, and cleavages.
Louverturean state crafters had to develop institutional mechanisms and policies

12

The Louverturean State had all the characteristics of a State-nation. By State-nation, I mean a state
where the polis have attachments to more than one cultural tradition within the existing boundaries;
where the heterogeneity of the nation may involve different cleavages, institutional and cultural
affiliations, which may or may not preclude identification with a common state. This is in line with Tilly’s
national states and Migdal’s State in society concepts (Tilly 1990, J. S. Migdal 2001). According to Stepan,
Linz, and Yadav, “if a polity has significant and politically salient cultural or linguistic diversity, then its
leaders need to think about, craft, and normatively legitimate a type of polity with the characteristics of a
state-nation” (Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2010, 52).
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to accommodate and manage competing and/or conflicting claims without
discrimination (Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2010, 52-3). As such, it was crafted to
support and secure new social arrangements, and it was on this basis its
legitimacy rested.
The Louverturean state itself, as a threat to an international order
dominated by slave-owning nations, and powerful neocolonial elites within its
territory who had vested interest in that order, required careful considerations to
decrease its internal and external vulnerability. Its entry into the international
system was not structured by powerful states, as its contemporary counterparts
have been (Ayoob 2001, Rapley 2004, Roniger 2004, Silicon Africa 2016). Its
forceful entrance into the international order compelled powerful states to
negotiate with it as equals for concessions even while they collaborated with
each other to curtail its power and influence. Thus, that Britain and the United
States constrained the circulation of the Haitian navy to reduce the threat the
Haitian state posed to the slave-based commercial ventures reflects the
constraints the Louverturean state faced externally and the impact of that
constraint on national development and international projection of state power
(Ardouin, 1860; James, 1963). That the Louverturean state and its leaders
compelled powerful nations to compete against each other for its market and
engage in bilateral negotiations and treaty arrangements indicates that it had a
degree of autonomy and international recognition (R. W. Logan 1941, Leyburn
1966, T. Ott 1973). The very fact that the American government felt compelled to
support Louverturean military efforts in the South aimed at consolidating the
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nation’s control over its territory demonstrates that the Louverturean state, having
forced its way into the international system had the ability to manage and protect
its own interests through strategic alliances.
The fact that Latin American elites sought and acquired its military and
financial support to secure their own independence is a clear indication of the
recognized and feared role the state played in international affairs in
counterbalancing the power of powerful slave-holding nations. Moreover, the
autonomy of Haiti’s post-slavery state and its ability to serve as the sole arbiter
between powerful national constituents, and to do so without arbitrarily
jeopardizing the interests of any, was the source of its legitimacy and survival
nationally. The Louverturean state experienced some constraints on the
international sphere and made its presence felt within it while operating with
autonomy in its national sphere. It was able, because of its internal strength, to
constrain powerful states, prevent their involvement within its territory, and
undermine or threaten their supremacy in their own colonies. Its power
compelled both the United State and Great Britain to negotiate non-interference
treaties with Toussaint (James, 1963; Logan R. W., 1941). For Louverturean
state crafters, the Haitian state’s role in securing the rights of former slaves,
planters, Mulatto elites, stave off the threats of slave-holding powers and
safeguard its own prosperity, institutional capacity, coercive power, and popular
legitimacy was central to their project of devising adequate sustaining regimes.
State formation faced a priori a complex balancing act and a particular need for
autonomy and the capacity to project its power to compel adherence to the new
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post-slavery social contract. Even when constrained by an international system
dominated by slaveholding nations, Louverturean state crafters devised
strategies that limited those constraints and undercut their influence and impact
on the nation.
The Louverturean model of state crafting is the developmental model for
contemporary Haiti and offers the solutions necessary to meet the expectations
and demands of its citizens. It contains the framework to establish a legitimate
democratic state that is responsive to the needs and interests of all cleavages.
By overlooking Louverturean statecraft, Haitian scholars undermine their ability to
offer a comprehensive analysis of the Haitian state, its trajectory, and thus the
context for national political developments. They also limit their ability to provide
the nation with solutions capable of addressing its challenges. A historical
background of the social, political, and economic developments that led to the
evolution of that state form will be provided in Chapter II.
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Chapter II
SLAVERY, REVOLUTION AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE HAITIAN STATE
This chapter provides the historical context for the emergence of the
Louverturean state after the end of slavery. Although various scholars have
written on this formative period (1791-1843) in Haitian history and political
development, a study of state formation and Louverturean statecraft has
remained elusive and in need of investigation13. The chapter seeks to provide
original insights into Haitian statecrafting during this momentous formative period
in the country’s history. It is widely acknowledged that Toussaint Louverture led
a revolution that brought slavery to an end in Haiti. What has not been
investigated, and would be useful for comparative political enquiry, is that the
post-colonial state that emerged after slavery under his leadership was a
constitutionally and institutionally dense state crafted to both constrain and
preserve the rights and interests of all segments of the population and neutralize

13

For further insight, see the works of Beaubrun Ardouin for a detailed history of the Louverturean period
as a scholar of that period and political actor albeit tainted by racial polemics. Influenced by the works of
neocolonial elites such as Ardouin and Madiou, Jean Casimir and Laurent Dubois provide broader
historical context while advancing the anti-Louverturean polemics that dominate the neocolonial
historical genre and contemporary studies of Haiti (Nicholls 1974). Moreau de Saint-Mery, Thomas
Madiou, Alexandre Bonneau, CLR James, and Pauleus Sannon offer important analysis of the societal
stratifications that gave rise to the revolution, and the persistent competition for power that pitted
national cleavages against each other and against the state. Although consistent in their analyses, Pauleus
and James’ work must be read as the treatise of Louverturean supporters. However, while their
understanding of the political dynamics is clear, their take on state formation and crafting is elusive.
Antenor Firmin, J.B. G Wallez, Thomas Ott, John Baur, Robert Louis Stein, and David Nicholls’ analyses are
useful for understanding the trajectory of the state, its early successes, and the political dynamics that
accounted for its instability. Jean Nicola Leger, Dantes Bellegarde, George Covington, Francois Dalencour,
Robert Louis Stein, offer detailed accounts of the internal dynamics and historical developments while
Michel-Rolph Trouillot provides us with a succinct albeit incomplete analysis of the state.
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all cleavages. This Louverturean state differed significantly from the post-colonial
state that emerged in many of the newly independent countries in Africa, Asia,
Latin America and the Caribbean (Rodney 1974, Dookhan 1975, Callaghy,
Thomas M. and Ravenhill, John 1993, Ayoob 2001, Bogues 2002). Ethnic and
class conflicts and arbitrary infringement on the rights of citizens characterized
the political evolution of many of those new post-colonial states. Moreover, they
were ab inito hemmed into an international system through debt and restricted
sovereignty through international institutional arrangements, which constrained
their potential for stability and development. Haiti differed from most of these
states in its divergent evolution under a Louverturean social contract and its
economic and political independence from the international system. To what
does Haiti owe this political and economic independence and divergent
evolution? How did this divergence inform the development and prosperity of that
state and its citizens? How did it sustain its legitimacy and power? The chapter
will elucidate the complex state-society relationships that emerged as a
significant starting point for understanding Haiti’s post-colonial political and state
trajectory.

The Colonial System and the Roots of National Conflict and State Formation:
At the eve of the Haitian Revolution, Haiti had within its midst people
whose identities and interests made them implacable enemies that would at first
threaten the birth of the Republic, and later characterized the travails of its
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state14. Conflicts between the Royalists and the Republicans that brought the
King and Queen of France to the guillotine and resulted in the French Revolution
and the “terror”, played out in Saint Domingue with equal ferocity. Royalists and
Republicans, ‘Les Grands Blancs’ and ‘Les Petits Blancs’, all fought over the
spoils of slavery. ‘Les Blancs’ against Mulattoes and Free Blacks, engaged in a
fight to the death for rights, privileges, and control over slaves and wealth.
Mulattoes themselves, divided into 128 categories, each a marker or gradation of
privileges or deprivations that elicited hatred amongst cousins and brothers, also
engaged in a struggle against whites over both political and social rights, as well
as for control over slaves and wealth (Moreau de Saint-Mery 1797-1798, James
1963, 38). Far below Whites and Mulattoes, the black slaves, despised but
wanted and fought over by both, because of the wealth and privileges their
subjugation provided, determined to be free, engaged in fierce resistance against
all who vie to subjugate, exploit, and dehumanize them ad infinitum. Blacks stood
firm against their half-brethren, who for status alone, never mind racial and
economic interests, were willing to claim their limbs and even lives, while
themselves clamoring for equal rights and social status from whites. Nowhere
were the social, racial, and ethnic animosity and economic interests so intense
and clear, and the ruthless greed-induced bloodshed so high. The celebrated
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For analyses of the conflicts within the society of Saint Domingue, see Ardouin (1843); James (1963);
Otto (1979); Geggus and Fiering (2009); and Dubois (2004).
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Caribbean historian C.L.R James wrote, that notwithstanding the infighting
between whites,
[T]he advantages of being white were so obvious that
race prejudice against Negroes permeated the minds of
the Mulattoes who so bitterly resented the same thing
from the whites. Black slaves and Mulattoes hated each
other. Even while in words and, by their success in life,
in many of their actions, Mulattoes demonstrated the
falseness of the white claim to inherent superiority, yet
the man of color who was nearly white despised the man
of color who was only a quarter white, and so on through
all the shades. The free blacks, comparatively speaking,
were not many, and so despised was the black skin that
even a Mulatto slave felt himself superior to the free
black man (James 1963, 43).

Added to these dynamics were regional manifestations and population
demographics that intensified racial competitions. In the North, whites and
Mulattoes formed alliances against the Black majority who strove for their
freedom. In the West, where plantations were few, poor whites and Mulattoes
who were seeking to extend their power and control over blacks allied against the
few rich white landowners while Southern whites and Mulattoes formed alliances
to retain control over blacks. Thus, blacks stood alone, cornered on all fronts,
already the disposable majority, engaged in a war of survival. By the time slavery
was abolished black generals determined to secure freedom dominated the
North, collaborated with, and armed maroon colonies in the other regions. The
West and South, led by Mulatto generals, in alliance with whites were determined
to maintain their control and interests. Such was the social context within which
the Haitian state emerged; regionally, ideologically, economically, and racially
divided, led by regional generals with competing interests and identities. The
state was thus predetermined to experience, manage, and constrain violent
internal competition for power, leadership, and wealth (Ardouin 1853). The
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Haitian state that would emerge thus faced a global slave system opposed to its
existence, nationalists determined to maintain its independence and protect its
sovereignty, and neo-colonialists keen on preserving their wealth, orientation
toward France, and the power they had accumulated through slavery, in support
of black subjugation but not necessarily slavery.
Revolutionary nationalist and neocolonialist leaders recognized the
challenge and feared that lack of cohesion could lead to the reinstitution of
slavery (Madiou 1847, v1-2, Ardouin 1848, v1-2). They engaged in a state
crafting project that eventually led to the declaration of independence and
continued until the American occupation. Even in the midst of internal divisions,
they seldom disagreed that securing the independence and liberty of post-slavery
Saint Domingue required crafting a strong and unified state capable of exercising
sovereignty over its territory and maintaining national cohesion. They
endeavored to create a state with the capacity to protect itself and its citizens
against regional secessionist movements, racial separatism, and imposition by
foreign powers in an international system dominated by slave-owning nations
who looked askance at the existence of a free Black Republic (James 1963, L.
Dubois 2004). The revolutionary leaders’ differences lay in their preindependence positions, the conception of the state they sought to craft, its
orientation, and their interests and goals in managing the rights and divergent
interests of the different identity groups (Nesbitt 2008). For almost one hundred
years following independence, Mulatto and black leaders would struggle to craft
a state consistent with their conceptions, goals, and interests. The majority of
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Northern Black Nationalist leaders attempted to craft a state responsive to the
majority of its citizens with the capacity and power to secure black liberty. They
endeavored to maintain a balance between the interests of the nation and those
of all citizens, while the majority of Mulatto neocolonial leaders sought to craft a
state to preserve their interests and maintain their dominance. The struggle
between the two groups over the state and the failure of both groups to
consolidate their power and control over it led to persistent national instability and
undermined national development, cohesion and the consolidation of the state
itself. This failure of both Western and Southern neocolonialists and Northern
nationalists to consolidate and stabilize the Haitian state ultimately facilitated the
American invasion of 1915, and the subsequent 19 years of physical occupation
and 34 years of political and institutional control.
Northern Haitian revolutionaries were not interested in ‘the inalienable
rights’ stipulated by the American slave-owners that relegated blacks to 3/5
human beings, and native Americans to invisibility on reservations, nor were they
interested in ‘les Droits de l’homme’ claimed by the French Bourgeoisie, that
ultimately limited those rights to white male citizens (James 1963, T. O. Ott 1973,
Hunt 1996, Nesbitt 2008). The Philosopher Nick Nesbit notes that Haitian
Revolutionaries “brought to fruition the unfulfilled promise of the French
Revolution to found a state in which positive rights applied equally to all citizens,
without exception” (Nesbitt 2008, 10). They challenged the still prevailing but
bankrupt notion of freedom centered on leaving the landed and moneyed elites
unhindered “to enjoy their property, human or otherwise” (Nesbitt 2008, 10). Yet,
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the paradox between unfettered freedom and institutionalized rights has not often
proven to be as easily reconcilable as Nesbit suggests.
Early leaders of the Louverturean state faced ab initio a contradiction; the
needs for a strong state in an agrarian society that depended on large plantations
and slavery, and the abolition of slavery and need for the labor of former slaves
as the basis for state development, expansion, and consolidation. As C.L.R.
James observes,
[T]his was almost an insuperable task in a disorganized
society depending on the labor of men just out of slavery
and surrounded on every side by the rabid greed and
violence of French, Spaniards, and British (James 1963,
155-6).

Faced with a hostile international system where state building and national
expansion projects were contingent on slavery and black subjugation, they
understood therefore that freedom in Haiti, a nation of freed slaves, was not
sustainable without the means to defend it (Charmant 1905, P. H. Sannon 19201933). To defend their freedom, they had to rely on an economic system that
could provide them with the necessary resources to craft, enhance, and sustain a
strong state (L. J. Janvier 1886). Black Northern revolutionary leaders saw the
crafting of a powerful state as the only means to protect not just the nation, but
also their own personhoods, and later to defend their “race”15 (Cole 1967, Griggs
and Prator 1968). From independence until the American Occupation, they would
grapple with this challenge and struggle against those in their midst who sought

15

See letter from King Henry Christophe to Thomas Clarkson in the Clarkson papers, British
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to undermine their revolution, and later following its success, to usurp their
project of state crafting for their own personal and ethnic gains. The history of
Haiti then is a history of competition between two “ethnic” factions with different
interests, ideologies, and different conceptions of the state and its relationship to
its citizens. Stable governance in Haiti required crafting a state to balance the
interests of these dominant ethnic factions for the benefit of the nation. This is a
history of the failure of state crafting.

Pre-Independence: Northern Nationalists, and the Crafting of the Louverturean
Haitian State:
There are no disagreements amongst serious scholars that Toussaint
Louverture is the first Haitian leader to assert the need for Haitian independence
and the formation of a strong state (Rulx 1945). Few scholars see him, however,
as the father of the Haitian state. Even fewer discuss his period of dominance
within the context of Haitian state formation and crafting. Yet, one cannot
understand the history of the Haitian state without first taking account of its
beginning.

Property and Production:
Louverture’ s quest to free his brethren from slavery and establish a state
dedicated to and capable of protecting against their re-enslavement positions him
as the undisputed leader of the black revolution in Saint Domingue, and founder
of the Haitian state. From his alliance with the Spanish Crown to his return in the
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French ranks, from his defeat of the British to his treaties with them, from his
unification of the island and consolidation of power to his project of state crafting,
Toussaint sought to identify the best vehicle to secure black liberty, national
independence, and the establishment of a strong Haitian state (P. H. Sannon
1920-1933, Rayford 1941).
He saw prosperity as the primary vehicle to crafting a state strong enough
to support and withstand the internal and external forces, which depended on
black subjugation for wealth accumulation, and sought the power to curtail black
rights in order to preserve and maintain their economic gains. For Toussaint,
economic growth and black liberty were not incompatible. His legitimacy and the
legitimacy of the state he sought to craft rested on the ability to secure both
liberty and prosperity, and both depended on maintaining the large plantation
system, the very structure on which slavery depended. Thus from the beginning,
Toussaint sought to create a social contract that balanced the needs of the
emergent state against those of its citizens.
To achieve his goals, he promulgated the Agrarian Laws to govern the
plantation system that constrained both laborers and plantation owners and
reestablished the centrality of Saint Domingue in Western commerce (T. O. Ott
1973, L. Dubois 2004). Laborers were compelled to work on plantations that
hitherto had enslaved them, with one fourth of the revenue allocated for their
compensation, another fourth as taxes to the state, and the remaining half to the
landowners (Ardouin 1848, Korngold 1965, Lacroix 1880). He established laws
governing and constraining landowners to respect the rights of people over
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whom months prior they held the power of life and death as slaves16 (P. H.
Sannon 1920-1933, Madiou 1847, James 1963). “This arrangement” argues

16

Some scholars have argued that Toussaint was not the first to institute these laws. Indeed the
proclamation of August 21, 1793 by Commissioner Polverel ironically offered Northern slaves who had
already liberated themselves their freedom if they went back to vacant, destroyed, or their former
plantations to cultivate them. This proclamation also freed slaves who had already liberated themselves in
the Eastern part of the Island on the condition that they cultivate vacant land. The French had not yet
acquired control of the Eastern part of the Island then under the Spanish Crown. The proclamation also
did two things worth nothing here to explain the distinction and future conflicts between the North and
the Western and Southern region. It kept slavery intact in the west and the South still controlled by
Mulattoes and Whites and gave Mulattoes officers, who had fought against the slave uprising, control
over some of the vacant plantations in the western and Southern region (Ardouin 1853, 235-7).
Additionally, Polverel’s proclamation applied only to those slaves who had revolted and did not apply to
northern Black and Mulatto slaves who had not revolted nor did it grant free Mulattoes on the Island
equal rights with whites for which they had allied with Whites to suppress the slave revolt. Clearly,
Polverel was in no position to give freedom to men who had already freed themselves or to give them
lands on the eastern side of the island over which he had no control, but his extension of citizenship to
them cannot be considered trivial. However, this rather dubious proclamation was important enough to
raise the ire of the propertied and non-propertied Mulattoes in the North and the South, who wanted an
unconditional return to the plantation system, equal rights with whites, and the preservation of slavery.
Consequently, the other French Commissioner, Felicite Leger Sonthonax assaulted by a Mulatto and white
mob in the North, only survived due to the intervention of Toussaint and his Black generals. Black
Freedom was thus secured in the North, but remained cursory in the South even after the general
emancipation (T. O. Ott 1973). This pre-independence regional dynamic and divergence between the
overwhelming black masses and landowning Mulatto and Black interests would play themselves out
throughout Haiti’s history. Upon his release, Commissioner Sonthonax in a second proclamation in August
29, 1793 now freed all the slaves in the North but to maintain the plantation system, appease plantation
owners, and create order in the colony, stipulated a series of labor regulations that were to govern
economic relations mirrored Toussaint’s plantation laws. Articles 2, 10, 11, 12, 19 &26. (Ardouin, Etude
sur L'Histoire D' Haiti 1853, 245-7).
Art. 11 – The cultivators will contract with their former plantation for one year during which, they will not
be able to change plantation without permission from the local magistrate.
Art. 12 - Revenue for each plantation is to be divided in thirds: 1/3 for the plantation owner, 1/3 for
expenses and the other to be paid to the laborers.
Art. 33 – Those not associated with a plantation or other work will be arrested and jailed.
Neither commissioner was able to enforce any of these proclamations. However, Sonthonax managed to
allay Mulatto anger and earn the support of the powerful black revolutionaries and military officers in the
North. According to both Ott and Lacerte, Polverel recognized the inadequacy of Sonthonax’s
proclamation, and Toussaint understood that Sonthonax’ unwillingness to coerce the laborers back to the
plantation weakened its attempt to reenergize production (T. O. Ott 1973, 130, Lacerte 1978, 451).
Toussaint, on the other hand had not just the means, but also the willingness to enforce his agrarian rules
for he saw in its success the means to safeguard liberty (L'ouverture 1803).
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Lacerte, “required balancing two opposite social interests without doing injury to
either” (Lacerte 1978, 453). Not all blacks accepted the new agrarian regulations,
nor did all the Mulatto and white landowners enjoy the curtailment of their power
over their former slaves, but all had to accept the new basis of the relationship as
necessary to preserve their interests under the Louverturean state (P. H. Sannon
1920-1933, Korngold 1965). Toussaint departed from the colonial system by
binding both former masters and slaves to the state with rights and
responsibilities that neither could violate at their whims, thereby crafting a
regulatory role for the state in this new system of employment and taxation. He
expanded the state’s domain by confiscating abandoned plantations and through
nationalization, thereby making the state the largest landowner in Saint
Domingue. By implementing his system of ‘fermage’17, Toussaint increased the
state’s sources of revenue, resources, and power. According to Cole,
[T]he system of fermage, which Toussaint instituted, was
destined to save the economic life of the colony and to
form the basis of the many codes rurales, which
succeeded it. The abandoned plantations were taken
over by the government and let out to rent, usually to
senior army officers and public officials. The tenants
were required to distribute one quarter of his gross
revenue among the workers on the plantation and to
provide lodging and nursing services. The governments
undertook to enforce a code of work under which the
field hands were required to labor for a set number of
hours each week and were not allowed to quit their
employment without permission (Cole 1967, 51).

James notes,

17

The fermage was a Land lease program that shared the proceeds equally with the state.
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[T]he experiment was a great success and plantations
were farmed out by the government on this new
principle. Toussaint encouraged his generals and other
notabilities to adopt this system by which everybody,
including the state, profited (James 1963, 186, T. O. Ott
1973).

Through its system of fermage, revenue from taxation on both buyers and sellers
at the custom houses, as well as its ability to enforce the labor codes and secure
the rights of laborers, the Louverturean state became the arbiter of interests and
the preserver of the social contract in Saint Domingue. The new social contract
protected the rights and equality of all citizens while constraining their ability to
infringe on each others’. It eliminated the differential racial treatment that
dominated colonial Saint Domingue and protected its black citizens against reenslavement. With a new state-centered social contract backed by a state whose
power and autonomy rested on the prosperity of its plantation system, the
Louverturean state became the manager of both conflicts and interests.
Toussaint protected even those who conspired against the new state in order to
preserve stability and maintain prosperity (James 1963, T. O. Ott 1973). He
urged the new citizens to “work together for the prosperity of Saint Domingue by
the restoration of agriculture, which alone can support a state and assure public
wellbeing” (James 1963, 205). The Louverturean state maintained its legitimacy
and the allegiance of its citizens because it had the power to constrain, preserve,
and protect their interests. More importantly, because of its prosperity,
institutional and military expansion, it had the capacity and power to compel
allegiance (Leger 1907).

49

Toussaint’s Agrarian Laws or Rural Codes18 charged his generals, and
later a special gendarmerie, with the responsibility of enforcing those laws. These
Agrarian Laws were to provide revenues for the emerging state and its
revolutionary army, by rebuilding the plantation system, and reinvigorating
production and commerce, disrupted during six years of war (Ardouin 1848).
Some scholars like Beaubrun Ardouin and Laurent Dubois have maintained that
far from seeking independence, Toussaint simply wanted a level of autonomy
from France (Ardouin 1848, L. Dubois 2004). Indeed, such is the dominant thesis
in analyzing Toussaint’s actions in St. Domingue. These scholars are either
unaware or purposefully overlooked Toussaint’s request that the United States
recognize Saint Domingue’s independence, his independent treaties with both
the United States and Britain in violation of France’s order, and his eclipsing of
France’s representation on the island. Toussaint’s Saint Domingue was already
interacting with America and the British as an independent state, sending Joseph
Brunel as his representative in America while receiving Edward Stevens as the
American Consul19. More importantly, Alexander Hamilton’s response to Timothy
Pickering suggesting the type of government for an independent Saint Domingue
at the behest of the American consul is a clear indication that American policy-
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See (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, T. O. Ott 1973, 130-134)

19

“Avoiding the Maelstrom of Saint-Domingue, 1 May–1 June 1801 (Editorial Note),” Founders Online,
National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/02-01-02-0181, ver. 2013-08-02).
Source: The Papers of James Madison, Secretary of State Series, vol. 1, 4 March–31 July 1801, ed. Robert J.
Brugger, Robert A. Rutland, Robert Rhodes Crout, Jeanne K. Sisson, and Dru Dowdy. Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 1986, pp. 127–129.
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makers at the highest level were aware of Toussaint’s goal to declare the
independence of Saint Domingue20. So determined was Toussaint to expand the
state, and so confident was he in the ability of the Louverturean state to manage
divergent interests that he encouraged French landowners to return to Saint
Domingue while signing independent treaties with both England and the United
States, and endeavoring to return the plantations to its former glory (R. W. Logan
1941, James 1963, L. Dubois 2004). At a time when France was at war with both
America and Great Britain, he disregarded the colonial pact that required French
commercial monopoly and expanded commerce with France’s enemies. The
inability of France to impose its will on Saint Domingue because of its wars in
Europe and the dominance of the British fleet in the Caribbean Sea, allowed
Toussaint the time and space to sideline the French envoys, remnants of French
power on the island, and consolidate his control over the territory, governance,
and policies of Saint Domingue. His goal was to create a militarily and
commercially powerful independent state, capable of resisting French
encroachment and the reassertion of French control and slavery. The assertion
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See Pickering to King, Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, III, 6. and "Letters of Toussaint
Louverture and Edward Stevens, 1798-1800," Franklin J. Jameson, Editor, Amerioan Historical Review.
1910, XVI, 70.
This is particularly important because at a time of an undeclared maritime war with France, Hamilton
advised caution to Toussaint’s ouvertures and the establishment of trades in Saint Domingue, sending
American representatives to secure relations with Saint Domingue, thus treating it as an independent
entity and Tousaint as it undisputed leader. The context cannot be ignored, while the fear of Toussaint’s
revolutionary influence led to containment measures, an independent and militarily strong Saint
Domingue was needed to undermine French regional power and ability to wage war using black troops.
Thus, the importance of the response of Alexander Hamilton, former Secretary of the Treasury’s and
advisor to the President, to his friend and Colleague, Secretary of State Timothy Pickering cannot be
overlooked.
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that he was not interested in independence proves false by the realities of the
existence of Saint Domingue as an independent entity by fiat while Toussaint
expanded its military capacity and reestablished its commercial linkages with
France’s rivals.
As Toussaint noted, “in a well-ordered state, idleness is the source of all
disorders” and as ‘all work deserves a salary, each salary demands work” ( (L.
Dubois 2004, 248-9). His goal was not to rebuild the plantation system for its
sake but to create a work for pay system as opposed to the slave system against
which he had fought. He sought to organize a stable system of government and
acquire revenues through taxation and land lease to enhance the capacity of the
Louverturean state and its institutions and create a well-armed military to defend
it against France and enemies from within and without (Madiou 1847, James
1963). Franklin notes that Toussaint “seems to have possessed a very correct
idea of the true source from whence national wealth was obtained, and he left no
measures untried that would in the least promote its increase” (Franklin 1828,
118). Out of the ashes of the six-year war, he succeeded in restoring Saint
Domingue’s prosperity and importance in international commerce. In less than a
year under his leadership, exports rose from a mere $700,000 to $3,000,000 and
doubled from 1800 to 1801 making Saint Domingue the most desirable
destination for merchants (T. O. Ott 1973, 137). This successful attempt to
secure Saint Domingue’s role in the international commerce linked the interests
of key international actors to the autonomy and survival of the Haitian state. By
all account, Toussaint’s agricultural policies were working, landowners who had
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deserted their properties returned to work their lands, soldiers rented land to
cultivate, and international commerce expanded, independent of France (Rayford
1941, L. Dubois 2004). Lacerte notes,
[F]rom an economic point of view, the new policy was a
success. Sugar exports rose from a low of 1,750,387
pounds in 1795 to a high of 18,535,112 pounds in 1801.
Coffee exports also increased in the same time period
from 2,228,270 pounds to 43, 420,270 pounds (Lacerte
1978, 453).

Independent Saint Domingue under Toussaint’s Leadership re-imposed itself as
the envy of the New World by being the most prosperous state and an important
center of commerce21. In the context of securing Saint Domingue’s role in
international commerce, and the revenue necessary for state defense and
expansion, his project of crafting a strong state was well underway (Montague
1940, T. O. Ott 1973).

International Relations and Commerce:
The assertion of St Domingue’s autonomy was paramount to the
Louverturean statecraft and claiming its sovereignty from France was already a
fait accompli. As we demonstrate below, developing a state capable of
maintaining this sovereignty and defend it was Toussaint’s ultimate goal.

21

Some have erroneously argued that Toussaint never intended to declare independence. I concur with
(P. Sannon 1905) and (R. W. Logan 1941), that he wanted to first build a strong state before declaring
independence. The peace treaty of Amiens signed between Britain and France impeded his plan.
Moreover, his delay in declaring independence suggests that he wanted a strong state to precede such
declaration, as he understood it would result in armed conflicts.
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Between 1795 and 1799, Toussaint designed a strategy to assert the autonomy
of the Louverturean state and prepare its full independence from France. To do
so, he undermined the oversight of the French commissioners forcing them out of
Saint Domingue22 (Schoelcher 1882). This strategy of eliminating French power
of oversight in Saint Domingue made him the leader of Saint Domingue by fiat.
France’s attempt to reassert its colonial control by sending the new
commissioner, Theodore Hedouville, failed because of the reliance of the
population on Louverturean defensive forces (Ardouin 1853). Toussaint’s defeat
of the invading British forces and his consolidation of state power in the North
and West accelerated his quest for autonomy. His dominance on the battlefield at
a time when French forces were at war in Europe and his territorial consolidation
allowed him to act independently of France and assert the autonomy of Saint
Domingue. His defeat of the British, along with the French Commissioners’
impotence in the face of Toussaint’s army and power compelled the British to
sign an independent treaty with Toussaint to avoid a military incursion into their
own territory (Coradin 1987, G. Corvington 2001). It was Toussaint and his
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Once nominated Governor General, Toussaint eliminated French oversight in saint Domingue by naming
Sonthonax, Representative of Saint Domingue in France. When Sonthonax refused to leave, he compelled
him by marching his army to the outskirt of le Cap where Sonthonax resided and sent him a letter
requesting that he travel to France to represent the colony. (See Ardouin, 1853, 564 Vol. 3 for a copy of
the letter). The latter had to leave but while on a ship to France, sent a letter to Rigaud in the South asking
him to assert control over his territory. Having been demoted and under arrest from France which
Toussaint had arranged, he did not have the power to command Rigaud and so acknowledged. Scholars
have suggested that the letter was a last ditch attempt by Sonthonax to continue the regional animosity
to maintain divisions that would benefit France. Sonthonax’s letter is found in its entirety in (Ardouin,
Etudes sur L'Histoire d'Haiti 1848). Rigaud in his simplicity and allegiance to France would indeed refuse to
accept Toussaint’s Leadership. Toussaint’s action can be understood by France rejection of his demand to
eliminate the French commissioner position a few months prior (James 1963, 193, T. O. Ott 1973, 91)
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representatives who presided over the negotiations, while France and its
representatives were left on the sidelines. Signing a formal reciprocity treaty23
with General Maitland thus became the Louverturean state’s first international
assertion of its autonomy.
The success of Toussaint’s calculated assertion of Saint Domingue’s
sovereignty, British fear of Louverturean military capacity, and France’s reliance
on the Louverturean forces to offset British power in the Caribbean facilitated his
march toward independence (Ardouin 1848, v2-3, Saint Remy 1850). Toussaint’s
judicious manipulation of British fear that Jamaica, which had already
experienced maroon uprisings and insurgencies, and the establishment of
independent maroon communities would quickly fall to attack from his forces
compelled Britain through general Maitland to negotiate directly with him instead
of France’s representative and to send an agent to Saint Domingue for further
protection24 (Leger 1907, 373). Toussaint used that fear to entice the British into
a treaty, the convention of August 31, 1798 that compelled them to give
protections to American merchants, their commercial competitor and sought to
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Reference to the treaty abounds, see EDWARD STEVENS TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL MAITLAND. (Copy.)
Gonaives, May 23rd. I799. in “Letters of Toussaint Louverture and of Edward Stevens,” 1798-1800, The
American Historical Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Oct., 1910), pp. 64-101. Oxford University Press
24
Maitland’s letter to Lt. Colonel Grant in June 1799 discussing his treaty with Toussaint required that the
agent ensure that no expeditions were being prepared and that every negotiation should be directly with
Toussaint. Moreover, the stipulation in the treaty that French vessels will no longer be welcomed in
Haitian ports demonstrates Toussaint intention to circumvent France’s power on St. Domingue. It is as
clear that Britain was hoping to manipulate Toussaint for their own interests, as it was that they
understood Toussaint’s intention to declare the Island independent. Moreover, an important section of
treaty was the commitment by Toussaint not to use his forces to invade Jamaica See full letter in (Leger
1907, 373-82).
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prevent military interference from France by banning French ships from Haitian
ports25. Banning the former colonial power from participating in the commerce of
its former colony is indeed an unequivocal assertion of independence. By
bypassing Hedouville, the French Commissioner, Toussaint crafted an
independent international policy and a political and economic course distinct from
France’s economic and political interests26 (Korngold 1965, IX, T. O. Ott 1973,
106). By so doing, he provided Saint Domingue a level of commercial and
political independence, securing its role in the international arena. Thus, he
established the basis of its international sovereignty: recognition through
commerce, diplomacy, and military strength. Saint Domingue became
independent by fiat. More importantly, by signing a commercial and military
treaty, he enhanced his power by consolidating control over and expanding
existing colonial institutions. The Louverturean state’s control over the
international relations of Saint Domingue meant securing supremacy over core
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For stipulations of the convention, see “To George Washington from Timothy Pickering, 11 March
1799,” Founders Online, National Archives, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/06-0302-0312. [Original source: The Papers of George Washington, Retirement Series, vol. 3, 16 September
1798 – 19 April 1799, ed. W. W. Abbot and Edward G. Lengel. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia,
1999, pp. 413–415.]
According to Ardouin (1853), Logan (1969), and Korngold (1965), fearing war with France and confiscation
of their merchant ships, the United States needed cover and protection from the British to continue their
lucrative trade with Saint Domingue. Toussaint treaty and his denial of access to France’s naval vessels
addressed the American concern. It is clear that the whole affair was to increase commercial competition
and access to both American and British military resources.
26

See Dispatches from US Consul Edward Stevens from Cap-Haitien to Secretary of State Timothy
Pickering, Sept. 30, 1799. In it, Stevens informed Pickering of France’s goal to attack Jamaica. France had
also long prohibited commerce with other nations in order to maintain monopoly over St. Domingue’s
lucrative commerce. The treaty eliminated that monopoly.
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colonial institutions designed to facilitate and implement those relations and
reorient them outside of France's sphere of influence.
His treaty provided diplomatic cover for the United States by placing their
ships under British protection to secure commerce with the Americans. However,
the most important aspect of this arrangement, British acquiescence to economic
competition, meant that the latter did not enjoy the kind of leverage in their
negotiations with Toussaint to demand Commercial monopoly. The treaty thus
was in Toussaint’s advantage for it allowed him to assert Saint Domingue’s
autonomy and to force the British and Americans to compete with each other for
Saint Domingue’s commerce thereby increasing the price of Saint Domingue’s
goods and state revenues27 (Ardouin 1853, R. W. Logan 1941, Korngold 1965).
An important aspect of the Louverturean strategy was clearly to avoid
commercial monopolies by encouraging competition between foreign
merchants28 and link their economic interests to Saint Domingue’s independence
(R. W. Logan 1941, Coradin 1987). Toussaint’s diplomatic engagement with
France’s enemies and competitors gave them an incentive to undermine
France’s role in Saint Domingue, and limit her ability to reassert control over the
colony. The Louverturean strategy while exercising territorial control over the
islands, secured a market for Saint Domingue’s goods, and provided Toussaint
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The full treaty can be found in the British National Archives in the King papers (King letter to Pickering
1798). Its translation can be found in (R. W. Logan, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with
Haiti 1941, 65-6).
28

See dispatches from U.S. Consuls in Cap Haitian from 1977 to 1801
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with sources of arms and ammunitions to resist the anticipated French attack,
and other nations if necessary (R. W. Logan 1941). Toussaint’s successful
expansion of commercial relationships and competition, along with his control of
the circulations of goods, provided revenue to enhance his military capacity,
which was a key feature of the Louverturean state crafting project29.
Some scholars have accused Toussaint of being solely concerned about
his personal power rather than establishing the framework for St. Domingue’s
independence (Ardouin 1848, G. Corvington 2001, L. Dubois 2004). Others have
suggested that he sought to be recognized as King by Great Britain, or that he
intended to ask for British protectorate of Saint Domingue (Madiou 1847, L.
Dubois 2004, Heinl and Heinl 2005). These assertions are widely disputed by
both Haitian and Western scholars and are often seen within the context of
Neocolonial Mulatto propaganda30 (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933, R. W. Logan 1941,
James 1963, Korngold 1965, Nicholls 1974). It is clear that Toussaint used the
war between France and Britain, and his own military power, to create the
political space to compel the British to sign independent treaties designed to
secure the autonomy of Saint Domingue and armaments for his army (Rulx 1945,
James 1963, Korngold 1965). The military and commercial treaty enabled him to
build a strong military to protect the emerging state. His strategy also included
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Letter from Pickering to Adams, May 29, 1799, Knox, Naval Doouments, III, 272.
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For an understanding of the attempt by Mulatto scholars to undermine the legacies of Black leadership
in Haiti, see Nicholls, David’s article “A Work of Combat: Mulatto Historians and the Haitian Past 18471867” in the Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. Feb 1974. V16. No.1 15-38.
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British and American recognition of Saint Domingue’s independence when
declared, the procurement of arms and munitions, along with a reciprocity clause
that neither Toussaint nor Great Britain would attack each other’s armies and
colonies. Toussaint’s skillful management of the emerging nation’s interests
enabled him to protect and expand his military without interference (R. W. Logan
1941, 65-6). Toussaint’s diplomatic engagement, far from being for personal
gains, focused on the survival of Saint Domingue as an independent state by
appealing to and securing British and American commercial interests (R. W.
Logan 1941, Rulx 1945, T. O. Ott 1973, Coradin 1987).
Toussaint also circumvented the power of France over St. Domingue with
respect to French citizens living in Saint Domingue by granting amnesty to
French citizens who had supported the British military actions against their
nation. In defiance of the French Commissioner’s mandate to expel these French
citizens, he enlisted them as officers in his own army (Saint Remy 1850). This led
Maitland, the British general, to observe, “Hedouville though possessed with
great nominal powers was in truth possessed of no real authority”. (Maitland
1798)31. The American General Consul in Saint Domingue, Edward Stevens,
seconded Maitland’s observations in a letter to U.S. Secretary of State, Timothy
Pickering: “The agent does nothing at present but what he is desired to do. The
whole machine of government, both civil and military, is regulated and guided by
the General-in-chief” (Korngold 1965, x). Like Sonthonax before him, Toussaint
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Quoted in (T. O. Ott 1973, 106)
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forced Hedouville to leave Saint Domingue eliminating again any vestiges of
France control. Hedouville had arrived on March 29, 1798, confident of his power
and France control of Saint Domingue, outmaneuvered by Toussaint; he left on
October 22, 1798, 7 months later, convinced of France’s impotence in the face of
St. Domingue’s autonomy32 (Madiou 1847, T. O. Ott 1973, 108). Toussaint would
later sign another tripartite treaty with the American and the British to consolidate
St. Domingue’s autonomy and their recognition of it, even if such recognition was
by fiat and implicit instead of overt (R. W. Logan 1941, 75-90).
Toussaint assessed correctly that neither America nor Britain would
ultimately fully support the independence of Saint Domingue, but would not
undermine it as long as they had commercial and economic interests in the
colony’s independence33 (Coradin 1987). Indeed, Alexander Hamilton’s letter to
Pickering on February 9, 1799, confirmed his suspicion,
[T]he provision in the law is ample. But in this, my dear
sir, as in everything else, we must unite caution with
decision. The United States must not be committed on
the independence of St. Domingo. No guaranty—no
formal treaty—nothing that can rise up in judgment. It will
be enough to let Toussaint be assured verbally, but
explicitly, that upon his declaration of independence a
commercial intercourse will be opened, and continue
while he maintains it, and gives due protection to our
vessels and property. I incline to think the declaration of
independence ought to precede.34 (R. W. Logan 1941,
82, Lodge 1904, VI, 395).
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Following Sonthonax’s model, Hedouville before leaving for France, issued a proclamation making the
Southern and Eastern part of the Island independent of Toussaint exacerbating again the regional and
racial tensions that would become the Achilles’ heels of Haiti. The letter can be found in (Ardouin 1853,
Vol 3, 511).
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Also see “Jefferson and the Nonrecognition of Haiti” by (Matthew 1996)
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Hamilton was interested in independence in St Domingue but did not want the predisposition of the
United States to result in escalation with France. He went even as far as to conceptualize the type of
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system that would be necessary there based on existing conditions and to prevent re-enslavement. The
following letter to the Secretary of State Timothy Pickering on Feb 21, 1799 demonstrates that point
clearly:
My Dear Sir:
The multiplicity of my avocations joined to imperfect health has delayed the communication you desired
respecting St. Domingo. And what is worse, it has prevented my bestowing sufficient thought to offer at
present anything worth having.
No regular system of liberty will at present suit St. Domingo. The government, if independent, must be
military—partaking of the feodal system.
A hereditary chief would be best, but this I fear is impracticable.
Let there be then, a single Executive, to hold his place for life.
The person to succeed on a vacancy to be either the officer next in command in the island at the time of
the death of the predecessor, or the person who by plurality of voices of the commandants of regiments
shall be designated within a certain time. In the meantime the principal military officers to administer.
All the males within certain ages to be arranged in military corps, and to be compellable to military
service. This may be connected with the tenure of lands.
Let the supreme judiciary authority be vested in twelve judges to be chosen for life by the generals or
chief military officers.
Trial by jury in all criminal causes not military to be established. The mode of appointing them must be
regulated with reference to the general spirit of the establishment.
Every law inflicting capital or other corporal punishment, or levying a tax or contribution in any shape, to
be proposed by the Executive to an assembly composed of the generals and commandants of regiments
for their sanction or rejection.
All other laws to be enacted by the sole authority of the Executive.
The powers of war and treaty to be in the Executive.
The Executive to be obliged to have three ministers—of finance, war, and foreign affairs—whom he shall
nominate to the generals for their approbation or rejection.
The colonels and generals, when once appointed, to hold their offices during good behavior, removed
only by conviction of an infamous crime in due course of law or the sentence of a court-martial cashiering
them.
Court-martials for trial of officers and capital offences to be not less than twelve, and well-guarded as to
mode of appointment.
Duties of import and export, taxes on lands and buildings to constitute the chief branches of revenue.
These thoughts are very crude, but perhaps they may afford some hints.
How is the sending an agent to Toussaint to encourage the independency of St. Domingo, and a minister
to France to negotiate an accommodation reconcilable to consistency or good faith?
Alexander Hamilton – The Hamilton Papers (Lodge 1904)
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Having defeated the Spaniards and the British forces in a costly war, the treaties
he sought provided him with the time and armaments he needed to strengthen
the Louverturean statecrafting project to maintain St. Domingue’s independence
through a marriage of the economic interests of foreign powers and military
deterrence (Coupeau 2008, J. Desquiron 1993). Toussaint understood that both
British and American support was ephemeral and depended on their commercial
interests and competition with France, thus his goal was to strengthen his control
over the entire island and create a military capable of defending the
independence of St. Domingue when American and British interests wane and
competition or war with France abetted. His was the epitome of the politics of
deterrence. Toussaint acted not from a position of weakness nor did he rely on
international benevolence. He was a realist. He aimed to maintain the state’s
autonomy by both economic and military power. Indeed, this was the basis of
Louverturean state crafting.
Unlike contemporary Haitian leaders, Toussaint understood the
international environment within which St. Domingue operated and crafted
effective policies and strategies accordingly. Neither American nor British leaders
fully supported an independent black nation, but the effectiveness of the
Louverturean regime prevented them from openly acting against its existence
and interests (Coradin 1987). As Pickering wrote,
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[W]e meddle not with the politics of the Island. Toussaint
will pursue what he deems the interests of himself and
his countrymen. He will probably declare the island
independent. It is probable that he wished to assure
himself of our commerce as the necessary means of
obtaining it. Neither moral nor political considerations
could induce us to discourage him; on the contrary, both
would warrant us in urging him to the declaration. Yet we
shall not do it (R. W. Logan 1941, 83).

Yet, despite the refusal to formally recognize Haitian independence, Toussaint
was successful in securing the existence of and support for the Haitian state.
American and British leaders assessed it preferable to have an independent
Saint Domingue contained by a naval blockade to prevent it from influencing
slaves in their territory than to have one controlled by France with the formidable
military power to pursue the latter’s expansionist ambitions (Lodge 1904).
Indeed, both Britain and the United States had to consider the advantages of St.
Domingue as a French colony versus an independent state. Pickering letter to
Rufus King, the American Ambassador on London in March 12, 1799 made this
point clear,
[T]here ought not to be any inducements to withdraw the
Blacks from the cultivation of the island to navigation;
and confined to their own Island they will not be
dangerous neighbors. Nothing is more clear than, if left
to themselves, that the Blacks of St. Domingue will be
incomparably less dangerous than if they remain the
subjects of France; she could then form with them
military corps of such strength in a future war, as no
other European or other white force could resist. France
with an army of those black troops might conquer all the
British Isles and put in Jeopardy our Southern States. Of
this the Southern members were convinced, and
therefore cordially concurred in the policy of the
independence of St. Domingue, if Toussaint and his
followers will it (R. W. Logan 1941, 83-4).
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In essence, Haiti’s neocolonial policy of limited possibilities and containment, as
formulated by the British and the United States was a harbinger of future policies
for the postcolonial world. The Louverturean state was in a system of externally
controlled autonomy and curtailed sovereignty. Its international reach and
national potential constrained by foreign powers determined to restrict its
influence, development, and power.
Despite American hesitancy, Hamilton’s letter to Pickering, and the latter’s
policy formulation, by May 22, 1799 both the British and America recognized the
independence by fiat, in the hopes of limiting its power and potential to impact
their territory and interests by signing a tripartite treaty with Saint Domingue that
[E]xcluded Rigaud’s South Province from AngloAmerican trade, protected Jamaica and the southern
United States from attack by the blacks, and guaranteed
that the British navy would neither interrupt commerce
nor molest Toussaint’s navy. The treaty was amended in
June to include opposition against indoctrination of slave
of both nations (T. O. Ott 1973, 110, Coradin 1987, R.
W. Logan 1941).

Toussaint had achieved an important objective in his quest for an independent
state. He not only consolidated his control over land and sea, he also exercised a
measure of control over the rebellious Southern territory by limiting their
commerce and cutting their access to the rest of the world using American and
British naval forces (R. W. Logan 1941, Madiou 1847, v1-2). In a world worried
about the existence of an independent black nation, Louverture created Saint
Domingue’s interdependence through a marriage of mutual benefits and
deterrence (Cole 1967, Rodman 1954). The commercial linkages he cultivated
and treaties he negotiated with other nations were his vehicles to securing the
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nascent state35. In Toussaint, Saint Domingue found an able and visionary leader
who engineered a state capable of protecting its interests, those of its citizens,
and maintaining its independence. Yet, despite Toussaint’s success in securing
an independent international role for Saint Domingue, he could not sustain it
without territorial unity, which remained elusive36. With total control over the
North and partial control over the West, the Southern and Eastern regions of the
island had resisted his control with support from France. Toussaint recognized
that one of the vulnerabilities of the Louverturean state was its lack of territorial
control and internal sovereignty. Having secured international treaties that
afforded the Louverturean state a degree of international security and
sovereignty, Toussaint turned his efforts inward toward territorial security and full
internal sovereignty (Jackson 1990).

Asserting Territorial Control:
Despite Toussaint’s success in establishing the autonomy of the
Louverturean state in international affairs, he contended with regional forces
opposed to the emergence of a Black-led state and determined to act

35

Both the American and British governments needing Toussaint to protect their territories and commerce
were forced to signed treaties with him as the government of an independent Saint Domingue, thus
implicitly recognizing its independence. Without an independent Saint Domingue they could secure
neither their commerce nor territories from France’s expansionary threats. Toussaint the representative
of the emerging State had skillfully maneuvered its importance to both nations. See the Letter of
American First Consul to Haiti Edward Stevens to Secretary of State Timothy Pickering. L'ARCAHAYE June
23rd: 1799 (Review Oct., 1910).
36

See letter from American First Consul Edwards Stevens to Secretary of State Timothy Pickering. Cape
Francois 3rd May & 24th June 1799. (Review Oct., 1910).
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independently against it in collusion with foreign powers (Leyburn 1966).
Toussaint could not secure his nascent state without controlling these forces nor
could he declare Saint Domingue’s independence without exercising sovereignty
over its entire territory.
The basis of sovereignty for any state rests on its ability to exercise control
over its territory. While Toussaint had established a de facto international
recognition, territorial control had been elusive (Ardouin 1848, v1-2, G.
Corvington 2001). The Eastern part of the island of Hispaniola, which was
controlled historically by the Spanish crown but ceded to France under the Basle
treaty of 1795, had maintained its autonomy with Spanish dominance under the
French adviser Philippe-Rose Roume, whom Toussaint had dispatched there
(Leyburn 1966, T. O. Ott 1973, Schoelcher 1882). To facilitate commerce and
guard against attacks from competing powers, Saint Domingue was organized
into regional centers of power. The fertile North, hierarchical, dominated by
colonial landowners, enjoyed established institutions, the most successful
agricultural-based commercial enterprises, and had the highest concentration of
blacks. The South and West, less organized and populated and with a larger
white and Mulatto population, had a mixed population and social classes. The
eastern part of the island, formerly a Spanish colony, was culturally different from
Saint Domingue, sparsely populated, with limited governance structure, and
poor. Stein notes, “The natural isolation of each of the three French provinces
encouraged the development of local political and social differences and fostered
interprovincial rivalries” (Stein 1985, 27). Moreau de Saint-Mery’s description of
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the population dynamics at the eve of the slave revolution is also instructive: the
North had 16,000 whites, 9,000 free men of color, and 180,000 slaves, The West
had 14,000 whites, 12,000 free men of color, and 168,000 slaves, and the South
had 10,000 whites, 6,500 free men of color, and 114,000 slaves (Moreau de
Saint-Mery 1797-1798, 115-30)37. This racial and regional diversity coalesced
into divergent interests and gave way to a realignment and consolidation of white
and Mulatto interests following the 1791 slave revolution. Whites and Mulattoes
in the West and South under the leadership of Andre Rigaud formed alliances to
maintain their dominance and undermined the black struggle for emancipation
(Ardouin 1848, Rulx 1945, Heinl and Heinl 2005). Mulattoes, who had long
sought to form alliances, shared power and equal rights with Whites without
much success found common cause with them in resisting black emancipation to
maintain their economic interests (Stein 1985). While blacks successfully fought
against slavery in the North, they had remained subjugated in the South and
West under a militarized Mulatto and white alliance. The abolition of slavery was
thus a direct challenge to their economic and racial interests (Ardouin 1848, Rulx
1945, James 1963, L. Dubois 2004).
Two years prior to emancipation, Mulatto representatives had sought an
alliance with whites in the assembly in France. Such a reunion they contended
would “create a mass of forces that is more effective for containing the slaves”38
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Also see (Stein 1985, 26-38)
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By 1793 in every areas but the North, Mulattoes supplanted the white population by their alliance with
large white landowners who needed their protection against both white artisans and slaves. This Mulatto
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(Stein 1985, Hunt 1996, 24). Even after the abolition of slavery in the North on
August 29, 1793, in Rigaud’s south and west, despite resistance, slavery and
black’s forceful subservience persisted (Ardouin 1848, v1-3, Rulx 1945, Korngold
1965). The Mulatto/White alliance to preserve their interests in black servitude
and power was well cemented by their interdependence. As Ott notes,
[E]ssentially the Grands Blancs and Mulattoes of the
west province, masters of the countryside, were fighting
the Petits Blancs, masters of Port-au-Prince, and the
slaves. In the South Province, the pattern was much the
same, except that whites did not split (T. O. Ott 1973,
55-6).

Mulattoes, having consolidated their dominance in those regions, consequently
viewed emancipation and black ascendency as a threat to their interests and
power (James 1963, Parkinson 1978). More importantly, the convergence
between color and status was such that Mulatto leaders, even those in the North,
resented black control, but only those in the West and South had the power to
openly refuse to acquiesce to Toussaint’s leadership (Madiou 1847, Ardouin
1853, Heinl and Heinl 2005). As The American Consul in Saint Domingue
observed in his Letter to the American Secretary of State, Toussaint’s drive
toward territorial consolidation contravened France’s envoys to the island who
designed to create divisions between Mulattoes and Blacks to curtail his power
and inhibit his drive towards independence39. The French Commissioners made

dominance is what led to the alliance of Whites in the west with the invading British. It was not an alliance
against France, but to offset Mulatto power (Ardouin 1853, T. O. Ott 1973, 51-60)
39

“As soon as Rigaud falls, Roume will be sent off, and from that Moment the Power of the Directory will
cease in this Colony. I hinted to you, some Time ago, my suspicion that Rigaud was privately supported by
the french Government, from the cruel Policy of weakening both Mullattoes23 and Negroes, by fomenting
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sure that the emancipation proclamation never applied to the places under
Mulatto and white control (Ardouin 1848, T. O. Ott 1973, 71-2). Furthermore,
Rigaud’s resistance had been encouraged and even given legitimacy by both
Commissioners Sonthonax and Hedouville who sought to undermine Toussaint’s
power prior to their removal from the Island by the latter (Madiou 1847, 402-6,
Ardouin 1848, Ardouin 1853). Hedouville, prior to his departure, expanded
Rigaud’s territorial control and made him independent of Toussaint. “Toussaint
sold himself to the British, the immigrants and the Americans,” Hedouville wrote
to Rigaud, “I relieve you entirely of the authority attributed to him as general in
Chief, and assign the southern department as I recently expanded” (Ardouin
1848, v3,511). The French colonial policy of creating racial divisions between
black and Mulattoes through legal sanction, and exploiting them to maintain their
dominance, was not far from Hedouville’s mind. “The sole hope of checking
Toussaint Louverture, even for the moment, lies in sedulously fostering the hate
between the mulâtres and noirs, and by opposing Rigaud to Toussaint”, he wrote
(Heinl and Heinl 2005, 76)40.

and keeping up a Contest between them. Every Day confirms me more in this Opinion, and I have now no
doubt that the Agent is the secret and diabolical Instrument employed by them for this Purpose. He
certainly is privately in the Interests of Rigaud, and Toussaint seems well acquainted with this Fact. Policy,
however, induces him to temporize” Stevens to Pickering, June 24th 1799 (Review Oct., 1910, 77).
40

In an attempt to reduce the power of Toussaint, Hedouville before his departure had promulgated the
“Law of 4 Brumaire” to expand Rigaud’s territorial control from the South all the way to the outskirt of
Port-au-Prince thus reducing the West to a few towns. and urged him not to recognize Toussaint’s
authority (Korngold 1965, 169-71)
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The coalescing of racial and economic interest with regional rivalries, and
the inability to overcome colonial-induced racial divisions provided a challenge to
the Louverturean state crafting project ab initio, one that would persist to date.
For the Louverturean state to achieve territorial sovereignty, Mulatto power had
to be checked. The choice was then and has been since, between Mulatto
consolidation of power for their personal and ethnic gains, and state building to
preserve the interests of the nation. The Consular dispatch to the Secretary State
Timothy Pickering by the American Consul Edward Stevens at the eve of what
would be the most violent racial civil war in Haiti spelled out the dynamics clearly,
[B]oth wish to reign, but by different means, and with
different views. Rigaud would deluge the country with
blood to accomplish this favorite point, and slaughter
indiscriminately whites, blacks, and even leading chiefs
of his own color. The acquisition of power is central to
him and the men in his ranks. Toussaint, on the contrary,
is desirous of being confirmed in his authority by the
united efforts of all the inhabitants, whose friend and
protector he wishes to be considered and, I am
convinced, were his power uncontrolled he would
exercise it in protecting commerce, encouraging
agriculture, and establishing useful regulations for the
internal government of the colony41

Toussaint “wanted the Mulattoes to be part of the emerging State,” and in his
search for a unified state, sought to resolve the conflict peacefully, but such was

41

Dispatches from Us Consul Edward Stevens to Timothy Pickering, June 24, 1799 Cap Haitien, Vol. 1.

It is important to note that the American consul lived in the North and had a rather more intimate
relationship with Toussaint, and that America had established greater economic relations with the North
and thus may have sought to protect their interests. Stevens has also been considered a supporter of
Toussaint’s policies and in some respect, an advisor to him (R. W. Logan 1941). Most historians have
concluded that indeed Rigaud and his Mulatto followers considered themselves French and acted against
the interest of the emergent state. Indeed, it is not controversial to suggest that they were against
independence from France as long as their interests were protected. Despite Toussaint’s overture to
Rigaud, the latter refused his attempt to form a coalition and instead alerted the French Commissioner of
Toussaint’s intention to declare independence (Madiou 1847, 464-70, James 1963, Review Oct., 1910).
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not the disposition of his foes (Ardouin 1853, James 1963, T. O. Ott 1973, Heinl
and Heinl 2005, 76). Had Rigaud acquiesced to Toussaint’s role as Governor
General, and submitted to his command as his subordinate military position
required, had he not been a Francophile, seduced by status and power and
predisposed to Hedouville’s machinations, war could have been averted.
However, Personal, territorial, ethnic interests and greed for power proved more
important than national independence and state building. Following Rigaud’s
refusal, it became also clear that despite Toussaint inclusion of all races in his
government and attempts to eliminate racial animosity, his quest to secure the
state’s territorial sovereignty had also become a struggle between Blacks and
Mulattoes42. His speech in the cathedral43 of Port-Au-Prince, one of the two
centers of Mulatto power is important in that vein,
[‘G]ens de couleur’ who since the beginning of the
revolution have betrayed the blacks, what are you up to
today? Everyone knows that you are seeking mastery
over the colony, that you wish to exterminate the whites
and enslaved the blacks” (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 76,
Madiou 1847, 487-8).

The civil war that ensued would ultimately determine the fate of the Haitian state
until the occupation. Contemporary scholar Laurent Dubois, following the racial
subtext of Southern exceptionalism, and obscuring that Toussaint was Rigaud’s
superior officer, maintains, that the struggle was not about race but over territorial
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See Toussaint Louverture’s Letter to the American President John Adams, August 14, 1799 (Review Oct.,
1910, 81)
43

This cathedral was destroyed in a criminal fire in 1991.
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autonomy. Louverture’s quest to control all regions and unite the island was met
by an independent and regionally distinct south44 (L. Dubois 2004, 233-4)

Despite the racial polemics, the conflict between Toussaint and Rigaud,
between the North and South could have easily been a war for territorial control
and regional power, had Mulattoes across the country not taken up arms against
Toussaint and defected to fight in Rigaud’s ranks (Madiou 1847, 467-73, James
1963, Korngold 1965, T. O. Ott 1973, 112-4). Even prominent Mulatto military
leaders, who had fought under Toussaint and achieved high ranks, deserted his
army to aid the South in what they considered a fight for the supremacy of their
color (Ardouin 1853, James 1963, Korngold 1965). Alexandre Pétion, JeanPierre Boyer, Geffrard, and many other Mulattoes who would later vie for
leadership of the state, deserted Toussaint and sided with their color and class.
As Dubois notes, the internecine war was fought with such intensity and hatred,
unarmed Mulatto soldiers would attack with their teeth, ripping the flesh of their
black brethren, rather than surrender to them, and “it never entered anyone’s
mind to take prisoners” (L. Dubois 2004, 235). The ‘Aristocracy of the skin’, which
until then was confined to regional dynamics and colonial institutions had thus
become embedded into the project of state crafting. Black generals Jean
Jacques Dessalines and Henry Christophe led the fight to quell Mulatto uprisings
in the North and West, and to assert sovereignty over the South. When Toussaint
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Similar justifications were made by Beaubrun Ardouin, the Southern Mulatto historian minister and
ambassador under various Mulatto regimes (Ardouin 1848, t4, 18-26).
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selected Dessalines to lead the South after the war, his efforts at pacifying the
region, ensure an end to resistance, and adherence to the Louverturean state,
were strongly resented by a population who thought themselves too superior to
be led by blacks (Ardouin 1848, v3). This resentment would later lead to his
assassination by Mulatto officers disguised as his military guards (Franklin 1828,
Debbasch 1967).
The war dealt a blow to this nascent state by limiting its human resources
and dispersing its energy. Once the civil war was over, despite the amnesty for
all the combatants, the defeated Mulattoes who were too proud to serve under
Toussaint and too resentful to pay taxes to the state and the required payments
to their laborers, never waned in their contempt against the state and its new
social contract (Waxman 1931)45. Seven hundred well trained officers and their
families left for Cuba rather than serve their state. Mulatto leaders went to France
to foment oppositions to Haitian independence and the Louverturean state. They
would later return with the French to re-establish slavery and control over the
Island. Officers that could have saved the nation from invasion, and protected the

45

Waxman (1931) and Ott (1973) have provided some important analysis of the disposition of the
Mulattoes toward the blacks. However, more importantly, primary documents of the French Revolution
demonstrate that the Mulattoes were not interested in safeguarding black liberty. They sought unification
and equal rights with whites as preconditions to help maintain slavery at perpetuity (Hunt 1996). CLR
James(1963) claimed that” never was there so favorable an opportunity for a working arrangement
between Mulattoes and Blacks as at the very beginning of their history”, but those defeated avaricious
Mulattoes leaders would support France’s attempt to recapture the old colony and re-establish the old
slave regime so despised and degraded. Where it not for Napoleon’s intent to disenfranchise them along
with the blacks compelling them to, temporarily, cast their lots with them, they might have continued
their support for the re-institution of slavery and the defeat of the new state
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young state and its citizens allowed racial animosity to prevail over their civism
and ideals of liberty (Schoelcher 1882, 28-9).
The very nature of the forces with which he contended contravened
Toussaint’s state crafting project. While internal forces sought to limit the power
of the state for their own personal and ethnic interests, external forces supported
them in order to undermine the formation and potential of that state. His goal of
creating a strong, unified and independent state was opposed by forces from
within driven by the ‘aristocracy of skin’ present still in contemporary Haiti, and so
dominant in postcolonial societies46 (Lacroix 1880, Schoelcher 1882, P. H.
Sannon 1920-1933, Nemours 1925, Waxman 1931). At a time when the
embryonic state needed stability and cohesion to protect its development, ethnic
divisions, and Mulattoes' vanity and economic interests led to civil war
(Schoelcher 1882). Southern and Western Mulatto leaders objected to a
government led by the Black Toussaint and its Northern black-dominated
revolutionary forces. They resisted the regulation of their plantations by a state
designed to maintain and enforce the interests of its majority population based on
established rules governing landowners and workers, and a social contract
securing their freedom47 (Heinl and Heinl 2005).
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For elaboration of this ‘aristocracy of skin’ see (James 1963) and (Nicholls 1979)
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Surely, there have rules governing landowners responsibility towards their slaves but not only were
they not enforced when it came to obligations that needed to be observed by landowners, they offered
no real protection to slaves. The Code Noir promulgated by France stipulation right for slaves, freed
people, and Mulattoes had little relevance. These new laws under this emerging state however were fully
enforced. According to Ardouin (1843), while it is true that Mulattoes felt entitled to be in charge of the
state and objected to Toussaint’s willingness to employ competent administrators from all stripes, what
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The ability of any state to control its territory and maintain order is one of
its primary sources of legitimacy (Mann 1984, Jackson 1990). By asserting
control over the national territory and defeat sectarian forces, along with
extending full control over the eastern side of the Island, Toussaint secured the
internal sovereignty and autonomy of the state leaving it in a stronger position to
resist external challenges and secure its international autonomy (Korngold 1965,
Heinl and Heinl 2005). It is clear however, that Toussaint was not interested in
crafting a state based on excluding segments of the population. He wanted all
citizens, whites, Mulattoes, and blacks to be included in the Louverturean project.
He was not interested in an exclusive ethnic-based state system. He wanted a
state strong enough to maintain control over its national sphere and deter
external threat. Ott notes, “Toussaint wanted the Mulattoes to be part of the
emerging black state”, but they wanted to be the leader of a state where blacks
were subservient to them; where the power of the state would be oriented to
maintain their dominance, not preserve liberty for all48 (T. O. Ott 1973, 128).
While Ott’s observation about Toussaint’s inclusionary intent is correct, his
characterization of Toussaint state project as “a black State” reflects the type of
polemical analyses in which many important scholars have been engaged, which

troubled them most was the state confiscation of property of landowners who deserted the Island. Many
felt, such properties belong to them as offspring of those proprietors though they were illegitimate and
not recognized (Nichols 1979; Heinl and Heinl 2005). Also, see Moreau the St. Remy and Thomas Madiou
who have written extensively on the Mulatto question. Although both St. Remy and Madiou are Mulatto
sympathizers, their work does to some degree show the cause of Mulatto discontent.
48

Also see (Coradin 1987), (James 1963), and (Lacroix 1880), and (Madiou 1847).
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have undermined studies of Haitian state formation (Nicholls 1974, 1979).
Toussaint sought the formation of a federated state system with institutions that
upheld its ethno-cultural, linguistics, and regional character. He created a
multilayered court system with both regional courts and a supreme court to
address legal challenges and provide impartial avenues for redress. His state
crafting accounted for regional differences and sought to strengthen institutional
capacity and eliminate areas of resistance to state rule by providing local and
regional constituents with independent and impartial institutions capable of
upholding the laws (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933). Institutional confidence was
paramount in Toussaint’s statecraft. Toussaint’s 1801 constitution had already
assigned the courts its due power to increase institutional confidence and allay
regional conflicts and national instability.
Toussaint had advocated for an inclusive effort to protect the citizens of
Saint Domingue. He saw whites, blacks, and Mulattoes as indispensable in the
crafting, expansion and security of the new state. His administration, his military,
his advisors had included members of all castes (Nemours 1925, 67-94, James
1963, 245). Mulattoes’ refusal to recognize and support the Louverturean state,
and the defections to Rigaud of prominent as well as ordinary Mulattoes, made
the vulnerability of the state to racial animus apparent. Already a matter of
necessity, it became urgent for Toussaint to assert territorial control for the
survival of the embryonic state and deny foreign powers a bridgehead from
whence to threaten it and re-enslave its citizens (Lacroix 1880, P. H. Sannon
1920-1933, Nicholls 1979, Coradin 1987). This multifaceted conflict: between
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those who chose independence and nation building against regional power and
dependency, between state-building, national interests and development against
personal and ethnic consolidation of power, between a nationalist state and
neocolonial entity, has been the primary obstacle to the process of state
formation and consolidation in Haiti and the primary source of its instability.
The war deviated resources from the state-building project, state
expansion suffered in order to manage an ‘internecine fratricide’ (Schoelcher
1882). Yet, these impediments did not last. In less than a year, Toussaint
managed to reassert Saint Domingue’s supremacy in commerce in the New
World and thus secured resources for the expansion and protection of the
Louverturean state.
By the time full control over the island was consolidated, the state was
weak at best with thousands dead, most of the plantations and cultivation
destroyed, and many experienced administrators having fled the island (James
1963, 242, T. O. Ott 1973, M.-R. Trouillot 1990). Yet, as James states, Toussaint
was undeterred by the devastation, “personal industry, social morality, public
education, religious toleration, free trade, civic pride, racial equality, this ex-slave
strove according to his lights to lay their foundation in a new state” (James 1963,
247). For Toussaint, institutions and administration were necessary for proper
governance. The preservation of liberty, state control over its territory, and
autonomy in delineating its international relations were predominant concerns he
sought to address.
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National Reorganization: Law and Taxation:
On the national realm, Toussaint redoubled his efforts at reorganizing the
state, by dividing the Island into six departments (Ardouin 1853, P. H. Sannon
1920-1933) . He created ordinary courts of law and two federal courts of appeal,
one in the French, the other in the Spanish part of the island, and a supreme
court of appeal in the capital. There were also especial military courts to deal
quickly with robberies and crimes on the high road. The special military courts
were important to prevent attacks from active maroon bands (Ardouin 1848, v3).
The finance of the old regime was complicated and irksome. Toussaint
demanded first an exact inventory of resources and policies, and then abolished
the numerous duties and taxes, which were only a source of fraud and abuses.
He gave the gourde, the local unit of money, a uniform value for the whole island
(James 1963, 244-5). The Louverturean system of taxation provided the state
with the necessary revenue to maintain its institutions, while addressing the
needs of the population. James and Nemours explained,
All merchandise, and produce imported or exported paid
a duty of ten percent. All fixed property incurred a similar
tax. To encourage the poor, he lowered taxes to six
percent on articles of necessity, and organized a
Maritime police to secure the ports and protect
merchants (Nemours 1925, 67-94, L. J. Janvier 1886,
James 1963, 245).

Agricultural Policies:
No longer dependent on slave labor, The Louverturean State crafted and
codified a new agricultural system based on paid labor and large plantations
(Madiou 1847, Bonneau 1862). Toussaint laid and strengthened the basis for the
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state and expanded its institutions to maintain a social contract based on the
liberty of the former slaves and their new rights as paid workers, citizens, and
soldiers. As James notes, the legitimacy of the Louverturean state was “rooted in
the preservation of the interests of the laboring poor” and in maintaining balance
between divergent interest groups within the nation (Nemours 1925, James
1963, 245-7). The new plantation system and labor laws compelled the new
landless citizens to work for a fee. These new labor arrangements were the basis
of the economic and regulatory power of the Louverturean state. Its primary goal
was the protection of the vulnerable majority, and the state itself was dependent
on their protection for without their adherence to the state and their willingness to
take up arms on its behalf, the state was defenseless.
Some blacks resented their new arrangements and status as workers,
preferring the ownership of their own land rather than laboring for their old
masters (Lacerte 1978, 450). Having identified slavery with working on
plantations, they resisted both the new system and state, seeking new social
arrangements that did not tie them to the plantation system. Some enlisted as
soldiers while other lived outside of the state as squatters on open lands or in
maroon communities in the mountains49. In analyzing the Louverturean
agricultural policies Trouillot’s observes,
The major weakness of Louverture’s party and the
fundamental contradiction of his regime was the
leadership’s failure to face the fact that the goal of
unconditional freedom was incompatible with the

49

Others openly revolted against a state they now saw, According to the Ardouin, as the new slave master
(Ardouin 1848, v2-3). Also see (Lacerte 1978, 453, L. Dubois 2004)
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maintenance of the plantation system. To the newly
liberated masses, the work regimen instituted by the
revolutionary state was no different from the slavery they
thought they had left behind (Trouillot 1990, 43)50

Trouillot‘s allusion that tensions existed between the necessity and imposition of
the new State, the responsibility of its new citizens versus the conception of
freedom by former slaves cannot be dismissed. However, Trouillot obscures an
important fact - namely that the very freedom enjoyed by the newly liberated
masses rested on the Louverturean State’s economic arrangements and its
ability to protect them against re-enslavement and thus necessitated the
formation of a new model of citizenship and a social contract between these new
citizens and the state, not just their presence as liberated people. Indeed, most of
the population opted to support the system that secured the prosperity of the
Louverturean state and enhanced its capacity to protect their freedom (Franklin
1828, Saint Remy 1850). Moreover, the Louverturean state was as determined to
pursue whites, Mulattoes, and Black landowners for violating the new labor
covenant, as it was determined to pursue workers for refusing to work, and
participate in some form to enhance the capacity of the state to protect their
freedom (L. J. Janvier 1886, Korngold 1965). This arrangement, argues Lacerte,

50

Trouillot statement, however avoids posing the fundamental question? Would the Haitian state have
been able to resist the Napoleonic forces had Toussaint not implemented his policies? Would he have
been able to secure the treaties with the British that temporarily safeguarded the Island from attacks and
allowed him time to strengthen the state? Were the interests of the new black citizens ultimately better
served by the new regulations? What other viable options did Toussaint have which he did not explore?
Perhaps contemporary assessment of Toussaint ought to ponder these questions. Nevertheless, we know
this, regardless of whether Black workers agreed to these arrangements, the revenues, and shared
expectation, would have been better than the alternative. Moreover, that there was only one major
armed protest incited by the his nephew speaks to the support for these new arrangements.
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“required balancing two opposite social interests without doing injury to either”
(Lacerte 1978, 453). The Agrarian laws required landowners to pay a fourth of
the production as compensation to the workers, and another fourth as taxes to
the state and compelled the worker to sign a contract for three years that would
require staying with one landowner and the need for state’s permission to nullify
the contract (Ardouin 1848, v2). For Toussaint, the protection against reenslavement necessitated a forceful and capable state, and the plantation
system provided the only viable revenue source for that state. In a hostile
environment permeated by powerful nations determine to re-impose slavery,
internal forces who regarded emancipation as an affront to their racial ideology
and economic interests, and a vulnerable majority fresh out of slavery, the
Louverturean state was at the center to balance internal and external interests
and secure the rights of the majority.
Toussaint seems to have understood that in postcolonial states, the ability
of the state to manage divergent interests, establish, and sustain a social
contract binding all interests were the precursor to national stability (Stepan, Linz
and Yadav 2010). He crafted a state powerful enough and in control of enough
resources to make it costly for all who would seek to undermine its rule. The
Louverturean state was not based on the exclusion of some groups and
interests, for such a state would be too prone to instability, institutional
weakness, and failure (Gros 1996). Unlike most contemporary neocolonial
states, resource extraction did not end up in the pockets of state and political
elites, but served to strengthen the state’s capacity, and enhance its ability to
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protect the nation (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933, James 1963, G. Corvington 2001).
The protection of the right of all citizens regardless of interests, social position,
ethnicity, or color was the Louverturean State’s primary focus.
In less than six years, Toussaint succeeded in crafting a state powerful
enough to exercise sovereignty over its territory and deter other nations from
infringements, economically strong enough to entice other nations to compete
over for its market, and feared enough to elicit treaties of non-intervention from
Britain and the United States (R. W. Logan 1941, Coradin 1987). Toussaint had
asserted territorial control, squashed regionalism and separatism, re-established
prosperity, international commerce, and secure relations with other nations. By
the end of 1799, he increased his military capacity by having 10 well-armed large
military ships built in the United States, and could put 100,000 well-equipped
men on the battlefield51. The Louverturean state had the power to prevent
internal challenges and guard against external threats. He had created a
standing army capable of defending the nation and securing the state’s and its
agents’ monopoly over the use of force on its territory (Korngold 1965, ix). Yet,
despite its successes, the Louverturean state remained a state on the defensive,
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Some scholars put the number of Toussaint’s troops to 55,000 but despite the debate about his forces,
most agreed that his success in arming the entire population and his ability to put them on the march to
protect their freedom made his military capacity almost too dynamic to limit to 100,000 troops. In
comparison to other militaries, Korngold wrote, “the largest military George Washington ever
commanded had not exceeded 20, 000,”… and “A British army of 20,000 well-trained and excellently
equipped soldiers had been decisively defeated by Toussaint Louverture” (Korngold 1965, IX). It is not farfetched to conclude that Toussaint’s army was formidable enough to elicit apprehension and induce the
British and Americans to seek treaties to protect their territories from encroachments. These
apprehensions were made explicit in the tripartite treaty.
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the target of forces both from within and without, and, at the eve of its territorial
consolidation, without a constitutional framework for stable governance.
Governance and National Cohesion:
Having addressed the internal and external sovereignty of the
Louverturean state, Toussaint endeavored to provide it with a constitutional
framework to preserve stability, national coherence and equal regional
representations. A constitutional commission of elected officials from each region
was summoned to draft “a constitution for the island of Saint Domingue,
according to its interests which are different from those of France” (L. J. Janvier
1886, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 87). Each region was afforded two elected
representatives to craft the legal framework of the nascent Haitian state (Ardouin
1853, L. J. Janvier 1886, 2, Korngold 1965, T. O. Ott 1973, 118-9). Toussaint
could have chosen a few men he trusted to draft the constitution and excluded
the South where Mulatto leaders harbored animosity towards him and resented
black leadership. Instead, he provided an inclusive framework for the state to
ensure the representation of all ethnic, economic, and regional interests. He
wanted a legitimate state, one dedicated to the welfare of all its citizens that
could command their allegiance.
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In presenting the Constitution to the population, Bernard Borgella52, the
White mayor of Port-au-Prince and Chair of the constitutional committee made
clear that they were engaged in formulating the legal basis for an independent
state (L. Dubois 2004, 246). More importantly, he recognized that the state was
destined to manage divergent group interests and claims. Indeed, convene by
Toussaint, the Haitian framers crafted a state to address the national challenge
with which French colonialism had saddled Saint Domingue. Borgella made it
clear the objective of the new constitution, “We sought to address the needs of
the different regions and create a legal system that expands to the entire Island,”
he notes,
[W]e saw the necessity to secure workers for the
reestablishment of commerce, manufactures; the need
to cement the union between the former Spanish East
and the rest; the need to establish a clear and uniform
system for the administration of finance and correct the
irregularities; to provide safety and rights to property
owners and workers. And finally, the need to consolidate
and stabilize the internal peace; to enhance prosperity;
to make known to all citizens their rights and
responsibilities; and eliminate all the animosity and
apprehension by presenting a system of law through
which all interests can be linked (L. J. Janvier 1886, 56)53.

The Louverturean Constitution provided the basis for a social contract for the
new state: equality, freedom, the rights to payment for work performed, and the
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Bernard Borgella was a proponent of independence. The fact that Toussaint named him chair of the
constitutional commission should not be seen as a mere coincidence. It was for many a clear indication of
his intention to declare independence from France (L. J. Janvier 1886).
53

To read the full constitution, and the speech by Bernard Borgella at its submission, see (L. J. Janvier
1886, 8-23)
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rights to due process and the protection of property and personal security (L.
Dubois 2004, 247-9). With Toussaint as the Governor, the framers enhanced the
regulatory role of the state by centralizing the taxation and judicial system giving
it ultimate control over state revenues and the rule of law (Madiou 1847,
Nemours 1925, 67-94, James 1963). Theirs was the early formulation of a
presidential system. To separate the army from the everyday protection of the
citizens, a 55-man police force was established in each parish to enforce the
laws and maintain security (Lacroix 1880, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 85-7). Deviating
from the colonial administration that reserved all state employment to whites, he
ensured that competent administrators managed the institutions of the state
regardless of race, “hiring even his staunchest enemies if they had abilities that
could be of service to the new state institutions54” (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933,
James 1963, 245). In less than six years, Toussaint had made considerable
gains in his project of state crafting. As Heinl and Heinl observe,
[H]e established tariffs, levied taxes, suppressed
smuggling, stabilized the currency, organized a budget
(33 million Francs for 1801), created administrative
subdivisions, set up courts, opened schools, built roads,
reopened the theater at Cap Français, restored the
Gregorian calendar, and returned the clergy to their
ancient places and offices (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 87)

Indeed, few could dispute the fact that by 1800, the Louverturean state was
militarily and economically strong, institutionally independent, and nationally
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James Franklin, no friend of Black emancipation nor of Toussaint, commented, ”He [Toussaint] never
allowed any prejudices against white persons to influence him” (Franklin 1828, 129)
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coherent, enjoying the allegiance of the majority of its citizens55. In Toussaint’s
constitution, religious freedom, equal rights for women and children born out of
wedlock were the law (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933).
The fact that Toussaint was about to declare Saint Domingue independent
was not up for debates then nor should it be now. Indeed, both the U.S. and
Britain expected the declaration. They were formulating policies while torn
between fear and greed for profit: Profit- because both could benefit from an
independent Saint Domingue; fear because of the challenge an independent
black state posed to them as slave owning nations (R. W. Logan 1941). Louis
Joseph Janvier, the Haitian historian and diplomat, is right to argue, “Toussaint,
after having ably conceived and prepared was about to execute, in 1801 and
1802, his plan of independence,” and had it not been for a changing international
environment he would have succeeded (L. J. Janvier 1886, 25, P. H. Sannon
1920-1933) . Toussaint’s goal was not just to declare independence, but also be
able to stay independent by the power of the Louverturean state, and the
determination of its citizens to defend their right to live free with a government of
their choosing. He had dedicated the resources of the state to arm and train the
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The Louverturean state reflected a truism which Toussaint himself expressed in referring to France’s
possible adverse reaction to the new constitution, “our liberty is no longer in her hands: it is our own. We
will defend it or perish (James 1963, 281, Korngold 1965, 239). When Napoleon wrote in anger to him,
“The constitution you have written while containing some good things is contrary to the dignity and
sovereignty of the French people, of which St. Domingue is but a part” Toussaint made his intent clear; St.
Domingue, colony which is an integral part of the French Republic your letter states, seeks its
independence. Why would it not do it? The United State did the same. I will never betray the cause I have
started” (Schoelcher 1882).
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newly emancipated citizens in order to protect both the state and their own
freedom56 (Ardouin 1848, L. J. Janvier 1886, Korngold 1965).

The Demise of Toussaint’s International Coalition:
No sooner had Toussaint succeeded in securing the state that the
international system he relied on began to unravel. The U.S. resolved its conflict
with France, and Great Britain signed the treaty of Amiens securing peace with
Napoleon57 (R. W. Logan 1941). The weakness of the Louverturean international
relations strategy was apparent as both nations assisted France in its quest to
reestablish control and slavery on the island (Coradin 1987). The fear of a black
nation overwhelmed their economic interests. Moreover, the 700 Mulatto officers
who had opposed the Louverturean state and chose to leave the island rather
than serve under black leadership returned with the Napoleonic expedition
(Ardouin 1848). “Virtually all the Mulatto officers exiled after the war in the
South”, observe Heinl and Heinl (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 111). The national unity
did not last, victim of racial schism and Mulatto resistance to the inclusive
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According to the Haitian Historian Pauleus Sannon, Toussaint had brought and distributed “30 thousand
rifles, 175 thousand barrels of gun powder, and a large quantity of sabers, pistols and cavalry
equipments” (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933, t3, 3). Korngold suggests that he distributed more than 100
thousand rifles to the population, stating as he did that only “these can secure your liberty” (Korngold
1965, 237)
57

The fear of France’s wrath for supporting St. Domingue’s independence, concerns about the influence
of an independent black nation on their enslaved populations, and the challenge it could pose to their
slave-based economic system compelled every western nations to support Bonaparte’s expedition to
regain control over the island and re-institute slavery (R. W. Logan 1941, 85-90).
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Louverturean state, but Toussaint’s subsequent treacherous arrest and
deportation did not result in the destruction of the Louverturean state. The
interdependence between the nation and state he had fostered, and his belief
and confidence in the willingness of black citizens to protect their freedom and
their state proved prophetic (Schoelcher 1882, P. H. Sannon 1920-1933,
Korngold 1965). The ambitious Toussaint had crafted a state dedicated to the
liberty of its citizens and tried to ready it for independence. Although he died in a
cold dungeon in France before he succeeded in declaring the country fully
independent, his state crafting project did not die with him. It took another two
years, along with more than 100,000 deaths, 60,000 of them French soldiers, for
the Haitian revolutionaries to formally declare independence and reassert their
control over the Louverturean state, which Toussaint had so skillfully crafted (P.
H. Sannon 1920-1933). The declaration of independence by his second in
command Jean Jacques Dessalines in 1804 and the creation of an independent
Haiti finalized the march toward a responsive state.

Jean-Jacques Dessalines: the War of Independence, and the Continuity of the
Louverturean State Crafting Project:
While the west and South most defiant to the Louverturean state,
collaborated with the French invading forces, the generals, whose career started
in the North, the center of the Louverturean project, initially resisted, feigned
adherence, then declared all out war. Indeed, like the average citizen, they had
much to lose in the re-institution of slavery. However, they had violated the
Louverturean military strategy (Rulx 1945). Rather than engage the French in a
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guerrilla war, vanity and pride led them to face the Expeditionary Forces in direct
combat (Korngold 1965, L. Dubois 2004). They exposed their soldiers to
unnecessary dangers and lost many to the better armed French forces, but the
French, aided by Rigaud’s Mulatto corps, also suffered immense casualties and
were out fought in various battles that registered to date in the annals of Haitian
History (Madiou 1847, t2, 128-35, J. Desquiron 1993). The Louverturean forces
had fought the French into a stalemate. Only the Maroon bands, which Toussaint
had left outside the state’s control, followed the Louverturean military strategy.
Christophe, in observing the tactics of the insurgents, admitted the failure of the
generals to follow Toussaint’s military strategy to resist the expedition in his
conversation with the French general Pamphile de Lacroix. “If instead of fighting
we had fled before you, and alarmed the Negroes of the country, you would
never have succeeded over us. Toussaint ceased not to say what no one would
believe – ‘we have arms in our hands – pride alone makes us use them’; and
now these new insurgents have arisen up to follow that very system…” 58 (Griggs
and Prator 1968, 30). Whereas the Louverturean military leaders temporarily
joined the invasion forces feigning adherence, the grassroots guerilla defensive
structure Toussaint had armed and organized, who would later be called Cacos,
waged guerilla warfare. The “indigenous forces attacked at night, and
disappeared before resistance could be organized” with Louverturean generals in
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Also see (Lacroix 1880)for a direct account of the conversation.
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seemingly in fruitless pursuit, collaborating and binding their times for all out war.
Even with the disengagement of the organized army from these attacks, the
French were having difficulty combating these Louverturean forces involved in
what Desquiron calls “la petite guerre du peuple” (J. Desquiron 1993, 32). This
model of highly organized grassroots defense of the state would persist until the
American occupation in 1915. It is this model the Americans would set out to
destroy and these Northern guerilla groups, which the marines referred to as
bandits that would offer sustained resistance to the occupation. The Marines saw
waging war against them as necessary to the subjugation of the Haitian people
and their state.
The French understood little of the nature of the Louverturean state, and
blinded by racial arrogance, Napoleon dismissed the thought that blacks could
defeat whites on the battlefield59 (Ardouin 1848, t2). With unspeakable violence
against blacks and Mulattoes, murdering 800 at a time by drowning, The French
army overplayed their hands (Madiou 1847, v2, Ardouin 1848, v4/5, James
1963). The indiscriminate killings, the arrest and deportation of Rigaud, and
witnessing their brethren massacred or eaten alive by dogs for the pleasure of
French audiences, led Mulattoes, who came with the expedition to destroy the
Louverturean state, to doubt France’s intentions of allowing them equal rights

59

How quickly did he forget the more than 20,000 British soldiers who were been soundly defeated by
them three years prior? Warned by The French Colonel Vincent, a good friend of General Christophe and
advisor to Toussaint who had lived on the Island that the army of St. Domingue was a formidable force,
they paid little attention to his advice and exiled him to Elba (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 31).

90

with whites60 (Waxman 1931, 290). Had the French only targeted blacks, it is
conceivable that Mulattoes would have remained their allies against the
Louverturean forces and undermined the prospects of a fully independent state.
While Mulatto support of the Expeditionary Forces vacillated, Northern black
generals, weary of their treachery, prepared to reassert control over the
Louverturean state by organizing and arming the resistance under the guise of
pursuing them (James 1963, L. Dubois 2004). Despite their increasingly common
plight, Mulatto support for the French continued, their disposition against blacks
persisted. It took the reinstitution of slavery in Guadeloupe, Trinidad, and
Martinique, and the reintroduction of laws circumventing Mulatto rights to
disabuse the latter of their pretentions (Madiou 1847, Korngold 1965). As Janvier
notes,
[W]hen they realized that slavery was being reestablished, that they would be deported, killed,
enslaved or place back in the humiliating conditions they
lived prior to 1789, they made common cause with
blacks and fought against the French with whom they
had sought to subjugate the blacks (L. J. Janvier 1886,
230-1).

For the first time since the revolution started in 1791, Mulattoes, whose economic
interests, prejudices, and vanity had made them party to an expedition that came
to subjugate blacks, found common cause with and bound their interests to those
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Historians continue to debate the predisposition of Mulattoes to put their interests above those of the

nation.
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of the black citizens61 (Waxman 1931, James 1963, L. Dubois 2004). The
alliance was not an act of repentance, or an acknowledgment of their wrongs
toward blacks, but one of survival, argues Waxman. The “Mulattoes, always as a
class, the bitterest enemies of the negroes, were so completely convinced by
events in Guadeloupe and Martinique that white interests could no longer be
theirs that they began to join the rebellion” (Waxman 1931, 290). The Mulattoes’
willingness to form an alliance with blacks thus was not a recognition of the futility
of their racial vanity, nor was it to protect the Louverturean state, but rather
because without blacks they could not protect their interest and freedom. It was
an alliance of convenience doomed to failure.
The election of Dessalines, Toussaint’s second-in-command, as generalin-Chief after the black/Mulatto alliance unified former enemies under the
Louverturean banner. In less than two years, the attempt to destroy the
Louverturean project had failed; France had lost more than sixty thousand of its
best soldiers; and blacks regained control of their state, declaring the
independence Toussaint had so skillfully prepared, this time with a seemingly
unified voice formally christening their newly independent nation of Haiti
(Bellegarde 1938). Black and Mulatto cohesion, a goal unsuccessfully pursued
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According to Mulatto sympathizers Heinl and Heinl, “The atrocities of Rochambeau, the noirs’ fear of
re-enslavement, and the despair of hommes de Couleur again stripped of their rights – all these
accomplished what no ruler or regime in Haiti ever again achieved. For the first and last time in the
history of the country, Haitians of all colors spontaneously united in a single cause… It was Dessalines
himself, who in the final analysis unified his countrymen" (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 105).
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by Toussaint, had provided the Louverturean state with the most promising
possibilities.
The project of state crafting continued, not started, as most historians
suggest, with the declaration of independence and the election of Dessalines
(Madiou 1847, L. J. Janvier 1886, P. H. Sannon 1920-1933). Toussaint firmly
anchored the framework of the nation: its policies, its laws, and its institutions.
Congruent with the Louverturean constitution of 1801, Dessalines was
unanimously elected general in chief for life62 by military and regional leaders,
and the constitution and polices Toussaint had skillfully crafted formed the basis
for this now fully independent state of Haiti. However, having inherited the
Louverturean state, Dessalines was left to resolve the racial schism that had
undermine it, reassert territorial sovereignty over the Eastern part of the island,
re-establish commerce and relations with other nations, and determine the role of
whites in the new nation (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933, Rulx 1945, Nicholls 1979).
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Following the usual racialized analysis, Mulatto historian Laurent Dubois barely masked criticism when
he wrote in 2004, “Dessalines, like Louverture named himself governor for life”. Unless we assume he is
not knowledgeable about Haitian History, we have to conclude that Dubois was involved in purposeful
revisionism by ignoring the fact that all the current leaders of the revolution and regional representatives
elected Dessalines unanimously in congruence with the 1801 constitution (L. Dubois 2004, 300). He also
omits the fact that Mulatto leaders like Pétion and Boyer though they rejected the Louverturean
constitution, kept the President-for-life in their own ‘republican constitution’. Dessalines coronation as
emperor of the independent Louverturean state was the only major constitutional change but it was a
change in title only as he refused to create a hereditary monarchy and followed the same constitutional
requirements for naming a successor established by the 1801 constitution. The concern for almost all
Haitian leaders since Toussaint was to secure institutional continuity and a clear direction for a nation
dominated by violent competition for power. They struggled between establishing a monarchy or a
presidency and most, even the most republican amongst them pursued a “presidency for life”. Scholars
often overlook the fact that Duvalier’s “presidency for life” was not an aberration but rather reflected the
historical search for institutional continuity.
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The Racial Question in Haiti at Independence:
The Haitian historian Thomas Madiou argues that on the very night of the
declaration of independence, on January 1, 1804, discussions about the French
presence on the island were already underway (Madiou 1847, v3, 107). The
Louverturean state under Toussaint’s leadership had encouraged and supported
white presence and participation in state affairs. The constitutional framers, even
while recognizing the threat divergent racial and ethnic interests posed to the
Louverturean state,63 included non-discrimination articles, and secured the rights
of every citizen (James 1963). Leaders debated the roles of white colonials who
had supported the expedition, participated in their atrocities, and questioned their
allegiance. While some blacks and Mulattoes spoke of taking vengeance on the
white population who had supported the re-establishment of slavery, and
excesses of the French forces, the two former generals of the Louverturean state
under Toussaint, Dessalines and Christophe, remained committed to his
constitutional framework (Madiou 1847, Leyburn 1966). However, the presence
of French forces on the Eastern part of the island and the failure to dislodge them
raised concerns about their collusion with France for another invasion (J.
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These whites who benefited from Toussaint’s regime were the first to rise up in support of the French
and clamored for the reestablishment of slavery. They were amongst those who feted as the French
murdered, drowned, poisoned, suffocated, and set dogs on blacks and Mulattoes tied to posts to be
devoured alive (Ardouin 1848, Nemours 1925, Cole 1967, L. Dubois 2004). That feelings of the population,
soldiers, and generals ran high was no surprise, neither was the need to decide how to deal with a
population that proved a threat to the liberty of the citizens.
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Desquiron 1993, Coupeau 2008, 37). “Indiscreet comments by some colons still
in the colony reported to the authorities angered the population. They were
already complaining about Dessalines’ moderation and predisposition toward the
whites,”64 notes Madiou (Madiou 1847, v3, 113).
Post-independence Haitians, “feared that whites in the colony were
actively conspiring to prepare a new attack aimed at bringing slavery back to the
island” (L. Dubois 2004, 300). Indeed, French spies were already flooding the
Island to foment dissent and ethnic conflicts, some using false papers; and the
arrest, prosecution, and execution of some French citizens using false Dutch
papers confirmed the fears (Rulx 1945, 133-4, Coradin 1987, 46-7). Concern of
France’s return, resentments for the massacres committed by colonial forces,
and the foolhardiness of some of the remaining French population in challenging
the new order incited the population to take matters into their own hands (Cresse
1824, 72-80). Four months after the declaration of independence, all the French
citizens were killed or asked to leave the Island (Ardouin 1848, L. Dubois 2004).
The only French who remained on the island were those who had fought against
the expedition, had skills that could assist in the rehabilitation of the state, or had
a history of actively supporting the revolution (Leyburn 1966, J. Desquiron 1993,
L. Dubois 2004). Although Dessalines and the revolutionary leaders did not
initially order the massacre, once it began, they allowed their military forces to
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For a full expose of the French population actions following the declaration of independence, see
(Cresse 1824). A witness of the incidents, Cresse makes clear the temerity of the French population and
the causes for the elimination of the French population on the Island.
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participate, hoping to deter future designs on their nation. “Whatever maybe the
judgments of my contemporaries and posterity upon this required measure, as
long as I save my country,” Dessalines stated65 (Madiou 1847, v3, 119). While
Toussaint had relied on the power of the state to constrain hostile forces within
the nation, leaders of post-independence Haiti had use expulsion and
extermination to resolve the colonial question, and fear as a deterrent to
challenges by hostile forces.
However, fear and resentment were not the only driving force behind the
elimination of French colonials however. It is clear that many, especially in the
South and West, had much to gain in removing the colons (Madiou 1847, v3, L.
J. Janvier 1886, James 1963, Klooster 2009). Klooster suggests that many,
predominantly Southern and Western Mulattoes, incited the elimination of the
white population against the wishes of Dessalines and Christophe. She argues,
“self-enrichment must also count as a cause of the elimination of the remaining
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Ott argues that Dessalines invited whites back to the island and “even apologized for the killing of
innocent whites by the rampaging blacks” and brought a large number of planters back (T. O. Ott 1973,
190). He sought to continue the policies of Toussaint but in the end, he could not contain the forces that
had experienced such horrors at the hands of the French. Leyburn rejects that premise, arguing, “It may
have been a desire for revenge or he may have wished to warn France against any future attempts to
regain possession of the country” (Leyburn 1966, 33). Madiou, suggests Toussaint had secretly assembled
all the black officers at the time of Leclerc’s expedition informing them, “the time to exterminate the
whites had arrived, that they were at the last phase of the revolution, and would never be free and happy
until all the whites were massacred” (Madiou 1847, v2, 117). His assertion seems the most doubtful.
Nevertheless, neither Ott nor Leyburn’s suggestions may be far from the truth, but as for deciphering
Dessalines’ intent, no scholar has such capacity. It is clear however that he did not stop the killing and in
some instances directed some of his troops to participate. It is also clear that he did not hate whites as
Mulatto propagandists suggest; he extended citizenships to whites through naturalization, and his family
doctor was white. The mass killing of French colonials began in the South, undertaken by the Mulatto
population suggest Klooster and Leger (Leger 1907, Klooster 2009).The Conflict over plantations formerly
owned by whites confiscated throughout the West and South by Mulatto planters and some military
officers that two years later led to the assassination of Dessalines partially supports this thesis.
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French amongst whom were owners of large plantation” in the areas where
Mulattoes had the most power (Klooster 2009, 111). The pervasive assertion that
Dessalines ordered the killing of all the whites, and that no whites could own
property on the island, maintained by many scholars and detractors, should
perhaps be revisited and constitutes part of the negative propaganda
perpetuated against Haiti (Lawless 1992). Indeed, any whites, except French,
could become citizens and thus landowners (L. Dubois 2004). Besides nonFrench merchants living in Haiti, immediately following independence,
Dessalines extended Haitian citizenship to the remaining white populations that
consisted of formerly French citizens who had supported emancipation, Poles
who had defected to the revolutionaries, and Germans who emigrated earlier to
the country (Rulx 1945, v1, 130-2).
The Black and Mulatto Question:
To address the black/Mulatto animosity that had plagued Saint Domingue
prior to independence, Dessalines expanded the Louverturean constitution by
stipulating, perhaps naively, that all Haitian citizens were black, hoping to
eliminate the color distinctions and rivalries that had impeded national cohesion
(Nicholls 1979, Klooster 2009). Janvier argues,
[D]essalines really wanted that there be no color
distinction between Haitians. On many occasions, he
repeated that blacks should marry Mulattoes and
Mulattoes’ blacks to create an intimate union between
members of the national family. To demonstrate the
sincerity of his intentions, he offered his daughter
Célimène, a black of pure blood in marriage to Pétion, the
most prominent Mulatto officer (L. J. Janvier 1886, 231)
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He forbade any talk of color or racial distinctions by people in his administration,
trying to subdue the tensions that had resulted in civil war between Rigaud and
Toussaint. However, the provision of a common classification to support a unified
and coherent national identity could not change the hearts of many who saw
themselves racially and culturally superior to their black compatriots and entitled
to replace the French as their masters66. Despite Dessalines’ efforts to eliminate
the aristocracy of the skin, a Mulatto party re-emerged, rejected his leadership
and policies as uncivilized, and plotted for his demise (Ardouin 1848, v6, 69-87).
Trouillot observes,
[I]t seems likely that the Mulattoes’ greater familiarity
with western customs and values led them to judge the
manners of the former slave who was leading them as
unbecoming to a chief of state. Some clearly viewed
Dessalines’ social policies as “uncivilized.” Ironically,
many such policies, including freedom of religion, equal
rights for children born out of wedlock, and marriage and
divorce laws favorable to women, have since become
hallmark of “civilization.” But when they were formulated
by Dessalines and his trusted Jacobinist legislators…
such views were anathema to those who thought they
had a natural monopoly on civilized behavior (M.-R.
Trouillot 1990, 46)67

Larcerte suggests that in addition to their refusal to accept Dessalines’ leadership
because of his color, as old elites, Mulattoes also resented the emergence of this
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James Franklin, a British merchant and Mulatto supporter who at the time advocated against the total
abolition of slavery in the British Islands because he felt blacks incapable argues it was Dessalines
tyrannical rule not racial prejudice that led to the failure of Mulatto/black alliance. However, the Haitian
historian Thomas Madiou, a staunch Haitian nationalist respected for his impartiality, who served in both
neocolonial Mulatto and black nationalist governments, and most Haitian scholars, even those who
supports the Mulatto narrative, concede that racial and “cultural” pride, and Dessalines’ land titles
verification were the cause of the failure (Franklin 1828).
67

What is clear is that besides some minor changes, the constitution promulgated by Dessalines was
essentially a reproduction of the 1801 Louverturean constitution.
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new group of black elites represented by Dessalines with whom they competed
and to whom they felt they were playing second fiddle (Lacerte 1978, 454-5).
Dessalines met Mulattoes’ plots and anger with an unflinching determination to
continue the Louverturean project impeded by the expedition and the arrest and
murder of Toussaint in France. Agricultural production, relations with foreign
powers, the protection of the state, the need for commerce and revenue:
Dessalines’ tasks could not be delayed by Mulatto avariciousness.

Agrarian Policies and Commerce:
Much as Toussaint did after the war of emancipation, Dessalines sought
to jump start the state, its institutions and laws neglected during the war.
Moreover, expecting a return of the French and with an army of 50,000 not
including militias, and a navy of 3,000 men, Dessalines needed both revenue for
defense and expansion of the state (Madiou 1847, v3, 110).
Dessalines reorganized the plantation system, adopted the Louverturean
agrarian policies to increase production and revenue. He re-established
commercial policies and increased taxes on imports and exports with greater
oversight over the ports to limit theft of state revenue (J. Desquiron 1993, v1). To
protect local industries and commerce, he restricted the importation of products
produced nationally such as salt, and secured a role for Haitian merchants by
giving them monopoly over retails and limiting foreign transactions to wholesale
product purchased through Haitian merchants (De Pradines 1851-1865, v1, 32-3,
L. J. Janvier 1886, 43-79). He rejected British protectorate offers and asserted
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Haitian sovereignty by threatening to ban British merchants from Haitian ports,
but kept commercial relations, which had started since he took control over the
revolution in 1803. To expand commercial competition, he began commercial
relations with Holland, Dutch, and the Danes. “The continual presence of these
nations in Haitian ports”, according to former ambassador Jean Coradin, “is proof
commerce in the nation grew, and they had an interest in preserving their
commercial linkages with Haiti as Haiti had in maintaining a market for their
goods” (Coradin 1987, 30-34).
The Louverturean state whose development suffered during the expedition
was again afoot. In less than two years, the independent Haitian state was on the
move. British offer of protection in exchange for occupation of Mole St. Nicholas
was rejected by a confident state able to defend itself and unwilling to cede its
territory to any foreign power. Dessalines implemented the Louverturean
strategies that protected the state and enhance its capacity, and re-established
the administrative and judicial institutions to manage the affairs of the citizenry. In
continuation of the Louverturean state project, state policies regarding religious
plurality, marriage, the need to have a trade, and the management of ports were
all again implemented (Franklin 1828). As an indication of the continuity of the
Louverturean foreign policy and political strategy, Dessalines even kept
Toussaint’s international representative, Joseph Brunel, at his post in the United
States (R. W. Logan 1941).
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Expanding the State’s Domain under Dessalines:
Dessalines’ insistence on following the Louverturean policy of
nationalizing vacant properties to expand the State’s domain ran counter to
Mulatto interests. The day of the declaration of independence, he decreed, “all
lands owned by France in colonial days, belonged to Haiti” and established a
‘Directory of State Properties’ to manage land titles and ownership led by the
able Joseph Balthazar Inginac (Rulx 1945, v1, 6, Leyburn 1966, 38). Aware of
the land grab that followed the departure of the French planters in the South and
West following independence, he voided “all sales and donations” of lands during
the war. The most controversial policy, however, was his second decree
demanding the verification of property titles (Franklin 1828, Nicholls 1979).
According to Lacerte, “the Director of State Properties carried out an effective
investigation of these titles and confiscated 562 plantations in the west” that were
acquired illegally (Lacerte 1978, 456). Given that the Louverturean state had
secured land titles, and state control over vacant properties in the North under
Toussaint, this measure impacted mainly the West and South, bastion of Mulatto
power, where French Colons had held their properties until the final war of
independence. News of Inginac’s work in the west and the prospect of its
implementation in the south caused the first open fissure in the black/Mulatto
alliance. Southern Mulattoes who, according to Leyburn and Rulx, had “managed
by hook or crook to secure tenuous claims to vacant properties,” resisted the
state's title verification of their suspiciously acquired estates (Leyburn 1966, 38,
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Rulx 1945, 7). Bellegarde also supported Leyburn and Rulx' thesis that the rising
hostility towards Dessalines was not solely due to Mulattoes’ sense of superiority.
[A]s Long as Dessalines closed his eyes to the disorder,
no one paid attention to his faults. As soon as he
threatens, according to his expression, to “break the
bones of the thieves” and the embezzlers, complaints
began to be raised against him (Bellegarde 1938, 92).

The Louverturean project of prioritizing state power and national interests
over those of individuals gave rise to Mulatto acrimony (Madiou 1847, Lacerte
1978, M.-R. Trouillot 1990, J. Desquiron 1993). Citing their French paternity as
the source for their claims on the estates, though they were not legally the heirs
of those they now claimed, Mulattoes resisted Dessalines’ titles verification law
as an encroachment on their rights (James 1963, Nicholls 1979). This reality was
not lost to the latter, who observed,
[B]efore the war, the Mulattoes, children of the whites
received no inheritances from their fathers; why is it,
since we chased the colons, they are claiming the
estates of their white fathers who not long ago denied
their existence? Will blacks, with their fathers in Africa
not have anything then? Where are the properties of the
thousands of colons who left the island? Mulattoes are
not just content embezzling the resources of the state,
they conspire… Be careful! Blacks and Mulattoes, we
have all fought against the whites; the resources we
have acquired by spilling our blood, belong to all of us; I
intend to ensure that they are distributed with equity
(Madiou 1847, v3, 247-8)68.

In a little over a year after independence, “by confiscation of vacant and falsely
claimed estates, Dessalines had created a vast public domain,” notes Leyburn
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See (L.-J. Janvier 1886, 44-5, Nicholls 1979, 38).
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(Leyburn 1966, 39). Two third of the national domain was acquired by the
Louverturean state under Dessalines (Lacerte 1978). “Dessalines behaved
badly”, suggests Klooster, it was bad policy “to review the legal titles to estates
confiscated in the last stage of the revolution,” yet, it was a legal requirement of
the Louverturean state (Klooster 2009, 112). Using the institutions of the state to
enforce property rights, and eliminate graft brought the tension between national
and Mulatto interests to the forefront. Dessalines’ attempt to secure and exercise
control over state resources, necessary for its expansion and security, angered
neocolonial Mulatto elites who saw those resources as the source of their
personal enrichment. Worst even was his willingness to ensure that not only
state properties illegally confiscated but also resources acquired from them were
reimbursed to the state. Closing his eyes to the fleecing of the state would not
only have weakened the state in a time where the state was in need of
resources, it would have also made a mockery of the institutions so much blood
had been spilled to safeguard.
The Haitian scholar and former member of the diplomatic corps, Louis
Joseph Janvier asserts,
[W]hen Dessalines ordered Inginac to scrupulously
examined property titles and reject those that were
acquired illegally, and he was attempting to exert state
control over those estates and properties that were to be
distributed to all… He sought to create the truest
independence of the peasantry by making them
landowners (L. J. Janvier 1886, 43-7).

Acquiring the properties abandoned by French colons and reasserting control
over those owned by the state prior to independence was the precursor to the
implementation of his land distribution program, Janvier contends (L. J. Janvier
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1886). The Mulatto historian, politician, and diplomat Beaubrun Ardouin
maintains that Dessalines’ land confiscation policy was not to expand the state’s
domain or distribute to the black majority but to accumulate his own wealth
(Ardouin 1848, v3). For Nicholls, ”whether Dessalines intended to divide the land
into small properties and distribute them to the people, or whether he meant to
extend state ownership with blacks enjoying equality with Mulattoes, is not
entirely clear” (Nicholls 1979, 38). What is clear is that the South and West, much
as they did against Toussaint, took up arms to safeguard their interests at the
expense of the state. By challenging Dessalines’ attempt to provide institutional
oversight over legal transaction and implement laws designed to enhance the
power of the Louverturean state, Mulattoes placed their interests above the
welfare of the nation. The old racial animus re-emerged, and conflicts between
men sworn to defend the nation grew (Madiou 1847, v3, Bellegarde 1938).
The assassination of Dessalines in October 17, 1806, who in less than two
years after the declaration of independence had regenerated the Louverturean
state, resulting from the misalignment of national and Mulatto interests, shaped
the political history of the Haitian state. His murder, notes Coradin, “ruptured the
alliance that made 1804 possible. It was realized because of the refusal of
neocolonial, mostly Mulatto elites in the South and West, to be dispossessed of
properties they acquired illicitly” (Coradin 1987, 48). The Haitian State suffered
its second major setback, one that would shape the national struggle for power
and state consolidation until the American Occupation. While it may be true, the
struggle for which Dessalines found his death was as so much about racial
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prejudice as it was about economic interests, the most important aspect of that
struggle was to determine the type state necessary to preserve the rights and
interests of the black majority (Nicholls 1979). The death of Dessalines
accelerated the struggle between Mulatto leaders and those of the Louverturean
state. By choosing caste over nation, and sacrificing the interests of the majority
to preserve their individual quest for wealth, neocolonial Mulatto elites carved a
path divergent from the Louverturean state.
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Chapter III
THE STRUGGLE FOR A NATIONAL STATE AND ELITE FAILURE: THE DECLINE of
NORTHERN COHESION, THE RE-EMERGENCE OF NEOCOLONIAL ELITES, AND
THE RISE OF AMERICAN COERCION AND DOLLAR DIPLOMACY

Chapter III analyzes the struggle between revolutionary Northern black
nationalists and southern and western-based neocolonial Mulatto elites to
implement competing models of statecrafting. Departing from the dominant
literature of the period, the chapter contends that the infighting between Haitian
elites did not simply revolve around “color”---black elites fighting light-skinned
Mulatto elites over resources. An alternative explanantion offered in this chapter
is that the struggle for power was centered on the type of state under which Haiti
would be governed and the interests that state would represent. After the death
of Dessalines, and for decades thereafter, there was a protracted struggle
between black and Mulatto elites, as the latter challenged the Louverturean state
crafting strategy that secured the economic and political rights of the black
majority and tied the destiny and legitimacy of the nation to the welfare of its
citizens. Successive Mulatto leaders sought to replace the Louverturean state
form with a neocolonial Haitian state that restricted the rights and freedoms of the
black majority, and consolidated Mulatto hegemony. To that end, Mulatto elites
formed alliances with external patrons whose subsidies helped to reorient the
Haitian state toward a political economy that became vulnerable to American
domination and subsequent invasion.
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A Divided Haiti: Pétion and Christophe:
Three years after its independence, Haiti was divided; the state of Haiti, which
later became the kingdom of Haiti led by Christophe in the North, and the
Republic of Haiti by Pétion in the South and West. As the historian and former
Haitian ambassador Jean Coradin observes, a “political chessboard” persisted
whereby the cleavages were clearly established. Neither of the protagonists
attempted to stop the process of division in which the country would be engaged”
(Coradin 1987, 50-1)69.

This division lasted thirteen years and reflected the fundamental divergence
between a nationalist state; secure, prosperous, and legitimate based on the
Louverturean model in the North, and an unstable and weak minority-led
neocolonial state in the South and West that depended on interest manipulations,
and bargaining away the power and resources of the state to maintain its
dominance70.

The death of Dessalines represented a major break in the constitutional
history of the Haitian state and its territorial integrity. Neocolonial Mulatto elites, a
minority within the nation, sought to control the lever of political power by
circumventing the constitution and creating a new political map that gave the

69

Translation mine.

70

A short-lived secessionist movement by Rigaud in the South is often referred to as a third republic, but
internal disjuncture merely demonstrated the instability of the Mulatto state.
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south and west political dominance (Saint-Remy 1854-7). The first move by
neocolonial Mulatto elites was to abrogate the national map of 24 parishes in the
South and West and 35 in the North; each constitutionally required to elect one
deputy per parish. Mulattoes, under Pétion’s leadership, instead created fifteen
new parishes overnight in the South and West in violation of the constitution,
giving these regions, thus themselves, majority in both the assembly and senate
(Griggs and Prator 1968, 39-41). Thirty-nine deputies were elected in the South
and West instead of twenty-four, and seventy-four deputies present instead of
the constitutionally mandated fifty-nine (L. J. Janvier 1886, Cole 1967, 155). The
constitution was hurriedly amended, and the threat posed by Pétion‘s Mulatto
forces, camped in the capital, which had only recently murdered Dessalines,
silenced outright protestations. In spite of the threat, 24 senators protested the
usurpation in a letter to Christophe, the constitutional successor of Dessalines (L.
J. Janvier 1886). Given the protest letter, it is unquestionable that many feared
for their lives.
The ensuing election of Christophe was of little consequence. He was a
president without power, the first attempt of what Haitian historians have aptly
coined “la politique de doublure” – the politics of under-study. Mulattoes would
wield power with a black figurehead as president in order to maintain their
legitimacy in the face of the black majority (Saint-Remy 1857, Bellegarde 1938).
Christophe’s refusal to accept this unconstitutional act and serve as a Mulatto
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puppet was predictable given his adherence to rules and ethics, which his
government would later demonstrate71.

Pétion and Neocolonial Mulatto Statecrafting:
Pétion‘s engineered constitution had all the trappings of a neocolonial
bourgeois democracy. It was indeed a Republican constitution inspired by its
American counterparts but with little interest in national development and state
expansion. Within the context of a minority ethnic group ruling a majority
population and relying on them for their wealth and livelihood, Pétion‘s republic
operated much like an American southern plantocracy, and to boot, initially
retained the Louverturean agricultural and land policies which maintained
laborers on the plantations with little to give them in return (Bellegarde 1938,
Trouillot 1990). Pétion’s regime consisted of Mulatto landholders governing a
black majority without rights enjoyed little legitimacy (Nicholls 1979). Such a
dynamic proved unsustainable, making the need to craft a strategy to sustain
their power and dominance not only important but also necessary.
From the start, Pétion’s regime faced challenges from within. Pétion and
his neocolonial state had to contend with a lack of legitimacy and devised
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Laurent Dubois’s suggestion that lust for unlimited power led Christophe to object to the new
constitution and the process that brought it to light, contradicts facts and the historical records,
documented by those intimately involved in the affair. More importantly, it reflect the neocolonial
Mulatto bias that has so tinted studies of Haiti (L. Dubois 2011).
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strategies to secure the allegiance of the population (Saint-Remy 1854-7). His
first policy was to secure elite support. To achieve this goal, he divested the state
of its domain and revenue by giving lands and estates back to Southern and
Western landowners of his caste, and reimbursing them for lost production from
those estates confiscated by Dessalines, which they had acquired illegally (J. G.
Leyburn 1966). Heinl and Heinl notes,
[A]s further sweeteners for the elite, Pétion at the same
time repealed the 25 percent share on every crop
instituted since Toussaint and proclaimed a crop-subsidy
policy whereby in years of low prices the government
would buy up surplus sugar and coffee” (Heinl and Heinl
2005, 130-1).

To increase Mulatto access to social mobility, Pétion also reduced the
minimum amount of land holding permitted from 50 acres to 30 acres. His repeal
of the landownership clause of the Louverturean state, instituted to maintain the
large plantation system and secure the prosperity of the state, was later further
reduced to 15 acres (Moral 1961, 129-31).
Pétion’s land policies weakened and impoverished the state to line the
pockets of his caste, and secure an allegiance and legitimacy he had not earned.
Having eliminated state revenue sources, the state faced deficits, which he
remedied by issuing money redeemable through claims against state lands. The
fleecing of the state by the Southern and Western neocolonial elites facilitated by
Pétion’s neocolonial Regime led, Bonnet, one of the more scrupulous Mulatto
Southerners to observe in disgust,
In a country where corruption has hold of every branch
of government; where everyone seeks to live off the
public treasury…, venality and misrepresentation end up
as accepted norms. Every reform that tries to shut off
graft by those who profit from this state of affairs stirs up
a frenzy (Bonnet 1864)

110

Pétion’s regime employed both Inginac, Dessalines’ former director of state
properties, and Bonnet, nationalist Mulattoes known for their integrity, who had
given so much energy to combat corruption, grow the state’s coffers, and
enhance its power and holdings. Inginac and Bonnet were later forced to leave
the country for their protest against the rampant graft and corruption of the
neocolonial regime (Inginac 1843, Rulx 1945, 8-12)72. With little legitimacy, and a
weak state that neglected the majority interests, Pétion’s permissive policies
toward the elites were not even sufficient to quell dissent within their ranks.
Faced with opposition to his rule, within a year the veneer of republicanism
crumbled. Pétion governed by decree and ignored the senate. He later
disbanded it at gunpoint and created a 5-member senate down from 24, which
re-elected him for another 4 years and later nominated him as president for life
(L. J. Janvier 1886, 90, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 131).
Resistance to Pétion’s regime also emerged from the black majority. The
Maroon bands in the west and South organized by Toussaint that fought against
Rigaud during the civil war and against the French/Mulatto alliance during the
French Expedition also challenged the new Regime. Quiet under Dessalines,
they rose against the neocolonial Mulatto state that until then had shown little
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It is clear that although motivated by the prevailing racial hierarchy that had been consolidated during
slavery, neocolonial elites acted to preserve their interests. There were many Mulatto elites who
supported the Louverturean state rather than their group interests Inginac and Bonnet represented those
within the Mulatto cleavage who saw their interests as intertwined with a strong centralized
Louverturean state.
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concerns for their welfare and interests73 (Saint-Remy 1854-7). With Maroons
forcefully challenging the Mulatto state, empty state coffers depleted by policies
and largesse to his caste, and unpaid black soldiers refusing to defend the state,
in which they had few benefits, Pétion engaged in a final divestment of state land
to purchase their allegiance74. He distributed fifteen acres to every soldier with
more acreage given to officers and sold over 70,658.07 additional acres of state
lands acquired under Toussaint and Dessalines75. To address peasants’
discontent and quell Maroon revolts, he eliminated the Louverturean agrarian
code that required laborers to contract with a large plantation76.
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This would become a permanent feature of Haitian politics, with maroon bands, which became more
organized expressing their grievances by challenging state power. The Cacos in the North and Piquets,
these groups would become the vehicle through which control of the state and state power itself would
be contested.
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Pétion is widely seen as the cause for the decline of the economy of the Haitian state. Some have
argued that his policy was also an attempt to cause military defection in the North and undermine the
prosperous Northern regime of his rival, Christophe (Ardouin 1853, v3&4, Nicholls 1979). It is true that
these policies caused some defection in Christophe’s rank. According to Desquiron, Pétion’s land
distribution policies led the Mulatto population to move from the North to the South in search of lands.
The population shift and mulatrization of the South further aggravated racial character of and animus
between the two regions. The defections posed no actual threat to stability for Christophe, having
expanded his military by importing blacks to serve as soldiers in his army. Pétion’s cancellation of the rural
codes did on the other hand result in some peasant defection from the North, a dynamic that Christophe
tried to address by policing the border (Cole 1967).
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His land distribution decree in 18 December 1809 was clearly designed to garner the support of the
black-dominated military. The military land grants were as follow:
Colonels - 75 acres; Bataillon Chiefs - 45acres; Captains to second lieutenants – 30 acres; noncommissioned officers and soldiers 15 acres (Nau and Telhomme 1930, 249-50).
76

It is clear that until the black population rose up against the regime, Pétion’s policies and land
distributions only benefited his caste. It is important to note that following only Mass challenges to his
regime and his predominantly Black soldiers’ refusal to fight led to the extension of the land policies to
them.
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Saint-Mery and De Pradines argue that Pétion believe that citizens’
ownership of property would create greater allegiance to the state and a greater
willingness to defend it77 (De Pradines 1851-1865, v2, 243-6, Saint-Remy 1857,
v2, 164-5). Others have argued that he fulfilled Dessalines’ goal of redistributing
lands to those who had shed their blood for the defense of liberty (L. J. Janvier
1886, Rulx 1945). While one can debate the finer points of these assertions, it
may suffice to observe that the policies directed at the military and the black
majority came at a time when the Mulatto state faced a rising popular insurgency,
and lack of support and legitimacy from the black majority.
The ultimate attempt to buy allegiance from the soldiers, and bolster
popular support, drove the final nail in the coffin of the state. The policies of
neocolonial elites lacking popular support and legitimacy had permanently
undermined the economic structure that had formed the basis of prosperity for
the Louverturean state (Saint-Remy 1857, v5,160-67). It deprived landowners of
workers for their plantations, undercut the large plantations system, and shifted
cultivation to small landowners, and sharecroppers. This shift became one of the
primary features of the neocolonial Mulatto state; enabling Mulatto landholders to
move to the cities and live off the sharecropping proceeds as intermediaries
between peasants and foreign merchants (Jeune 1826, M.-R. Trouillot 1990).
The cost of the lack of legitimacy of the neocolonial Mulatto state was its

77

Both Trouillot and Nicholls maintained that Pétion sold more than 100,000 acres of state land most of
which benefited high-ranking Mulatto officers and administrators (Nicholls 1979, Trouillot 1990).
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permanent weakness and reliance on clientelistic networks and the exploitation
of its black peasantry. Pétion felt it necessary to secure the survival of his regime
by bankrupting the state, and divesting it of resources in order to maintain the
allegiance of its citizens.

Pétion and International Recognition:
Pétion sought to secure foreign allies in hopes of creating friendly
neighboring states. He supported Simon Bolivar’s war against Spain in Latin
America with men and munitions, mirroring Dessalines’ support for Francisco de
Miranda in 1804 (Coradin 1987). He pursued the Louverturean strategy of
gaining recognition through commerce with Britain but due to the weakness of
the neocolonial state, and unlike Louverturean state, allowed the British to dictate
the terms. The most important feature of Pétion’s foreign policy, however, was
his willingness to negotiate with France and offer payment for the recognition of
Haiti’s independence78 (Bellegarde 1938). As the following excerpt from an
official French Royal report explains, he was much more willing to negotiate with
France than was his counterpart in the North.
In 1816, ostensibly: official agents were sent to SaintDomingue to deal directly with the two leaders who
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Nicholls suggests that it is inconclusive that Mulatto leaders in the South and West, or Pétion himself
were willing to buy recognition from France. It seems more likely, he maintains, “Pétion’s private and
secret view was that some kind of French protection or Suzerainty would be desirable or at least
acceptable” but was unable to pursue it openly (Nicholls 1979, 49). Beaubrun Ardouin, the Mulatto
Ideologue, beneficiary of many posts under Mulatto regimes and architect of “la Politique de Doublure”
rejects outright the suggestion of such predisposition or the assertion that the leaders in the North and
Christophe were more uncompromising with France78 (Ardouin 1853, v8).
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shared authority on the Island. The negotiators, without
succeeding completely with Pétion, achieved a result
more satisfying from him, for they succeeded in
establishing commercial relations between France and
the Southern party of the Island under borrowed colors,
et reported from Pétion, the proposition of an indemnity
to pay to the ‘anciens colon’, and commercial
preferences, if France consented to recognize the
Haitian republic. Since the end of 1816, period of the
return of the agents to France, to Pétion’s death at the
end of March 1818, it was never again a question of
negotiations79 (G. Paul 1836, 3).

The weakness of the Mulatto neocolonial regime, and his predisposition
toward France led Pétion to compromise the very legitimacy of the revolution. As
former plantation and slave owners, neocolonial elites were torn between their
historical socio-economic interests that made them allied to white colons, and the
legitimacy of the emancipatory revolution80 (Vastey 1814). Some of his
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« En 1816, d'une manière ostensible : des agents officiels furent envoyés à Saint-Domingue pour' traiter
directement avec les deux chefs qui se partageaient l’autorité ; les négociateurs échouèrent auprès du roi
Christophe, et, sans réussir complètement auprès de Pétion, ils obtinrent cependant un résultat plus
satisfaisant de ce côté, car ils parvinrent à établir des relations commerciales entre la France et la partie
du sud de l'île sous des pavillons empruntés, et rapportèrent, de la part de Pétion, la proposition d'une
indemnité à payer aux anciens Colons, et d'avantages commerciaux, si la France consentait à reconnaître
la république Haïtienne. Depuis la fin de 1816, époque du retour des commissaires en France, jusqu'à la
mort de Pétion, survenue à l'a fin de mars 1818, il ne fut plus question de négociations » (G. Paul 1836, 3).
This report was published by the Royal library of France for the Department of Commerce in 1836.
80

However, given the offer made by the King of France, Louis XVIII, it seems that he too was aware of the
neocolonial elites’ conflict of interet and their anti-black proclevities when he proposed them the
following a decade after the revolution in exchange for recognition:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

To Pétion, Borgella and others (as long as their color approach them to the white race),
assimilation to the whites, and advantages honorific as well as fortune
To the rest of their caste currently alive, full political rights with whites, with some exceptions
that could lead to less
To all who are more or less closer to white than the pure Mulatto, limited political rights
To the free men who are fully black more limited rights
To be returned to their old masters all blacks who are working on the land and return as many as
possible those who have moved away from the plantations
Purge the island of all the blacks that cannot be admitted amongst the free who would be
dangerous with the others on the plantations
Curtail the creation of more free blacks (Ardouin 1848, V8, 25-6, 30, Coradin 1987, 81)
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contemporaries suggested that Pétion’s offer to pay an indemnity reflected this
conflict of interests and undermined the notion that the nation was justified in
declaring its independence, while others argue that his primary concern was to
secure France’s Recognition, upon which relations with other nations depended
(Vastey 1816, Vastey 1819, Delorme 1873, Coradin 1987). Whether scholars
attribute his proposition to France to his search for international recognition or to
a willingness to preserve Mulatto interests at the expense of the nation may be
conjecture. What is unequivocal is that the weakness of the Mulatto state,
Pétion’s upending of the Louverturean state crafting project, and Christophe’s
adherence to it dictated their reaction to France and reflected both historical
reality and an ideological disposition (Madiou 1847, Leger 1907, Bellegarde
1938). While Pétion dinned and entertained the French envoy, Christophe
arrested and jailed his for daring to suggest the recognition of French sovereignty
and having on his person papers advocating for the reinstitution of the old regime
(Cole 1967).
The rejection of the Louverturean state model by Pétion, and
consequently, the social contract that secured the protection and allegiance of
the black majority undermined the capacity and prosperity of the state,

Nicholls’ suggestions that these distinctions, maintained by force for over two hundred years, which
the king sought to reinstitute, did not create cleavages with core interests that influenced their
statecraft and governance model requires re-evaluation.
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weakening legitimacy and support to his regime. Having neglected the black
majority, Pétion could not rely on them to defend the neocolonial state against
foreign encroachments despite its clientelist schemes. Thus, as it was with
Rigaud, argues Nichols, the neocolonial elites “believed that the best way for
their caste to survive was to submit to France” (Nicholls 1979, 51). Lacking in
legitimacy, and without the support of the majority, the regime felt compelled to
not only seek foreign support, but to engage in an ill-conceived negotiation With
France offering to pay with resources it lacked for a freedom its citizens rightfully
acquired.
Ardouin and Saint-Mery argue that Pétion’s state model provided a degree
of peace and individual rights in the south and west. For the two scholars, the
decline of commerce and the weakness of the neocolonial Mulatto state were
more the result of national adjustment than policy. The happiness of the
population, they contend, more so than its commerce is a better marker of its
success, ignoring the discontent and armed resistance of the black population on
the state (Ardouin 1848, V4, Saint-Remy 1857). Nevertheless, even Leyburn, the
passionate Mulatto apologist, concluded,
Pétion saw prosperity slowly wane, cultivation decline,
profits give way to deficits… The fact remains that his
country was rich when he came to power and poor when
he died, united in 1806, and divided in 1818. Candor
compels his admirers to admit that many of the
calamities of the social and economic history of Haiti can
be traced back to Pétion’s administration (J. G. Leyburn
1966, 53 & 62).

Pétion’s death from yellow fever in 1818 did not end the Mulatto state crafting
experiment. His successor, President Jean-Pierre Boyer expanded the reach of
the neocolonial state. Two years after the death of Pétion following the death of
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Christophe, the Northern Louverturean state was disbanded and the Island
forcefully united. The neocolonial Mulatto state became the national model.

Christophe and the Survival of the Louverturean State:
As a black officer under Toussaint since the start of the revolution, he
understood the cost of freedom and had supported Toussaint plan to create a
state capable of defending it. Christophe had the interests of the Louverturean
state and nation in mind, and saw in its strength the very foundation for the
preservation of his own individual freedom and the nation’s citizens. Despite the
political constraints and the urgency of organizing the country’s defense to
protect its independence, his regime and political acts, in essence, prove more
republican and legitimate. Janvier notes,
[H]is 1807 constitution was more appropriate to Haiti’s
political needs for a country, to the leadership of which,
all citizens thought necessary to place a military officer
capable of defending its independence (L. J. Janvier
1886, 82)

More importantly, the new constitution of the Northern State reasserted the 1801
Louverturean constitution by eliminating the post-revolutionary foreign ownership
clause81 passed by Dessalines, offering full protection to foreign merchants,
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Vastey argues that while it was fine to exclude French from property ownership, it was unfair to exclude
other nationals, as well as unhelpful to the national development and commerce. This is particularly
important given baron de Vastey’s role as council to the king, and state ideologue (Vastey 1817, 207). .
Ironically, restrictions on foreign land ownership were reestablished in 1819 at the suggestion of the
British Abolition, and Christophe’s Ambassador at large Thomas Clarkson in a letter to King Henry dated
June 28, 1819. For a full copy of the letter and the King’s response, see (Griggs and Prator 1968, 146, 167).
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allowing foreign ownership of property in the city, and encouraging foreign
economic involvement and investments (Franklin 1828, 200-1, Ardouin 1853,
V7,14, Nicholls 1979, 52)82. As the Louverturean ideologue, Demesvar Delorme
remarked, the goal was to create a prosperous state for “prosperity is power”,
and the Louverturean state needed a prosperous state and foreign merchants to
find adequate resources to buy armaments for its defense (Delorme 1873, 138).
As Toussaint and Dessalines before him, Christophe’s regime was based on
economic and military power backed by a social contract between the state, its
elites, and the masses.
As Toussaint and Dessalines did before him, Christophe raised taxes on
imports, enacted laws that restricted the importation of certain products such as
white sugar to protect the national sugar industries and expand consumption of
national goods (Gazette 1808, Vastey 1817). The state blocked the foreign
imports of foodstuff to ensure national self-sufficiency and required all planters to
produce food for national consumption in addition to increasing production for
exports. Baron de Vastey, the Secretary of State and state ideologue, was
unequivocal about Christophe’s intent when he wrote, “A nation must be able to
supply herself with everything she principally needs. “If she depends on foreign
markets for subsistence, she has no more her independence in her hand”
(Vastey 1817, 53-4). To further the quest for self-sufficiency, the Northern regime
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James Franklin, a British merchant was particularly interested in the growth of commerce in the North.

119

built weaving mills that were so successful it became unnecessary to export
cotton, as it was needed for national production (Vandercook 1928, 135).
Christophe's fidelity to the Louverturean project of securing the nation, and
crafting a strong state through commerce, self-sufficiency, and military power,
made his regime the center of commerce, development, and security, and one of
the most successful in Haitian history (Cole 1967). Whereas, under Pétion graft
was the norm, which led him to comment, “All men are thieves”; the Northern
regime was known for its safety and the integrity of its citizens (Leyburn 1966,
Cole 1967, Griggs and Prator 1968).
The British merchant, James Franklin, no supporter of black leadership,
observed, Christophe’s “regulations unquestionably display sound views of policy
which ought to have ensured the welfare of the country, together with the security
and happiness of its people” (Franklin 1828, 210). Others also noted the success
of the Louverturean project under Christophe.
The state coffers were filled to overflowing – the annual
revenue amounting to three and a half million dollars, the
nobility and landowners became wealthy, and want and
hunger disappeared” (Griggs and Prator 1968, 55).

Dutch, Americans, English, Danes, and Swiss merchants competed for access in
this most lucrative market in Northern ports. Properties of British merchants in
Cap-Haitian alone were valued at over one million dollars (Cole 1967,
189).Franklin’s observation of the Louverturean Northern state is most telling:
“agriculture was smiling, the produce of the soil increasing considerably, [and]
commerce was making rapid progress, and bidding fair to become equally
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advantageous to the state.” The state generated revenue “sufficiently ample for
all the exigencies of government” (Franklin 1828, 219).
Unlike Pétion’s regime, whose entire administrative and military leadership
was composed of Mulattoes, among Christophe’s most important administrators
and military officers were Mulattoes, blacks, and whites committed to the
Louverturean state model. British, Dutch, Scots, Americans, Spaniards were also
involved in the Northern regime. Christophe was interested in the development of
his compatriots and the state and spared no resources to that end (Rodman
1954). British officers headed his navy and trained Northern sailors in marine
craft (Cole 1967, 162-73). He hired agricultural experts from England, and bought
tools from foreign companies to improve cultivation. German architect assisted in
the development of his infrastructure. He sought the help of teachers from
England and Philadelphia, requested teachers from the British foreign school,
and opened five national public schools using the Lancastrian83 method to
accelerate the education of his population (Griggs and Prator 1968).
Christophe encouraged the creation of private schools, and founded
academies for professional training (Vandercook 1928, 150, Rodman 1954, 17,
J. Desquiron 1993, 40). He understood that a population that was denied the
right to an education could not effectively sustain the independence and
prosperity of the Louverturean state without remedy. He also understood the
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According to Desquiron, the Lancastrian method meant that teachers taught in the morning, and the
most advanced students transmitted their knowledge in the afternoon to other students. This process he
notes accelerates the alphabetization rate (J. Desquiron 1993, 40-1).

121

false claim of superiority upon which white supremacy rested. Cole is right to
assert, “The project closest to his heart was the education of his people. He saw
clearly that learning was the only sure safeguard of their continuing freedom”
(Cole 1967, 229). Thus, Christophe expanded the Louverturean project to
safeguarding the independence of the nation through prosperity, commerce, and
a strong state backed by not only an armed, but also an educated and
enlightened citizenry84. Out of a population of 240,000, notes the Diplomat,
senator, and historian Edner Brutus, 72,000 were already alphabetized in the
North (Brutus 1948, 51-7). The Louverturean educational policy was so thorough
that it regulated absences and required every boy ten years or older, in addition
to their education, to learn a trade (Vandercook 1928, 151). His was not a
plantocracy or a neocolonial state based on exploitation, extraction of resources
from the masses for external gain and personal enrichments, he was crafting a
nation of actors not idlers where every citizen would contribute to its
development. Whereas education was reserved for the neocolonial elites in
Pétion’s regime, it was compulsory and free in the North (Vandercook 1928,
150). In the Louverturean state, schools flourished, a printing press was
established, monuments, palaces, schools, even a theater was built, and
fortresses were erected at the ready to defend the nation against encroachments
by foreign powers (Griggs and Prator 1968, 55).
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After learning of Christophe’s educational policies, Pétion did follow suit by creating a Lycée to
Christophe’s seven public and professional schools. Moreover, the school as it were was in Port-Au-Prince
and exclusively dedicated to elite Mulattoes (Brutus 1948, Nicholls 1979, J. Desquiron 1993).
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Agricultural and Commercial Policies:
Christophe’s Northern regime continued the Louverturean agrarian
policies, but expanded and protected the rights of agricultural workers with
required breaks for breakfast, lunch, a two-hour mid-day rest, time for dinner. He
established a five-day work week, with Saturdays and Sundays off to allow
workers the time to tend to their own fields and pursue their personal economic
and social interests and address the causes of worker discontent experience
under Toussaint. Moreover, to secure compliance by landowners and workers,
he replaced Toussaint’s 52 police inspectors with 70 especially trained police
officers stationed in each of the thirty-five provinces (Griggs and Prator 1968, 50,
Heinl and Heinl 2005, 136).
Christophe continued the Louverturean project of state expansion by
expanding the state’s domain started by Dessalines, increasing worker’s
protection, and bolstering the state’s regulatory and institutional capacity. He
distributed and sold lands indiscriminately to Mulattoes, whites, and blacks (J. G.
Leyburn 1966, Cole 1967). These land policies were designed to increase state
revenue and provide resources for reconstruction and state expansion. Unlike
Pétion, Christophe’s land grants and sales were not to secure allegiance but
were predicated on a required annual production yield by the grantee or buyer,
creating an incentive for increased production, and state revenue and capacity
(Nicholls 1979, 54). These policies increased both production and commerce,
and through taxation, the revenue needed to expand the state institutions, and
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improved its military capacity and training. He also continued the Louverturean
state-centered policy of leasing state lands to government and military officials
who had a stake in increased production, commerce, and state revenues. One of
the most important additions to the Louverturean project was the institution of a
successful monetary policy and a currency – the Gourde - to manage internal
commerce85 (Vandercook 1928, 108-9).

International Relations in the Louverturean State:
In no area was the determination of Northern Louverturean leaders to
preserve the sovereignty of the state, the integrity of the nation, and manage its
international affairs more uncompromising. Christophe had fully adopted the
Louverturean international relations’ model of enticing nations through
commerce, and linking state autonomy to their commercial interests. Such a
model was predicated on ensuring a level of agricultural production to sustain the
commercial needs of multiple nations (Rayford 1941). The fear of another French
invasion made the recognition of independence the primary focus of all Haitian
leaders. Whereas Toussaint was able to couch his project of state crafting, and
drive toward independence behind the rhetoric of allegiance to France, the formal
declaration of independence gave no cover or protection to the new nation,
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In an attempt to emulate Christophe, Pétion created a tin currency, ridiculed by his citizens as Serpenta-monaie - snake money, for its lack of value (Leger 1907, J. G. Leyburn 1966).
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making international recognition of Haitian sovereignty the single most important
goal.
Despite the animosity between Mulattoes and blacks, specifically between
Christophe and Pétion, Nicholls argues, both Haitian leaders were equally
committed to preserving Haitian independence. “The public and official policy of
both Pétion and Christophe was that national independence must be defended at
all costs,” he wrote (Nicholls 1979, 49). They had differing view, however, on the
type of recognition to pursue. Pétion was content with a protectorate status
whereas leaders of the Louverturean state wanted unequivocal and unconditional
recognition by other nations86 (Cole 1967, 179-81).
The success of the Louverturean state under Christophe gave it relevance
and leverage in international commerce. Yet, France’s power and the dominance
of the slave-based economic system were such that despite their commercial
interests, other nations dared not recognize Haitian independence (Wallez 1826,
Coradin 1987). Christophe’s commercial relations with the British were good, and
despite the act of the American Congress banning commerce with Haiti between
1806 and 1809, American merchants proved useful in securing Haitian autonomy
and implicitly its independence, but not enough for overt recognition as was the
case with Toussaint (Rayford 1941, Nicholls 1979). Other neutral nations also
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Had the black and neocolonial Mulatto elites maintain their unity; their common goal would have been
facilitated by the national expansion, and consolidation of the Louverturean state. Their failure to do so
meant that only the Northern state had the capacity and was fully committed to securing its
independence whereas the neocolonial Mulatto state could not.
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flocked to Northern ports to benefit from the commercial advantages Christophe’s
kingdom offered87 (Cole 1967).
The Northern State enjoyed an implicit recognition of its independence,
and nations engaged with its representatives on that basis (Vastey 1816,
Vandercook 1928). Christophe asserted the nation’s sovereignty by arresting
foreign merchants who violated its laws, confiscating ships and their cargo for
infringing on the Nation’ sovereignty, protected its national waters by a wellorganized naval fleet, and compelled the British and the Americans to recognize
and respect its laws88 (Cole 1967, 182-90). He had found in the abolitionists
Wilberforce and Clarkson supporters to his cause, willing to serve as agents in
England and Russia, and thus expanded the state’s representation and outreach
to other nations89 (Griggs and Prator 1968, 126, 140-6).
The eagerness of the neocolonial Mulatto state leaders to negotiate with
France reflected an emotional and cultural dependence on a country that still
considered them second-class citizens. On the other hand, the Louverturean
state’s categorical refusal to deal with France without a piori recognition of the
nation’s independence was a clear indication of their independence and
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Due to the lack of production in the South, nations were less interested in doing business in its ports.
Pétion’s government had to lower taxes to entice nations, Allowed French ships to frequent its ports, and
even sought British protectorate in 1810 fearing attack from both Christophe from the North and Rigaud
in the South who had returned from France and taken control over the South (Cole 1967, 176-80).
88

See the Von Kapp Brunce Affair (R. W. Logan 1941, 188). Also, see Consular dispatches, Cap-Haitien,
lettre de Monseigneur de Compte de Limonade Ministre des Affaires Étrangères. 24 Avril 1818.
Communique from William Taylor to Monroe 20 May 1818.
89

For copies of the correspondence between Christophe, Clarkson, and Wilberforce and between the
abolitionists and representative of the Northern state, see (Griggs and Prator 1968, 103-280).
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determination not to enter negotiation with France from a position of
subordination (Vastey 1814, Pre zeau 1815, L'an 12 de L'independence, 4-5).
Contrary to its counterpart, France had no emotional or cultural hold on the
Louverturean state.
Scholars have long mused on the predisposition of the two regimes,
suggesting the precariousness, flaws, and lack of legitimacy of the neocolonial
Mulatto state as the cause for their willingness to entertain negotiations with
France, and offer to pay a ‘reasonable indemnity’ for recognition90 (Wallez 1826,
Leger 1907, 163, Nicholls 1979, 51). When France approached the two states
again in 1816, in another attempt to reassert its sovereignty over the Island, the
Louverturean state led by Christophe again took the lead in setting the conditions
for negotiations from a position of strength,
[W]e will not negotiate with the French government
unless it is on the same level: sovereign with sovereign,
nation with nation! No negotiations will take place with
this nation without being firmly based in the recognition
of the independence of the kingdom of Haiti in matters of
government and commerce. The French flag will not be
admitted in any of our ports, nor will any French citizen
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Negotiations with the French agent Dauxion Lavaysse would have continued under Pétion had
Christophe not published the information he gathered from Medina, forcing him to break off negotiation
(Leger 1907, Griggs and Prator 1968, 59). Scholars, partial to Pétion have often pointed out his public
pronouncement after he broke off negotiations with Lavaysse. What they conveniently ignored is the fact
that negotiations were stopped only because of pressure from Christophe’s publication of the materials
he confiscated from Medina. More importantly, they overlook the fact that it was Pétion who wrote,
without prompting, to the French envoy, “I propose to your excellency to establish the bases of an agreed
indemnity which we shall solemnly engage to pay, accompanied by any just guarantee that may be
required of us”, weakening the Haitian position (Wallez 1826, 169, Nicholls 1979, 51). Baron de Vastey,
the Northern ideologue and member of Christophe’s leadership council rejected the notion of paying for
the recognition of Haitian independence in a scathing manifesto (Vastey 1817, 53-4, 1814).
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until France unequivocally recognize the independence
of Haiti91 (Ardouin 1848, V8, 252,5, Leger 1907, 164-5).

Having been previously embarrassed by Christophe’s publication, Pétion
followed suit this time, linking the recognition of Haitian independence as
precondition for negotiations. Neither would live to see full recognition of Haiti but
the implementation of Pétion’s indemnity proposal would have a lasting impact
on the nation by indebting it, establishing its dependence, consolidating its
neocolonial status, and depriving it of much needed resources for development92
(Nicholls 1979, 50).

Christophe: Unintended Consequences of the Louverturean State:
While hierarchy and status dominated the neocolonial state, a sense of
equality pervaded the North (Harvey 1827, 120-1). Comparing the North to the
South, Nicholls notes,
[I]n the kingdom, there was a considerable spirit of
equality in spite of the elaborate façade of aristocratic
hierarchy, while in the republic, a careful reading of the
constitution as well as an examination of the practice,
would reveal that, despite talk about the sovereignty of

91

The original letter from King Henry to Thomas Clarkson’s his British advisor can be found in (Griggs and
Prator 1968, 276-80).
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As I have pointed out before, his offer of indemnity had unfortunately been made. It is on that offer
that future negotiations will be based. The Haitian Diplomat Jean Coradin wrote, “in not limiting the
negotiations to a single proposition: unconditional recognition and in proposing an indemnity that was
not even demanded, Pétion seemed to have gone beyond French designs, without contemplating the
consequences that would result from such an act (Coradin 1987, 77). While the assertion that the
indemnity was an offer by Petion is at best revisionist, it is clear that the weakness of his government
compelled him to accept it while Christophe rejected it outright. A rather interesting fact is that the
indemnity paid for the confiscation of the properties of former colons, the very properties Western and
Southern elites embezzled, and resisted Dessalines’ attempts to reintegrate in the state’s domain. The
neocolonial Mulatto state paid restitutions for stolen properties in the possession of its elites.
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the people, real power was in the hands of a small selfperpetuating elite (Nicholls 1979, 59).

However, this spirit of equality and the legitimacy of the regime did not eliminate
internal dissent. Samuel Huntington’s contention that economic development
brings internal pressure for political change seems relevant in analyzing the rise
of dissent in the North (Huntington 1965). The success of the Louverturean state
created frictions between its elites. Moreover, contrary to the exclusionary
practices in the neocolonial Mulatto state, the rise of blacks in positions of power
created resentments from many Northern Mulattoes who had always maintained
a sense of superiority and entitlement to leadership and power. Yvan Debbasch
argues that some Mulattoes under Christophe were not pleased that they were
placed on equal footing with blacks and collaborated with the rival neocolonial
state, seeking the overthrow of the successful Northern Louverturean state
(Debbasch 1967, 254).
The re-emergence of old racial dynamism and a failed Mulatto uprising led
to a wave of Mulatto migration from the North to the South. This mulatrization of
the South furthered the North/South racial antagonism, and Northern Mulatto
collaboration with the neocolonial Mulatto state created instability and an internal
insurgency movement (Cole 1967, J. Desquiron 1993, 41). Despite appeals by
Baron de Vastey, and Chevalier Pre Zeau, Mulattoes and ideologues of the
Northern regime, for Mulattoes to bind their interests to those of the Louverturean
state and its citizens, Mulatto rebellions, plots, and collusion with Pétion’s
neocolonial regime and later his successor Boyer were constant (Pre zeau 1815,
L'an 12 de L'independence, 6, 17, Vastey 1819, Nicholls 1979, 56). Following
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Christophe’s stroke, the power that held sway over the varied interests in his
kingdom waned. His resulting paralysis allowed those within his regime that only
fear and state power held in check, to foment rebellions to undermine the very
regime dedicated to serve them and the nation (Cole 1967). Mulatto uprisings
and defections grew, creating a level of instability, and elite ambitions resulted in
internal divisions that ultimately led to the overthrow of the regime, and the death
of Christophe (Vandercook 1928, 162-5, Cole 1967, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 1389). One could argue that Christophe’s failure to find a balance between the
interests of neocolonial elites within his regime and those of the state and the
masses, his insistence on pushing his people too quickly to expand the state and
create a nation worthy of international praise, and his failure to recognize and
address Mulattoes’ divergent interests, led to internal schisms and destruction of
the Louverturean state upon his death. However, not much could have been
done by Christophe besides sacrificing the state and its citizens. It was
neocolonial elites who sought the destruction of the Louverturean state and
subjugation of the black majority to preserve their economic, caste, and political
interests. The cost of their success continues to be felt after almost 200 years.
Those who overthrew him hoping to benefit from the power and gain
control of the state he had so skillfully crafted regretted the act that not only gave
control of the northern state to the Southern Neocolonials regime, but
undermined the Louverturean state crafting project leading to the decline of the
nation (Cole 1967, Griggs and Prator 1968). The English merchant and author
James Franklin, who was no friends of Haiti and black freedom, captured the
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result of the fall of the Louverturean state best when he wrote, “Had Christophe
lived, he would have raised his country in affluence and in civilization, but his
death has sunk the former, and retarded the latter” (Franklin 1828, 231)

Boyer: The Ascendency of the Neocolonial Mulatto State in a United Haiti:
The ascendency of Jean-Pierre Boyer as President of the Mulatto state in
181893, followed by the death of Christophe, led to the forceful unification of the
nation and the nationalization of the Mulatto state project (Cresse 1824, Rodman
1954). The reassertion of control over the Spanish part of the Island in 1822
would further entrust the Mulatto state with full control over the destiny of the
Island. For the first time since the death of Toussaint, Haiti had reasserted
sovereignty over its national territory by formally reuniting the island of
Hispaniola. However, far from leading to the enhancement of the nation, Boyer’s
25-year leadership remains one of the most damaging in the story of the nation
resulting in both national neglect and international indebtedness rendering the
nation forever subservient and dependent as a neocolonial state.
The expansion of state control over the entire island ran counter to the
interest of Spain, the United States, and Britain whose policies had been to limit
the power and potential of the Haitian state, and curtail its influence (Lodge 1904,
R. W. Logan 1941). It is this policy, which prevented Toussaint from formally
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Boyer’s ascension to power was not without controversy. It took the intervention of the presidential
guard to compel the senate to elect him as president of the republic (Heinl and Heinl 2005).
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declaring independence in 1801, supported the separation of the country into two
states, and now isolated it after its successful territorial re-unification. Rather than
influencing the recognition of independence, the reunification served as further
rationale for denying it94. This became clear to Boyer and other Haitian leaders
when Britain and the United States recognized the independence of Mexico and
other newly independent Latin American states, and when even the Latin
American states assisted by Haiti in their struggle for independence refused to
recognize Haiti as an independent state (Leger 1907, 175). Worse was the
refusal of the United States to treat Haiti as a nation, and the exception made in
the Monroe Doctrine, which restricted its application and protection to Haiti while
expanding it to all the newly independent Latin American states (R. W. Logan
1941, 186, Weeks 2008). Faced with an international environment increasingly
hostile, the realization that Haiti could no longer rely on British commercial
interests as a safeguard against France, Boyer re-engaged France in the
negotiations began under Pétion (Cole 1967). For the first time since
independence in 1804, the Haitian state, in its neocolonial formulation, was
vulnerable.
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Haitian leaders were also aware that Britain, while banning slavery, had extended France’s right to buy
slaves for five years with the goal of eliminating all Haitians and replacing the population with slaves.
Many of those leaders, who had long believed that Britain would be the first to recognize the
independence of their nation, were disillusioned. Christophe, while seeking recognition without
compromise, pursued the Louverturean model of creating a state strong enough to deter attacks. Like
Toussaint, he had challenged the British naval blockade imposed on Haiti since 1797, and tried to build its
own naval fleet.
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Thus, the national ascendency of the neocolonial Mulatto state project,
even with territorial expansion, did not succeed in enhancing state power and
national prosperity but became a vehicle for elite enrichment at the detriment of
the nation. Worse, it increased the enemies and vulnerability of the state by
angering the new Latin American states and reducing the commercial linkages
that existed between Haiti and other nations by not following adequate policies to
enhance national production (P. Sannon 1905, J. G. Leyburn 1966). Victim of the
neocolonial Mulatto state project, the Haitian nation, found itself without recourse;
its prosperity and commerce weaker, its military, one the most feared in the
Western Hemisphere, disorganized and disengaged, and unable to sustain its
autonomy without external protection and international recognition (Wallez 1826,
P. Sannon 1905). This emerging neocolonial state was not even in a position to
negotiate without preconditions (P. Sannon 1905, 19).
Its leaders had already undermined the legitimacy of Haitian
independence by proposing an indemnity. Boyer furthered this process by
sending representatives to continue the negotiations on the same terms95. This
weakness of the Haitian state empowered France to decree, unilaterally, the
conditional independence of Haiti on 17 March 1825. With an armada of fourteen
warships, France entered Haitian waters compelling the Haitian government to
agree to the imposed conditions for recognition: 150,000 francs as indemnity,
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According to the French ministry of finances, the government of Jean-Pierre Boyer, represented by
Baron de Machau entered in negotiations with France to renew its commitment to pay an indemnity for
the full recognition of Haiti. See Report from the French Ministry of Finances and capitalists, 1828 and (G.
Paul 1836).
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and the reduction in half of tariffs and taxes for French merchants in Haitian
ports96 (Wallez 1826, Esmangart 1833, G. Paul 1836, Coradin 1987). Not only
did France compelled Haiti to pay an exorbitant price for recognition, the
imposition also reduced the state revenue needed to pay it by giving France
dominance over Haitian commerce as the most favored nation, and by reducing
their taxes by half (P. Sannon 1905, Leger 1907, Rulx 1945). No other nations in
the American continent suffered such infringement on its right to selfdetermination.
In less than five years after the fall of the Louverturean state, neocolonial
elites had managed to weaken the nation and alienate the very black population
on whose shoulders the protection and prosperity of the nation rested. This
national affront, made possible by the predominance of Mulatto caste interests
over those of the nation, remains one of the lasting wounds of the neocolonial
Mulatto state project (L. J. Janvier 1886).
The power of the Louverturean state rested on commerce, military power,
and the balance of elite interests, state interests, and the interests of the majority.
With the ascendency of the neocolonial Mulatto state, such balance had
disappeared and with it the economic and military power of the state. This loss of
power enabled France to impose conditions on the young Haitian nation and
compel its representatives to sign an agreement, which wounded its national
conscience and pride and destroyed its economic independence.
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For a full account of the indemnity, see the French Commercial Journal Le Constitutionnel, 1919, p3
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Although Boyer continues to be faulted for buying an independence that was
already in the nation’s possession, the recognition by France upon which all
other recognitions depended resulted in the recognition of Haiti a year later by
Britain, Holland, Switzerland, and Denmark (Leger 1907, 182). The Mulatto
regime had ended the limbo status and isolation of the Haitian state in
international Affairs at a cost that consolidated its neocolonial position and
established its dependency status. This is perhaps the only area besides
unification where the Mulatto regime succeeded, tying the new republic to the
metropole through resource expropriation. Had the neocolonial Mulatto elite not
incurred the indemnity, perhaps history would have judged them less harshly.
However, by placing a prosperous and debt-free nation in debt to France, and
borrowing from French banks to service that debt, they structured the nation into
permanent subservience, the Mulatto elite dealt Haiti a fatal blow97.

Boyer and Neocolonial Mulatto Hegemony:
Boyer further accelerated the racial stratification of the nation, as “more of
the people enjoyed less and less with the aristocratic Mulatto caste” (Rodman
1954, 19). His 25-year presidency consolidated Mulatto control over the state
and resulted in the disenfranchisement of the black nation. The public schools

97

See Emprunt D’Haïti – Rapport a Monsieur le Président du Conseil des Ministres du Roi de France –
Paris, le 15 Décembre 1830 et 29 Janvier 1831 signe par le général Lemoine, Président de la Commission
et Filleau, Felines, Santerre et G. Paul Commissaires. Imprimerie de Setier.
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established under the Louverturean regime of Christophe in the North that
alphabetized over 72,000 citizens were closed, or turned into barracks for
southern soldiers; the efforts to improve the population were indefinitely
suspended (Leger 1907, Cole 1967). No government did more to exclude blacks
from state positions and eliminate the possibility of them ever attaining those
positions by systematically eliminating their access to education than Boyer’s.
James Franklin, the merchant and British representative in Port-au-Prince at the
time observed,
[I]t is the prevailing sentiment of the people of color, that
blacks should be kept in their present state of ignorance,
and so long as the government be composed of people
of the former class, the latter will remain in their present
condition (Franklin 1828, 399).

The neocolonial Mulatto state project intensified under Boyer, sought not just
Mulatto domination of the state, and the preservation of Mulatto interests, but the
complete and indefinite exclusion of the black population from the levers of
power (Heinl and Heinl 2005). Destroying existing schools and systematically
eliminating their access to education was one of the strategies used to facilitate
that endeavor (P. Sannon 1905, Rodman 1954, 18-20). In less than a year after
the demise of the Louverturean state, the neocolonial Mulatto state “was already
buttressing its elite status by denying literacy and education to the black masses
of the North, and the Artibonite and, in general to peasant and cultivators
everywhere” (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 154).
Besides the educational policies that delayed the advancement of the
Black population, the neglect of the state institutions in the North that were the
source of stability and development was a major strategy to weaken the
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prospects for the re-emergence of the Louverturean project. The disregard for
the laws, agriculture, and commerce, the source of so much wealth and
international competition in that region, constituted a systematic subordination of
national interests to facilitate Mulatto domination and the supremacy of the
neocolonial state (Charmant 1905, Cole 1967). The crafters of the neocolonial
Mulatto state at the height of their power, with the opportunity to lead a united
nation, and provide Haitian citizens with the leadership necessary to consolidate
a prosperous nation, chose their caste over the national welfare. They engaged
in racial separatism and exclusion instead of fostering a national identity and a
unified nation dedicated to the welfare of its citizens.
To consolidate its power, the Boyer regime engaged in a systematic
dismantling of black leadership, substituting competent northern black leaders for
inexperienced southern and western Mulattoes, and murdering prominent
northern elites and high-ranking army officer, while exiling others to southern
towns under Mulatto control (Wallez 1826, 337-343). In less than a decade,
Mulattoes had succeeded in pushing blacks out of leadership positions, and
eliminating the prospects of their children ever developing the capacity to
challenge their hold on state power. In his usual apologist sentiment, and
ignoring the success of the North under black leadership, Leyburn argues that it
was a lack of educated blacks and not Boyer’s intention to create a Mulattodominated state. Despite his inclination, he was forced to admit, “during Boyer’s
time class distinctions became fixed, in large part although not wholly, on the
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basis of color” (J. G. Leyburn 1966). Haitian scholar Alcius Charmant offers us a
clearer assessment of the consolidation of Mulatto power under Boyer,
[I]n systematically excluding blacks from participation in
important state functions of the nation, in denying their
children access to education, in pushing his egotism to
the point of closing professional and primary schools, as
well as the academies that Christophe had opened in his
kingdom, president Boyer thought he found the solution
that would render his aristocratic power indestructible,
and permit the men of his caste to become the only
masters of the territory (Charmant 1905, 211).

Thus, by placing their personal and caste interests above those of the nation,
neocolonial Mulatto elites, managed to undermine the viability and autonomy of
the Haitian state, structure its dependence on foreign powers and banks, and
create the conditions for national bankruptcy, and decline (Franklin 1828, L. J.
Janvier 1886, Rodman 1954). The nation previously economically independent
became the first victim of the neocolonial system. Had neocolonial elites tied their
interests to those of the nation, had they not felt themselves an extension of their
former masters thus entitled to crafting and controlling a state designed to protect
their interests, the Louverturean state crafting project would have endured and
secured the prosperity of the Haitian state and its citizens. The presence of a
state established against the interests of the nation became the symptom of the
Haitian national maladies (Trouillot 1990).

Boyer and the Orientation of the Neocolonial State:
Despite its Mulatto orientation, the Boyer regime was the target of young
Mulatto aristocrats who wanted a change from the old guard who dominated
state positions (Leger 1907). The exiled of black military officers, the exclusion of
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Black nationalist elites in state affairs, and the extension of that exclusion to the
masses through the rural codes also angered black elites and military leaders (P.
Sannon 1905). From 1826 until the fall of Boyer’s regime in 1843, the military
implicitly refused to enforce the code, and even though the regime capitulated,
military uprisings and plots against it intensified.
Rather than provide a rallying point for the government, the earthquake of
May 7, 1842 became a symbol of its ineptitude, and the source of vociferous
contestations. The intra-elite struggle that developed within the neocolonial
Mulatto regime festered, and when it resulted in open conflict lead by young
southern Mulatto leaders, and the black military refused to intervene, the die was
cast. Boyer and other prominent leaders of his regime went into exile in 1843
leaving the nation dependent and destitute, scarred by an aristocracy of the skin
that had been institutionalized as state policy, and constrained by a catastrophic
debt that robbed it of resources needed for its development. In summing up the
impact of Boyer and the neocolonial Mulatto state, Leyburn wrote,
From great estates to tiny plots; from carefully tilled
fields to small gardens in a wilderness; from financial
prosperity to debt; from directed enterprise to slot; from
an attitude of hopeful determination to one of tolerance
for things as they are – these are the striking contrasts of
the two periods and the two state models (J. G. Leyburn
1966, 86).

Historian Thomas Madiou puts it simply: for 25 years under Boyer, “the nation
barely existed. The nation did not even stay stationary, she did not progress, she
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regressed…”98 (Madiou 1847, v5,468-9). His fall also resulted in the secession of
the East, encouraged as it were by France, Britain and the United States, and
Boyer’s Mulatto supporters in the East - every effort to reunite the island again
would fail (Leger 1907, 199-201, R. W. Logan 1968). If color prejudice grew more
acrimonious thanks to polemics between Mulatto and Louverturean ideologist
under Pétion and Christophe, Boyer did little to calm them and, by all account,
intensified and institutionalize them. In his analysis of the Boyerist regime,
Janvier notes,
Boyer could have pacified the racial acrimony by
preaching Dessalines’ ideas on the matter. He did the
contrary. With his rural code of 1826, he aggravated the
situation. Blacks made up nine tenth of the population:
he threw them in the countryside. Although reduced to
serfs on Mulatto plantations, Blacks were not idiots.
They took note there were none of them in his
administration, none in the highest ranks in the military,
in the senate, nor in the lower house, not even in the
liberal careers from which Boyer kept them with devilish
skills (L. J. Janvier 1886, 231-2).

Indeed, presiding over a unified island, Boyer had an opportunity to inspire the
nation and craft a state to account for the interests of all its citizens and lead a
cohesive nation. Instead, he continued to consolidate a neocolonial state crafted
to preserve Mulatto interests and predisposed against the majority of its citizens.
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Also see (J. Desquiron 1993, 50)
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Boyer, Land Reforms, and Commerce:
By the time Boyer took over control of the neocolonial Mulatto state, little
remained of the state’s domain, and commerce had declined, leaving the state
bankrupt (Bonnet 1864, J. G. Leyburn 1966). The unification of the nation
following the death of Christophe (Franklin 1828, Cole 1967). Unification with the
North provided Boyer with a well-managed public domain, and successful
agricultural and commercial enterprises and afforded himthe opportunity to
reverse the state’s economic decline, shift its fortune and direction, and, more
importantly, create an inclusive representative government. Instead, he
confiscated the northern treasury, squandered the wealth, neglected the
commerce and agriculture that enriched the Louverturean regime, and rather
than expand the progress accomplished by the North to the rest of the nation,
destroyed and undermined every Northern institutions (Leyburn 1966). Heinl and
Heinl, no friends of Haiti’s Louverturean leaders, note,
[I]t took three years for Boyer and the men in Port-AuPrince to run through the surplus inherited from Henry: in
1823, the republic’s treasury was empty” (Heinl and
Heinl 2005, 154).

More than eleven millions in gold confiscated from the Louverturean
regime vanished, regulatory institutions were disbanded, and landholders were
forcefully removed from their properties, seniorwere military officers, were
transferred leaving the north with neither order nor resources (Esmangart 1833)..
Reunification with the sparsely populated Spanish East also offered no
advantages to the state. Rather than expand the state’s domain, Boyer
distributed land to members of his caste and at the insistence of Mulatto
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landholders, reintroduced the rural codes of 1826, which, unlike those of the
Louverturean state that allow for social mobility, educational opportunities,
independent contracts and greater rights for workers, aimed to create a
permanent black serfdom (Ardouin 1848, v8). Under Boyer’s rural codes,
Workers could not send their kids to school without approval from Mulatto state
officials, establish a shop or sell their produce, build a home away from the
plantation, and once classify as a cultivator only government officials could
change that classification (J. G. Leyburn 1966, 66-70). Unlike the Louverturean
codes, cultivators could not form cooperative enterprises, or pool their resources
to buy and work on their own plantations; they could not sell their produce
cultivated on their own land and therefore acquire revenue to change their social
conditions and that of their children. Unlike the Louverturean regimes that were
willing to lease lands to workers as long as they maintained a level of production,
the neocolonial Mulatto state blocked all avenues of upward mobility to the black
population (L. J. Janvier 1886, P. Sannon 1905, 23-6). The rural code
implemented by the neocolonial Mulatto state, notes the Haitian scholar Dantes
Bellegarde, “profoundly angered the old soldiers of the revolutionary army who
became cultivators: had they not only spilled their blood to transform slavery into
permanent servitude?” (Bellegarde 1938, 108). The scholar Leyburn, a Mulatto
supporter, puts it bluntly,
[E]very individual who was not a public functionary, and
who had no private means or a profession – in plain
English, every Haitian except the aristocrat, the official,
the artisan, and the soldier – was bound to the land, with
no right to separate himself from it except in case of
imminent danger (J. G. Leyburn 1966, 66).
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Whereas the Louverturean regime required parents to send their children
to school and for fourteen year olds to learn a craft, thereby providing a way out
of the plantation system, the Mulatto state eliminated the prospects of upward
mobility for the black majority, confining them to permanent serfdom on Mulattoowned plantations (Bonneau 1862, P. Sannon 1905, 25). The black-dominated
military refused to enforce the rural codes, and the masses ignored it in the North
while resisting its enforcement by Mulatto military leaders in the south and west.
The Spanish east already with a different work habits refused to cooperate. The
maroon revolts that challenged the neocolonial state under Pétion because of its
neglect and anti-black policies, re-emerged under the leadership of Jean
Jacques Accau (Madiou 1847, Leger 1907). Leyburn adeptly observes,
The enforcement of the rural code failed primarily
because the army was controlled by Negroes, whom the
president dared not drive too hard; while only the army
could have enforced faithful performance by the black
laborers (J. G. Leyburn 1966, 80).

The emerging neocolonial state lacked the legitimacy, institutional capacity, and
the allegiance of the military to enforce the oppressive codes. The fear of popular
resistance also limited its ability to enforce them even in the South and west
where Mulatto military power was strongest (Madiou 1847, v4, Ardouin 1848, v8).
The personal urgings of Boyer himself to local military leaders and his
Machiavellian maneuvers to transfer local troops and their senior officers to new
areas and station non-local troops and officers to enforce the rural codes caused
further frictions and popular resistance (Boyer 1824, J. E. Baur 1974, Nicholls
1979). Prominent Louverturean military generals who refused to enforce the laws
were targets of assassination, and others who took up arms against the
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neocolonial state were either executed or exiled to other parts of the country
(Rodman 1954, J. E. Baur 1974). Moreover, the Black majority retreated to their
own small plots, free from the excesses of a neocolonial Mulatto state whose
policies, though unenforceable, were intentionally detrimental to their interests
and those of their children. This retreat of the workforce from the neocolonial
state and their uprisings to challenge its impositions, expanded the pattern of
economic decline of the south to the rest of the nation. Under Boyer notes
Rodman,
Coffee grew wild, and the organized cultivation of
sugarcane, cacao, and cotton for export had ceased
altogether. The French buildings, factories, and irrigation
works that had survived the revolution and been rebuilt
under Dessalines and Christophe fell into disrepair…
The Mulatto attempt to rule Haiti on behalf of an elite
caste, while making economically disastrous efforts to
appease a predominantly Negro population, had failed
(Rodman 1954, 20).

However, the failure of the Mulatto regime was not so much due to the attempts
of its leaders to craft policies that appeased its black population, as Rodman
suggests, but rather their attempt to restrict the black population to Mulattoowned plantations, and exclude them as full citizens from their state crafting
project. Their state lacked popular support and thus was doomed to being
anemic and unstable.
Post-Boyer Transition:
The fall of Boyer was orchestrated by young Mulatto aristocrats he had
brought to power who resented the dominance of the old guard, resistance from
the military dominated by black officers, and a peasant-led insurgency movement
challenging their disenfranchisement and their quasi servitude status at the hand
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of Mulatto landowners99 (L. J. Janvier 1886, 226). However, Boyer’s fall did not
mean the fall of the neocolonial Mulatto state but placed the black-dominated
military, which rose against his rule, at the center of the struggle for power (L. J.
Janvier 1886). Mulatto representatives sought to eliminate black control of the
military by arbitrarily promoting members of their caste to high military ranks, and
by introducing universal suffrage, before only reserved to those with military
service (J. G. Leyburn 1966, 89). This attempt to refashion the military and place
it under Mulatto control to lessen the re-emerging power and influence of
Northern black military leaders and heroes of the revolution, was met with
contempt.
With a black-dominated military restive, young neocolonial aristocrats,
confident for having successfully overthrown Boyer and the old guard, tried to
retain control of the state. It took two cannons to decide Boyer’s successor and
four years for the black army to reassert itself. Rodman notes, after this affront on
their institution, the only one in which black still maintained some power, “the
negro army had finally resolved to lessen the power of the Mulatto government”
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Due to historical Mulatto dominance, Southern blacks were the most disenfranchised and had less
access to property. The confiscation of colonial lands by southern Mulattoes, which Dessalines had tried
to reverse for a fairer distribution, and for which he was killed was further expanded under Pétion and
Boyer (Marcelin 1896, J. G. Leyburn 1966). Boyer’s 25-year rule consolidated Mulatto landownership by
dispossessing blacks and legally binding them to large plantations. Thus, Boyer had faced a sustained
popular insurgency led by former southern maroons and revolutionary soldiers known as the ‘Piquets’
because of the tradition wooden lances they carried as weapons for lack of guns. Unlike in the North,
Toussaint had not succeeded in arming blacks in the south, which resulted in their inability to conquer the
state for force. They could only resist it and their landowning elites. Dominated by Mulatto landowning
elites who wanted a docile black majority to tie to their lands, southern blacks along with poor Mulattoes
had waged a sustained insurgency movement and aided Toussaint in the war against Rigaud. (L. J. Janvier
1886, 223-227, Bouzon 1894).
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(Rodman 1954, 20). To continue their hold on power, Mulatto leaders sought to
craft a system that would enable them to retain power and control of the
neocolonial state, with blacks in the presidency. Four generals, heroes of the
revolution, succeeded each other in power in less than four years, all
octogenarians and the target of Mulatto political manipulations in their attempt to
maintain power with a black figurehead. “La Politique de Doublure” or “the
Politics of understudy”, as Nicholls and Dorsainvil argue, took center stage
(Dorsainvil 1894, Nicholls 1979).
The Southern Mulatto General, Riviere Herard, elected on December 30,
1843, lasted a year before being toppled by a mass uprising from the South,
revolutionary leaders in the North, and elite discontent, as the black army
watched on, unwilling to fight fellow blacks to preserve Mulatto hegemony (Leger
1907, 188-91). As Leyman notes, “not gifted with administrative ability, Herard
blundered first by imprisoning one of the most popular southern negro leaders in
the country, thereby turning much of the population of the South against him” 100
(J. G. Leyburn 1966, 90). A more important factor, however, is ignored by
Leyburn. Namely, having helped to overthrow Boyer in return for land retribution,
Herard’s government sought to continue the Boyerist agenda and reneged on
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Louis Felicite Salomon Jeune, a Louverturean supporter from one of the few Black Southern elites had
caused the ire of Mulattoes by celebrating a mass in honor of Dessalines and advocating for an end to
Mulatto control. His father, nominated by Toussaint in 1799 to administer the South following the war
with Rigaud, and his older brother, murdered by Boyer for objecting to the policy of black
disenfranchisement, Louis Félicité Salomon Jeune’s arrest by the Mulatto general, turned president,
Riviere Herard, led to a frontal attack by the black population in the South on the state, and the
overthrow of the Mulatto general. This first attempt of Mulattoes to use the military to their advantage in
the transition had failed (Nicholls 1979, 77-8, Delince 1979, v8, 60-8).
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land redistribution promised to the Southern peasants (Dorsainvil 1894,
Bellegarde 1938). As the former Haitian Ambassador, minister and nationalist
scholar J. N. leger notes, although their revendication “was the result of grave
abuses; it indicated the ideals of the Haitian peasantry to remain proprietors of
the land, and fight against their exploitation” (Leger 1907, 192-3). The Northern
black General, and former official in Christophe’s Kingdom, Philippe Guerrier,
succeeded Herard on May 3, 1844.
Guerrier, a product of the Louverturean state project, pacified, without
bloodshed, the Southern insurgency by the black masses against Herard by
supporting their demands for land redistribution. He founded two Lycées: one in
the North, the other in the South, reorganized state institutions, re-instituted the
state council, and started a land distribution program to meet the demand of
dispossessed southern blacks (Leger 1907, 193-4). He attempted to consolidate
black control over the state by moving the capital from Port-au-Prince to the
North, away from the Mulatto center of power and influence, and congruent with
other Louverturean leaders, strongly defended Haitian sovereignty in
international Affairs (Nicholls 1979, 79). Recognized for his courage and common
sense, and despised by Mulattoes for his attempt to curtail their power, he died a
year later on April 15, 1845. His rule, however short, demonstrates the
Louverturean tendency to prioritize the welfare of the nation by safeguarding the
interests of all national constituents with a strong state as arbiter. His successor,
Christophe’s brother-in-law, General Louis Pierrot, sought to pursue the same
policy without alarming Mulatto leaders, but his refusal to live in Port-au-Prince

147

and acquiesce to Mulatto power led to a Mulatto orchestrated military coup,
which resulted in his resignation on March 24, 1846 (L. J. Janvier 1886).
The last black General, Riche, fully controlled by the neocolonial elites,
died less than a year later, on February 27, 1847, leaving Mulattoes without a
malleable black candidate to continue their politics of understudy. In control of
state institutions, lacking legitimacy, without military power to support their
dominance, and able to undermine the military or subvert its quest to re-assert
black control over the state, argued Desquiron, Mulatto elites assessed, “since it
is necessary to have a black as president, we will choose one who is ignorant
and docile we can manipulate” (J. Desquiron 1993, 52).
Their nomination of General Faustin Soulouque in March 1847, seemed at
last to be the answer to the Mulatto search for a figurehead (Dorsainvil 1894,
212). Soulouque was a former member of the presidential guard under both
Pétion and Boyer, and was promoted general and the head of the presidential
guard by the deposed President Pierrot. The choice was not designed to uplift
the nation, but rather to enable Mulattoes to maintain their power while providing
the masses with a symbolic black president. Indeed, with an all-Mulatto cabinet
running his government and little decisions left to him, his first few months as
president appear to be an ideal manifestation of “the government of understudy”.
Yet, despite Soulouque’s willingness to work with the neocolonial elites, little
respect was paid to the dignity of this old black general with a deisre to do his
best to administer the affairs of state, notes Leger (Leger 1907, 197-8). Worse,
having nominated him because of his perceived malleability, many within the
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Mulatto aristocracy were still dissatisfied, argues Janvier, “unwilling to accept
even the presence of a black president. For them, personal interests superseded
those of a nation already mutilated and troubled” (L. J. Janvier 1886, 233).
When Soulouque asserted his leadership and demonstrated his
independence from the neocolonial elites, he was attacked, and ridiculed at
home and abroad by Mulattoes opposed to his regime, impacting the prestige of
a nation already under attack by those that resented its existence (Stinchcombe
1994). He was also the object of insubordination from neocolonial Mulatto elites
in his government who felt entitled to the leadership of the nation having ruled
exclusively for 37 years (Dhormoys 1859, Bouzon 1894, Bellegarde 1938). In
addition to Mulatto intransigence, disturbances throughout the country, the
arrogance of foreign agents encouraged by the elites, and the national threat
posed by the secession of the East demanded the attention of this nationalist
general.

A veteran military officer devoted to his nation, he resolved to address its
challenges by first reconstituting a cabinet composing of both blacks and
Mulattoes, something not seen since the demise of the Louverturean state.
Facing a persistent insurgency, ongoing guerilla war with the east, Mulatto
malcontents, and a weakened nation, Soulouque sought to rectify the precarious
condition in which thirty-seven years of Mulatto hegemony, and exclusion of the
majority of the population had left the nation (Leger 1907, 197-200, MacLeod
1970, 39).
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Within a few months in office, to offset Mulatto power and influence in
Port-Au-Prince, and having witnessed their manipulation of the military to remove
leaders they could not control, he created a paramilitary guard, the Zinglins 101,
consisting of entirely new recruits (Bouzon 1894, 13). The creation of the Zinglins
was to undermine the ability of the Mulatto elite to use segment of the military in
the South to maintain their dominance. He further consolidated the power of his
regime in Port-Au-Prince against Mulatto encroachment by naming his colleague,
General Jean Louis Bellegarde as military governor of the city, and Colonel
Dessalines, the son of the late revolutionary leader, as chief of police (Heinl and
Heinl 2005, 144). These changes enabled him to suppress the Mulatto coup
d’état in Port-Au- Prince that came one year after taking office in April 16, 1848.
In an attempt to re-orient the neocolonial state toward the Louverturean
model, he appointed a racially diverse cabinet, silenced the armed Mulatto
opposition to his regime, and sent prominent members of their caste overseas to
represent the nation rather than leave them in the country to foment rebellion and
instability in their quest for power (Marcelin 1896, Leger 1907, 198). By
suppressing the Mulatto armed rebellion against his government, Soulouque,
argues MacLeod, “effectively destroyed any threat of an elite uprising for a
decade” (MacLeod 1970, 41). Others, however, were more generous in their
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Janvier argues that the Zinglins were created to control peasant insurgencies. However, the fact that
they were not present in the North and were concentrated in the capital and Cayes, the two primary
Mulatto strongholds where most of the Mulatto military officers resided is crucial in understanding the
counterbalancing role they were created to play. This strategy of creating paramilitary organizations to
offset Mulatto power would be adopted a little over one hundred year later by Dr. Francois Duvalier to
offset the post-occupation military, tame Mulatto power, and assert control over the neocolonial state.
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assessment, suggesting that he permanently broke the political and military
power of the neocolonial Mulatto elite (J. G. Leyburn 1966, 93).
Soulouque sought to emulate Christophe’s kingdom by re-instituting the
royal model. His coronation as Emperor represented the attempt by Soulouque
and high-ranking Northern military officers to eliminate, once and for all, the
power of regional Mulatto legislators and regional military factions, concentrate
power in the hands of their commander, and uplift the prestige of the nation. As
leger notes, “the superior officers estimated that only absolute power
concentrated in the hands of their chief would stop national discords” (Leger
1907, 199). The military itself organized the national petition to crown Soulouque
Emperor in order to create the condition for national cohesion (Bouzon 1894). It
was a genuine, albeit misguided belief that the concentration of power would
eliminate long established racial and regional discords, address the
marginalization felt by blacks under the power and policies of the Mulatto state,
and allow the country to speak with a unified voice with its international
detractors.
Congruent with Louverturean policies, Soulouque pursued a vigorous
defense of Haitian internal and external sovereignty. He pacified armed
revolutions in the South spurred by Mulattoes, as well as the peasant insurgency
that challenged state power, and subdue the factionalism within the military.
Simply put, “Peasants and urbanites understood that armed manifestations of
discontent would no longer be tolerated; everything remained calm and the
country had a few years of quiet” (Leger 1907, 198). He also sought to reassert
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control over the East whose secession was supported by the three major foreign
powers and the anti-nationalist Mulatto clique102, and strengthened the black
military, neglected under Boyer (Madiou 1847, v5, Bouzon 1894, Dorsainvil 1894,
210-218, Marcelin 1897, 8-12). For the first time since its independence, Haiti
established ambassadorships and full recognition in France and England,
previously denied to the nation (Bouzon 1894).
Soulouque also refused to pay the indemnity to France, which he
considered an affront to Haitian sovereignty (Marcelin 1897). When the French
Admiral Duquesne threatened to bombard the capital, he fiercely responded that
“he would meet force with force”, the French capitulated (Coradin 1987, v2, Heinl
and Heinl 2005, 194). In this vein, he adopted an international political strategy
that mirrored those of the Louverturean state. He sought to regularize relations
with the Vatican under pope Pius IX without ceding the right of Haitians to name
their clergy. More importantly, Soulouque maintained a vigorous and successful
diplomatic front against France, Britain, and the United States defending Haiti’s
rights to address the secession of the Dominican Republic as an internal matter,
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It is important to note here that Mulatto resistance to Soulouque led them to act against Haitian
interests by allying themselves with the eastern secessionist movement. Rather than defend Haitian
liberty by preserving its territorial integrity, Mulatto military leaders who were stationed in the East
facilitated the uprising against the state (Bouzon 1894, Leger 1907). It was Beaubrun Ardouin, the most
prominent Mulatto elite, Member of Parliament, and ambassador to France who suggested Britain and
France act together to secure the independence of the Dominican Republic. Indeed, it was this policy that,
together with the United States, they pursued; recognizing the independence of the Dominican Republic
while denying recognition to Haiti. Unable to control the state, Mulatto leaders who reign supreme under
Boyer, aided in the dismemberment of the nation (Nicholls 1979, 82). The letter from the Haitian
Ambassador Beaubrun Ardouin to the British Consul Ussher is instructive in this respect. Ardouin to
Ussher, 17 Sept. 1849, Pro, FO 35/36.
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staying firm despite various threats by those nations103 (R. W. Logan 1941, 23776). MacLeod notes, “Soulouque ruled Haiti during the difficult period of the high
tide of ‘manifest destiny,’ and kept the new republic intact almost to the
presidency of Lincoln (Bouzon 1894, MacLeod 1970, 47).
Scholars like Leyburn, and Ardouin, whose brother, Celigny Ardouin, was
executed by Soulouque for his participation in the 1848 coup d’état have been
quick to malign the emperor. These scholars have gone to great length to
mischaracterize his regime and those of Dessalines and Christophe as
“barbarous” and “backward”, betraying their sentiments toward black rule, and
the polemics of race and identity that has dominated Haitian historiography
(Ardouin 1848, v6, Leger 1907, Nicholls 1974). Although one cannot deny that
there was violence associated with those regimes, one cannot cherry pick which
violence to condemn, nor ignore their context and causes. The difference
between the violence of the Soulouque regime and that of the neocolonial
Mulatto state under Boyer can best be understood by analyzing its purpose. For
the first time, state violence was directed against Boyerist neocolonial elites to
limit their power and control over the state and provide the space for good
governance rather than secure Mulatto supremacy and black exclusion.
Soulouque ‘s regime at its worst represented a backlash to the exclusive
policies of the neocolonial Mulatto state, and as such, was marked by a degree
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See Congressional Globe, 28th Congress. 1st session., 164 for documents supporting the collusion of
Spain, France and the United States to support the Eastern secession and prevent Haiti from re-asserting
control over its territory. Also quoted in (Padgett 1940, 269)
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of violence present in any major transition and struggle for power. Neocolonial
Mulato elites, refusing to concede to the decline of their power, reacted violently,
and were met with equal violence from new state actors determined to end their
supremacy and preserve the integrity of the state (Dhormoys 1859, Delorme
1873, Bouzon 1894, Leger 1907). The roots of the recurring violence that marks
Haitian regime politics can be traced to the stalled statecraft of the early-to-mid
nineteenth century.
Soulouque seemed mostly concerned with securing a strong and unified
state accessible to all and exclusively devoted to neither black nor Mulatto elites.
Moreover, the criticism of Soulouque’s coronation is at best misdirected, for the
differences between a presidency for life with the right to name your successor,
and a kingdom, appear to be of little consequence except for the prestige of titles
awarded to administrators of the kingdom (MacLeod 1970, 43-4). Even the
prestige, according to MacLeod, seems less important when one realizes that
administrators under the presidency earned a lot more than the Dukes and
Barons of the Kingdom104. More importantly, almost all Haitian leaders attempted
to create a level of permanency and continuity of their regime in order to curtail
racial and regional factionalism to maintain national cohesion and protect the
nation against its external enemies. Unfortunately, ethnic and elite factionalism
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The Haitian scholar Justin Bouzon argues that the empire enjoyed popular support because of the
symbol of independence it conveyed. Seeing their new leaders in the same titles and positions as other
European leaders was a source of pride (Bouzon 1894). Writers Paul Dormoys and Hubert Cole also
support this thesis (Dhormoys 1859, Cole 1967).
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was too dominant to allow the need for continuity shared by all leaders to create
the condition for the emergence of a national coalition.

Education and Access:
Less than two years following his election, Soulouque reversed Boyer’s
educational policies by expanding educational access, establishing primary
schools in every province, and requiring entry to 7-year olds (Brutus 1948, J.
Desquiron 1993, v1, 56). The expansion of schools to the provinces eliminated
the concentration of schools that was designed to cater to neocolonial elites, and
made it unnecessary for the masses to move from the countryside or to have to
acquire resources to send their children to schools in the cities (Bouzon 1894, J.
Desquiron 1993, v1). Soulouque brought the schools to the masses and thus
broke Mulatto elites’ monopoly on education. To meet the need for secondary
education, and limit Mulatto dominance in this area, he hired French teachers to
supplement Haitian educators. By the time he left office after ruling the country
for twelve years, notes Desquiron, there were 175 primary schools with a total of
13,000 students and two public Lycées educating 200 students (J. Desquiron
1993, 56).
While the educational gains were meager compared to the Louverturean
state under Christophe, for the first time the black masses in the South had
access to education, and Northern schools closed by Boyer were open again and
supported by the state. Like Christophe, he endeavored to provide the black
majority with the vehicle to upward mobility. To the black elites, he opened
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access to state employment denied by neocolonial Mulatto elites, consolidated
their positions within national institutions, thus providing them with resources to
enhance their education and break the Mulatto monopoly over knowledge and
national institutions105 (L. J. Janvier 1886, 264-6, Dorsainvil 1894, Charmant
1905).
For the first time since Christophe, both black and neocolonial elites were
involved in the leadership of the state. While Soulouque tried to limit Mulatto
power, he could not implement the social contract of the Louverturean state that
created interdependence between state and nation. He was operating within an
entrenched neocolonial state structure to limit its external orientation and
exclusion of the black majority. He offered few advantages beside schools,
access to state positions, shared power and national pride to the black majority.
Seeking cohesion and endeavoring a strong state to counter external challenges,
he forcefully put down Southern black peasants’ resistance against the state
(Bouzon 1894). His goal was neither to re-introduce Louverturean statecraft nor
assert black control over the state, but to eliminate Mulatto dominance of the
state, and perhaps less ambitiously, given his inclusion of Mulattoes in his
government, to facilitate equal access by reducing Mulatto power and enabling
black elites to share control over state institutions106 (Leger 1907).
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According to Janvier, one of the mistakes of the members of Soulouque’s nobles was their failure to
send their children to acquire higher education abroad. This, he suggests, led to the decapitation of the
regime and post facto attacks against it that had no defenders (L. J. Janvier 1886, 268-9).
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Although virulently anti-Soulouque, Dhormoys’s book is important in that it reflects the tendency of
European authors and Mulatto elite to misrepresent Soulouque as a thoughtless Tyrant instead of a
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Unlike Boyer who excluded Blacks from positions of power, Soulouque did
not exclude Mulattoes from high positions. His objective was not to dominate
Mulattoes, he merely wanted to ensure an equitable distribution of positions,
power, and access between black nationalists and neocolonial elites and secure
a respectable place for Haiti in the world.
It is thus in this context: the search for solution to Haiti’s challenges in the
post-Boyer era, that Soulouque’s rule can be judged. Indeed, his detractors have
unsuspectingly provided us with the motivation of Soulouque and his regime. “He
was an authentique,” argues Heinl and Heinl sarcastically, “a man of his time
who believed the nation belonged to all equally, and not just to some, and took
his role as the head of state seriously,” implying that Soulouque was out of touch,
and his conviction - misguided (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 196). Indeed, in one of
their few lucid moments, Heinl and Heinl offer a reliable analysis, but not
surprisingly, they fault Soulouque for believing in an accountable state and
inclusive citizenship. Soulouque’s regime, as has been the case for all regimes
that have sought a balance of interests, which has meant balancing the interests
of the elites with those of the populace, is still portrayed as the most “backward”,
“uncivilized” and “violent”. Nevertheless, “because of the tranquility he
established”, argues Leger, “agriculture flourished again, and prosperous days
re-emerged” (Leger 1907, 199). For a man who could neither read nor write,

leader who sought to end Mulatto dominance of the nation and create a more inclusive and responsive
state. See (Dhormoys 1859)
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elected by neocolonial Mulatto leaders because they thought him manipulatable,
he, Soulouque, accomplished for the Haitian nation a degree of respect and
prosperity in less than twelve years, something thirty seven years of “learned”
Mulatto rule were unable to achieve. “He was the first black ruler of the whole
nation of any consequence”, argues MacLeod, and although his rule marked the
definite eclipsing of the Louverturean statecraft, it gave rise to the emergence of
a black nationalist party that would challenge Mulatto power, and, if not fight for
the elimination, at least, for the direction and control of the neocolonial state
(MacLeod 1970, 47).
Soulouque did not succeed in protecting the interests of the black majority,
nor did he attempt to fully implement the Louverturean model by centering the
state’s legitimacy on the protection of, and legitimacy from the black majority. He
gave access to the state to a marginalized black elite, and middle class officers,
without re-orienting the neocolonial state. His was an elite-centered politics that
rejected the notion of Mulatto supremacy and the total subordination of the
neocolonial state to Mulatto interests. He did not enjoy the support of Northern
elites who erroneously interpreted his rise as fulfilling the Mulatto agenda and
resented its orientation toward southern black elites with whom he was most
acquainted.
Although his challenge of Mulatto supremacy earned a level of support
from the North later, he inherited the constraints rooted in the “Mulatto state,” and
as such were limited in terms of ultimate power (Leger 1907). Therefore, the
Soulouque regime did not constitute a reemergence of the Louverturean state, as
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Ardouin and Leyburn incorrectly suggest, but rather maintained a slightly
modified, continuation of the neocolonial Mulatto state as the state over which
competition for power would take place (Ardouin 1853, v6, J. G. Leyburn 1966,
92). His struggle against Mulatto dominance was not to craft a new direction for
the state, but an intra-elite struggle over control of the state itself. At its best, the
state had to employ a mélange of coercion and enticements to maintain mass
support. The elites of this now established neocolonial state, both blacks and
Mulattoes, were outward oriented, and dependent on the support of foreign
merchants to compete for control over the state (Trouillot 1990).
Nevertheless, if, as some have argued, the rise of Soulouque in 1848
marked the first successful attempt by black elites to wrest power from Mulattoes
and gain control of the national neocolonial state, the demise of his regime in
1859 represented their failure to consolidate that power, and an opportunity for
both elites to find a way forward together. The dominant thesis that he was
consumed by a lust for power and contributed little in the twelve years he led his
nation seems at odds with a more factual analysis of his regime. MacLeod points
out,
[T]here is a prima facie case against the generally
accepted version of the history of the Soulouque era and
even cursory examination of the record reveals some
possible new interpretations (MacLeod 1970, 37).

Most scholars, even those who reject the existence of a neocolonial Mulatto
state, conclude that his regime shifted the orientation of the state and perhaps
more specifically, transformed it from a state designed to protect Mulatto power
and serve Mulatto interests to one firmly oriented toward a more inclusive but
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elite-centered politics. Soulouque’s government shattered the power of the
Mulatto elite, gave black elites access to the state, and, for better or worse,
created the conditions that made it impossible for any elites to dominate the
nation, and disenfranchise the black majority unchallenged (Bouzon 1894, Leger
1907, Bellegarde 1938). By placing blacks and Mulattoes on equal footing within
the state, his regime created the possibility for an elite coalition to emerge to
move the nation toward stability and prosperity, and for a while under his
successor, this seemed a likely path.
A distinguished military officer and former Duke under Soulouque,
Geffrard’s overthrow of Soulouque government appeared more a result of his
dissatisfaction with the latter’s military incapacity to put an end to the
secessionist movement in the East, failure to assert control over the military. His
discontent was accentuated by Soulouque’s execution of fellow high-ranking
military officers on accusation of dereliction of duty than outright opposition to his
regime. A career military officer since the age of fifteen, the defeat of the military,
coupled with Soulouque’s treatment of its officer corps, was surely disturbing to
General Fabre Geffrard. Thus, it is not coincidental that the military, itself
discontent, offered no serious opposition to Geffrard’s armed revolt against the
emperor (Michel 1932, J. C. Baur 1954).
General Fabre Geffrard was not an enemy of the regime. He had been
well acquainted, nay, embedded in the previous regime, having been elevated as
a duke in Soulouque’s imperial court. His government, argues Janvier, “was but a
continuation of the empire, without the emperor, the nobility, and the international
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strength” (L. J. Janvier 1886, 270). By all account, Geffrard embodied a national
aspiration to continue the move from the internecine struggles, and instability that
had bewitched Haiti (D'Alaux 1856, E. F. Dubois 1862, Michel 1932). He was not
from the elites, nor was he from the masses. He had served under both regimes,
and had assisted in the overthrow of both. He also had the confidence of the
military, the only major institution capable of exercising its will (Michel 1932).
He pursued the negotiations with the Vatican started under Soulouque,
expanded Soulouque’s school of arts and crafts, and reorganized the school of
medicine (Leger 1907, 205). Geffrard completed and expanded the primary and
secondary schools started under Soulouque, established the schools of law,
music, and drawing, and invited French priest to teach in the national schools. To
“ensure the formation of competent professors,” he sent young Haitians to
Europe to complete their education on state scholarships devoid of the ethnic
favoritism of yesteryears (Leger 1907, 205-6, J. Desquiron 1993, 57).
Under Geffrard’s leadership, a foundry was opened, new modes of
transportation, new industries doted the national territory (G. Corvington 2001,
v3, 154-5). More daring was his reorganization of the army: the reduction of its
forces from 30,000 to 15,000, the retiring of many military officers, and the
introduction of French military trainers on Haitian soil to train his presidential
guards, a decision that alarmed nationalists who objected to French military
presence on the Island. Adam sums up Geffrard’s success thus, “some very
important economic, political, social and technical transformations took place
under Geffrard: urbanization, industrialization, and the penetration of foreigners
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in furthering the commerce capitalist” opened new doors for the nation (Adam
1982, 73).
Despite the economic and educational success of the regime and the
recognition of Haitian independence by the Americans, Geffrard’s diplomatic
relations lacked vigor. Moreover, his overtures to whites through the decree of
Oct 18, 1860, his land distribution to light skinned African-Americans while
ignoring peasant demands for lands, and the perception that neocolonial Mulatto
elites were reasserting themselves under his regime, alarmed segments of the
nation, and led to armed conflict, and the emergence of a vocal black opposition
(L. J. Janvier 1886, 295-7). Geffrard was keenly aware of the geopolitical
environment and sought to entice entrepreneurial foreigners, including AfricanAmericans to immigrate to Haiti and assist in its development. His government
did not pursue the exclusionary politics of Pétion and Boyer. It gave access to
blacks and Mulattoes alike, and sought through foreign overture to encourage
commerce, investments, and innovations. However, elites’ reaction to perception
of increasing encroachment, competition, and displacement by foreigners, and
the disbanding of half of the army led to unrelenting military challenges to his
regime from former officers and peasants encouraged by northern black elites.
Geffrad’s tactics were heavy fisted. He resorted to executions and forced
exile of important members of the Black Nationalist elites to quell dissent, which
increased their hostility and challenges to his regime (Clement 1860). As the
perception of a “Mulatto government” supported by foreigners increased
resistance to his government, so did Geffrard’s reliance on coercion (Leger
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1907). The Soulouque Empire had reduced the political power of the Mulatto but
as Nicholls notes, “Mulatto control of the national sector of the economy left them
in a permanently strong position and enabled them to reassert their political
power under Geffrard” (Nicholls 1979, 107). The re-emergence of Mulatto power
within the regime, facilitated by their monopoly of commerce fueled an already
conflict ridden environment an angered a black elite armed with both pen and
swords (Delorme 1873, J. Desquiron 1993).
No less than fourteen-armed uprisings occurred, and amongst the various
leaders of anti-Geffrard forces were the Northern Louverturean ideologue and
nationalist scholar Demesvar Delorme and Southern nationalist ideologue and
former Soulouque’s minister of Finance, Lysius Felicite Salmon Jeune. The black
elite party had taken shape, this time defying historical regional separatist
tendencies. Despite countless executions and military assistance from foreign
forces, the population succeeded in overthrowing Geffrard under the leadership
of Sylvain Salnave (L. J. Janvier 1886, 296-7).
A political unknown in a nation dominated by popular military raceconscious leaders, and acrimonious ethnic and regional politics, the populist
Mulatto Salnave fit in neither camp and lasted only two years in office. Having
challenged military leaders and black elites in the North and South, and not
beholden to neocolonial Mulattoes Salnave fell victim to a coalition of Southern
and Northern black military elites supported by Mulatto elites (Bellegarde 1938, J.
Desquiron 1993). His capture and execution by the military, ended a rather brief
popular presidency controlled by neither black nationalists nor neocolonial
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Mulatto elites but supported by the masses. His execution marked the first
coalition of Mulatto and black elites to prevent a populist leader from
consolidating control over the neocolonial state in which their interests now
rested. The ascendency and popular support of the Mulatto Salnave
demonstrated that the Haitian masses were more concerned about their freedom
and interests, and a leaders’ politics than ethnicity or color. They were not
against a Mulatto president, but against any president, black nationalists or
neocolonial Mulatto elites, who failed to protect their interests107.This too would
prove to be a common theme in Haitian politics.

Elite competition and the Struggle for Control of the Neocolonial State:
From Salnave until the American Occupation, competition between
northern and southern black elites over control of the neocolonial state with the
old neocolonial Mulatto elite benefitting economically, but caught in the middle
with neither political nor military power and willing to give financial backing to the
aspirant most likely to protect its interests, reflected the nature of national politics.
Haiti became dominated by coups and countercoups. As Michel Rolph Trouillot
observes,
[T]he bayonet, not the senate, put presidents in power,
the bayonet also ousted them. The lesson of the post
Salnave period then, is that the armed forces – the
regular army as well as forces raised by military
landlords – played a key role in shaping the crisis and in
defusing it (Trouillot 1990, 94).
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It is a historical fact however, that they were more inclined to support a nationalist than they were
others not of that ilk as Nicholls and others contend.
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Adding to this dynamic was the regional character of the military, he continues,
where the army’s “main regional divisions acted as semiautonomous bodies, at
least insofar as their allegiance to the local commanders was stronger than their
sworn obedience to the chief of state” (Trouillot 1990, 94). For every overthrow of
government, every coup d’états, Haiti and the Neocolonial state lost competent
men to exile or executions. Therefore, the state, no matter its advances under
previous regimes, had to restart over with new constitutions, new institutions and
without institutional memory, continuity, or a technocratic bureaucracy. The state,
like its presidents, represented a series of ephemeral representations with the
only permanent feature being its neocolonial orientation. The only permanent
element of their rule was the permanency of elite interests. Indeed, it is a strain to
characterize these past regimes as purveyours of “states” in the manner scholars
typically discuss.
Of the 15 presidents who succeeded Salnave, few served a full term, most
were overthrown by military factions, and some were executed as acts of
revenge. The nationalist Mulatto, General Nissage Saget, served his term but
only due to support garnered from military leaders in the North, and the
arrangement to turn the power over to the Southern Black General Michel
Domingue in 1874. He did so despite attempts by neocolonial Mulattoes to
convince him to remain in office for he was not interested in presiding over a
state to preserve Mulatto interests. Michel Domingue, with his nephew, the Black
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nationalist ideologue Septimus Rameau108, served two years of his eight-year
term, barely escaping with his life (Bellegarde 1938).
He was overthrown by neocolonial elites, who murdered Rameau, the
Southern Black nationalist Ideologue, in the process (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 2356). Having acquired some prominence under Geffrard, Mulatto elites, had with
the overthrow of Domingue in 1876 regained control of the state, and brought
with them their ideological wing, the liberal party, headed by the grandson of
Boyer, Boyer-Bazelais (Marcelin 1896, J. Desquiron 1993). Neocolonial Mulatto
elites, with the Liberal party as their ideological arm led by Boyer-Bazelais, and
Boisron-Canal as president, returned to their old Boyerist tricks, but this time,
there was a black political, military, and intellectual force with which to contend
(Bellegarde 1938). Eighteen uprisings were orchestrated by the end of his first
three years in office by a populace refusing to relive the Mulatto experience, and
a liberal party determined to reinstate those exclusionary practices. These
unrelenting attacks led Boisron-Canal to ally himself with the Black Nationalist
party and thus undermined the rise and power of the exclusionary neocolonial
Mulatto party (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 73).
However, his refusal to marginalize Blacks became reason for the liberal
party’s call to arms against his regime and thus a leader of their own caste. One
observer notes, “[t]he government was attacked because it refused, in its
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founder of the nationalist party, served as vice-president, the first in Haitian history.
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impartiality, to favor a party who wanted to take power and oppress the rest of
the citizens” (L. J. Janvier 1886, 408). They murdered government ministers,
soldiers and citizens, and burned the capital, the center of their own power, only
their defeat and exile ended the bloodshed. They had attempted to regain power
by force and lost; it was the liberal party and Mulatto oligarchy’s last act.

By opposing the seeming reasonable Boisron-Canal, they had created the
condition for the re-emergence of the black elites and the military, which had
remained quiet since the fall of Domingue. Neocolonial elites found themselves,
as in the period from 1843 -1847, targets of reprisals in what some incorrectly
described as a race war, but given that the primary targets were Mulatto office
holders who supported the liberal exclusionary party, it can only be properly
categorized as a violent struggle for state control as all such struggles often are
(Heinl and Heinl 2005, 245). Indeed, it may even be said that the removal of the
supporters of the oligarchs from state institutions was even mandated by
parliament109 as a requirement for a peaceful nation. The directives seems clear:
“It is incumbent upon you, citizens of the departments, to stop with your wisdom,
and firm and resolute attitude an impious civil war, started to satisfy the private
interests of a few,” they urged (L. J. Janvier 1886, 409). Boisron-Canal, rather
than lead a state devoted to Mulatto interests, and engage in an internecine war,
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See Bulletin Des lois et Actes D’Haiti, No. 10, 1879

167

left office not long after, a year prior to the end of his term leaving the state to
black nationalists (Leger 1907, 233).
The return of Lysius Salomon Jeune, the Minister of Finance under
Soulouque, and staunch Black Nationalist ideologue and adherent of
Louverturean statecraft, and his election as president for seven years was a
prosperous and tranquil period, punctuated by the invasion of the neocolonial
oligarchic forces who had been in exile in Jamaica. Under Salomon, the First
National Bank was created, agricultural production grew, access to primary and
secondary schools expanded, and universities opened. Land was distributed to
the peasantry who had long demanded it as an affirmation of their independence.
The presidential palace, blown up under Salnave, was rebuilt. Haiti became
member of the international postal service, industries were created, a railroad
established, a military school - the first since Christophe - was created. The
Haitian dollar became equivalent to the US dollar; this was a major transition for
a nation historically plagued with instability and a weak economy (L. J. Janvier
1886, Leger 1907, Bellegarde 1938).
Salomon’s government, however, was not without opposition. Mulatto
oligarchs categorically opposed it and northern Louverturean elites with
parentage in Christophe’s nobles were fully not supportive of Salomon’s regime
due to its regional southern roots110. Mulattoes led by the Liberal party leader and
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Salomon faced hostility from the North from the very start. Nord Alexis, son of Baron Nord, a noble
under Christophe, the son-in-law of former president Louis Pierrot, Christophe’s brother in-law who had
been jailed twice by Salomon, Cincinnatus Leconte, and Florvil Hyppolite all generals, connected to the old
Louverturean state opposed Salomon and took up arms once he was re-elected for another seven years
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grandson of Jean-Pierre Boyer, Boyer Bazelais, mounted a full-scale invasion,
which ensnared the nation in a civil war that in the end they lost with costs both
to themselves and the nation, argues the historian Frederic Marcelin (Marcelin
1896). The former American diplomat Heinl, commenting on the defeat of the
Mulatto party, and the national cost of the civil war between black nationalists
and the neocolonial Mulatto oligarchs, put it thus,
[I]n a perverse way, Bazelais had won. By clawing the
country apart, by forcing the government to spend
millions for arms and defense, by killing commerce, by
polarizing society and the races, the insurrection inflicted
wounds on Salomon and his program – and on Haiti –
that could never be healed (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 261).

The resources that could have been focused on Haiti’s development were
wasted in the hands of arm dealers. Some of the most educated citizens of the
nation that could have devoted their energy to enhancing the common good, and
expanding the capacity of institutions of the state, allowed caste interests, and
racial pride to dominate their sentiments. The great historian Dantes Bellegarde,
in assessing the opposition to Salomon, lamented,
[I]n the opposing factions were men remarkable for their
education, experienced in conducting Haiti’s
international affairs with integrity. Never before could
Haiti have presented so fine a showing… By
cooperating, these men could have assured the
prosperity and dignity of their country111.

(Leger 1907). Also, for a detailed expose of the Mulatto armed opposition to Salomon, see (Heinl and
Heinl 2005, 251-261)
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Qted in (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 254) – (Bellegarde 1938)
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His re-election for another seven years led to regional conflict between members
of the Louverturean and Southern black elites resulting in his resignation and
voluntary exile (Nicholls 1979, 110).
The overthrow of Salomon led to the election of the southern Black
Nationalist ideologue Francois Denis Legitime in 1888. Within a year, he was
overthrown by Northern generals for the sake of getting one of their own in the
presidency, and opposing a Southern black elite whom they considered, if not a
member of the class, at least too cozy with the Mulatto oligarchs (Edouard 1890,
27-9). Regionalism and elite competition had again reared their heads, with the
North determined to assert control over the neocolonial state. There was no
opposing ideologies, no state model or race to wrangle over. This was a struggle
for power and control of the neocolonial state. Dorsainvil puts it thus, “three men
from the South had just succeeded each other in the presidency: the North, this
time wanted one of its sons” (Dorsainvil 1894, 268, J. Desquiron 1993, 77).
It was the first time since the tumultuous transition from the exclusionary
state led by Boyer and the short presidencies of Guerrier, Pierrot and Riche that
the North had asserted control over the neocolonial national state. The adherents
to the Louverturean state model, and descendants of Christophe’s nobility,
supported by the Nationalist movement, had finally managed to gain control over
the neocolonial state. With the neocolonial Mulatto faction having been soundly
defeated by Salomon, and the last hope of the oligarchs dispatched into exile,
the election of General Florvil Hyppolite faced little internal conflicts, and

170

provided the nation with its first chance since Boyer to serve the people
unimpeded.
Guerrier had little time to serve as he died less than a year in office.
Pierrot had tried unsuccessfully to move the capital to the North, overthrown by
the Mulatto Oligarchs, and Riche, in his late eighties, died less than a year in
office. Thus no northern elites came close to state power before this time. The
North had a chance with the popular Mulatto Salnave, but black and Mulatto
elites rejected him.
Until Hyppolite, no Northern representative had consolidated enough
power to lead the whole nation since the assassination of Dessalines in 1806,
and the reorganization of representative body, and none had manage to lead the
neocolonial state since the failed attempt by Pierrot.
The Hyppolite regime continued Salomon’s policies of national
development and a vigorous international defense, defeating the American
attempt in 1890 to gain control of Haitian territory (Douglass 1891, Dorsainvil
1894, G. Corvington 2001, v4). The North overthrow of Salomon was simply a
question regional nationalist competition, not because of ideology, policy, or
political disagreements. Congruent with Louverturean practice of securing
national sovereignty and expanding state capacity and services, Hyppolite’s
regime compelled the French to change their citizenship practices in Haiti,
secured a non-interference policy with the Dominican Republic, and established
ambassadorships in various nations before hostile or indifferent to Haiti. As the
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historian and former ambassador Leger notes, “President Hyppolite had good
relations with all the foreign powers” (Leger 1907, 245).
Under this Northern leader, the ports were rebuilt, an iron market was built
in both the capital and Cap Haitian, for the first time a waterworks project
delivered clean water to homes in various cities, and telegraphs lines linked cities
and provinces. Bridges allowed for uninhibited transportation, new government
buildings and customhouses were built, stimulated by his new ministry of public
works (Dorsainvil 1894, 272-4, R. W. Logan 1968, Nicholls 1979, Heinl and Heinl
2005, 289-90). Even an electric plant began operation (Leger 1907, 246).
Telephone service was introduced in all the main national centers, The Senate
and Deputies were housed in a new building, and new attentions were given to
roads. For the first time Haiti had an ice-plant (Leger 1907, Bellegarde 1938).
Dorsainvil notes, “No government signed more contracts… Without a doubt, they
represented the determination of the president to ensure the progress of Haiti”
(Dorsainvil 1894, 273).
His regime was the implantation of the Louverturean model constrained by
a neocolonial structure and orientation. The strong regulatory developmental
state we have come to understand and studied in Asia and other regions could
not have been better represented under Hyppolite. However, unlike South Korea
and Taiwan, countries that benefited during the Cold War era from east-west
competition for influence, and thereby were financially well supported by western
powers through investments and foreign aid. South Korea and Taiwan also had
a homogeneous population, whereas Haiti was not homogeneous, and had
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cleavages with strikingly divergent interests; but more importantly, it was on its
own, already indebted and undermined. Hyppolite continued Salomon’s march
toward state expansion, the centralization of power, and national development.
Institutional coherence and continuity, and the temporary defeat of the
neocolonial Mulatto elite forces, masked by a thin veneer of liberalism allowed
the nation a modicum of stability that facilitated a level of development.
Hyppolite’s as well as Salomon’s regime have been characterized as violent
for their refusal to allow factionalism and neocolonial elites to undermine their
national development projects. Their determination to give the state monopoly
over the use of force and subdue destabilizing forces, and the re-emergence of
armed Mulatto insurrections under the guise of the “liberalist party” did indeed
result in violent confrontations (Nicholls 1979, Gaillard 1993). Often ignored are
the very causes that led them to resort to state military power to maintain stability
and prevent regional and ethnic-based forces from upending their state projects
for personal or ethnic gains.
The parallel between Christophe’s drive to develop his nation, and
Salomon and Hyppolite’s government has been drawn by many, and not without
merit. His death of a stroke ended his term in 1896112. The election of Tiresias
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Legitime, an elite black Southern nationalist, was one of the most respected Haitian intellectuals and
had never served in the army. More importantly, he was a member of the Southern elite with little
popular support except in Port-Au-Prince. Face with opposition from General Florvil Hyppolite, also a
Black Nationalist but supporter of Salomon, and the son of one of Soulouque’s ministers, and the former
minister of war of Salnave’s populous government “puts him squarely in the Soulouque-Salnave-Salomon
anti-oligarchic line” (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 278). Other opposition figures included, Gen. Nord Alexis
descendent of Northern nobility and son-in-law of former Pierrot, and Northern General Cincinatus
Leconte also a descendent of Northern nobility. Desquiron wrote with regret, in overthrowing Legitime,
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Auguste Antoine Simon-Sam, Hyppolite’s Secretary of War, seven days after his
death prolonged Northern supremacy over the neocolonial state and the project
of state building. Under the presidency of Simon-Sam, the project of national
development and state expansion continued, a new modern national court was
built, the national college was rebuilt, the railroad linking the capital to the
Northeast started by Hyppolite was completed, and the Tramway service
reestablished in Port-Au-Prince. Railroad transportation began in the North to
connect the various Northern provinces.
In the midst of all the development projects, state leaders acknowledged
the contributions of blacks in the formation of the state, which had not been
acknowledged since the establishment of the Pétion and Boyer’s neocolonial
state. The emperor and liberator of the nation, Jean Jacques Dessalines was
recognized by the state with a marble statue erected in its honor in the capital
(Dorsainvil 1894, Leger 1907, 249, Bellegarde 1938). The end of his term over,
President Simon-Sam left office on May 15, 1902, leaving it to the assembly to
elect the next president113. The efforts of Salomon, Hyppolite, and Simon-Sam
constitute a twenty-one year focus on Haitian state development, and the most

“We miss the occasion to create a civil government for Legitime was general in name only. He had the
reputation of being a thoughtful man, and an excellent administrator” (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 77).
113

Many historians have accused Tiresia Simon-Sam of enriching himself by orchestrating kickbacks while
signing contracts to expand the state and of mismanaging state funds. There may well be truth in their
accusations. (Bellegarde 1938, 141-2, G. Corvington 2001, v4, 59-61)It is important to note though, that
no governments prior to Hyppolite and Simon-Sam engage in such ambitious development projects and in
an environment where Haiti was entirely dependent on international Banking, one can only imagine the
challenges. Suffice it to say, for the first time, Haitian leaders from all quarters seemed to have oriented
their energy not to undermining the state or each other but for the benefit to the nation and state.
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unified and longest nation-building period of the nation. These leaders attempted
to refocus and re-orient the state toward the nation by implementing the
Louverturean model to build stronger more responsive state-society relations.
The die, however, was already cast, as the neocolonial Mulatto elites had
established the state economic dependence and indebtedness to France, and on
foreign merchants for loans.
Anthenor Firmin, Nord Alexis and the Re-Emergence Neocolonial Elites’ Power
and the Politics of Understudy:
The departure of Simon-Sam left open a political void with the North still
dominant but divided, and America, Germany, and France competing for
influence, became more determined to interfere in Haitian internal Affairs. The
Germans dominated Haitian commerce, and had threatened to bombard the
capital to compel the Haitian government to pay the claims of its citizens, a
common practice by western powers in the region. America, interested in
implementing its Monroe Doctrine on Haiti, engaging in a period of Gunboat
diplomacy, and seeking to acquire control over Haitian territory to establish a
military base, also threatened Haiti with its navy, while France, dominant in
Haitian Affairs since the indemnity, was competing to keep its economic
stranglehold and imposition of most favorite nation status114.
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The Monroe Doctrine prior to the late 1800s excluded Haiti driven by American racial politics. Now an
emerging world power, the need to control Latin America and the Caribbean and prevent German
expansion Change American foreign policy toward Haiti (R. W. Logan 1941).
See the following communication for the change in American policy towards Haiti: Consular dispatches xvi
on 17 Oct. 1888, No. 915, Haiti, Instructions, III, Sherman to Powell, 11 Jan. 1898, no. 97

175

No one would deny that Dr. Antenor Firmin, staunch nationalist and a
prolific intellectual, was a Francophile, and his collaboration with France to
resolve the conflict with the United States over the base, and France’s support
for Hyppolite’s government after the German threat had further endeared France
to the Haiti’s economic and political elites (Bellegarde 1938, R. W. Logan 1941,
109-14, G. Corvington 2001, v4). Both the U.S. and Germany were apprehensive
about the election of Antenor Firmin, the Finance Minister under Salomon who
opened the First National Bank in collaboration with France at a time when
American Bankers and German merchants had asserted control over most of
Latin America’s banking. Firmin had served in both the Hyppolite and SimonSam regimes as Finance Minister and as the celebrated interior minister who
successfully defended Haitian sovereignty against American encroachment. The
opposition of German merchants to Firmin as President was, if not justified, at
least understood. Firmin had, as a minister under the previous governments,
reduced German monopoly on Haitian commerce, and sought France’s financial
assistance instead of Germany’s to secure the economic independence of the
Haitian state. More importantly, he had broadened commercial and economic
competition to the displeasure of the dominant German merchants, and created a
national bank to decrease national dependence on German lending institutions,
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long-term allies of the neocolonial Mulatto elites115(Rotberg and Clague 1971,
111-2).
Firmin’s skillful defeat of America’s land grab attempt116, and his preference for
French rather than American banking at a time of American expansion and
financial dominance of the Western Hemisphere did not make him a darling of
American Diplomats (Coradin 1987, v3, 120-7). Trouillot suggests,
The tension between the German merchants, who were
tied to the local elites, and the U.S. diplomats, who were
willing to fall back on military intervention, reflected
larger international games but profoundly affected
Haitian political life (Trouillot 1990, 99).

German and American interests, though divergent, were not compatible
with Haitian national interest and the stability of the Haitian state, which the
election of Firmin would have facilitated. Although both nations were on a
collision course, it is not altogether very surprising that both nations collaborated
to undermine the election of Firmin; they shared a common short-term interest.
The Germans and their neocolonial allies had much to lose in the election of
Firmin, and the Haitian state and people - much to gain.
Few were against Firmin, according to Desquiron, “The idol of young
Haitians who admire this great intellectual, this masterful diplomat who
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The Haitian position against the German was also a matter of national Pride. The Germans had acted
against national sensibilities and Haitian nationalist intended to decrease their influence in the country as
a consequence (Coradin 1987, v3, 200-26)
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Under the threat of American naval power, Firmin had outmaneuvered the American delegates, to the
acclamation of his compatriots, forcing them to leave Haitian waters without any concessions. See Logan
and Coradin for a detailed discussion of the incident (Coradin 1987, v3, 133-46, R. W. Logan 1941).
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maintained the United States at bay, the financer who, twice, restored the
budgetary equilibrium of the nation.” Moreover, [f]or qualifications, one could not
find better: experienced administrator, he held the entire government’s portfolio
for a month under Hyppolite. His reputation of integrity and his popularity was
such that though the previous president did not like him, he dared not dismiss
him” (J. Desquiron 1993, 84). The Firminist mystique had blurred all lines,
continuing the process of creating a national identity, and national conscience
capable of focusing Haitians and the state toward a common goal. It was
something long desired; a new age of Haitian national consciousness was
emerging, one that would be delayed by foreign opposition.
Neocolonial Mulatto elites also assessed that the election of Firmin would
mean the continuation of nationalist control and consolidation of the state and its
orientation toward national accountability and development. They therefore opted
to support the eighty-seven year old Northern General Nord Alexis as a means to
re-assert their control and interests against the popular will. Although not
surprising, their decision to undermine Dr. Firmin election in order to implement
their politics of understudy through the malleable Octogenarian confirmed their
position vis-à-vis the nation. Both the U.S .and Germany intervened in the
political process providing weapons to Firmin’s opponents to protect their
interests117 (Dorsainvil 1894, 275-80, Bellegarde 1938, 140-6, Trouillot 1990).
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The roles of the German merchants have been dissected by scholars with respect to their gunrunning
to Aid Nord Alexis and their attack on the Haitian navy, which supported Firmin. The case of “Crete a
Pierrot”, and the Haitian Admiral Killick who blew himself and the ship up rather than letting it be taken
by the German navy remains salient in Haitian nationalist discourse. Few scholars have analyzed with
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American and German support of Nord Alexis circumvented the will of the
population, and Haiti missed another opportunity to maintain continuity in state
affairs and the momentum towards national development and institutional
expansion that had started under Salomon. The connection between American
and German support for Alexis, the cancellation of the national Bank’s charter
instituted by Firmin as a Minister of Finance under Hyppolite, and the increased
dependence of the Haitian state on German financiers during his time in office, a
reversal of Firminist policies of creating a politically and economically
independent state. Finding a strong economy and the Haitian dollar equivalent to
the US dollar at the beginning of his presidency, he left the nation with an
exchange rate of $170 Haitian to one U.S Dollar, with Germans bankers the
primary beneficiaries of the Bankruptcy and weakening of the state (Heinl and
Heinl 2005, 310). By bringing Nord Alexis to power, neocolonial elites gave the
country their “black” president and acquire the power to reassert control over the
neocolonial state and re-orient it toward their interests and those of their foreign
allies.

depth the role of the American consulate in undermining Firmin’s presidency. Some have noted in
passing, that “the U.S. Secret Service in New York had intercepted Firmin’s arms and war chest - 2,000
rifles, 100,000 cartridges, and $400,000” ; an act that left Firminist forces empty handed to face General
Nord’s military (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 306). But even without discussing the implications of that seizure or
the interests involved, one would have to argue that by refusing asylum to supporters of Firmin who had
taken refuge in the American consulate in the City of Saint Marc, and turning them over to the forces of
General Nord Alexis to be shot, the American made their intentions and support for Nord quite clear
(Bellegarde 1938, 140-6, R. W. Logan 1968, 115, J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 85-7). Further studies would help
illuminate American involvement and elite collusion in undermining Firmin – a precursor to the American
invasion.
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The previous regimes having enjoyed the support of the population, and
earned a degree of legitimacy by their national predisposition, experienced a
level stability unprecedented in Haitian history, which consequently facilitated
state expansion and national development. Violence between state and nonstate actors, as well as attacks on the state, had decreased. The government of
Nord Alexis reintroduced a level of instability and national acrimony that had
been absent in Haiti for over two decades. Alexis’ regime, depending entirely on
force and violence to maintain stability and power, made martyrs across caste
and color of elites and commoners alike – all those who supported the previous
nationalist regimes or who sought the election of Firmin in search of a more
responsive and accountable state were targets. Every sector of Haitian society
became victim of a president they neither supported nor thought to be the most
capable. The peasantry, long silent, led by the Southern Piquets and the
Northern Cacos returned on the political scene, challenging the state, and by
extension all cities under the control of its supporters (Rotberg and Clague 1971,
Heinl and Heinl 2005).
American military involvement in neighboring nations had not reached
Haiti but its political machinations and those of foreign governments had created
the Haitian governance crisis to block the path of national development its
nationalist leaders had undertaken. The American expansionist project placed
them in direct competition with Germany, and propelled them to become more
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involved in Haitian affairs118. As Logan observes, “the establishment, during the
administration of Nord Alexis, of a custom receivership in the Dominican
Republic should have served as a warning”, and by preventing the ascendency
of the nationally respected, Antenor Firmin to the presidency, neocolonial elites
and the Alexis’ “administration deferred hopes for political stability, and economic
viability” (R. W. Logan 1968, 114).
In undermining Firmin, neocolonial oligarchs ensured Haiti would miss an
opportunity for national cohesion and a chance to address national challenges
with a unified voice. The defeat of Firmin and election of Nord Alexis also
undermined a process of national unification and the elections of governments
that enjoyed the popular support and legitimacy of the whole nation rather than a
specific region and elites. It halted the monopoly of governments interested in
securing viable state-society relations through national development and their
commitment to using the talents of all citizens, regardless of race, to serve the
nation (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 90). The regional manifestations of the armed
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There was a clear interest in Haiti and the territories of Mole St Nicolas and La Tortue as well as Haitian
finance and banking. The following consular Dispatches makes clear the international competition for
Haiti:
Hayti, Despatches, XVII, Langston to Frelinghuysen, Dec. 3, 1884, No. 691, confidential.
France, Instructions, XXI, Frelinghuysen to Morton, Feb. 28, 1885, No. 698
Hayti, Instructions, II, Frelingheysen to Langston, March 19, 1885, No. 336
For Firmin’s negotiations that prevented American takeover of Mole St. Nicolas, see (Leger 1907, R. W.
Logan 1941, 446-51). Also see Hayti, Despatches, XXV, Douglass to Blaine, April 21, 1891, No. 155
What would come to dominate American interests in Haiti turned out to be no longer territorial interests,
but the consolidation of American power through banking and the control of financial institutions, and
sources of state revenues (R. W. Logan 1941, 1968, Coradin 1987, v3).
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forces returned, and the South rose to overthrow a government that lacked the
legitimacy to govern unlike his most recent predecessors (Bellegarde 1938, 1408).
Alexis’ presidency represented a reassertion of the old guard against the
emerging highly educated technocratic class. He eliminated the Northern Black
Nationalist coherence that had undermined and sidelined the neocolonial
oligarchs for more than two decades, and by so doing, relegated control of the
state to neocolonial elites. His overthrow led by Gen. Antoine Simon allowed the
South to reassert its control over the state, and continued neocolonial Mulatto
ascendency to control the state and dictate its orientation.
They found in Antoine Simon a force against Northern nationalist power
and influence under his government, they furthered the consolidation of their
power and involvement in the management of the nation in the pursuit of their
personal and caste interests. However, the election119 of the Antoine Simon did
not eliminate the acrimony. Indeed, whereas under Gen. Alexis, violence
revolved around state control and state power, under Simon’s government
violence took a more regional character and ultimately led to open military
conflicts with Northern generals and the nationalist Cacos (Heinl and Heinl 2005,
330-332). Simon’s military excursion in Northern territories to reduce the most
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Many Haitian scholars would object to the characterization of election, the manner of coming to power
in those times. However, unlike many other nations in Latin America, no Haitian presidents took office
without first being elected by the Senate as required by the constitution. While it may be said that those
elections took place under duress with military forces camping in the capital, and that the senate’s action
is better classified as a certification than an election, it cannot be denied that a level of respect existed for
state institutions. No man, no matter the size of its army became president without the Senate approval.
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concentrated and coherent group of nationalists increased regional tensions
resulting in a northern backlash and greater coherence between Northern elites.
Northern leaders, the Zamor brothers, the Peraltes, General Vilbrun
Guillaume Sam, cousin of the former president Tiresia Simon-Sam, rallied to
support Cincinatus Leconte, the German-educated northern nationalist and
former Minister of Public Works under Tiresia Simon-Sam to oppose the regime.
Antoine Simon served three out of a 7-year term of his presidency, overthrown by
Northern nationalist forces led by General Jean-Jacques Dessalines Michel
Cincinnatus Leconte, the great-grandson of the Emperor Jean Jacques
Dessalines (Dalencour 1935, Bellegarde 1938).
The struggle between neocolonial elites and black nationalists had reemerged with neocolonial elites enjoying more power gained and consolidated
under the two previous regimes. With the election of Leconte on August 14,
1911, the North had regained their supremacy and control of the state. No
national forces would be strong enough to resist Northern dominance until the
American invasion and occupation. Leconte’s presidency was not without
international implications for a nation over which foreign powers competed.
The previous neocolonial government, in recreating the National Bank
disbanded by Nord Alexis, had allowed France and the United States to acquire
full control over the finance of the state, sidelining German interests and
deepening the nation’s dependency and vulnerability to foreign pressure.
Leconte’s studies in Germany, his past employment at the German embassy in
the North, and the alleged financial support garnered from German merchants in
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his military campaign against the Antoine Simon’s regime, made him a presumed
ally to Germany thus a threat to British, French, and American interests 120 (Heinl
and Heinl 2005, 332). The fear seems misplaced, however, as he went on to
secure Haiti’s interests and re-start the modernization program arrested since
Nord Alexis (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 91).
In less than a year, Leconte’s determination to preserve Haitian
sovereignty from an ever-threatening and encroaching United States, and protect
the territorial and financial integrity of the nation became a primary feature of his
regime. The creating of the Banque Nationale de la Republique D’haiti under the
previous regime with 50% of its share under American control and the rest under
French control with a 5% German share meant that the Banque was Haitian in
name only121 (H. Schmidt 1971, 39). More importantly, under the Franco-
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The French Indemnity and the various loans taken by Mulatto governments France to finance it not
only made Haiti an indebted nation but also dependent on French financial institutions from 1826 until
the American occupation. The emergence of German merchants in the 1880s at the height of Haitian state
expansion and development, reduce that dependence, by providing state leaders with different sources of
funding rather than just one thus making Germany notes Historian Hans Schmidt, increasingly important
in Haitian commerce and finance (Gaillard 1993, 150-1, 335-339). By 1907, “Germans dominated Haitian
commerce and shipping ad had obtained a number of concessions” (A. Millspaugh 1971, 21). Fear of
German dominance in Latin America and the Caribbean had made Germany the primary competitor of
American power in the region and the only nation capable of challenging the Monroe Doctrine. Moreover,
German military power, its commercial interests and financing of regional Northern forces, and the
existence of a German population since the revolutionary war of 1804 gave Germany a foothold
incomparable to other nations (H. Schmidt 1971, 34). The awareness of American racism in Haiti given the
Plessy vs. Fergusson Supreme Court case in 1896, a case where the complainants were people if Haitian
descent in Louisiana, did not aid Haitian perception of American racial policies (Laguerre 1998, 1, 67-8).
121

Millspaugh, the American Imposed Financial advisor to Haiti following the occupation noted, “the
support given by the State Department to American interests in Haiti, especially to the national City bank,
appeared at the time to give color and motive to our entire Haitian policy (A. Millspaugh 1971, 26). He
committed an error however in suggesting that American Banking interests were 20% rather than 50% (A.
Millspaugh 1971, 22). In fact, it was American foreign policy to undermine what America rightly saw as
German monopoly of Haitian commerce thus a threat to their domination of the Western Hemisphere.
Controlling Haiti was indeed a primary focus of American foreign policy in the Hemisphere and the vehicle
to that control became the New York City bank (R. W. Logan 1941, H. Schmidt 1971). Under the
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American Banking arrangements, the Haitian government finances and decisionmaking became dependent on foreign powers. As Millspaugh, the American
financial advisor imposed on Haiti during the occupation notes,
[T]he bank was the sole treasury of the government: it
received all government funds intact until the end of the
fiscal year, and it was in no way legally obligated to
make advances. Nevertheless, under agreements
entered into annually, it had advanced from month to
month amounts required for ordinary governmental
expenses… (A. Millspaugh 1971, 23).

The Bank had therefore the power to undermine governmental stability by
starving it of cash necessary to pay its employees and if militarily threatened, to
defend itself. It is this dependence, this loss of autonomy of the state, and the
nation to Franco-American banking interests that Leconte sought to undermine
and curtail by relying on German merchants rather than the Bank.
Leconte’s skills in limiting the power of the Franco-American Bank made
him a respected and competent leader, good for Haiti, but despised by those with
banking interests in Haiti, and their merchants (R. Gaillard 1984, Blancpain
1999). The most important economic accomplishment of the Leconte’s regime
was the reduction of the BNRH stranglehold on the nation, providing the
government with a fiscal year surplus of $800,000, and the ‘Convention

Presidency of Cincinatus Leconte, which American saw as a German ally, the secretary of state himself,
Philander C Knox, escorted by two military attaches visited Haiti to convey American concerns to the
president (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 93, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 334). Haiti was the only country with
substantive German economic interests, having eliminated, or reduced foreign interest in all the other
independent Latin America and Caribbean states, American policy-makers turned against the only Nation,
which had resisted it. Given the economic nature of the American expansion, following the Panama Canal
project it is not surprising then that American Banks was an important if the most important vehicle of its
foreign policy.
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Budgetaire’ that compelled the bank to agree to a monthly disbursement to the
government (A. Millspaugh 1971, 17-8, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 337).
Leconte appointed competent Haitians to the Courts, paved streets,
established a sewer system, re-organized the primary school system, Built a
military headquarter, the first in the nation, and sought to modernize the military
in order to address its regional character (Bellegarde 1938, 140, G. Corvington
2001, v4,216-7). His assassination a year into his presidency, on August 8, 1912,
due to a palace explosion abruptly ended what most Haitian scholars and his
contemporaries termed a remarkable beginning. It also raised questions and
suspicions about the possible involvement of foreign agents in pursuing their
interests by more nefarious means to remove a president they found unpalatable
for placating their agenda.

The Decline of Northern Coherence and Rise of American Coercion and Dollar
Diplomacy:
From 1912 to 1915, Haiti saw five presidents and experienced a level of
instability that crippled the nation. Elected right after the death of Leconte, the
Northerner Tancrede Auguste continued the projects started by his predecessor,
but died less than a year later. The consequence of Firmin’s failure to gain the
presidency was the eclipsing of a national figure capable of uniting the nation.
Cincinatus Leconte and Tancrede Auguste were the next best chances for a
national candidate, but their short presidencies eliminated that prospect. With
Leconte and Auguste ended the North’s cohesion and power and Haiti’s
opportunity of having a respected nationalist leader with roots in the
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Louverturean project and the commitment to national development that paralleled
earlier leaders. After them, no single figure arose to provide Haiti with a viable
national option. Moreover, whereas Northern forces previously remained
dominant by acting with regional coherence, their dominance now was no longer
a result of regional unity, but because members of its nationalist elites could
effectively manipulate different segments of Cacos forces to impose their
presidency on their own region and the nation. The disunion in the North thus
provided an opening for neocolonial elites to reassert their power and craft a new
political course for the state but this too would not last.
The legal expert Michel Oreste followed on May 4, 1913. The first Mulatto
westerner since 1843, and a reformist, Michel Oreste had the support of both
neocolonial political and intellectual elites. The election of Oreste supplanted the
preponderance of Northern military power in determining the presidency was
seen as an attempt by western elites to shift the nature of the presidency and
circumvent northern military dominance of national politics122. Emphasizing the
civilian character of the presidency was already a trend under the two previous

122

Jean Desquiron disputes the claim that the election of Oreste was an attempt by western and southern
elites to regain control of the state but rather an increased longing of a cross-section of the population for
civilian leadership. “It seems”, he notes, “they are tired of military governments and that the moderate
management of Leconte and Auguste made good impressions” (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 92). However, the
countervailing argument is that Oreste was a Bazelaisist or from the liberal party which opposed the
dominance of the North and the control of the state by blacks. Regardless of one’s position on the matter,
it is fair to note that the firminist period had created a convergence of people of different political ilk
seeking a more responsive and effective state led by competent civilians and technocrats. Perhaps
Oreste’s Bazelaisist orientation had been overstated but it was nevertheless a rallying point for Black
nationalists across the nation (R. Gaillard 1993, 12-23, 146, G. Corvington 2001, v3). For reference to
Michel Oreste’s Bazalaisist orientation, see (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 340).
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regimes. Both the Leconte and Oreste presidencies had emphasized the
technocratic and civilian character of their regimes and distanced themselves
from military-laden governance structures123.
However, whereas Leconte, a military general and direct descendent of
Dessalines, had the support of the Northern military and political elites and could
prevent challenges to his regime as long as he did not capitulate to American
pressure, Oreste lacked that support because of his regional and neocolonial
affiliations.
His regime faced the same economic pressures than Leconte’s from an
ever-encroaching United States who wanted control over Haiti’s customhouses,
the nation’s primary sources of revenue, as they had acquired in the Dominican
Republic, Nicaragua, and Cuba. American and French control of the Banking
system narrowed the options of Haitian governments and made the nation even
more dependent on transaction in its custom houses. Relinquishing control of
these custom houses was the last stage of ensuring American economic
supremacy, the imposition of its economic agenda, and Haiti’s total dependence.
Oreste’s unwillingness to allow American banking interests veto power over the
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One cannot discount the military reaction to Oreste’s government. Both Leconte and Auguste were
members of the military whereas Oreste was not, both were allied to regional Caco forces and supported
them financially, whereas as Oreste cut the financial support. His attempt to reform the military also
reduced their support for him and increase resentment for an institution not accustom to civilian
oversight. Michel Oreste “Disdained military titles of which his predecessors were so fond. He inaugurated
the civil presidential regime in Haiti. His inclination to disregard the influence and even the authority of
military leaders from the North, who, since Leconte, considered themselves indispensable, better yet,
central to the power of the government, angered the latter (G. Corvington 2001, v4, 255-6, Heinl and
Heinl 2005, 340).
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Haitian state deprived his government of needed financial resources to defend
itself or provide subsidies to segments of the Northern military. His inability to
deal with Northern political elites’ concern of neocolonial Mulatto supremacy, and
most specifically, its inability to pay off Caco leaders Oreste Zamor, and Davilmar
Theodore due to economic constraint imposed by the United States, led to his
overthrow nine months later (Bellegarde 1938).
The overthrow of Michel Oreste’s civilian regime by a segment of the now
competing Northern forces thus cannot be analyzed solely through the lens of
civilian-military tensions or neocolonial-nationalist competitions. It must be
viewed within the broader context of a failed American strategy to coerce the
government into making decisions that would give them access to the nation’s
primary sources of revenue and lack of cohesion of Northern Nationalist forces.
The fall of Oreste also brought to light another fissure in the North: the cohesive
military front North military and political elites had for so long depended on had
devolved into sectorial military competition, available for the highest bidder to
those seeking control of the neocolonial state. Northern nationalist elites were no
longer the only one competing for control over the presidency. Regional Cacos
military leaders who before supported Northern elites were now involved in
directly competing for the presidency. Elites of all stripes therefore became
victims of the adventurism of regional Cacos groups who vie for the spoils of the
neocolonial state.
By withholding its funds, American policy-makers anticipated the need to
remain in power over years of Northern dominance to be strong enough to
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supersede Oreste’s commitment to safeguarding the nation’s sovereignty by
maintaining control over its ports and customhouses. The American strategy
based on their assessment of neocolonial elites’ quest to reassert their power,
failed. By refusing American dictum, Michel Oreste had also decided that it was
best to lose power to another citizen rather than cede Haitian sovereignty to a
foreign power, and worse, one whose history of black mistreatment was well
known.
Internal opposition to Michel Oreste was not due to intra-elite competition
or competition between nationalist and liberalists, but was the result of direct
competition between regional Caco forces (Charmant 1905). For the first time,
Northern elites had lost control of their shock troops. Caco factions were no
longer subservient to northern nationalist elites but sought, for themselves,
control of the neocolonial state and the presidency. This was a turning point in
Haitian politics; all elites now fell prey to a military-driven politics they had
practiced in their competition for state control.
Although one can conclude that the overthrow of Michel Oreste and
election of Oreste Zamor on February 10, 1914 resulted from misguided elite
competition for the leadership of the neocolonial state, it was also, at least partly,
if not primarily, due to American use of its banking interests to enfeeble the
government and undermine its ability to defend itself against internal armed
threats by reducing its access to capital. This policy of starving governments of
funds to influence their decision-making became the primary tool of United
States’ foreign policy in Haiti.
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The refusal of Haitian head of states to cede their nation’s sovereignty
despite the financial noose, led American policy makers to seek more coercive
tactics, thus American war ships’ presence in Haitian waters increased and
remained permanent from 1913 until the invasion in 1915 (A. Millspaugh 1971,
25). American Gunboat diplomacy had reached Haiti. The most significant event
was not the fall of Michel Oreste, but the landing of U.S. marines under the
pretext of protecting its citizens and their interests during the transitional period
following the departure of Michel Oreste. It was by all account a dry run, and set
a precedent for things to come, notes Haitian scholar Dantes Bellegarde
(Bellegarde 1938). The presence of American boots on Haitian soil made three
points clear: first, the United States was no longer shy about landing forces on
Haitian territory, second, American interests was such that military involvement
would no longer be avoided, and third, Haitian elites in Port-Au-Prince did not
object to the American military presence and colluded with them as a vehicle to
offset Northern political and military dominance intimidated by the presence of
competing regional Cacos groups in the capital.
The Cacos regime of Oreste Zamor that preceded Michel Oreste faced
immediate economic pressure from the United States and opted to challenge
America’s coercive Dollar Diplomacy (H. Schmidt 1971, A. Millspaugh 1971, 24).
Unwilling to succumb to American financial coercion, Zamor transferred the
treasury service to local merchants, rather than the American bank, reduced the
dependency of the government on monthly disbursements, then aided by the
nationalist-dominated chamber of deputies, issued a bill enabling the government
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to produce paper money. Zamor’s attempt to circumvent American financial
coercion failed when the American State Department blocked the shipment of
paper money from New York. His refusal to agree to American control over
Customhouses, and his loans from German Merchants, all but signaled American
hostility toward his regime (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 343-7).
Starved of cash from the American controlled bank; unable to pay his
soldiers and support his regime, Zamor became the first overt victim of American
“Dollar Diplomacy” enabling its regional Caco competitor Davilmar Theodore to
overthrow him less than a year later on October 29, 1914. His presidency
acquiesced by the Senate on November 7, 1914, Theodore also maintained the
same disposition as the two previous governments, refusing the American offer
to assist his regime in exchange for control over its customhouses. The passing
of another bill permitting the issuing paper money on Dec. 24, 1914, and using
local merchants for loans to offset the bank’s supremacy, was the carbon copy of
the government he had overthrown (Bellegarde 1938, A. Millspaugh 1971).
With the Zamor regime, refusing to cede control of the nation’s
customhouses, and enjoying the support of the population, the American
government’s pattern of creating a financial crisis to compel governments hostile
to foreign control to acquiesce to its demands became its primary strategy
(Bellegarde 1938, 243-5). To do this, the U.S. State Department, as it had with
previous uncoorperative Northern governments, requested that the bank stopped
dispensing the monthly funds needed by the Zamorist regime to cover its
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expenses124. Facing internal challenges, the withholding of the monthly
disbursement, Peter Fuller, the American minister in Port-au-Prince at the time
confirmed his government’s intentions by observing,
[T]his [financial strangulation] most likely would bring the
government to a condition where it could not operate …
It is just this condition that the bank desires, for it is the
belief of the bank that the government, when confronted
by such a crisis, would be forced to ask for assistance of
the United States in adjusting its financial tangle and that
American supervision of the customs would result 125 (A.
Millspaugh 1971, 27).

Despite these concessions, and various attempts by Zamor’s minister of the
Interior Dr. Rosalvo Bobo, and his minister of Foreign Affairs Louis Borno to
negotiate with the American government, their unwillingness to cede control of
Haitian territory was interpreted as a failure by an American government with its
sight on Haiti’s customhouses and its territory (R. W. Logan 1968, 120-122).
Unable to convince Zamor to cede control of the nation’s customhouses, the
American State department dispatched a marine expedition a month after his
election to illegally remove the nation’s gold reserve from the Bank worth five
hundred thousand dollars, and transfer it to the National City bank of New York
(J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 94).
The days of Haitian independence appeared numbered. American
banking interests, having acquired control of Haitian finances as a vehicle of US
foreign policy, now had a stranglehold on the Haitian state and governmental
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For more detail, see Despatches from U.S. Counsul in Port-au-Prince on June 2, 1914 and July 2, 1914.

125

See Despatches from the American Minister to Port-Au-Prince, July 2, 1914
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decisions. It was a stranglehold that went beyond mere control of national
finances. It was outright theft of the national treasure to eliminate the last
vestiges of Haitian indepenence. To paraphrase Montague, the neocolonial
Haitian state was not only at the mercy of the National City Bank of New York but
was also losing a high percentage of its resources to foreign misappropriation
and crookedness over which it had no control to prevent. From 1911 till the
invasion, a percentage of every Loan acquired by the state never made it to its
coffers. Of the $674k loan issues in 1911, 81%; $609k in 1913, 78.8%; $712k in
1914, only 60% was netted by the state; and in 1914 out of $525k from City Bank
56% reached Haitian coffers (Montague 1940, 2002-3).
Despite the hypocritical historical and contemporary accusations of Haitian
mismanagement levied by American diplomats and scholars, theft, blackmail,
and coercion characterized America’s new relationship with Haiti, and has
persisted. Northern Nationalist resistance remained the only obstacle to
American regional supremacy. Having had its way with Nicaragua, Cuba, Puerto
Rico, and the Dominican Republic, and being the hegemon in the region,
America was unwilling to accept the refusal of the ephemeral governments of a
nation it saw as weak if not illegitimate (H. Schmidt 1971).
Further, so weak was the Haitian state that even the recognition of the
governments was preconditioned on its relegation of national sovereignty and
interests to American control126. Elite infighting and absorption in their incessant
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Foreign Relations 1914, 355, 361-369 – Indeed, the government of Davilma Theodore never succeeded
in achieving full recognition because of its refusal to agree to American terms and cede control over the
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competition for power, Haitian leaders squandered the nation’s leverage and
independence, and left it little room to maneuver away from American dollar
diplomatic grasp. Their failures had made the Haitian state an easy target of
foreign manipulations, vulnerable to their intimidations. Faced with Northern
nationalists’ refusal to cede Haitian sovereignty to American banking interests,
Dollar diplomacy would ultimately gave way to American Gunboat diplomacy. As
historian J. Fred Rippy notes,
[T]he United States had endeavored to attain its
objectives by diplomacy – straightforward or devious –
but when diplomacy or financial coercion failed or
patience, sometimes too meager, was exhausted, force
and the menace of force occasionally were employed as
instruments of national policy (quoted in Montague 1940,
v).

The American Dollar Diplomacy had succeeded as far as it had reduced
the reliance of the Haitian state on moneylenders and hamstringed Haitian
governments to American-controlled financial institutions127. More importantly, by
reducing the influence of other nations, it created a re-orientation of the sphere of

country’s sovereignty. In turns, The US government withheld Haitian state revenues controlled by its bank
to force a concession. As Logan and Millspaugh stipulate, the weakness and fall of Theodore’s government
was directly related to the lack of state funds. Historian Rayford Logan offers some important insights into
the negotiations between Theodore’s government and the United States (R. W. Logan 1968, 28-30, A.
Millspaugh 1971).
127

Heinl and Heinl argue that Haitians were already facing financial problems prior to the restrictions.
Millspaugh went further to suggest that Haitians were defaulting on their loans prior to the American
occupation. These are gross mischaracterizations. According to Schmidt, “despite the precarious character
of Haitian finances and the frequent revolution, Haiti continued to meet external obligations up to the
time of American intervention… Indeed, Haiti’s record of debt payment was exemplary compared to that
of other Latin American countries: in 1915 Ecuador was $2 million in arrears, Mexico was $15 million in
Arrears, and Honduras was more than $100 million in Arrears (H. Schmidt 1971, 43). It is under the
occupation with American financial advisors that Haiti became unable to pay its debts. The Haitian
government went to extraordinary degree to maintain the service of its foreign debt. For more on the
fidelity of the Haitian government to pay its debts, see Senatorial Report No. 794, p7-9.
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influence making it impossible for Haitian governments to survive without
American support. The confiscation of Haiti’s treasury not only destroyed the
confidence of local moneylenders dominated by Germans, it undermined the
ability of the Haitian government to service their loans, procure new ones, and
offset the United States’ financial stranglehold. The American strategy as
stipulated by the American ambassador to Haiti made clear that the goal was to
starve the Haitian government out of much needed funds to compel them to
bargain their sovereignty. “Haitian head of states will oppose United States’
demands as long as they have access to one dollar”, he states. “However, when
they run out of their resources, they will yield. Such is the secret of the
embarkation of the gold”, and the aggressive economic maneuvers orchestrated
by the American government (Anglade 1977, v2, 25)128.
Although the goal was to deepen the Haitian economic crisis and
undermine political legitimacy, the American foreign policy strategy often rightly
revealed US policymakers’ genuine concerns about German power and
encroachment in the Caribbean in the post-Panama Canal and World War I era.
As Heinl and Heinl correctly assert,
[T]he synchronous opening in 1914 of World War I and
of the Panama Cana heightened U.S. concerns over the
West Indies as well as American Sensitivity toward What
Germany evidently saw as its special position in Haiti. As
the war went on, this sensitivity changed to suspicion. It
was against this backdrop that the United States sought
Haitian assent to customs receivership (Heinl and Heinl
2005, 358).
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Secretary of State Lansing made the concerns even starker, there was “good
reason to believe that Germany was ready to go to great lengths to secure the
exclusive customs control of Haiti, and also to secure a coaling station at Mole
St. Nicholas,” he wrote on May 4, 1922129. Indeed, Haiti featured highly in the
geopolitical concerns of the United States, and the failure of all segments of the
Haitian leadership to use that concern to advance Haitian interests due to their
infightings remains a major reflection of their ineptitude and shortsightedness.
Contrary to historian Philippe Girard’s evidence-light assertion that there
were no American interests to protect, and that American involvement in Haiti
was simply a case of “benevolent imperialism”, most scholars concur on the
geopolitical importance of Haiti to the United States. The methodical approach of
the American drive to control Haiti’s primary sources of revenue and tie the
nation into its economic system to eliminate German influence, and secure its
regional dominance had little to do with benevolence but much to do with
imperialism (B. G. Plummer 1988, Blancpain 1999, P. Girard 2010, 81). It is
indeed quite reasonable to suggest that American failure to convince Haitians
leaders to assent to their demands, ultimately led to more forceful measures (H.
Schmidt 1971, B. G. Plummer 1988, Renda 2001). In the end, American national
interests could not be indefinitely postponed in the hopes of successful
diplomacy with Haitian governments that had become, by most accounts, grossly
dysfunctional.
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The inability of Theodore’s regime to prevent national resources and
financial decision-making from being susceptible to American banking veto
demonstrated the increasing impotence of the Haitian neocolonial state and its
governments to protect Haitian sovereignty and control its internal affairs and
international obligations. This was the turning point and the end of the regime of
the well-liked, popular, but inept president130. It was also a turning point for a
nation politically and economically bankrupted by its elites.

Prelude to the Invasion: National Crisis, the Failure of National Elites, and the
Rise of American Dominance:
Once again, political competition and the failure of nationalist and
neocolonial elites to find common ground, and to gain popular legitimacy,
eliminated the prospect of national development, and ultimately, the chance to
formulate a coherent national response to American intrusion. Haitian elites’
disunion wilted away the strong Louverturean state. Haiti’s inability to respond to
this affront was due to the failure of Haitian leaders to craft a strong and
accountable state. Additionally, and perhaps more destabilizing was the violent
competition between northern elites and regional Cacos leaders because of the
Firminist defeat. The unabated militarized conflicts resulting from competition in
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Haitian Historian George Corvington in his analysis of Theodore’s regime notes, “During his short
presidency, ‘Fre da’ –Brother Da- as he was affectionately called could only be considered as a good old
man, an old man without initiative… The fire he unintentionally lighted in the heart of the people would
grow dimmer, because of the excesses of the troops from the North that accompanied him, and that he
was unable to control (G. Corvington 2001, v4, 296). Also quoted in (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 94)
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the North had undermined the northern state crafting project, and weakened the
military and the North as the center of nationalist resistance against foreign
encroachment, leaving the nation defenseless and vulnerable.
Iterations of failed “neocolonial states” had made Haiti vulnerable by
directing its resources away from state expansion and national development and
diluting its bond with the majority of its population. Having disenfranchised the
population by crafting a state to support elite interests rather than those of the
nation and its citizens, neocolonial elites had to rely on foreign powers to regain
their dominance. Moreover, nationalist elites, shortsighted as they were, in not
supporting Firmin and resisting Neocolonial elites’ and foreign nations’
manipulation of Nord Alexis, could no longer rely on the population to defend or
support their cause.
Despite the fact that the American affront to Haitian sovereignty was
partly, if not wholly, encouraged by neocolonial elites and facilitated by the intraelite struggle in the North, it nonetheless angered Northern elites who blamed
their counterpart in Port-Au-Prince and their influence on Davilmar Theodore, the
old Cacos chief turned president, for the affront. The march of an elite-led
Northern military force commanded by Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, former minister
and cousin of former President Tiresias Simon Sam, meant the end of the Zamor
regime but also accentuated the intra-nationalist struggle and military
factionalism amongst Northern elites for state control.
The fall of Theodore and the election of Sam on February 1915 was
marked by resistance. Almost all sectors of Haitian society: neocolonial elites in
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Port-au-Prince, Jacmel and Les Cayes, the primary centers of neocolonial elite
power standing against Northern control plotted with foreigners; from the North, a
faction of the black nationalist elites led by former minister of the interior and
finance, Dr. Rosalvo Bobo, a staunch Firminist, and unapologetic Northern
nationalist, sought a return to nationalist leadership, while American military
threats hung over the nation.
Vilbrun Guillaume Sam lasted only five months in office, victim of both a
changing international environment, the determination of neocolonial elites intent
on taking advantage of Northern factionalism to upend Northern political control
and military dominance, lack of cohesion between Northern nationalist elites, and
the imbecility of his military chief for carrying out his order to murder defenseless
people in their jail cells if his regime was threatened (Nicholls 1979, R. Gaillard
1984, Heinl and Heinl 2005, Pierre-Etienne 2010). By murdering Sam in revenge,
the Neocolonial elites demonstrated their own failure to put the interests of the
nation before their own. They had an opportunity to secure an alliance with
faction of the Northern nationalist elite but lacked the foresight; it was a zero-sum
game.
The chaos of the years that culminated the end of Sam’s Presidency
reflected a political stalemate. It culminated with a factionalized nationalist
Northern elite unable to form a coherent military and political front to maintain
control over the Neocolonial state, and a neocolonial Mulatto elite, with no
military power and scant political legitimacy to exert control and influence over
the state it had crafted, siding with foreign powers (Nicholls 1979, Dupuy 1989,
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Pierre-Etienne 2010). The nation under foreign threats, and neither Mulatto nor
black elites capable of sustaining their power without a coalition, provided a
unique opportunity for a lasting solution and political stability. It was an
opportunity created by dynamics not unlike the pre-independence period but this
time, the U.S. offered a better bargain than France, and neocolonial elites opted
for an external alliance, one that would forever seal the destiny of the nation and
eliminate its last chance toward securing a modicum of independence and
national sovereignty.
A subsequent American occupation further retarded the development of a
functional Haitian state. The U.S. consolidated the neocolonial state by allowing
Mulatto elites to achieve supremacy and by eliminating northern military power
and secured the subservience of the Haitian state and its people. Haitian scholar
and political party leader Pierre-Etienne wrote,
The military intervention and American occupation of
Haiti in 1915 occurred in the context of the total collapse
of the state. In this context, of state absence, the
occupiers found themselves obligated to entirely
reconstruct the repressive and administrative
apparatuses of a new state” (Pierre-Etienne 2010, 234).

However, the state had not collapsed as Pierre-Etienne, a candidate for the
Presidency in 2010, argued. The neocolonial project underfoot since the advent
of Pétion and contested by nationalist elites had come to its natural conclusion.
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CHAPTER IV
THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION, ELITE COLLUSION, AND CLIENTELISM IN
HAITI

Chapter IV analyzes the impact of the American Occupation on the
reorientation of the Haitian state. Under American occupation, American Marines
created, supported, and funded a client regime to give legitimacy and rubberstamped American demands and policies. With the Haitian state under American
control and its government at their service, for the first time since its
independence, clientelism and external dependency took root in Haiti. A distinct
form of clientelist regime emerged, disconnected from popular support and
legitimacy, one that relied on foreign military force and neocolonial elite cohesion
as the basis for its sustainability. Clientelism evolved in Haiti with neocolonial
elites in collusion with foreign forces and in opposition to popular aspirations to
secure particular rather than national interests. Although most scholars concur
that, the occupation centralized the state and left Haitian elites with the coercive
infrastructure to maintain their dominance, few discuss the impact on the Haitian
state itself, its lack of legitimacy and popular support, and its orientation away
from the masses toward neocolonial control and political and economic
dependency. Also left wholly unexplored is the nature of the state left behind and
the regimes that controlled it.
This chapter argues that the 19-year occupation waged war on nationalist
elites, systematically destroyed their military and political infrastructure, an
objective long sought after by their neocolonial rivals. More importantly, the
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occupation imposed a client regime on the nation in opposition to popular
aspirations; one lacking in legitimacy and dependent on coercion and external
military support for its survival. To facilitate the persistence and dominance of
the client regime, the occupation reorganized and consolidated the historically
contested neocolonial state and created an uncontested and centralized military
to protect foreign and neocolonial elites’ interests. Far from eliminating the
dominant military paradigm that dominated elite competition as some scholars
suggest, the occupation merely consolidated the power of neocolonial elites
placing them at the helm of a militarized state and reinforced the historical
schism between the two groups centered around color (H. Johnson 1920, Balch
1927, P. H. Douglas 1927, D. B. Cooper 1963, A. Millspaugh 1971).
The Occupation handed neocolonial forces control of the direction of the
nation with a new military responsive to foreign powers and dedicated to
preserving their interests rather than those of the nation (Buell 1929, J. H.
McCrocklin 1934, Montague 1940, H. Schmidt 1971, Dupuy 1997). It cemented
the colorist politics of exploitation and exclusion supported by neocolonial elites
and their foreign allies that was so staunchly resisted by nationalists (Nicolas
1927, Bellegarde Smith 1982). By creating a neocolonial regime dependent on
foreign support for its political and economic dominance instead of one based on
political legitimacy and responsiveness to popular aspirations, the occupation
created the seed of instability that continues to plague Haiti. The persistence of
neocolonial control of the state along racial lines became central to the
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contestation against the occupation and post-occupation political development
(Price-Mars 1928/1983, Spector 1985, M.-R. Trouillot 1990, Blancpain 1999).
In the end, it is this colorist clientelist regime and its determination to maintain
control of the state through military means that gave rise to the Negritude
movement, the political and cultural recriminations and ultimately to Noirism or
the Haitian Black power ideology resulting in the election of one of its leaders, Dr.
Francois Duvalier in 1957. The American Occupation thus created the context
and conditions for the political, economic and institutional instability that has
plagued Haiti by consolidating the neocolonial state, and imposing and
supporting client regimes that undermined the need for governing elites to
develop a level of popular legitimacy that could have strengthened state-society
relations and the possibility for stable democratic governance. It created a state
weak on legitimacy and dependent on coercion.
As was demonstrated in earlier chapters, since Jefferson, the U.S. had
been hostile to the Haitian Republic, blocking its recognition, and enforcing its
isolation (R. W. Logan 1941, Y. L. Auguste 1979, B. Plummer 1990, Matthewson
2003). Except for Mexico and the Louisiana Purchase, the U.S. had enough
territory and people to conquer within its own boundary. They came to external
imperialism late but lost no time from the mid-1820 to 1915 to directly impose
their will on neighboring nations, except Haiti. Franco-American relations and
American national racial politics had made them hesitant to meddle with the
recalcitrant Black Republic (L. Manigat 1967, R. W. Logan 1968, Weeks 2008).
The U.S. had sought since before Haitian independence to keep Haiti at bay,
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both for fear of its influence and because of its own treatment of its Black
American population (Lawless 1992, Rothenberg 2007). The Monroe Doctrine
and its corollaries, and the Platt Amendment as tools of American expansionist
policies had caused every independent nation in the Western Hemisphere and
European powers to acquiesce to American supremacy. However, fiercely
jealous of its independence, Haiti had stubbornly managed to keep this powerful
neighbor at bay and the nation away from its influence. By the mid-1890s, the
American gaze had turned toward Haiti. Despite this apparent historical
reluctance to fully engage with this republic, according to scholar Mary Renda,
American forces made multiple attempts to influence or intimidate Haiti in the
later part of the nineteenth century (Renda 2001). The 1880s saw a marked
determination to gain direct access and influence in Haitian affairs. The
dominance of American commercial and banking interests in shaping American
national interests and foreign policy, the prevalence of German merchants and
banking interests in Haitian commerce, and American concerns about Germany’s
interest in establishing a coaling in Haitian territory at the start of WWI made Haiti
a central element in American foreign policy (R. W. Logan 1941, Healy 1976,
Heinl and Heinl 2005). That they succeeded or that Haiti finally succumbed to US
hegemony can be ascribed to the failure of Haitian elites, and the fact that, not
unlike the pre-independence years of the Haitian Republic, American foreign
policy and economic interests superseded their racial apprehension (R. W.
Logan 1968, Y. L. Auguste 1979, R. Gaillard 1984).
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The Disembarkation of the Marines:
The landing of the marines and American occupation was neither
accidental nor a result of political turmoil, as is often suggested by most scholars
(Montague 1940, Healy 1976, E. L. Beach 2002, Langley 2002, L. Dubois 2011).
American had devised to establish control over the black republic and had been
waiting for the opportune time to execute their plan (R. W. Logan 1941, Castor
1978, B. G. Plummer 1988, 1990). The former minister, ambassador and scholar,
Antenor Firmin, having successfully resisted various American attempts to usurp
Haitian sovereignty, and recognizing the impending danger to Haitian
independence, advocated for national cohesion to prevent American interference
in Haitian internal affairs. He argued that instability, not interest in Haitian
territory, which he had so skillfully defended, would facilitate American
encroachment (Firmin 1905)131. Some Haitian patriots also wrote alarmingly
about the danger represented by American action in neighboring Dominican
Republic, Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Puerto Rico while others foresaw an
impending American invasion and decried the expressions of support for
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While Firmin was correct on the territorial question in 1905, the dynamics had changed considerably
by 1910 fear of German influence and economic interests became the driving force in American foreign
policy towards Latin American and the Caribbean. In Haiti, specifically, American policy-makers had used
their acquisition of banking interests through collusion with France as a lever of influence and control
over successive governments. Moreover, by 1904 the United States government asserted the right to
intervene and exercise police power in the region (Weeks 2008, 68-85). Impositions on Venezuela,
Honduras, Panama, Nicaragua, the arbitrary control of Cuban and Dominican customhouses, primary
sources of state revenues, and unrelenting pressure on various Haitian governments to cede control of
their finances all fit neatly into a pattern of foreign policy driven by economic and regional hegemonic
interests. All this, justify, as it were, by their own Taft (Government n.d.), and Roosevelt’s Monroe
Corollary (Review Oct., 1910, Weeks 2008)
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American intervention amongst neocolonial elites (Edouard 1890, 46, Laventure
1893, 19-25, Frederic 1902, 15, Charmant 1905). Their fears were not unfounded
as the Secretary of State Elihu Root at the time confirmed to Albert Shaw, the
American council in Haiti,
[O]f course, they have some pretty good reason for
doubting the advantages of too close an association
between the United States and a black man’s
government. I have been watching every move in Haiti
for several years very closely in the hope that a situation
would arise in which we could be of material help to
them and in which we could give that help in such a way
as to establish the right kind of relations… For any
positive step, I think we must wait for the psychological
moment (qted in Montague 1940:192)132.

Montague, in defending United States’ action in Haiti, argues that the State
Department was more interested in transferring the foreign debts of countries in
the western hemisphere from Europe to New York to secure their financial
dominance than invading their territories. While true, the presence of American
forces in various nations suggests that the refusal to comply to cede economic
control voluntarily, as should be expected, led to military impositions and the loss
of economic and territorial sovereignty. Even those who allowed control of their
Custom Houses could not allay military occupation, as was the case in the
Dominican Republic (R. W. Logan 1968, G. Black 1988, Langley 2002, 133-41).
Moreover, the imposition of financial control placed an American chokehold on
these nations in “America’s Backyard” subject to the Monroe Doctrine,
eliminating their last vestiges of autonomy, and the last sphere of European
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Elihu Root to Albert Shaw, Dec., 1908 – also see Phillip C Jessup, Elihu Root, I 554-5

207

influence in the Hemisphere. This was well understood and resisted in the region
(Montague 1940, Healy 1976, 1988, Langley 2002, Weeks 2008). The goal was
not simply financial control but fashioning the right kind of states, regimes, and
institutions to support that control and make that transfer of economic dominance
from Europe to the United States permanent. America was involved in a project
of regional economic dominance and control of Custom Houses, the primary
sources of revenue for these nations was central to this project. To maintain that
dominance, uncooperative governments and corresponding national political
environments were forcefully re-oriented (Healy 1976, G. Black 1988)133.
As mentioned above, American policy of coercing Haitian governments to
cede control of their primary sources of revenue by limiting access to resources
was constant and was the source of political instability. Succeeding governments
failed due the financial constraints imposed by the American government
because of their refusal to acquiesce to American Demands (Kelsey 1922, R. W.
Logan 1941, Y. L. Auguste 1979, G. Black 1988, B. G. Plummer 1988). However,
what is often not discussed is the damage American interference did in
weakening Haitian governance structures and intra-state and intra-elites power
relations. The Americans well understood that their economic constraints and
impositions on Haitian governments by controlling the banking system were the

133

American economic imposition had already occurred in the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Honduras,
Venezuela, Panama, and Nicaragua (Weeks 2008, Langley 2002).
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source of these ephemeral governments and instability, having observed the fall
of three governments as a consequence of their policies and strategies. What
they hoped for were leaders who cared more about holding on to power than
preserving the nation’s sovereignty.
The American strategy failed because Northern nationalist politicians
preferred to forego power rather than cede the nation’s sovereignty to American
control. It was precisely American policy-makers’ failure to understand the
Louverturean influence on Northern self-determination that led to the invasion
and an all-out military attack on the North. Thus, the American argument that the
intervention was to eliminate the instability is at best a disingenuous
mischaracterization. The American government colluded with the City Bank of
New York in efforts to force successive Haitian governments to yield to American
demands as the American minister to Haiti, Madison R. Smith made clear in his
letter to the Secretary of State on June 9, 1914,
[T]he suspension of the budgetary convention signed
between Haiti and the National City Bank of New York
would most likely bring the government to a condition
where it could not operate. It is just this condition that the
bank desires, for it is the belief of the bank that the
government, when confronted by such crisis, would be
forced to ask for assistance of the United States in
adjusting its financial tangle, and that American
supervision of the customs would result. In the event the
bank refuses in July or august to renew the convention
budgetaire, it is not unlikely that the government of Haiti
will soon thereafter indicate its willingness to negotiate
with the United States in an effort to find some way out
of its financial difficulties 134.
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Minister Smith to the Secretary of state – American Legation – June 9, 1914 – file 838.51/340 – No. 88
Madison R. Smith. It is important to note here that based on the American minister’s letter, someone on
the Haitian president’s cabinet was assisting the American minister by relaying information and quite
obviously, not the nationalists who objected to the demands.
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It is this partially manufactured instability, which would serve as the excuse for
invasion – partially manufactured because of the factionalism in the ranks of
Northern nationalists, which made them vulnerable to external pressures and the
perfidy of neocolonial elites in prioritizing power over nation.
The fact that the U.S. was partly responsible for undermining Haitian
governmental stability and creating for the first time since 1843 rapid successions
of governments has to be central to understanding pre-invasion Haiti. The active
and dogged resistance by Haitian northern political actors, despite American
success in gaining control over Haiti’s debt and banking system135, their refusal
to succumb to American pressure and voluntarily cede control over the nation
meant that an American military invasion remained the only option for American
policy-makers. Thus, predictably, since economic coercion and ‘dollar diplomacy’
failed to produce the intended results in Haiti, American gunboats diplomacy took
the lead, substituting dollars with bullets as was advocated by President Taft
(Montague 1940, 200-4, Renda 2001, 30-1). Mary Renda notes,
[A]s US capitalists made important inroads in Haiti,
instances of gunboat diplomacy would become more
and more frequent, by 1910, the United States had
achieved a position of dominance over other great
powers in Haitians Affairs, by 1913, President Wilson
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It is true that Vilbrun Guillaume Sam was faced with Elite resistance from the start and opted to
incarcerate a large number of prominent individuals (Healy 1976, 36-7). Guided by his foreign minister,
Louis Borno who was already committed to American intervention, it is argued that Sam had succumbed
to American economic pressure and was about to acquiesce to custom control until his overthrow
forestalled the advancing Cacos troops of the former minister, and staunch nationalist, Dr. Rosalvo Bobo
(McCrocklin 1934). The Americans well understood that Dr. Bobo would not cede control of any aspect of
Haitian sovereignty, having so written and having rejected earlier American advances as the main
negotiator under the former president Davilma Theodore (Wriston 1929, 512-3).
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and his advisors were searching for a way to translate
that dominance into definitive control. The American
government attempted to secure control at various
points during 1914 and 1915, culminating in the decision
to land marines and sailors on July 28, 1915 (Renda
2001, 30).

The following message from the invading Admiral Caperton to the navy supports
Renda’s assertion of Haiti economic and strategic importance for the United
States. “During my operations on the Island of Haiti,” he notes,
I have tried to understand and apply the politics of my
government toward this nation. Given its economic and
commercial importance for the United States, and
considering its strategic importance for the navy, in an
area threatened by foreign powers”136 (Gaillard 1973,
35)

American policy makers were implementing the Monroe Doctrine across Latin
America and the Caribbean. Haiti was the last holdout. Furthermore, they feared
German Design on the strategic Mole St. Nicholas, for a Submarine base, which
would compete with American military dominance of the region137 (R. W. Logan
1968, 123-5). However, despite American dominance of Haitian banking
systems, and the constant threats and pressure on national leaders, the refusal
of Northern nationalist leaders, adherents to the Louverturean creed, to give in to
American demands and cede control of the nation’s sources of revenue
remained the only obstacle to their fiscal domination of the region and of the
Haitian state.
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Us Senate Report, No. 794, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, Inquiry into the Occupation and Administration
of Haiti and the Dominican Republic (1922), vol. I, p.294
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Us Senate Report, No. 794, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, Inquiry into the Occupation and Administration
of Haiti and the Dominican Republic (1922), p.313.
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Therefore, “that the American occupation occurred is no surprise, what is
surprising,” asserts Rothberg and Clague “is that they waited until 1915” (R. W.
Logan 1941, Rotberg and Clague 1971, 109). Indeed, the plan for invasion was
drawn since November 1914 and American policy-makers had been waiting for
the most opportune moment when nationalists could offer the least resistance138
(H. Schmidt 1971, 64-71). That moment came at a critical time in Haitian political
history; one that saw an emerging alliance between segments of the neocolonial
elites and Northern nationalists led by Dr. Rosalvo Bobo, the former Minister of
the Interior of the Davilmar regime. It was perhaps the advent of another Firminist
moment where the potential for elite coalition and more stable governance was
the most promising. The young, outward looking, better educated modernist
sector of both nationalist and neocolonialist elites found common cause in their
search for a more responsive government and modern state system; one that
could have provided a unique opportunity for national stability. It was their
challenge to the oligarchical leadership of their parents. Dr. Bobo, as did Dr.
Firmin before him, represented this segment of the highly educated bourgeois
technocrats nationalists who rejected the competition between neocolonial and
nationalist elites. They rightly saw this competition as a hindrance to national
development and their search for a more responsive state and accountable
leadership.
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“War Portfolio No. 1, reference No. 5-d: Republic of Haiti,” Nov. 9, 1914; NA, RG45, WA-7, Box 636.
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This alliance was the result of the usurpation of power and control of the
neocolonial state by a Northern military adventurer, the son of a former president,
Vilbrum Guillaume Sam who had accentuated the schism amongst Northern
elites by seizing power for self-aggrandizement (Bellegarde 1953, 245-6). His
ability to usurp power was the culmination of Northern elites’ disunion and served
to galvanize them behind the unifying leadership of Dr. Rosalvo Bobo. Supported
by neocolonial modernist allies in the capital, and the Northern elites and its
military infrastructure, Dr. Bobo marched toward the capital to unseat a
government that lacked both the support and ability to govern (R. Gaillard 1973,
33-6, Blancpain 1999). Sam’s jailing and subsequent murder of 168
neocolonialist and nationalist elites’ supporters of Dr. Bobo in the capital and
consequently, the revenge killing of the northern president and members of his
cabinet by the very oligarchs whom had opposed their sons’ support of Dr. Bobo
were aberrations in Haitian political history (Gaillard 1973, Heinl and Heinl 2005).
Despite being a military general and the son of a former president, Sam had
lacked both the necessary Northern Nationalists support to lead the state, and,
more importantly, the popular legitimacy to defend military challenges to his rule
(Castor 1971, R. Gaillard 1973, 83-97, E. L. Beach 2002).
Elites fissures in the North, neocolonial intergenerational disconnect in the
West, American economic coercion and American military forces patrolling Haiti’s
waters in wait, Haiti’s neocolonial oligarchs morning their sons, saw an
opportunity to permanently rid themselves of Northern Dominance. To this end,
they facilitated the landing of occupation forces, advised their policies and
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strategies, aided in the disarmament and disbanding of military regiments in the
city, and collaborated with them to forestall the advancing northern military
forces, led by the Nationalist Dr. Rosalvo Bobo, (Bellegarde 1929, II,5, R.
Gaillard 1973, 83-8, Nicholls 1979).
Neocolonial collusion with the invasion and Occupation is often discounted
and has yet to be fully investigated. Too many Haitian scholars and apologists
still maintain that neocolonial elites were not complicit in the invasion and only
collaborated with a fait accompli, or better yet, attempted to limit the impact of the
invasion on the sovereignty of the nation by negotiating and collaborating with
occupation forces (Renda 2001, Heinl and Heinl 2005, L. Dubois 2011).
However, Congressional records, diplomatic correspondences, and navy
archives offer substantive evidence of not only their collusion during, but also,
perhaps more damning, demonstrate that such collusion preceded the
occupation. Thus, that neocolonial Mulatto elites conspired is not in question,
what is to be determined is to what extent they facilitated foreign invasion and
domination of the state, and the impact it has had on the nation and its people.
This chapter advances that the rationale for conspiring is in the history of
competition between nationalist and neocolonial elite groups. Theirs was an
attempt to undermine Northern Nationalists’ Dominance and acquire control of a
state they had crafted but had lacked the power to control. This lack of power is
the source of their collusion with foreign powers, and ultimately the establishment
of a client regime under their leadership.
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For the first time in Haitian history, a client regime controlled by foreign
powers took roots with the capacity to sustain itself. Even prior to the election of
Guillaume-Sam as President, neocolonial elites worked with foreign powers to try
to facilitate their ascension to state control notes Healy (Healy 1976). Such
assertion is supported by the proposal of prominent senators, led by the head of
the senate, for American intervention as testified by Admiral Caperton,
[T]he proposal of ten senators that Caperton prevents
the entry of Guillaume Sam into the capital and let the
senatorial group arrange a “free election” to choose a
new president. This man would presumably be
guaranteed in office by the United States, along the lines
already followed in Santo Domingo (Healy 1976, 37)139.

Admiral Caperton states that neocolonial elites had long before the invasion,
approached him seeking American support, tutelage, and protection in his report
to the navy, “Better class Haitians keep aloof of politics, desire American
intervention to stabilize the government but do not openly promote such ideas for
fear of execution by Politicians”140. Neocolonial elites already foresaw their role
as leaders of a client regime. Given the power of Northern military forces,
neocolonial elites understood that in order to acquire and maintain control over
the nation, foreign backing was necessary and thus consequently while some
advocated for it in their newspapers, others covertly proposed it (Nicholls 1979,
J. Desquiron 1993, Renda 2001, 11). Viewed in this context, clientelism began in
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Caperton testimony at the Senate Inquiry Hearings, p293. The leader of the Senate, Sudre
Dartiguenave, would later become the central figure of the American occupation ( (Gaillard 1973).
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Caperton to Secretary of the Navy. February 10, 1915. Those politicians would be later be
systematically disenfranchised.
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Haiti at the urging and with the support of neocolonial elites who had created a
level of dependency by indebting Haiti to France with the indemnity in 1825.

Occupation and Clientelism in Haiti:
Although Caribbean clientelism and dependency theorists assume a
degree of popular legitimacy for regime survival, for neocolonial elites in Haiti, the
absence of popular legitimacy meant that state control was dependent on a
foreign clientelist model that rendered their governance impervious to internal
mass pressures and independent of popular legitimacy. Absent the political
dependence and reliance on legitimacy from the masses, and under political and
military protection of an occupying force neocolonial client regimes left the
population with little effective institutional tools to safeguard their interests
besides armed opposition, which could only be offered by the North (C. J. Edie
1984, Dupuy 1989, Blancpain 1999). Having identified the nationalist elites and
their military infrastructure as a threat to their dominance and their clientelist
model, both occupation forces and neocolonial elites sought their destruction as
a precondition for their usurpation of power (R. W. Logan 1961, R. W. Logan
1968, 126-29, H. Schmidt 1971). Admiral Caperton’s admission that neocolonial
leaders sought the creation of a regime under U.S. protection reflects the lack of
power and legitimacy of neocolonial elites. Thus, Nicholls is correct to assert,
[M]any members of the elite welcomed the American
occupation and … saw in the occupation a chance to reestablish the political hegemony of Mulatto elite, which
had been gradually eroded in the preceding decades.
Other elite Haitians, while secretly collaborating with and
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advising the Americans, refused to commit themselves
publicly to the occupation (Nicholls 1979, 146).

Neocolonial elites’ collaboration with the Occupation is not only central but
becomes crucial for American imposition. Even if we take the observation of
Edward Latimer Beach, the biographer of Admiral Caperton with some
skepticism, his rendition of the situation is consistent with various scholars,
consular correspondences, and Congressional documents. Beach notes,
[A]dmiral Caperton asked for and received the
cooperation of law-abiding Haitians, and though he
immediately assumed complete military and civil control,
this was with the willing consent of the vast majority of
those in Port-au-Prince. In all of his acts, he received the
immediate cooperation and help of the best elements of
Haitian Society. Amongst these, there were no evidence
of sullenness (E. L. Beach 1915, 3)141.

It is unequivocal that neocolonial elites initially advocated for, facilitated and
sustained the occupation. According to the American Charge D’ Affaires Davis
Beale, “the better elements of the natives in Haiti are in favor of American
intervention…” (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 383). Even Montague, a historian at the
Virginia Military Institute despite contradicting the officers involved directly with
those elites by suggesting that the motivation of the neocolonial elites was less
clear than portrayed by American representatives and other scholars, offered a
damning assessment,
[T]he motives of individuals were confusingly mixed;
each persuaded himself that his course was in the public
service, while his selfish interest was very plain to his
critics. Few could have been utterly cynical, but also few
showed themselves ready to make personal sacrifices

141

Given American racial policies, the segregation within the American military, and the realities of
American occupation, it is clear that, from the start, Caperton had found a group in Port-Au-Prince willing
and eager to cooperate; one he could accept with more ease.
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for the sake of their convictions. undoubtedly the attitude
of many were determined by considerations of private
fortune rather than of the public good, for that was
inevitable in a class which knew no source of livelihood
save the treasury. As the event was to prove, some were
ready to imperil Haitian independence in order to gain a
political advantage over their fellow citizens (Montague
1940, 212-13).

Neocolonial elites, whose interests rested in State control, rightly saw
collaboration with occupation forces as a propitious vehicle to assert their
individual and caste power and interests and offset decades of northern political
and military dominance. Consequently, they collaborated with the Occupation
forces both overtly and covertly much as they did during the revolutionary war
with France (Trouillot 1990, 128-30).

Dartiguenave vs. Dr. Bobo:
As the Minister of the Interior and Education in the regime of Davilmar
Theodore, Dr. Bobo had objected to American pressure and attempts of
members of the cabinet to cede control of the nations’ sovereignty (Gaillard
1973, 17-20). Like previous governments, Davilmar’s government was faced with
an ultimatum; formal recognition by the American government depended on
Haitian capitulation to American demands. The American Secretary of State not
only demanded the creation of a committee that would be required to sign over
Haitian Sovereignty to which, according to the American Minister, the Haitian
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Foreign minister had already agreed to the terms142. American pressure and
neocolonial collusion appeared to have succeeded in cornering the Theodore’s
government, leaving Dr. Bobo the sole cabinet member to object to American
demands and blocking the capitulation of the regime143 (R. Gaillard 1973, Healy
1976). Consequently, leaked information about the negotiations undertaken by
Joseph Justin, the Foreign minister, and disclosure of the treaty the American
sought to impose for recognition to the Senate, led Justin to be interpelled by the
Senate dominated by nationalist delegates. The feelings of the foreign minister
during the senate hearings revealed the very dysfunction of neocolonialist elites,
and the covert negotiations in which he was engaged with the American
government. “For some time”, Foreign Minister Justin stated, to the
consternation of the senate, “they say that the country cannot administer itself,
that our civil struggles have impoverished it, that our finances are disorganized.
They say, also, that we are in need of a master” (Gaillard 1973, 20-21). The
nationalist-dominated senate, outraged by the nature of American demands and
the lack of transparency of the foreign minister, forced his resignation144
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A series of telegrams correspondences between the State department, the American representative in
Haiti, and the Haitian government makes clear the American strategy resisted by Dr. Bobo. Minister
Blanchard to the Secretary of State, File No. 838.00/1028; secretary of State to Minister Blanchard,
Washington, Nov. 24, 1914, File No. 838.00/1039; Minister Blanchard to the Secretary of State, Nov. 25,
1914 – File No. 838.002/31
143

Blanchard to Bryan, April 6, 1915. File No. 838.00/1150; New York Times, July 29, 1915, p4
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It is worth nothing that because of racial dynamics in the United States, Haitian foreign ministers were
usually neocolonial elites and the rare Mulatto nationalists, like Leger and Hannibal Price. Therefore, it is
not surprising that there may have been collusion between the American embassy and the Haitian foreign
minister, Joseph Justin, which Dr. Bobo and Nationalist Senators recognized and sought to undermine.
Unfortunately, Justin would be replaced by Louis Borno, would serve as foreign minister under the first
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(Montague 1940, 206, R. Gaillard 1973, 18-24). The emergence of Dr. Bobo as
the defender of the Nation was added to his reputation as a preeminent scholar
and doctor of medicine. In his letter to the State Department, Blanchard, the
American minister in Haiti lamented the impact of the leaked documents on the
negotiations to the Secretary of State and the emergence of Dr. Bobo as the new
chief negotiator for the Theodore’s government,
[T]he Minister of Foreign Affairs was interpelled by the
Senate as to the foreign policy of the Government and
notably regarding recognition, appointment of
commission and custom control. Senate Rose in a body,
denounced Minister for Foreign Affairs, accused him of
endeavoring to sell the country to the United States and
concerted attempts were made to serve him blows. In
the course of Foreign Minister’s interpellation in the
Senate …, the interpellator, on the refusal of Minister of
Foreign Affairs to give any information as to the
negotiations at that time, which he considered
premature, produced and read a draft of our convention
for the customs control as well as the counter-project,
which contemplated financial control and had appeared
to me as possibly acceptable. This was the cause of the
manifestation against the Minister of Foreign Affairs
resulting in his resignation145.

Although the role of Dr. Bobo in leaking the documents has never been
discussed, his intervention in the senate during this debacle made clear that he
was fully involved in the matter and aware of the views of the senate.
Outnumbered on the cabinet due to his opposition, he needed the intervention of
the senate to assert control over the negotiations. Having succeeded, he spoke
with confidence of the government’s position; “the government would bury itself

occupation government and later as president to assist in its persistence and in the consolidation of
neocolonial dominance.
145

File no. 838.00 / 1063 & File No. 838.00/1044 - Minister Blanchard to the Secretary of State. Port-auPrince, Dec, 4, 9 a.m. and 12, 1914, 11pm ;
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in the fold of the national flag, rather than consent to the slightest injury to Haitian
Autonomy” (Gaillard 1973, 21). Consequently, Bobo’s centrality in the
government and popularity in the nation increased, but so too did the ire of the
American representative. “Dr. Bobo has gained much popularity by posing
himself as an ardent patriot with the mission of protecting Haiti from the American
aggression,”146 he noted,
[H]aving succeeded in relieving the foreign minister of
his duties, Dr. Bobo, forcefully defended Haitian
sovereignty by rejecting American demands. Rather than
succumb to American pressure to cede control over the
nation sovereignty, he provided a comprehensive
counterproposal that sought an economic partnership
instead of subservience147 (Montague 1940, 205, Turnier
1955, 259)
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National Archives, Washington. DC, 838.00/1183 also quoted in (Gaillard 1973, 18)
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See telegram from Minister Blanchard to the Secretary of State – American Legation, Port-Au-Prince,
December 12, 1914, 11pm – File no. 828.00/1063
Haitian Government’s counter project to the State Department’s proposed convention
Provides for the appointment of three commissioners to the United States to Negotiate as to:
1. Appointment of three American and Three Haitians engineers for the prospecting, etc., of mines
in Haiti
2. Salaries and expenses of the engineers to be borne by Haiti during preliminary investigations
3. The Haitian Government will concede to the Government of the United States or to American
companies approved of by the Government the exploitation for twenty years of mines
designated by the engineers.
4. Exploitation by a corporation, all expenses of installation, exploitation, etc… of the same to be
borne by the concessionaire
5. One third of the stock to be the property of the Republic of Haiti
6. The shares of the Government of Haiti to be registered and inalienable during the life of the
concession
7. Assistance from the United States in obtaining for Haiti a loan, the amount to be determined, to
enable it to consolidate its debt, meet its obligations past and future, and reform its monetary
system
8. In return for advantages granted by article 7, the Haitian Government will grant preference to
the Government of the United States and citizens in commercial and industrial affairs while
giving full protection to foreign interests in Haiti.
a. Under equal conditions in a concession to be awarded, to give preference to the United
States should it desire it
b. Settlement at the earliest possible moment by arbitral commission appointed in
accordance with commercial law of Haiti of all questions pending between the United
States Legation at Port-au-Prince and the Department of Foreign Affairs of Haiti
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Whereas the former Foreign minister, Joseph Justin, was amenable to giving
American control of Haiti’s revenue and sovereignty, Dr. Bobo endeavored to
preserve her independence. His counterproposal demonstrated a willingness to
tie American interests to those of the Haitian Republic, as did other Louverturean
elites before him. It also sought the development of the economy and industry.
The American strategy had failed and Dr. Bobo made clear his intentions in a
document published across the nation,
[I]ntroduce in our nation her industries, her capital, her
work habits, providing her with particular advantages for
mutual benefits, is one of my most ardent and constant
dreams. However, to deliver our customhouses and
finances and put us under her tutelage, never! Never!
That or the destruction of the nation, I would choose
destruction148.

His determination to preserve Haitian sovereignty and political and economic
autonomy, ran counter to American agenda in the Western Hemisphere thus in
this context, once the Marines had landed and the American government opted

9.

Good offices of the United States to Haiti to secure modification of contract between Haitian
Government and Bank Convention to continue in force for a period of years from and after its
ratification by the contracting parties in accordance with their respective laws.
Blanchard also notes in the telegram that the bill for the issue of sixteen million in paper money has
passed the chamber of deputies and has been sent to the Senate and by it referred to its finance
committee.
148

Public manifesto of Rosalvo Bobo published on April 15, 1915. The full text can be found in (Gaillard
1973, 243-4). Dr. Bobo’s determination to protect Haiti ran counter to the American regional undertakings
and Haiti’s refusal to acquiesce to American demands challenged the forceful tutelage being imposed in
Cuba, Puerto Rico, Nicaragua, Panama, and the Dominican Republic. Oppositions to the geopolitical
aspirations of an emerging imperialist power supported by the Monroe Doctrine and its Corollaries and
attempts by the United States to compel Haitian governments into a treaty by Haitian nationalists
determined to maintain the autonomy of the nation resulted in political instability and successive
overthrow of presidents who entertained negotiations. Dr. Bobo embodied that Nationalism resistance to
foreign encroachments and dependency both in its historical and contemporary manifestations.
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for occupation, he was by all account unacceptable as a candidate for the Haitian
presidency. Having made it clear he would oppose American policy-makers’
quest to render Haiti subservient to their national geopolitical and economic
interests, Dr. Bobo, along with its Northern forces, became the main target of the
opposition and its collaborators. To many Haitians and resident foreigners Dr.
Bobo represented a long line of skillful, well-respected and cultivated Northern
nationalists, ideal to lead a nation in search of legitimate, stable and unifying
government and precisely the type of government not wanted by an occupying
force and neocolonial elites. As the British Minister in Haiti observed,
[H]e was highly educated and refined. His sense of
honor is well known, and he enjoys a reputation of
uncontested integrity. During a long conversation we had
once, (and I have no reason to doubt his sincerity) he
expressed his sentiments of devotion to his country149
(qted in (Gaillard 1973, 18).

The observation of the British minister contrasted starkly with the portrait drawn
by the American consul Livingston who wrote, “Dr. Bobo is a big charlatan in
medicine. The Haitian people do not take him seriously and consider him as the
biggest political phony in Haiti”150. Caperton, the head of the occupation
characterized him as emotionally unstable to the State department, unfit to lead
Haiti151 (E. L. Beach 1915, R. Gaillard 1973, Healy 1976). Even those who
determined to prevent his presidency conceded he was greatly beloved by his
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British Minister in Haiti to foreign Office, August 6, 1915. Public Record Office. London, England, F.O.
371/2370
150

National archives in Washington, DC 838.00/1183
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Caperton to Daniels, August 13-19, 1915. Also see Lansing to Wilson, August 3, 1915, 838.00/1275B
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compatriots (E. L. Beach 1915). For his willingness to defend Haitian sovereignty
against American encroachment, argues Gaillard, “Rosalvo Bobo became a
target. Washington is advised that for the happiness offered us by the United
States, this person, is the most firmly hostile” (Gaillard 1973, 23). Having offered
the presidency to various prominent leaders without success, American found in
Dartiguenave the only person willing to agree outright to American conditions
after which “he was provided with a nine-man Marine bodyguard detachment” to
safeguard him from the population who felt betrayed 152 (Montague 1940, 214, H.
Schmidt 1971, 73). Thus it would come to pass that despite elite collusion in the
capital to prevent the election of Dr. Bobo, none would agree to the presidency
unsure as they were of the permanency of the occupiers and weary of the cost to
themselves, their legacy, and, perhaps, their nation (E. L. Beach 1915, 130-33).
America Found its ideal candidate for the Presidency, a Southern neocolonial
elite, one whose grandfather had fought with Rigaud against Toussaint and his
Northern revolutionaries for the preservation of slavery and French rule (Ardouin
1848, 390, Vol. 3). History was being re-enacted. “In the presence of
Congressmen, Dartiguenave, the president of the senate” writes Admiral
Caperton to the Secretary of State,
[H]ad agreed that Haiti must and will accede gladly to
any terms proposed by the United States. Now, they say
they will cede outright without restrictions Mole St.
Nicolas, granting us the right to intervene when
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Beach memorandum, August 10, 1915, RG45, w4-7, Box 365. Admiral Caperton, leader of the
occupation testified before Congress that Dartiguenave acquiesced to American terms to secure their
support for his Presidency. (Foreign Relations, 195, p431-437)
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necessary, customhouse control and any other terms”153
(A. Millspaugh 1971, 39, H. Schmidt 1971, 74).

The election was at best a farce; nationalists were cleared from the chamber,
and deputies informed the United States would not permit the election of a
president not predisposed to acquiesce to American dictum to which
Dartiguenave had acquiesced and Dr. Bobo rejected154. According to Millspaugh,
[W]hile there is no proof that the members of the national
assembly were directly coerced into voting for
Dartiguenave. His election was eventually attributable to
the American intervention. Had matters taken a more
precipitate and in Haiti more natural course, Dr. Bobo
apparently would have been elected by a Cacosdominated assembly” (A. Millspaugh 1971, 41)

The American Secretary of the navy would later admit, Dartiguenave’s
election “was undoubtedly not the choice of the mass of the Haitian people but
only of those who felt that intervention by America was essential,” But essential
for what? Did they believe as Captain Beach maintains that “the interests of Haiti
could best be served by complete cooperation with the United States”, or were
they “ready to imperil Haitian independence in order to gain a political advantage
over their fellow citizens,” as Montague asserts (Montague 1940, 213, H.
Schmidt 1971, 72-74)
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Admiral Caperton to the Secretary of the Navy. Telegram – extract. File No. 838.00/12433 Also; see
Testimony of Admiral Caperton, Congressional hearings p 315. One must assume that no nationalist
congressional representatives were present in the meetings with Caperton as they were subsequently
excluded in the election of Dartiguenave. Neocolonialist seemed to have finally found the alliance capable
of securing their control over the state at a high cost to the nation.
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Foreign Affairs 1915, 431-7; Testimony of Admiral Caperton, Hearings, p316. It was a classic case of
historical reoccurrence, one that rivaled the election of Pétion and would adopt his institutional
framework to govern; this time with foreign backing.

225

Haitian Clientelism:
Lemarchand and Legg define clientelism as a personalized ‘face-to-face’
relationship between actors or sets of actors, commanding unequal wealth,
status, or influence, in exchange for support and conditional loyalties (Scott 1969,
Lemarchand and Legg 1972). The power of patrons to provide protection or
services, and their control over and access to vital resources are central to
sustaining clients’ support (Scott 1969). These interdependent transactional
relationships, according to Flynn, rely primary on a convergence of power and
inequality guided by social class dynamics (Flynn 1974). Patron-client relations,
rooted in national inequality, resource scarcity, and dependence between political
and economic elites and the masses, are prevalent in the Caribbean but distinct
in Haiti. Haitian clientelism supports the thesis of inequality but does not rely on
party-voters transactional relations or economic Elite–party dependence. As the
Caribbean scholars Carlene Edie, Anthony Bogues and Carl Stone argue,
clientelist regimes and political parties derive their legitimacy from resource
distribution, and are externally dependent and lack the resources to
autonomously sustain their national dominance (Stone 1980, C. J. Edie 1984,
Bogues 2002). Their reliance on resources from national elites and/or foreign
powers to maintain voter support limits their capacity to fully preserve the
autonomy of the nation and interests of the citizens (C. J. Edie 1984).
Consequently, Caribbean nations with clientelist regimes suffer from
diminished sovereignty, internal and external dependence, and a restricted
capacity to be responsive to the demands and aspirations of its citizens (Knight
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1993, Roniger 2004). Clientelist regimes seek and try to maintain their legitimacy
and popular support by garnering and redistributing limited resources. The
clientelist regime that evolved under the American Occupation in Haiti was more
dramatically insulated from the population than its Caribbean counterparts. It had
no political party structures from which to manage patron-client relations. More
importantly, it evolved in opposition to the aspiration of the population, installed
and protected by a foreign force, and without the required resources, the
willingness, and need to maintain a level of popular support (Bellegarde 1924,
1929). Whereas states controlled by client regimes in the Caribbean enhanced
their capacity to secure popular support through state control and dispensation of
jobs and state support and services through their political party structure, Haiti’s
client regimes during the Occupation was only interested in securing the state’s
limited resources for its core elites but not the populace. Moreover, even in their
preferential patron-client relations, they were hampered by their lack of control
over state institutions firmly in the hands of American Marines and treaty officials.
The Dartiguenave Regime and those who succeeded it during the Occupation
was the veneer of legitimacy needed to impose American will and destroy the
nationalist forces that had maintained Haitian independence and resisted its
subjectivity since its independence. It did not require nor did it seek popular
legitimacy and support.
Edie’s dual clientelist model recognizes that Caribbean cleintelist regimes
require foreign support for governance and derives most of their legitimacy not
from an organic development of political responsiveness, confidence building,
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and economic development but from internal and external economic support.
This support enable them to facilitate internal resource redistribution through their
political party structures in order to secure the adherence and support of
segments of the masses (C. J. Edie 1984, 1991). The Dartiguenave clientelist
regime did not receive economic resources from either the neocolonial elites who
supported it nor from external actors but instead was funded, its expenses
monitored and even the salaries of the Presidents and its ministers withheld.
They were the employees of the Occupation’s senior officers thus subject to their
supervision and sanctions. The regime used whatever resources it was allowed
to circumvent the popular will and secure neocolonial elite support through
resource redistribution, and preferential employment opportunities (Bellegarde
1929a, Berthoumieux 1950, A. Millspaugh 1971). Instead of devising ways to
secure popular support, Dartiguenave’s client regime lent legitimacy to American
efforts. Despite the constraints, it was not just a puppet regime, but one with its
own interests that facilitated, used, and collaborated with the occupying force to
fulfill its own agenda of neocolonial elite supremacy. Driven by the need for
political supremacy, Dartiguenave and its neocolonial supporters sought and
acquired the support of the Marines not just for political dominance but also for
military action to subdue an organic nationalist infrastructure that enjoyed
widespread legitimacy in the North.
In this context, the Haitian clientelist regime evolved distinctly from its
Anglo-Caribbean, Dominican and African counterparts, independent of popular
support and legitimacy but in direct opposition to the national will (Buell 1929,
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Lindsay 1975, R. Gaillard 1981, M.-R. Trouillot 1990). Pre-independence AngloCaribbean states developed within an intentionally designed institutional
structure of political and economic clientelism and dependency forced to operate
as semi-autonomous political entities within prescribed institutional, economic
and political frameworks (C. J. Edie 1991). Post-independence Anglo-Caribbean
states already structured into dependency, developed into a system of dual
clientelism and dependency as emerging political parties no longer relying on
their opposition to British control as a source of legitimacy, faced constraints as a
result of a national economic environment dominated by neocolonial elites and
western interests (C. J. Edie 1984). Engaged in competitive political environment,
political parties became dependent on these internal and external actors for
resources to maintain their competitive advantage and secure their political
survival (Stone 1980, Knight 1993, Gonzalez-Acosta 2008, Girvan 2015). In this
context, a decline in the patron’s ability to offer financial and security support
leads to a decline in legitimacy and support155.
Similar to many countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America
(Scott 1969, Lemarchand and Legg 1972, Flynn 1974, Stone 1980, Roniger
2004), Haitian clientelism is both domestic and external. The state being the
primary vehicle for wealth accumulation, national political and economic elites
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African States, on the other hand, when not dominated by post-independence one-party systems
capable of garnering support through nationalism and state control, became dependent on their former
colonial powers found themselves constrained within a structure of international economic and
institutional clientelism and dependency (Rodney 1974, Bienefeld 1988, Callaghy, Thomas M. and
Ravenhill, John 1993, Walle 2007).
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rely on foreign support to remain in control of the state in exchange for policy
orientation, restricted sovereignty, and state subservience. Elites rely on external
patrons for coercive support (i.e., weapons, riot control gear, military training and
support) protection from international pressure, and economic support (i.e.,
monetary aid, food aid, loan access, and national project support). These patronclient relations are necessary to maintain control of the state due to the lack of
popular support and legitimacy, and their inability or unwillingness to meet the
needs of the population through redistributive economic policies that would
counter their particular interests and the economic interests of their capitalist
patrons.
The Haitian state, like its counterpart in the Caribbean, is used as a
vehicle for clientelist patronage through state jobs, access to elite public schools
and scholarships, inclusion into the military, and access to high-level state and
international positions. In the Anglophone Caribbean, this has been primarily an
upper middle-class, and in the case of Guyana and Trinidad,ethnic-based
transactional relations directed by neocolonial elites to maintain the allegiance of
their groups while neglecting the largely black poor and using the state’s
coercive capacity to control them (C. J. Edie 1984, Hintzen 1994).
With the advent of the neocolonial state and formal entry into the world
system as a structurally unequal member because of the capitulation of
neocolonial elites, the Haitian state maintained its independence because of the
determination of Northern nationalist forces. The post-indemnity and preoccupation state became indebted but not dependent. It relied on no foreign
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power for resources and was not vulnerable to their dictates. The dependency of
the Haitian state and its clientelist model developed through the destruction of
nationalist infrastructure, the liquidation of its forces, and the consolidation of the
neocolonial state under American Occupation. Its development is directly related
to the collusion of neocolonial elites and imposition of client regimes by the
United States.
Neocolonial Collusion and the Consolidation of the Clientelist Regime:
From the start, the client regime of Dartiguenave worked to supplant nationalist
forces and collaborated with the Occupation to remove those forces and
individuals capable of challenging its legitimacy. Dr. Bobo was forced into exile,
his attempts to re-enter Haiti through the Dominican Republic prevented at the
behest of American representative to frustrate the nationalists of their political
leader, and undermine resistance to the Occupation and challenges to
Dartiguenave’s government156. Allowed to travel to Cuba, and under surveillance
and armed monitor by the Cuban client Regime157 at the request of the American
Government, Dr. Bobo was forced to leave for France where he died158 (Gaillard

156

Charge D’Affaires Johnson to the Secretary of State. Santo-Domingo, August 28, 1915 – 11am. File no.
838.00/1277. The American had acquired undue influence in Dominican Affairs having supported the
client regime of Jimenez and control over the nation’s Custom Houses since 1904.
157

Having already installed and supported client regimes in Cuba since the Spanish-American War of
1898, American influence and policies predominated.
158

Correspondences between American representatives, the Cuban and Dominican government and the
Secretary of State make the coordination to curtail Dr. Bobo’s movement unequivocal. See The Secretary
of State to Charge Johnson, Department of State. Washington, August 28, 1915 – 9pm. File No.
888.00/1282, and Minister Gonzales to the Secretary of State, American legation. Havana, September 1,
1915. File No. 838.00/1287. It is precisely the disconnectedness of these American client regimes to the
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1973). Conscious of the hostility it faced, and to bolster its legitimacy, the client
regime included three staunch nationalists in its cabinet to supplant vocal and
armed recriminations while simultaneously requesting the suppression of
Northern forces by the Marines (Berthoumieux 1950). This strategy rather than
allaying recriminations intensified them by giving nationalists within the client
government quasi veto power over its decisions and enabling them to subvert the
American clientelist strategy from within. With American pressing for the adoption
of its treaty as promised by Dartiguenave, nationalists blocking within the
government and opposing nationally, Dartiguenave could have permanently
resisted American encroachment and bolster the legitimacy of his regime by
openly opposing occupation forces, but instead chose to continue to collude159.
The Neocolonialist clientelist regime’s strategy became even clearer. Within a
month of its establishment, Dartiguenave requested the imposition of martial law,
and the restriction of the Freedom of the Press to prevent an uprising and
facilitate the forfeiture of Haiti’s sovereignty by signing the treaty opposed by the
majority of the nation to which he had already agreed as a condition for
ascending to the presidency160 (H. Schmidt 1971, 75, Healy 1976, 135). In

aspirations of the masses that led to later revolutions in countries such as Cuba, the Dominican Republic,
Philippines, and Nicaragua, and continues the patterns of instability in those societies.
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Resisting the American occupation would have deprived them of a client regime from which to procure
its legitimacy. It would have created a national front against the occupation and assume common cause
with the North. Instead, Dartiguenave’s collusion not only provided the occupation with the national
cover needed but with the international legitimacy to consolidate the occupation and act against Haitian
citizens by characterizing resistance forces as brigands and bandits (U. S. Congress 1929).
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Senate Hearings, 1922, p70. Davis to Lansing, September 3, 1915; Foreign Relations, 1915, p442.
Dartiguenave not only requested the imposition of Martial Law to suppress popular discontent and
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collaboration with American forces, he requested the resignation of the three
nationalists in the cabinet, for their refusal to acquiesce to the treaty, replacing
them by compliant neocolonial supporters.
The most important facet of the pre-planned forced resignation was their
replacement by, as the American Legation wrote to the Secretary of State, “men
more in sympathy with the desires of the United States”161. Such was the level of
collaboration between the American government and its client regime that on
Sept. 4, the American Charge D’Affaires Davis was informed by the president of
the impeding “resignation” of nationalist members of the cabinet, a decision,
which he implemented on September 7, three days later. Consequently, Louis
Borno replaced the eminent nationalist scholar Pauleus Sannon as foreign
minister following consultations with American representatives162.
The subservience of the client regime and its neocolonial supporters to
American dictates set the regime squarely on a collision course with the nation.
Borno’s collaboration not only secured the signing of the treaty, a move that
would later facilitate his rise to the presidency of the clientelist regime, but
worked closely with the Americans for its implementation and extension. Through

intimidate elected officials into signing the treaty, he even informed the charge D’Affaires American that
“the declaration of martial law greatly strengthened his position and will facilitate speedy ratification”.
See Charge Davis to the Secretary of State - American legation. Port-Au-Prince, September 4, 1915. File
No. 711.38/28
161

Charge Davis to the Secretary of State, P-au-P, Sept. 4, 1915 – 10am. File No. 711.38/36 and Charge
Davis to the Secretary of State. American legation. Port-Au-Prince, September 4, 1915. File No. 711.38/28
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Charge Davis to the Secretary of State. Telegram. American legation. Pot-au-Prince, September 7, 1915
- 8:00pm
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the treaty, the American government acquired complete control over Haitian
sovereignty and decision-making and implemented it as a modus viviendi prior to
congressional ratification163 (A. Millspaugh 1971). The most important feature of
a clientelist regime is reliance on resources to secure support. The Dartiguenave
regime, strapped for cash and facing resistance in both chambers and the nation
sought financial resources from the occupation forces, which, argued the
American Charge D’Affaires, Davis, “will be greatly beneficial to the government
both in securing ratification and with the public generally” 164. The acquisition of
financial resources from foreign powers for elite’s redistribution, and the
assignment of governmental posts to secure their adherence and support is a
distinct feature of Haitian Clientelism. When offers of bribery failed to induce the
members of the senate to ratify the treaty, coercion became the modus operandi.
Using a list drawn by Dartiguenave, the Marines targeted dissenting senators
while Admiral Caperton gave an ultimatum, “treaty or no treaty, the United States
intended to retain control over Haiti, pacifying the country to whatever extent
might be needed and meeting out to ‘those offering opposition’ the treatment
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Charge D’affaires Davis’ correspondence to the Secretary of State makes the collusion of Dartiguenave
with the occupiers unequivocal. “I have just returned from a conference with President and Cabinet
which began at 3 this afternoon… Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Public Works refused to
accept financial advisor... whereupon the President requested and accepted their immediate resignation.”
Davis to the Secretary of State. Port-au-Prince, Sept. 7, 1915 – 8pm. File No. # 711.38/20. Pauleus
Sannon, the scholar and staunch nationalist foreign minister, Antoine Sansaric, its minister of Public
works, and later, Emile Antoine , minister of the interior, were removed from the government. (Charge
Davis to the Secretary of State, P-au-P, Sept. 4, 1915 – 10am. file No. 711.38/28, 29) and also see (Healy
1976, 154)
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Charge Davis to the Secretary of State. Telegram – American Legation. Port=au-Prince, September 14,
1915 – 8:00pm. File No. 711.38/32.
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their conduct merited” (H. Schmidt 1971, 77, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 396). To
further strengthen and confirm its clientelist credentials, Dartiguenave and its
new cabinet members strategized with Occupation forces to dissolve Congress if
ratification was still not forthcoming, while the United States warned, “its
government will not countenance efforts, either direct or indirect to overthrow
Dartiguenave administration, to the support of which the United States purposes
to lend all proper aid…”165. So traitorous was the client government that it
undercut the efforts of its own ambassador to end the occupation or change the
terms of the treaty166. As an indication of its unpopularity and lack of legitimacy,
Dartiguenave remained under American military protection until his replacement
by Louis Borno (H. Schmidt 1971, 75).
Disarmament and Pacification of the Nation:
Even the exile of Dr. Bobo did not allay the patterns of Northern resistance
to the occupation and resulted in the declaration of “international war against
Dartiguenave and the American Occupation”167. From the start, the occupation
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Charge Davis to the Secretary of State – American Legation. Port-Au-Prince, September 25, 1915 -3pm
– File No. 711.38/35. Acting Secretary of State Polk to Charge Davis. Telegram – Department of State,
Washington, September 27, 1915 *pm. File No. 711.38/38
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See correspondence between the Haitian Minister Solon Menos and the Secretary of State from Sept.
4-6. The Haitian Minister, Solon Menos to the Secretary of State, Washington, Sept. 4, 6, 1915/ File no.
838.00/1294 and 838.00/1295; The Secretary of State to the Haitian Minister (Solon Menos). Department
of State, Washington, September 10, 1915; and the Secretary of State to Charge Davis. Washington,
September 10, 1915 – 6pm, File no. 838.00/1295. It was the Secretary of State who informed Menos that
negotiations would take place directly in Haiti and not through him, the nations’ legitimate representative
in Washington DC. Rather than facilitate the negotiations of its representative, the Dartiguenave Regime
had undermined the efforts of the nationalist Menos in Washington.
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See Admiral Caperton to the Secretary of the Navy. Port-Au-Prince, August 13, 1915 in the Acting
Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State. Washington, September 11, 1915.
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forces and their neocolonial allies recognized the need to eliminate the armed
revolutionary threat posed by the Haitian military in Port-au-Prince and other
cities as well as the Northern Nationalist military infrastructure. Two marines had
already been killed by snipers upon their landing, and with an armed population
willing to resist American encroachment; neither an occupation nor the imposition
of a neocolonial client regime would have been possible168 (A. Millspaugh 1971,
U. S. State n.d.). All military personnel were disarmed, including the 1500 Cacos
Soldiers stationed in the City, armed marines invaded military premises and
forcefully disbanded all military personnel escorting them out of the city with the
blessings of city elites (E. L. Beach 1915, Balch 1927, R. Gaillard 1973, 108-9,
Nouvelliste 2005). Aided by neocolonial elites, American Marines lost no time
asserting military control over the capital and the state by neutralizing the
military, and executing those who refused to disband. Within a month, the
marines had landed in the capital, received reinforcements, taken control of all
military installations, disarmed and disbanded all military personnel, seized
control of the Haitian navy disbanding its personnel, controlled all institutions,
and set off to eliminate what they consider the greatest threat to their occupation
and client regime169 (Bellegarde 1929, Auguste 1979). According to the military
officer, Capt. Beach, in charge of implementing American policies on the ground,
[O]n the order of Admiral Caperton marines were
dispatched in the military installations, all military
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Charge Davis to the Secretary of State. American Legation, Port-Au-Prince, July 29, 30, 31, and August
1, 2015. File No. 838.00/1226, 838.00/1231, 838.00/1230, and 838.00/1276
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(The Hoover Commission 1922, Vol I p308 & II, 1671)
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equipment and munition in possession of the Haitian
army were confiscated. Moreover, we have disbanded
all military personnel and evicted them from the city. We
informed them that any attempt to enter the city dressed
in military uniform would result in their arrest and
imprisonment (E. L. Beach 2002).

The only remaining forces capable of challenging the Occupation were the
Cacos in the North; the only forces historically fully committed to defend the
nation’s sovereignty (Bellegarde 1929b, II, 5, Pavet n.d., 101-3, Montague 1940,
212-3). Established and maintained Since Toussaint as a well-organized and
layered guerrilla force led by local, regional, and national leaders, the Cacos had
been dedicated to preventing neocolonial elites from taking control of the state
and undermining its sovereignty. Thus, “the first priority was to disband the
Cacos” concur most scholars of Haiti (Castor and Garafola 1974, B. Plummer
1990, 93). Caperton’s letter to the Secretary of the Navy was more specific,
I think the time has come to resolve the Haitian question.
In this vein, and to ensure that the solution is definitive, it
is necessary to destroy the Cacos bands170. To render
that occupation and its client regime secure, to create a
Haiti permanently oriented toward American interests, it
was necessary to clear the surrounding countryside of
armed Cacos, and occupy their territory far in the
northern interior171 (Montague 1940, 218).

As Schmidt suggests, from the start of the Occupation, “Cacos forces
interfered with food supplies to American-occupied coastal cities, and raided
Marine encampments. Their efforts were directed solely toward nationalistic
political objectives of driving the Americans into the sea.” (H. Schmidt 1971, 83).
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(The Hoover Commission 1922, Vol II, p1674). Also see (R. Gaillard 1973, 126-7, R. Gaillard 1981)
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Admiral Caperton to the Secretary of the Navy. P-au-P, August 13, 1915 – File no. 838.00/1301
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A few weeks into the occupation, and at the request of the client regime, armed
with Howitzer and Gatling guns, Marines invaded Northern territories,
encountered determined but lightly armed guerilla forces, at times armed only
with machetes and rocks, they engaged in a killing spree that so alarmed the
Secretary of the Navy that he requested the Marines desist172. Admiral
Caperton’s reply to the order to desist demonstrate the level of information he
had received as to the location of Northern nationalist military centers of power
and the level of support for the military action he was undertaking from the client
regime and neocolonial elites. Acknowledging receipt of the order, he wrote,
I received Department’s radiogram 22018, in which the
department directs that, in view of the heavy losses to
the Haitians in recent engagements, our offensive
operations be suspended to prevent further loss of Life.
It is assumed that the department understands that
patrolling in North Haiti is now underway by our forces
and hostile with the bandits173 contact may unavoidably
occur… The operations we have been conducting are
purely of a defensive character for the preservation of
law and order..., and the suppression of revolutionary
activities against the present government… Having
undertaken this intervention, any diminution in the
protection and support offered the government and the
people of Haiti by the United States will greatly harm our
prestige. Our action in suppressing these bandits is
approved by the Haitian government, and in the case of
most of the members of the government, most
enthusiastically. It is absolutely necessary that the
present movement continue to the Southward to include
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In a telegram to Admiral Caperton, the Secretary of the Navy wrote, “Department strongly impressed
with number of Haitians killed. Department believes a proper patrol can be maintained… without further
offensive operations” (The Secretary of the Navy (Daniels) to Admiral Caperton, Navy Department.
Washington, November 20, 1915. File no. 838.00/1373. For firsthand accounts of the Marines’ actions
against the Cacos in the North, see Foreign Relations, 1915, p491-5
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American occupying forces, in their attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the Northern Nationalist
forces referred to them as bandits. Yet, despite bribe offers, and wholesale slaughter, these so-called
bandits resisted the occupation and the client regime for five years succeeding in bringing the fight into
the Capital, the very center of power twice (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 397-401).
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Hinche at least… If Hinche is not occupied it will
therefore form a base for future revolutions… 174

Determined to support their project, early resistance to the Occupation
and its client regime was met with overwhelming force; “the Marines engaged in
wholesale execution, hunting down a courageous but poorly armed group…
killing unarmed and surrendering Cacos” hoping to destroy any threats to the
client regime175. Colonel Waller who headed the expedition against the Cacos
reported to the client regime,
The Cacos will not infest these regions anymore, they
have been almost all crushed. All the fortifications in the
North, except the Citadelle de la Ferriere and the one in
the city of Cap Haitian, have been razed and dynamited.
Every important corners of that department are occupied
by our troops.” (j. Desquiron 1996, 67)176

That the Occupation forces concentrated its efforts in the North is no
accident, that they were acting on behalf of the client regime and neocolonial
elites reflect an important shift in the historical conflicts between neocolonial and
nationalist elites. It was the first time since Boyer that Nationalists were on the
losing end of the conflict. From the time of the occupation in August 1915 to
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Admiral Caperton to the Secretary of the Navy, Port-Au-Prince, November 19, 1915. File no.
838.00/1373. Also, see Foreign Relations, 1915, p493-4. Hinche was the regional headquarter of
Cacos and the home of one of their most significant leader of Charlemagne Peralte. Hinche was well

known since the struggle for independence to be the Center of resistance and to have fostered a
citizen devoted to the defense of Haiti sovereignty. The eminent Historian Roger Gaillard once
observed, “History had made, the men and women of Hinche, a population, as attached, without a
doubt, as the others to the homeland, but more combative on this point, for they were always prepared
to having to defend it.” (Gaillard 1981, 14)
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Colonel Eli K. Cole, USMC, personal letter to Capt. E. H. Durell, USN. October 27, 1915. NA, RG45, WA7, Box 633. (H. Schmidt 1971, 85), also refer to the actions of the marines in the North.
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Desquiron, vol. IV. Quoted from Le Matin no. 3616
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1920, Northern military resistance to the occupation persisted despite wholesale
slaughter and summary execution of surrendering peasant nationalists (Gaillard
1981). The formation of a new Gendarmerie in February 1916 to support the
client regime, which Caperton predicted would help resolve the Cacos question,
gave the regime and the occupation a national force dedicated to their interests
but did not end resistance to the occupation177. Earlier recruitment of the new
military focused on the elite in Port-au-Prince, but resulted on recruiting middle
class Westerners, and was later extended to elite and middle-class Southerners,
the North having mainly ignored recruitment efforts and being engaged in
resistance against the occupation (De Young 1959)178. With mainly Southern and
Western soldiers as recruits, and officered by American Marines accountable
only to the leadership of the occupation, the Gendarmerie was purely an
extension of the occupation’s war Machine that served to offset their lack of
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Admiral Caperton to the Secretary of the Navy, Port-Au-Prince, August 16, 1915. Most scholars concur
that the Marines succeeded in pacifying the North the first year of the occupation and the renewed
fighting was simply the result of the ‘corvee’ or forced labor imposed by the marines. History may offer us
some insight in this respect. As in the struggle for independence, segments of the Northern military
infrastructure rushed to fight the invaders, took bribes, disarmed, or were massacred by the Marines
while the shock troops of Northern nationalists withdrew to organize, observe and plan the next phase of
the resistance. It was these troops, more organized, and under strict leadership that posed the real
danger to the occupying forces and its new national constabulary.
178

Although some scholars suggest that actual elite participation in the Gendarmerie did not materialize
until the opening of the military school in 1928. Their reference is mainly to the officer corps, which was
led entirely by Marines. After all the American military itself was a highly segregated force with no place
for high-ranking blacks. What Deyoung and others make clear is that recruits were from the South and
West of the country, and later Mulatto officers replaced whites ones, a move fully supported by
succeeding client regimes.
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manpower 179 (H. Schmidt 1971, 89, R. Gaillard 1982, 26). Its creation would
serve to strengthen the client regime by equipping neocolonial elites now in
control of the state with a centralized military force180 and exasperate the
historically tenuous national ethnic caste181 dynamic (H. Schmidt 1971, 86, Heinl
and Heinl 2005, 402). Widespread abuses of power by the Marines, the
implementation of forced labor that black chained gangs in Southern America,
the arrest of the Peralte brothers for revolutionary activities, the looting and
ransacking of their home by the Marines, and the summary execution of the older
brother, Saul Peralte, brought to light the ongoing Cacos insurgency182 (Gaillard
1982, 30-9). The New gendarmerie was overwhelmed, the Marines, confident
they had overcome the Cacos, and unable to contain the continued revolt, sought
and received fresh reinforcements from the Deep South (J. W. Johnson 1920,
Balch 1927, Montague 1940, Renda 2001). With the Northern population
engaged in guerilla resistance, the Marines, now aided by the Gendarmerie
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American engagement in WWI had severely reduced the manpower of the Marines. The gendarmerie
expanded their military capacity in their quest for control of the Haitian State.
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According to Maingot, the pattern of US intrusion, military adventurism, and military creation was in
accordance to the Monroe Doctrine and its Corollaries (Weeks 2008). Centralized military forces were
being created or refashioned across the region and beyond - in Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, the Philippines,
and the Dominican Republic - all nations occupied by the Marines in order to permanently secure
governments that supported American interests (Weston 1972, Munro 1974, Greene, et al. 1984, Healy
1988).
181

For an in-depth expose of the caste system in Haiti, see (J. G. Leyburn 1966)
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The Peralte brothers, respected functionaries and former generals of the Central plateau were paraded
in front of their citizens in chains and sent into forced labor. While Saul Peralte’s home was looted but,
the home of the Charlemagne Peralte was looted and burned to the ground (Gaillard 1982, 38).
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renewed their terror, “tens of thousands of Haitian peasants were massacred 183,
thousands more were placed in internment camps184, the Marines engaged in
electrocution, torture and summary execution185. Consequently, to escape
oppression, peasant emigration to Cuba, and later, the Dominican Republic,
dramatically escalated. This was a new phenomenon, for while migration of the
landless from other countries in the region for work in the construction of the
Panama Canal, the agro-businesses of the United Fruit Company in Latin
America, and the tobacco and sugar industries in Cuba increased in the early
1900’s, the Haitian peasantry had remained home, masters of their land and
destiny. The occupation would change that paradigm resulting in a dramatic
exodus of the Haitian peasantry. From 1,838 between 1912 and 1914 to 79,495
between 1915 and 1921 with 30,000 leaving the country in 1920 and a
comparable number crossing into the Dominican Republic at the height of the
repression (Balch 1927, 77-8, Bellegarde 1929, 1929a).
Already accustomed to target and kill Black American citizens without due
process, Southern Marines engaged in an orgy of lynching with orders to kill
Cacos on sight. According to Marines’ testimony, since they could not determine
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(U. S. Congress 1929, 12-19). The Scholar George Anglade estimated that 50,000 Haitians were killed
(Anglade 1974, 33).
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The scholar and former minister of the United States to Haiti, Raymond Leslie Buell noted that 4,000
Haitians died in prison in the City of Cap Haitian and 5, 475 died in the prisoner camp at Chabert (Buell
1929, Bellegarde-Smith 1985, 192).
185

During the Senate hearings, Marines and members of the gendarmerie testified that Marines executed
and electrocuted prisoners (U. S. Congress 1929, 1722-1842).
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an average Haitian from a guerilla, every male adult was considered one
increasing the arbitrary murder of the citizenry (United State Congress 1929, 139, 1804-1806). An article on October 15, 1920 in the New York Times noted,
Marines, largely made up of and officered by
Southerners, opened fire with machine guns from
airplanes upon defenseless Haitian villages, killing men,
women, and children in the open market places; natives
were slain for ‘sport’ by a hoodlum element among these
same Southerners.186

According to witnesses testimonies, the killing of women and children, the
beating to death of Haitian citizens, summary executions, the burning alive of
man and women in broad daylight, the execution of widows and family members
of suspected guerilla fighters, and the burning of crops and killing of cattle and
horses were some of the excesses of American forces against the Haitian
Northern peasantry (Balch 1927, 125-7, Davis 1928, 224-38)187. This was not
unlike the murders and lynchings so common in Southern and mid-Western
America. Peasant resistance also broke out in the South and west-eastern part of
the country following the old Louverturean guerilla lines and the first recorded
instance of American coordinated air-ground combat took place on Haitian soil to
suppress the resistance of the poorly armed but determined Haitian peasant
nationalist guerillas188 (H. Schmidt 1971, 102-4). Despite the excesses of the
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(NYT 1920, 17)
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See (McCormick 1920) and public testimony given at the (The Hoover Commission 1922). Also, see
congressional testimonies in Inquiring into the occupation (U. S. Congress 1929).
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Information relation to aviation raids and bombings activities can be found in congressional
testimonies the Marines (U. S. Congress 1929, 1734-6).
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Marines, the client president and his cabinet decorated them with 20 medals of
valor for their suppression of Cacos forces while he disbanded parliament twice,
extended the occupation mandate for another 10 years until 1936189.
To make its collusion unequivocal, the client regime collaborated with the
Occupation forces to run a plebiscite to adopt a new constitution giving foreigners
the right to own land in which only the yes ballots were distributed190 (Davis
1928, 201-9, Bellegarde 1953, 259-61, R. W. Logan 1968, 133-4, Danache
1969). As Schmidt correctly noted, the new constitution did much more than
allowed foreigners to own land. It “served to consolidate the legal and
constitutional position of both the occupation and the client-government. It also
presumably laid the bases from which Haiti would henceforth proceed.” (H.
Schmidt 1971, 100) Emboldened by what scholar Logan called the “farcical
plebiscite”, the president and his cabinet reduced the number of deputies and
senators from 116 to 30 and 39 to 15 respectively to limit the number and impact
of a still vocal legislative opposition. When opposition persisted to the new
constitution, he disbanded them appointing a 21-members council of state
selected by his foreign minister Louis Borno with the approval of the General in
charge of the occupation to rubber-stamp his decisions (R. W. Logan 1968, 1334, H. Schmidt 1971, 94). What is remarkable are the policy parallels between
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Louis Borno, as minister of foreign Affairs, Education and Finance worked to facilitate the extension of
the treaty at the height of the insurgency.
190

See testimony given to the Senate (U. S. Congress 1929, 26-8 & 81). The American president Warren
Harding during his electoral campaign criticized the seating government for “a constitution shoved down
the throat of the Haitians at the end of a bayonet” (Penceny 1999, 2)
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Pétion and Boyer’s usurpation of power and Dartiguenave and Borno’s; both
changed the number of representatives and facilitated new legislative elections in
the hope of securing support, and in the end, disbanded the legislature and
handpicked a council of state to rubber-stamped their decisions. Both used the
Council of State to give institutional legitimacy to their governments, which lacks
the popular legitimacy to govern.
The only distinctions between the Pétion/Boyer neocolonial regimes and
the Dartiguenave/Borno’s were, the earlier regimes relied on Mulatto military
leadership for support and was dependent on Black soldiers. The earlier regime
was held in check by the reality of a military dominated by Blacks and a more
powerful Northern competitor. The new neocolonial client regime on the other
hand, had the full backing of the military of a foreign power, faced no internal
armed opposition, and had a new centralized foreign-backed gendarmerie to
impose its will on the population (Castor 1971, Delince 1979, 18-9, Y. L. Auguste
1979). While Boyer never defeated Northern nationalist forces, the client regime
of Dartiguenave did, with the support of occupation forces. Unlike the PétionBoyer regime whose lack of legitimacy compelled it to curtail its excesses against
the population, the new neocolonial client regime had no such reservations. Its
dependence on a foreign military force and their defeat of Northern forces made
it impervious to threats and internal pressures, and less careful about cultivating
internal legitimacy with the Black citizenry. By 1920, Haiti was saddled with an
entrenched occupation, a client regime that had no control over national
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decision-making and having even to request and be denied funds to repatriate its
dead ambassador from Washington, DC by the American financial advisor191.
As Langston Hughes keenly observed during his visit to Haiti, “The Haitian
live today under a sort of military dictatorship backed by American guns. They
are not free.” (Hughes 1932, 157) To add insult to injury, Haiti had to suffer an
elite and its president who, having betrayed a segment of the nation for its own
interests, would not even be considered fit in their own country to enter the social
clubs of these very Marines on whose support they depended for domination (H.
Schmidt 1971, 129, Blancpain 1999, 362). Ironically, despite the collusion,
subservience, and dependency of the Haitian president he was informed by
Warren G. Harding, the American president in 1921, that his term would not be
renewed because of the failure to fully cooperate with American government
functionaries in Haiti192 (Blancpain 1999, 364). They had found a better client
president.
The seven years of the client regime of Dartiguenave ended with the
consolidation of the neocolonial-American alliance, the political dominance of
neocolonial elites, the elimination of the nationalist military and political
infrastructure, and the creation of a central military apparatus at its service. The
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Financial Advisor Addition T. Ruan in a letter responding to Louis Borno’s request for funding to
retrieve the body of Solon Menos, the Haitian ambassador on November 13, 1918 wrote, “As you know
financing laws stipulate no payment without the appropriate requirements and a new rule has not been
produced to that effect nor budgetary provision accounting for such expense. In the absence of these
indispensable legal requirements, I regret not being able to acquiesce to your request”. The difference
between clientelism and subservience was indeed thin in occupied Haiti.
192
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Haitian government under Dartiguenave was a government without the capacity
to make decision about state matters; it could neither collect revenues from its
own customs nor dispense of them for the benefit of the state and its citizens
without the approval of the American government and its representatives (Balch
1927, Bellegarde 1929a, Blancpain 1999, 148-53). Even the salaries of state
functionaries had to be cleared and paid by American commissioners and were
often denied or delayed if the functionary did not support the occupation or if their
role were deemed unimportant. Dartiguenave, the president of the client regime
had his salaries withheld for disagreeing with leaders of the occupation (Danache
1969).
In assessing the absence of autonomy of the client-regime of
Dartiguenave, Bellegarde-Smith notes, “At the government level, all executive
departments of the Haitian state had been seized outright by the occupying
forces, except for education and justice” (Bellegarde-Smith 1985, 28). The
Ministry of Justice was irrelevant as occupying forces abrogated all laws,
arrested, imprisoned or killed citizens at their discretion while refusing to pay the
ministries’ staff and judges. Education was neglected and defunded and closed
the only medical school was. American Marines did not think Haitians were
capable of classical education, closing existing schools, favoring and funding
only vocational and agricultural schools (Buell 1929, R. W. Logan 1930, 448-51,
Brutus 1948, 460-8, Berthoumieux 1950, 110-13). These policies led the
American scholar Rayford Logan to observe of General Russell,
[T]he high commissioner appeared to consider Haitians
primarily destined to be hewers of wood and drawers of
water when he proclaimed a policy of making every
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Haitian the master of a trade. Russell’s educational
program not only implied the inability of Haitians to
acquire professional an classical education, but it also
run afoul of the Haitian tradition which had always
depended on these disciplines to defend their nation and
their race… (R. W. Logan 1968, 137, 1985, 64-7).

It appeared for all intents and purposes that “racism and violent measures
to pacify the country” were the two main features of the occupation under
Dartiguenave’s client regime (R. W. Logan 1971, 339). Indeed, American forces
introduced and institutionalized Jim Crow laws and practices into the Haitian
political and social spheres. Paradoxically, neocolonial elites engaged in their
own brand of Jim Crowism, excluding dark skinned Haitians as they complained
of exclusion by Americans in their own nation193. Neocolonial elites while
decrying being barred from white clubs, hotels, and social gatherings by marines
and American representatives in their own country engaged in wholesale
targeting of Blacks in the North, the eclipsing of black leaders in positions of
influence, and the preferential treatment to their Mulatto kin. As Paquin notes,
“certain hotels, clubs, and restaurants catering to Americans became off-limits to
Haitians” (Balch 1927, Price-Mars 1928/1983, Bellegarde 1929a, Paquin 1983,
77)194. Another scholar notes,
[A]mericans retained their initial distrust of the elite,
denigrating the Mulattoes for their anti-democratic
politics and European ways. Already American social
standards penetrated polite society. Segregation
flourished. The Marines had their American clubs, off
limit to Haitians including Borno, but the Port-au-Prince
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Although a Mulatto apologist, Paquin argues, that before saddled with colorism and a sense of cultural
superiority, Mulatto elites became outright racist because of the occupation, distancing themselves from
their Black counterparts with whom they historically mingled.
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elite had its Club Bellevue, which remained closed to
anyone in Uniform. Upper-class Haitians suppressed
their resentment of American racist slights (Langley
2002, 167)

Even neocolonial elites who colluded and benefited from the occupation
by capturing control of the state were themselves loathed and discriminated
against by the occupation forces. Yet, suppression as Langley suggests is an
inadequate characterization, perhaps Richard Rohr observation that “Pain, if not
transformed, is transferred,” is more appropriate in this respect. While offended
by American racism, neocolonial Mulatto elites reproduced the same patterns of
discrimination and Jim Crowism. They opted to recreate, with American support,
the policies of Black marginalization of the Boyer era, and refocusing the
historical schism by elevating and institutionalizing, once again, the aristocracy of
the skin in all the institution of the nation. In a misreading or blatant obscuring of
Haitian history, Paquin notes
[T]he Mulatto upper class became color conscious and,
reinforced by their position under the occupation; their
social activities became more exclusive of their black
counterparts. Social clubs tended to become limited to
members of a particular color group (Paquin 1983,
77)195.

Trouillot is perhaps closest to the historical reality in his assessment of the
convergence between American Jim Crowism and neocolonial racism noting,
U.S. racism added its institutional systematism to Haitian
colorist favoritism. The U.S. ‘advisers,’ who in fact ran
many government services, openly showed their
preference for light-skinned officials… The visibility of the
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(Rotberg and Clague 1971), quoted by Lyonel Paquin. The Caribbean and Latin American scholar, Lester
Langley notes, it was not infrequent to hear high level American representatives suggest, “the only hope
of the negroes is wise guidance… it would be fatal to turn the government over to negroes, as fatal or
worse than it was to turn the South over to negroes after the Civil war” (Langley 2002, 164).
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mulatres grew – as did their arrogance in
institutionalization of ‘the aristocracy of the skin’ (Trouillot
1990, 129-30)

It is not that they became color conscious, for the first time, though they held
power as client to the occupation, they felt protected and empowered by the
support offered by a foreign power to impose Their governance model as they
did under Pétion and Boyer. Moreover, that power and the type of governance it
offered to neocolonial elites had thinned their ranks of the few non-Mulattoes
elites. Successive neocolonial Mulatto client regimes would deepen that
arrogance and systematization of American Jim Crow practices. The
replacement of Dartiguenave by Louis Borno, the highest-ranking member of his
cabinet selected by his handpicked Council of State, was supported by
Commissioner Russell. According to consular correspondence, as Dartiguenave
promised to acquiesce to American demands by signing the treaty if elected in
1915, Louis Borno, constitutionally ineligible for the presidency196, promised to
sign banking contracts to which the previous regime had objected thus
committing “the United States government to long-term oversight of Haitian
finances197 (H. Schmidt 1971, 132-3). Despite some objections to Borno’s
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For information regarding the birth of Louis Borno and subsequent naturalization as a Haitian citizen of
his French father, a fact that should have prevented Louis Borno from becoming president due to the
constitutional requirement that stipulates Haitian presidents be born of Haitian fathers, see (Blancpain
1999, 157)
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Although the historian Blancpain argues that Borno had no prior agreement with Russell and dismisses
those who suggest otherwise as engaging in myths, correspondences between the American
Commissioner, General Russell and the Division of Latin American Affairs suggest otherwise (Blancpain
1999, 158). A perusal of the following documents seem to upend Blancpain claim in support of the
Haitian thesis – see Division of Latin American Affairs memorandum to Welles, November 16, 1921 No.
838.51/1262 and Russell to Hughes, April 26, 1922.
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election by segments of his neocolonial allies, their collaboration with him
consolidated and centralized authority in the president and the high
commissioner and consolidating the clientelist aspect of the occupation into what
most scholars of Haiti (even the American financial advisor) describe as a “joint
dictatorship” (A. Millspaugh 1971, 107). Voted by 14 out of the 21 members of
the Council of State, and over the objections of remnants of the nationalist elites
in Port-au-Prince, Borno’s presidency meant a consolidation of neocolonial
control and the expansion of the clientelist relationship. It also meant leading a
government not just dependent on American support but one where the
American high commissioner exercised veto power over every decision of the
Haitian government, however insignificant and the Haitian government exercising
dictatorial power over his countrymen (Bellegarde 1929, Brutus 1948).
The Dartiguenave regime, even when collaborating with the Occupation
and assisting in the dismantling of northern nationalist political and military
infrastructure and the consolidation of neocolonial power, sought a degree of
autonomy from American control and retained some independent nationalists,
albeit members of his ethnic group, on his cabinet. Borno, on the other hand,
named people already known and palatable to Commissioner Russell, avoided
conflicts by acquiescing to his policies at the detriment of the state and its
citizens198. According to the American financial advisor at the time,
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Some scholars have suggested that Borno’s cooperation with the occupation was “because he believed
that the American program would modernize Haiti, achieve a viable economy and bring efficiency to
governmental institutions” (M. W. Shannon 1976, 57, Blancpain 1999).
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[G]overnment in Haiti took the form of joint dictatorship.
There was understanding, Friendship and collaboration
between them… The High Commissioner’s close
relationship with President Borno made the opposition to
Borno an anti-American movement, particularly so
because the High Commissioner was the diplomatic
representative of the United States (Streit 1928, A.
Millspaugh 1971, 107-8).

Under Borno’s client regime, jail became a revolving door for the
opposition, the implementation of vocational and agricultural at the detriment of
classical and professional studies became fully supported. More importantly,
neocolonial elites and their progeny who were responsive only to Borno
dominated the institutions of the state. The gendarmerie became the primary
vehicle for buttressing the regime and quelling internal dissent against both the
occupation and the regime. Apart from the Gendarmerie, whose training,
personnel, and institutional capacity had been carefully expanded, the expantion
of the capacity of state institutions, led by American advisors remained
neglected. Such was the dependence that in some cases, even the regime’s
attempts to deepen its clientelist network by expanding access to state
institutions and schools were prevented. Despite the rhetoric of development and
good governance used by the American government, given their policies and
practices, it is fair to suggest that Borno would not have been permitted to
develop the state’s institutional and personnel capacity necessary to support the
development of the nation and its citizens.
[A]merican teachers hired by the state received $3-400
monthly to Haitians’ $15.00. Haitian schools who favored
classical education was financed at $4.50 per capita to
the Americans’ $50 and of the 400,000 school age
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children three-quarters were not in any school at all (R.
W. Logan 1930, 440-60, 1968, 137-8)199.

Re-elected again in 1926 by his personally selected Council of State, Borno
served with mounting opposition. Despite the declaration of martial law by the
American Commissioner, his attempt to delay legislative elections and
orchestrate a third term using his Council of State culminated into a widespread
civil disobedience movement and the demise of his government (Bellegarde
1929, Anglade 1974, Y. L. Auguste 1979). The scholar Paul Douglas in
discussing the role of the Council of State in the election noted,
[P]rior to the election, President Borno replaced several
members of the Council with others of whose support he was
more certain. He was re-elected in April, receiving all of the
twenty-one votes with the exception of one member who did not
vote and another who cast a black ballot. These men are
appointed by the President and hold not for any stated period of
time but only at his pleasure. The somewhat ridiculous spectacle
is then presented of a President appointing the very men who
are to determine whether or not he shall be re-elected. Under
these circumstances, it would not seem very difficult for a
President to succeed himself if the American Occupation did not
oppose him and if wanted another term (Douglas 1927, 255,
258)
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Some have argued that in many ways, Borno had managed to reproduce if not the policy of
disenfranchisement of the Black masses implemented by Boyer, at least the same result of educational
neglect and institutional marginalization, if not exclusion. Borno’s collaboration was based on the belief
that Haiti needed American support for national development and political stability. The mulatrization of
his regime is not due to racism views but the fact that he had little control over those institutions
controlled by Americans. Moreover, both Scholars Shannon and Blancpain refute the claim that a disparity
truly existed and argues that any disparity in education was due to Borno’s provincial ideas and emphasis
on classic French education. They maintained that Russell was convinced that a system of vocational
education, agriculture, and trade was necessary to create a middle class that could bridge the gap
between the elite and the masses and letters from Russell to Borno clearly support their claim (M. W.
Shannon 1976, 63, Blancpain 1999, 213-6). Indeed one could argue that theirs was a difference in
philosophy of national development and not based on racism. Russell’s idea that a strong and stable
middleclass is a source of political stability and democracy is not without foundation. However, Bobo also
expressed similar idea, “the country needed time to organize itself so that the masses up to now
miserably exploited can be fully liberated, through work and education, from the slavery where
plundering politicians without heart and honor have kept them” qted in (Blancpain 1999, 248)
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The American Occupation did not object and in fact tacitly supported his decision
by aiding in the arrest of opposition figures and the muzzling of the press
(Blancpain 1999, 248-53). The Bono-Russell alliance, at its peak, made the
client-regime impervious to national pressures, but by making the alliance so
obvious and visible, both the regime and the occupation governance
infrastructure became vulnerable to national recriminations.
The Borno regime, by its actions and collusion, seems to be an extension
of the authority of the occupation. As Streit observed, it resulted in
[I]dentifying American officials and President Borno as
one and the same. It has put both in a position where
each may be condemned in specific matters, for the sins
of the other, but where neither can afford to disown the
other. All of which constitutes a vicious cycle of
centrifugal force, ever widening between most of the
articulate Haitians, on the one hand, and the Haitian
government and out intervention officials, on the other
(Streit 1928, 626-7).

This symbiosis between the client regime and the American occupation created a
political opening for resistance national forces. For the first time, opposition
forces were able to challenge the Occupation and its client-regime and neither
the Occupation forces and its gendarmerie nor the client-regime had the ability to
limit the impact of that challenge on its governance structure. The most
remarkable aspect of this new phenomenon however, was the complete absence
of Northern nationalist forces and their military infrastructure in this political
transition. Nevertheless, the prevalence of their progeny, not as politico-military
and economic elites as before, but as middleclass and working class
professional, and political newcomers in Port-au-Prince would lead a new
resistance, one lead by intellectual and professionals instead of military men.
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Surviving and new intellectual elites created a new political phase, one that
would come to challenge the neocolonial grip on the state, its institution and the
nation (Trouillot 1990). Short of military capacity, they used the most important
instrument Haitians have used since independence to defend their nation; their
intellectual capacity and the power of the pen200.
The failure of Borno and the Occupation to subdue the widespread national
protest movement finally opened the way to renegotiating the terms of the
occupation and a path to its end. As if to confirm the dependence and clientelist
nature of Borno’s neocolonial regime, despite widespread protests, it was the
State department that mandated the terms of his departure and ordered a
process for legislative elections201 (M. W. Shannon 1976, 58). However, the
demise of Borno’s client regime did not end American clientelism in Haiti nor did
it end the neocolonial supremacy it had orchestrated. Neocolonial control
remained unimpeded and far from including remnants of the surviving nationalist
elites, their progeny, and the emerging Black middle class, they monopolized
state and national institutions and continued the Jim Crow policies their patrons
used to marginalize them.
It was precisely this racism and the Borno-Russell alliance that gave focus to
Haitians resisting the occupation one centered on Haiti’s black identity and
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This is precisely why resistance to American refusal to fund classical education was the source of so
much conflict. Targeted by powerful nations since its inception, the nation has always relied on its
intellectuals as a bulwark of resistance to marginalization and exclusion on the world stage.
201

See correspondence between Stimson, the Secretary of War to the American Legation, April 11, 1929;
Stimson to Russell, August 2, 1929, p.1; Russell to Stimson, December 24, 1929, PSCH, HHPL.
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culture. What the Black nationalist elites and their military infrastructure were
unable to accomplish, this intellectual cultural movement, Negritude, which
involved both the sons of neocolonial elites who grew up under the Occupation
and black intellectuals made possible. Negritude was Haitians’ way of reclaiming
their history, pride, and identity as a source of resistance against the trauma of
occupation and the violence and racism it produced. Rather than succumbing to
American and neocolonial racism, they reclaimed their blackness, arguing that
the nation can only be uplifted from the degradation of occupation and
destruction of the national psyche by acknowledging its identity and using it as a
tool for resistance and regeneration. It was not new; it was part of the
Louverturean discourse. It was the ideological underpinnings that guided the
nationalist regimes of Dessalines, Soulouque and Solomon rejected by
neocolonialists, and partly that of the nationalist party absent the political and
military power.
Negritude, led by the Black Northern scholar Jean Price-Mars, with both
blacks and Mulatto intellectual adherents directly challenged the clientelist
framework of neocolonial’s aristocracy of the skin and American racism and
domination. This new movement confronted both the Occupation and its client
regime on the terms in which they had cooperated and led; racism and the
disenfranchisement of the black population (Bellegarde Smith 1982, 171-5). It
motivated students to take to the street nationwide to challenge the occupation
and its client-regime and won. Borno was removed from power, a caretaker
government chosen to organize legislative and presidential elections, which saw
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a legislature and a president properly elected according to Haitian constitution for
the first time since the occupation began.
Despite the success of Negritude in providing focus for the resistance and
influencing political change, it was ultimately the Americans who dictated the
terms of the transition for the client state; it was they who mandated the very
steps that would end the occupation202. The recommendations of the Forbes
Commission sent to investigate the disturbances in Haiti is useful in
demonstrating the success of the movement and ironic if one understands the
constraints the Occupation imposed on the Haitian state and on the sociopolitical and economic life of the nation203 (M. W. Shannon 1976, 66). The
Commission sought to undo in six years what had been imposed after 15-years
under Occupation with considerable violence and collusion:






Rapid Haitianization of the services by 1936 – but all of these institutions
were led by White Americans and Haitians, no matter their education and
professional experience had not been allowed important post. Even in the
Gendarmerie only 38% of all its Captains and Lieutenants were Haitians
The selection of racially unbiased employees for the Haitian service –
even though they had already removed dark skinned Haitians and replace
them by Mulattoes and the American society itself relied on racism for
governance
Abolition of the office of High Commissioner, appointment of a non-military
minister, and non-intervention in Haitian affairs – Though the very reason
for the occupation was to bring Haiti and other nations in the Caribbean
and Latin American under American political influence and economic
control. More importantly, the alliance with post-occupation elites and the
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Reports of the President’s Commission for the Study and Review of Conditions in the Republic of Haiti,
March 26, 1930, PSCH, HHPL. Plan of Commission, March 21-24, 1930.
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formation of a central military to support them created the new
infrastructure for indirect intervention. The power of the American
Embassy would replace the power of the Marines.
Gradual withdrawal of the Marines – yet the Gendarmerie was structured
and trained as the new occupying force so the departure of the Marines
did not mean the end of their policies and their involvement. In the case of
Haiti, not only did the gendarmerie placed Mulattoes at the head of the
Gendarmerie, it was the only institution that was intentionally trained,
organized and permitted to lead thus the most powerful post-occupation
institution.

The Occupation and its client regime had permanently re-engineered the
political landscape and political competition and participation. The Black
Nationalist elites and their military infrastructure that had kept neocolonial elites
at bay from the levers of power and limited the vulnerability and dependency of
the state had been dismantled (Bellegarde 1929, 1929a, R. W. Logan 1961). The
success of the Negritude movement forced both a re-evaluation of black identity
as central to the nation and a transition did not upend the new landscape, but
simply removed the U. S. Marines from Haitian soil. Haiti’s political landscape
had been redesigned – clientelism and dependency were now permanent
features of the nation.
The removal of Borno and election of Stenio Vincent would reaffirm the
challenges of a post-occupation dependent Haiti and the new political dynamic.
Vincent was elected because he was a member of the Patriotic Union, a group
founded in 1920 “to defend Haiti’s sovereignty and dignity”. He had taken part in
resistance activities against the Occupation and the Borno regime with prominent
Black Nationalist Pauleus Sannon and was considered impartial, free of racial
bias, and above all an “intransigent patriot.” His program, according to Gingras,
“reflected the unanimous views of all honest citizens; to liberate Haiti smoothly
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from the occupation and from foreign ascendancy.” (Gingras 1967, 70) Within a
year, the Veto powers held by the American ministers and financial advisor were
eliminated as mandated by the Forbes Commission; The Garde was fully
Haitianized as well as the management of important departments (Castor 1978).
By 1934, due to Vincent’s personal relationship with the President of the United
States, F.D. Roosevelt, the physical manifestations of the occupation were also
finally removed. To facilitate his re-election, Vincent changed the Constitution,
and mirroring the Occupation, used the military to arrest opposition figures,
organized for a plebiscite for the approval of the Constitution and closed
newspapers and imprisoned journalists who opposed him.
While, argues Flynn, “coercion and manipulation are inseparable from the
power relationship expressed in political clientelism,” Violence and coercion are
by necessity the central feature to control a state in the absence of legitimacy
and adequate resources to maintain effective populous clientelist networks
(Flynn 1974, 135, Knight 1993, Gray 1998, Bogues 2002, Roniger 2004). Having
little control over the resources of the state, still under American oversight, and
having dedicated available resources to secure the support of neocolonial elites,
Vincent had little recourse other than coercion to hold the population and
opposition in check. His new Constitution muzzled the legislative branch by
removing their ability to influence governmental decision from the Chamber of
deputies, and as Gingras notes,
This democratic constitution gave Vincent the right to
name 10 out of the twenty one senators and to submit a
list of the 11 others to the chamber of deputies for their
nominal approval. A later amendment gave him the
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power to dismiss any representative at any time.”
(Gingras 1967, 73, Blancpain 1999, 329)

Vincent had re-implemented the policies of the previous client regimes without
the High Commissioner, created a Mulatto-dominated Senate, put his caste in
charge of all state institutions and short of disbanding, undermined the power
and influence of the more populous, more nationalist darker-skinned Chamber of
deputies. His control and Haitianization of the new military or Garde D’Haiti
provided him with the protection to impose his will on the nation and shifted the
Garde’s strict hierarchical and meritocratic promotion mechanism to one at the
service of his caste. Having integrated the Garde’s leadership into his clientelist
network “he surrounded himself with, and was protected by a group of totally
devoted Mulatto officers, who naturally worked diligently to promote their own
kind and kin,” notes Paquin (Paquin 1983, 80). Despite Vincent’s initial attempts
to include prominent Black leaders in his government and some Blacks in state
institutions to obtain broader popular support and offset Mulatto competitors, his
election and re-election furthered the mulatrization of the neocolonial client
regime. However, the Mulatto-dominated national political landscape and the
state had been transformed into a new clientelist and dependency paradigm; one
best described by Gingras,
In the overall scheme, the Americans granted some
concessions to the Mulattoes and even gave them some
semblance of supremacy; but, and most importantly,
American influence predominated ( (Gingras 1967, 78)

Indeed, Americans had since the occupation decided who should be in power
and when they should leave; their litmus test, the willingness of these regimes to
protect of American geopolitical and economic interests. Since the Occupation, it
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has ranged from acquiescing to a treaty that permanently tied the Haitian
economy to American economic and geopolitical interests, to securing and
consolidating loans that enable the monopolization of Haitian banking and
economic decision-making (R. W. Logan 1968, 144). However, despite requiring
the obeisance of successive Haitian governments and preservation of American
economic interests, it was not just the Americans who were informing and
supporting Mulatto dominance, it was the emboldened neocolonial Mulatto elites
themselves, backed by the new Mulatto-dominated military.
The military-protected clientelist infrastructure of power had demonstrated
its capacity to impose its will on the nation. The Pétionist neocolonial regime had
resurfaced more powerful than before, and “the elite caste seemed firmly in the
saddle…and Vincent’s amoralism had opened all the politico-social sores of
Haiti” (Gingras 1967, 72). The 1937 massacre of 33,000 Haitians and
Dominicans of Haitian descent in the Dominican Republic by the Trujillo regime
and the absence of a robust response by the Vincent’s government became part
of the symptom of the new post-Occupation neocolonial state. The response,
argues the eminent Haitian historian, Dr. Suzy Castor, lead to the suppression of
the incident and to a “complicity of silence” that was indicative of the interests of
the oligarchy to the plight of the Haitian masses (Price-Mars 1953, Castor 1988,
70). Given the neglect with which the Vincent government and its representative
in Washington dealt with the genocide, it is fair to suggest, as have most
scholars, that Vincent and those who dominated his government lack of concern
for the lives of their citizens was demonstrated by its failure to produce an
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adequate state response204. Thus, it is not surprising that the Haitianization of
services he undertook as recommended by the Forbes Commission and
mandated by the American government led to the institutionalization and
systematization of neocolonial Mulatto dominance to the detriment of the majority
black population.
Having been already populated by light-skinned Haitians in the lower
echelon due to American racism, the Gendarmerie, now christened Garde D
’Haiti, as well as all other state institutions became under Mulatto leadership
through Haitianization205. The centralization of power in the Capital, a
geographical space historically dominated by neocolonial elites that had not
experienced the violence the occupation meted on the North and its black
population, also facilitated this mulatrization process. Having re-established
control over the senate, Vincent also engineered the election of his chosen
candidate Elie Lescot to continue his political platform. As Gingras points out,
“citizen Lescot was elected president, on April 15, 1941, without a presidential
campaign, by a rubber-stamp parliament, with a majority of 56 voices out of 56
voters”206 (Gingras 1967, 74).
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Paquin suggests that Vincent was concerned about military conflicts between the two nations and that
this concern mitigated the national response (Paquin 1983). What is clear though argues Delince is that
following this debacle, he removed the highest-ranking officer of the Haitian Garde replacing him by more
malleable Mulatto officers (Delince 1979).
205

Haitian governments had no control over their finances until 1946 because of the treaty signed by the
Borno regime. The occupation could have compelled an inclusive Haitianization had their national politics
and international politics not been influence by their own racism and stereotypes (Weston 1972) .
206

Rayford Logan argues that it was elected by 54 votes out of 56 voters (R. W. Logan 1968, 146)
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This re-emergence of the aristocracy of the skin during the Occupation, its
consolidation and continuity with the farcical election of Lescot207 and its control
of and reliance on the centralized American-created national army without the
Northern nationalist military infrastructure to challenge it, gave neocolonial elites
unlimited national power. The Occupation had created a new political landscape,
refashioned the state and engineered their re-emergence as holders of state
power. Lescot presidency would become the rallying point. Lescot not only
continued the policy of his predecessor, but demonstrating the true clientelist
nature of his regime, he made clear his alliance with the United States in his
inaugural address,
Let us proclaim that our fate is deeply tied with that of
the United States. I intend that our international policy be
the real, candid image of the international policy of our
generous and powerful neighbor.” (Gingras 1967, 75)

The Lescot Regime, attempting to support American investments,
dispossessed the Haitian peasantry of 200,000 acres of land, the most important
marker of freedom for the Haitian peasantry since independence. He used the
military to institute mass arrests of those who criticized his regime, extended his
mandate and those of the Senate whom he had the power to nominate,
postponed elections, established the most exclusive Mulatto regime since Boyer
with segregationist pro-Mulatto policies to institutionalize political power (Dash
1997, 87). Both Borno and Vincent had tried to, at least, maintain a veneer of
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With the new power to select the Senators, Vincent nominated Lescot for the Senate in absentia which
made him eligible for the presidency. Following his selection as a Senator, he was subsequently selected
as the president to replace Vincent.
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racial equilibrium. However, Vincent at the end of his regime, and Lescot from
the very start of his presidency advocated and implemented policies of
discrimination not just against the peasant masses by targeting their religion and
traditional practices, but against the surviving and new intellectual, political and
economic elites by excluding them from the levers of state and national
institutional power. As Paquin notes,
[T]he question of color became the paramount issue in
Lescot’s regime… The Mulattoes had unchallenged
political supremacy. Secured in that fortress, they
extended their exclusivism to the social setting… The
Lescot regime outdid itself in its blatant discrimination in
the foreign service.” (Paquin 1983, 82-83)

These practices of exclusion and Lescot targeting of the peasantry reinvigorated the Negritude movement. Despite engineering his re-election, he was
forced from the Presidency by popular uprising, and a military triumvirate was
established to lead the political transition. It was the military, not politicians, that
dictated the terms of the transition. Subsequent attempts by its Mulatto officer
corps to forcefully shape the path, scope and nature of the post-Lescot transition
process without success, became the staging ground for future actions (Delince
1979, Paquin 1983, Ruffat 1991, M. S. Laguerre 1993, Renda 2001).
Three features evolved in post-occupation Haiti, which became apparent
in the overthrow of Lescot: first, the exclusion of the masses in the electoral
process was necessary for neocolonial dominance of the political system and the
state. Second, whereas before the challenge was between opposing elites, now
the masses became the primary challengers to the client regimes. Third, the
military the source of support for nationalist and later reorganized to support the
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new neocolonial clientelist infrastructure, began to display its own power,
interests and internal schisms because of the inclusion of its leadership in the
neocolonial governance scheme.
The fall of Lescot resulted in shifting the electoral calculus that had
perpetuated neocolonial dominance; the senatorial election by popular suffrage
instead of presidential nomination was instituted. This change resulted in the
election of the most diverse chambers of Senators and Deputies since the
occupation, and consequently, the election of Haiti’s first Black president,
Dumarsai Estime. The population had reasserted its power, and accordingly, a
Black president was elected projecting future struggled between a neocolonialdominated state and military and a new black president with roots in the North.
Lescot, according to Paquin, “did very well what his regime was supposed to do
as an overseer of American interests in Haiti” but the post-occupation
governance system and its anointed neocolonial leaders, because of their
deficiency in popular legitimacy, lacked the ability to withstand pressure from the
Haitian polis. Their lack of legitimacy became the primary source of vulnerability
and instability. The military had emerged not just as a pawn but also as an arbiter
in Haitian affairs and perhaps the most important one. The election of Estime
however did not affect the direction of the new neocolonial state nor did it
substantively change the role and leadership of the military. This new political
development, the election of a true representative legislature and a Black
President, far from indicating a shift in the orientation of the state and its military,
created the pressure that would compel the military to play out its true nature of
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preserving and protecting political elites capable of maintaining American and
business interests.
The new post-Occupation state, with its military exercising monopoly over
the use of force, its unchecked power, and lack of reliance on the population for
its legitimacy, became the only institution capable of maintaining neocolonial
dominance or intervene decisively in the political process. The military forceful
entry into the political arena to support the client regime or lead if need be to
safeguard foreign and elites’ interests became an important post-occupation
transition.
Unable to retain power democratically, neocolonial elites and military
supporters would result to coercion (J. McCrocklin 1956, Delince 1979). The
increase role of the military to protect their clientelist infrastructure and its
neocolonial elites would mark it as a target by the masses and an emerging
Black intelligentsia and middleclass Black population opposed to an elite that had
neglected their interests (Gingras 1967, Nicholls 1979). The Garde’s cohesion
since its creating by the Marines with its leadership dominated by Mulattoes and
its lower echelons by Blacks began to experience internal dissent due to the
political and ideological divergence between its officers and soldiers (Delince
1979, Laguerre 1993). Before the vehicle for Mulatto dominance, racial and
ideological schism within its ranks would shift the allegiance of the Garde as the
vehicle that would drive the rise of Duvalier’s dictatorial Noirist regime, and later
its target in Duvalier’s attempt to undo Mulatto political and institutional
dominance of the state and the society (Pierre-Charles 1973, Dalvius 1987).
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Clientelism and Dependency as Consequences of the Occupation:
In Haiti, American occupiers found a divided nation and a weak,
leaderless, and dysfunctional state with northern leaders competing for its control
and orientation, and neocolonial elites for its spoils. They found a state that had
lost its direction and ability to defend challenges to its sovereignty since the failed
attempt of the Firminist modernist forces, which ended with the death of Leconte.
More importantly, they found collaborators willing to sacrifice national sovereignty
for personal and ethnic interests208. The lack of cohesion of Louverturean forces
and intra-elite competition had lost them the control and orientation of the state to
neocolonial elites and their foreign allies (R. Gaillard 1981, J. Desquiron 1993).
Their failure to maintain an effective northern coalition and re-establish the
Louverturean social contract between the state and its citizens ultimately resulted
in their downfall. More than neocolonial elites whose economic interests had
historically taken precedence over those of the nation, and whose betrayal was
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The Scholar Philippe Girard, Edouard Depestre, and others have correctly suggested that some elites
were genuinely concerned about the welfare of the nation and saw the continuing instability as an
impediment to national progress (P. R. Girard 2010, 76-9). This concern is what led Charles Moravia to
write, “We are not at war with the United States, the Americans are the enemies of a sovereign
Despotism and occupy the country to prevent its restoration” (Nicholls 1979, 146, Montague 1940, 212).
They saw in the United States a potential ally for both investments and support (Firmin 1905). Even the
distinguish nationalist scholar and statesman, Jacque-Nicolas leger, as early as 1886, advocated for an
alliance between Haiti and the United States, “If it was necessary” he wrote, “ for Haiti to form an alliance,
it would not be, at the moment, in Europe she would seek such an alliance… many times, the United
States have shown themselves disposed to accord us, at the very least, strong moral backing; and has
always treated us with the utmost courtesy” (J.-N. Leger 1886, 135-6). It may be therefore useful to
suggest that not all who collaborated with the occupation forces did that for personal and/or ethnic
interests. The distinguished historian Roger Gaillard argues that the cooperation of certain members of
the elite was to avert bloodshed (Gaillard 1973, 112-4).
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predictable, Northern Louverturean elites, with unqualified military dominance,
should ultimately be held responsible for losing the independence of the Haitian
state so valiantly gained. Their failure to use their political and military power to
bring national stability and cohesion cannot be ignored. Having gained the upper
hand over their neocolonial counterpart, shortsightedness and fratricide
undermined their ability to find a permanent path for the state (Bellegarde 1929,
H. Schmidt 1971). The ultimate measure of that failure was their inability to
properly arm and train their shock troops for a confrontation they surely could
anticipate given the patterns of American involvement in other neighboring
nations in the Caribbean and Latin America (Nicholls 1979, Trouillot 1990). They
had neglected the very forces upon which their political and military dominance
depended and the very national ideological underpinnings that afforded them
coherence and purpose. In their internal competition for control of the neocolonial
state, they had neglected the very basis of the Louverturean project, and the
foundation of the nation’s independence; military power for the protection of
national sovereignty from external and internal threats, and interdependence
between the state and the nation (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933, A. Millspaugh 1971,
M.-R. Trouillot 1990, Pierre-Etienne 2010). The American Marines found a
Northern military force, the only force capable and willing to resist the occupation,
unprepared, untrained, and poorly armed, having been used in intra-nationalist
elite competition for power rather than national defense (R. Gaillard 1984, Dupuy
1989). Yet, even so, they found a force and leaders, whom despite being
outgunned, were willing to defend the sovereignty of the Republic and did so well
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into the fifth year of the occupation (Nicolas 1927, H. Schmidt 1971, R. Gaillard
1981).
Despite their resistance however, they succumbed to the overwhelming
force of a better-equipped military superpower, and lost the historical struggle to
create an independent nation, connected to the world system but not subjugated
by it. The Louverturean project continued through the struggle of Northern
nationalist to maintain dominance over the neocolonial state finally ended and
with it the sovereignty and autonomy of a nation that had fought so valiantly
through the years. The Occupation, having defeated the nation’s nationalists and
destroyed their political and military infrastructure, imposed on Haiti a distinct
Clientelism; one guided by coercion and foreign military support, lacking the
required popular legitimacy from a cross-section of the population and the
political institutions to sustain it (Nicolas 1927, 160-5, H. Schmidt 1971, 86,
Renda 2001). This form of military or coercion-centered clientelism established in
Haiti that relied on foreign protection and dependency enabled its beneficiaries,
neocolonial elites and their client regimes, to ignore the interests of the nation
and aspiration of its citizens.
The Occupation succeeded in four major aspects. The population, armed
since independence, and long able to defend itself, was disarmed and pacified,
northern elites predominance was eliminated, and their military infrastructure
destroyed and replaced by a centralized military led by Western and Southern
Mulatto officers. Moreover, the neocolonial state became centralized with all
power derived from the capital. For the first time, political and military power was
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finally concentrated into the hands of neocolonial elites. More importantly, the
state and its client regime came under the patronage and protection of an
external power. The policies of the Occupation, in re-structuring power in the
neocolonial state, and the institutional, economic, and political developments
they engendered, crafted a more stable and protected state no longer vulnerable
to pressure from regional forces, but designed to pacify resistance to the
governance system and its elites instead providing national protection (Delince
1979, M. S. Laguerre 1993). For once, since the Boyerist regime, the neocolonial
state was safe and its power uncontested and because of the policies
implemented by the occupation, had acquired the capacity to maintain and
defend neocolonial elite control. The state under American Occupation and
during the post-Occupation era became less prone to contestations, and
neocolonial elites, having acquired a new centralized military and the protection
of a foreign power, became less interested in fostering their relationship with the
population and strengthening legitimacy and support for themselves and the
state. The state hitherto, weak and fragmented, became the vehicle for external
control, and its military, before decentralized, dependent on regional forces, and
vulnerable to armed resistance to its infringements, became the undisputed
arbiter of power in the nation. The United States, as it did in Nicaragua, Cuba,
the Philippines, and the Dominican Republic, eliminated resistance to elite
domination and crafted a military-centered state to protect its interests and those
of its client neocolonial elites.
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From 1915 until the end of the Occupation in 1934, American forces
engaged in a project of state centralization designed to consolidate the
neocolonial state by pacifying and disarming the nation, and eliminating the
nationalist northern forces that had provided a check on neocolonial elite power
and prevented their control over the Haitian state. Powerless, and since the fall of
Boyer, unable to acquire and maintain control of the national neocolonial state
they themselves had crafted, these elites collaborated with Occupying forces to
create institutions capable of strengthening, sustaining, and protecting the state
and their dominance over it (Dupuy 1989, R. Fatton 2007).
The post-Occupation neocolonial state, with neocolonial elites as its
leaders, a new centralized army created by American Marines for its protection,
and the client regimes they established, became consolidated and selfprotecting. Neocolonial elites, encouraged by their foreign supporters rather than
allaying the prevalence of old cleavages for the sake of nation building,
accentuated it. At a time when neocolonial elites had the capacity to unite the
nation, their decision to forego the nation for their own interests became the
source of national instability. Their path to national dominance intensified racial
and mass-elite schisms ultimately resulting in the rise of Negritude and the black
power movement that propelled and facilitated Duvalier’s centralized dictatorship
(H. Schmidt 1971, Castor 1978, M.-R. Trouillot 1990)
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CHAPTER V
THE POST-OCCUPATION CLIENTELIST STATE: THE RISE,
CONSOLIDATION AND DECLINE OF DUVALIERISM

This chapter analyzes the post-Occupation period of neocolonial elite
hegemony and the national schism that facilitated the rise and consolidation of
the Duvalierist regime. It covers the Estime and Duvalierist periods and the
attempts of both regimes to institutionalize a Noirist regime within the framework
of a post-Occupation neocolonial clientelist state constrained by American
geopolitical concerns and interests. It focuses on the reorganization and
consolidation of the neocolonial national state into a military-centered coercive
state apparatus and the struggle over military control between Noirist and
neocolonial elites. The chapter offers an original analysis of the rise of
Duvalierism and Noirist governance, within the framework of a neocolonial
clientelist infrastructure imposed by the United States, and sheds light on the
Noirist state-military centered politics that have dominated Haiti.

The Decline and Demise of Neocolonial Elite Dominance: Mulatto Hegemony
and the Rise of Noirism:
The destruction of the Northern military infrastructure, forceful removal of
Blacks from positions of power, imposition and perpetuation of Mulatto
domination, and marginalization of Black citizens, left them with little options but
to challenge neocolonial elites and the post-Occupation military-centered
neocolonial clientelist state. Baridon and Philoctete argue, “The Racist,
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humiliating, and insolent occupation provoked in Haitians an enlightened
awareness of their own racial, spiritual, and moral worth” (Baridon 1978, 14). The
Occupation, the defeat of Northern Nationalists, and the Mulatto domination it
facilitated, created a new cadre of Haitian leaders, not military generals, but
intellectuals committed to re-centering the Black presence and re-asserting Black
leadership as the source of national identity and state legitimacy. In the absence
of a military option to the Occupation, a cultural ideology based on Haitian Black
identity became central to nationalist resistance. New leaders emerged to
challenge the neocolonial adoption and implementation of the racial system
imposed by American Occupation forces, and the forced displacement of the
Black majority from every aspect of the state and national institutions it
engendered. Such a displacement “permitted the traditional Mulatto elite to hold
onto political center stage” as spoils for their collusion with the U.S. Marines in
their defeat of Northern nationalist forces (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 150). Intellectual
resistance to this displacement produced a cultural revival – Indigenism209 - that
sought to reassert an African cultural identity in opposition to white supremacy
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The Indigenist movement emphasized the Haitian African majority as central to national identity and
culture, thus necessary as a vehicle for national liberation. For Haitian scholars, it was precisely the
disregard for Haiti’s African identity and culture that allowed neocolonial elites to adopt and implement
American racist ideology as a feature of the Haitian state and institutions. An affirmation of that African
identity and culture, they argue, would serve as a counter weight to American and neocolonial elites’
racial imposition and rekindle national pride. Indigenism would later be transformed into the international
Negritude movement adopted by many Latin American, Caribbean, and African anti-colonial scholars
(LHerisson, et al. 1956). To use the description of Rene Depestre, one of its most famous proponents,
“Negritude was an awareness of Blacks’ historical circumstances as a means of decolonization and the
realization of the necessity to destroy the myths and stereotypical images of people of color... It
compelled Haitians to accept its African origins in order to make common cause with the masses and
restore the collective conscience in order to create a spirit of national solidarity and cohesion” against
the occupation (Price-Mars 1928, Nadeau 1978, 14,18)
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and colonial racial impositions. Thus, Indigenism, as a reaction to the Occupation
and white and neocolonial dominance was purely a cultural movement whose
goal was the valuation of Black culture and the end of white dominance.
“Not only did Africa come into view as the wellspring of much that was Haitian,”
remarked Leyburn, “but Haiti’s status as an occupied though once –sovereign
power dramatized the need for a social and political philosophy” (Leyburn 1966,
xii). C.L.R. James argues that the trauma of the Occupation and the
transformation it spurned in Haiti meant, “Haiti had to find a rallying-point. They
look for it where it can only be found at home, or more precisely, in their own
backyard” (James 1963, 394). Indigenism was the answer.
In spite of the success of the Indigenist movement in engendering cultural
and intellectual resistance to the Occupation, and contesting its anti-Black
manifestations, it could not control the actions and offset the power of
Occupation forces, their neocolonial elites’ collaborators, and new neocolonial
infrastructure. Indigenism as an intellectual cultural form of resistance proved
inadequate in addressing Black marginalization.
From 1915 to 1946, American forces had maneuvered Mulattoes into
economic, political, and institutional power to sustain the clientelist regime and
preserve their interests at the detriment of the Black majority. Charles
Dartiguenave, Louis Borno, Stenio Vincent, and Elie Lescot, were all Mulattoes
brought to and sustained in the Presidency to continue and deepen their
institutional control and supremacy over the neocolonial clientelist state.
American Occupation forces were not simply the cause of cultural
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marginalization of the majority Black population, they had imposed a structural
marginalization and the solution required a re-structuring of the society and its
centers of power. Their segregationist politics and policies exacerbated racial
tension and though it affected remnants of the small and fragile Black
bourgeoisie, it disproportionately affected the Black middle and working class,
leaving them out of the institutions and direction of their own state. It was the
Black middle-class and working class,210 left out of the primary vehicle for social
mobility, that reacted most strongly to the segregationist policies. Their
dependence on the state and public institutions was not just based on cultural
and historical expectations, but also on political and economic survival in this
new dependent neocolonial clientelist state (Labelle 1976, 133, 1987). This
institutionalization of color prejudice, imposed by Occupation forces and
continued by neocolonial Mulatto elites, according to Jean-Luc,
[H]ad direct consequences on their economic wellbeing.
This racist ideology allowed the Mulatto middle-class to
have access to political and professional positions and
propelled them to economically advantageous positions
at the detriment of their more competent Black
counterparts” (Jean-Luc 1968, 11-12)211

Etienne Charlier, a Marxist Mulatto elite observed, “ we have seen dumb
Mulattoes with no training chosen to represent the nation in the most important
international institutions while Blacks with credentials are systematically kept out
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If the American occupation did anything, it was that it facilitated the emergence of a middle class in
Haiti as General Russell saw the presence of a middle class as necessary for national development, and a
vehicle to offset the insurmountable disparity between elite peasantry (Logan 1930, 1968).
211
Qted in (Labelle 1987, Labelle 1976, 133, Blancpain 1999).
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of diplomatic posts” (Bonhomme 1946, 64)212. The eminent Noirist scholar Roger
Dorsinville noted,
All the ministers, all the important administrative posts,
all the embassies were in the hands of Mulâtres, the
administrative offices of subcontracting companies were
full of light-skinned girls. They ran the country as they
would have run a plantation... In this context, whoever
was not a noiriste would have been scum… They forced
upon us a culture of contempt. To this culture of
contempt, we opposed our resistance and our hate
(Dorsinville 1972, 130-1, 1985, 21)213

As this pattern of neocolonial elites’ domination of the neocolonial clientelist state
and segregationist policies persisted, the radicalization of Black middle and
working class seeking to upend Mulatto dominance, and assert their own power
and control over the state, intensified. Indigenism214, a socio-cultural intellectual
movement advocating for an African national identity, would morph into Noirism,
a socio-political movement seeking to unseat neocolonial Mulatto elites from
state power (Baridon 1978). Noirism, as an ideology, advocated for Black
leadership as the only legitimate leadership for the Haitian state much as
Louverturean nationalists did before them. Noirism thus, as a political movement,

212

Also qted in (Labelle 1976, 135)
Qted in (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 134)
214
As was the case with Dr. Firmin and Dr. Bobo, it was the convergence of the Black middle-class and
young neocolonial elite intellectuals who sought to provide an answer to the neocolonialist infrastructure.
Unable to contest militarily, they opted for an ideological struggle against both the occupation and the
new neocolonial state and its elites asserting a Black identity for the Haitian state. Although various
scholars have credited Black elites for the movement, it is important to note those who were in its
leadership were mostly not economic elites but the intellectuals and professionals class. Lorimer Denis,
Francois Duvalier, Arthur Bonhomme, J.C. Dorsinville, Catts Pressoir, Jacques Roumain, Henri Terlonge,
Philippe Thoby-Marcelin, Jacques Alexis, Anthony Phelps, Carl Brourd, Louis Diaquoi, Rene Depestre,
Roussain Camille, almost all poets, physicians, sociologists, ethnologists, anthropologists lead by the
former senator and scholar Dr. Jean-Price-Mars. Their movement was a “call to conscience for the
exploited and humiliated blacks, but also something deeper that sought to counter all the forces which
prevented them from breaking the chains of poverty, suffering, injustice, oppression, and moral misery”
(Nadeau 1978, 17)
213
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provided the answer to Blacks’ quest to re-assert their control over the state and
contest their marginalization. In sum, Noirism married the class struggle between
middle class Blacks and Mulattoes elites, and a political struggle seeking to wrest
control of the state from Mulattoes who had dominated it since the Occupation.
As Trouillot correctly noted,
Noirism was perceived as the only viable political
alternative by the vast majority of the middle classes.
The very terms of urban political debate would not allow
the question of color to be set aside (M.-R. Trouillot
1990, 134)

Their first success was the overthrowing of two successive Mulatto governments
through peaceful protests215; the second was the election of Dumarsais
Estimé,216the first Black president since the Occupation. The demands of the
Black population that led to the election of Estimé therefore have to be
understood within the context of that Noirist struggle for state power. The
destruction of the Louverturean elites and their military infrastructure provided the
space for the emergence of a new model, one not led by the historical military,
economic, and political Louverturean elites but by the Black urban middle class in
alliance with its working class and peasantry (Labelle 1976, 130-1, Nicholls 1979,
189-90). The Occupation, and the dependent Neocolonial Clientelist state it
imposed on the nation, had created new forces and a new dynamic of resistance;

215

These two governments led by Stenio Vincent and Elie Lescot as I have demonstrated were the most
egregious and blatant in their implementation of the aristocracy of the skin which further alienated and
radicalized the Black elites and middle class (Simpson 1941, 640-1)
216
A lawyer and professor, Estime was dismissed for Sedition by Louis Borno and joined the nationalist
movement in 1930 becoming a staunch opponent of the American occupation. Having married into the
neocolonial elite class, he was one of the few Blacks who served in the government of Stenio Vincent as
minister of Education (Georges-Pierre 2010, M. Smith 2009). Estime, in this context was seen not as a
threat, but as a good alternatives to more radical black voices by neocolonial elites
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no longer dependent on elites, but on the Black urban middle and working class
alliance with their peasant counterpart (P. Pierre 1987, Dupuy 1989).

Dumarsais Estimé: Noirism and the Struggle for State Control:
From 1920 to 1946 Blacks contested Mulatto dominance of the
neocolonial clientelist state with neither a clear understanding of the nature of
the state itself for which they fought, nor a formulation of the state they sought to
create. Their success in forcing the overthrow of the Lescot regime through a
military coup represented an attempt by neocolonial elites to stem the
radicalization of the Noirist movement and retain control of the neocolonial
clientelist state by orchestrating the election of Estimé. The perceived success of
the Noirists according to Leslie Pean was simply a strategy for ceding state
leadership without state control and state power (Pean 2016). Voltaire argues
that the military coup that facilitated the rise of Estimé was no fluke. The coup, he
asserts,
constituted the first stage in liquidating the revolutionary
situation by the Haitian army. However, the military
leaders, fearing losing complete control over the
situation could not overtly nor covertly oppose the urban
masses’ movement and the radicalized black middle
class. So it opted to divide the contesting forces (Voltaire
1988, 208).

Estimé not only understood the manipulation of the army, he used his popularity
and their attempt not to further radicalize the contesting Noirist movement as a
counterbalance to maintain their neutrality. In Estimé, Haiti saw the reemergence, if not of the Louverturean model, at least its politics, some of its
ideology, and policies. Louverturean elites, unlike their neocolonial counterparts,
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included Mulattoes in high positions and as representatives of the state both
nationally and internationally. Theirs was a politics of nationalist ideology, not
color, but even those not in agreement with their politics could be part of the
Louverturean state, not as tokenism but as full participants in state affairs (P.
Sannon 1905, M.-R. Trouillot 1990). The basis for the legitimacy of the
Louverturean state was strong enough not to be concerned with the beliefs and
actions of any one man. Despite the fact that the racial exclusion imposed by
Occupation forces, which was continued and expanded by neocolonial elites,
changed the political landscape and consequently radicalized the Black urban
middle class, Estimé’s government was the most culturally and “racially”, and
ideologically inclusive. His cabinet consisted of Daniel Fignolé, the radical
advocate for the working class, as Secretary of Education; George Rigaud,
descendant of General Rigaud, the nemesis of Toussaint, as Secretary of
Commerce; the Indigenist scholar and public health expert, Dr. Francois Duvalier
as Minister of Health and Public Works; and he sent young Black and Mulatto
middle and working class students abroad to study (Nicholls 1979, 189-92,
Georges-Pierre 2010). This strategy helped to broaden its bases of support, and
offset the divide and conquer manipulations of the army and neocolonial elites.
More importantly, Estimé’s policies sought to re-establish, if not a social contract,
at least an orientation of the government toward the majority of its population.
The policies of the first Black government since 1915 sought to elevate the
marginalized and neglected population and create a government to manage the
interests of all groups. Its orientation was not unlike those of previous
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Louverturean regimes, but its goal was to offset the prevalence of Mulatto office
holders. Unable to formulate an ideology of state crafting beyond Noirist
discourse of state power, Estimé’s quest for a path to equity meant that the state
and public institutions became the site of contestation.
Under the Estimé government, the interests of the masses were protected.
Black professionals, instead of just members of the light-skinned population, also
got access to government jobs, including cabinet positions, for the first time in
thirty years (Leyburn 1966, xxi, M. Smith 2009, 108-9). Congruent with
Louverturean policies and the emphasis of Louverturean leaders, Estimé
expanded access to schools, particularly rural and urban schools, and increased
the number of trained teachers, which resulted in a 45% increase in primary
school enrollment217 (Magloire 1950, L. Dubois 2004, M. Smith 2009, 117-21). In
line with the Louverturean social contract of supporting rural development,
Estimé encouraged rural cooperatives to facilitate peasant autonomy and control
over their resources and production, and more than doubled the minimum
wage218 (Bonhomme 1957, Heinl and Heinl 2005). He raised the salaries of civil
servants, and ensured the representation of middle and lower class Blacks in the
state and national institutions (Dupuy 1989, 143, M. Smith 2009, 108-135,
Georges-Pierre 2010). Estimé enacted the country’s first income tax, fostered the
growth of labor unions, and began the process of Haitianizing the clergy. In a nod
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This was not unlike the policies of Christophe and later Soulouque and Salomon who expanded
educational opportunities to Blacks and increase the middle classes in the urban areas and the capital
(Bonhomme 1946).
218
Estime increased the minimum wage from 30 to 70 cents (Diederich and Burt 1969, 55-7).
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to Indigenists and Haiti’s rural masses, he suggested that voodoo, their Africanderived religion, targeted and maligned since the Occupation, and persecuted
under the neocolonial clientelist regimes of Vincent and Lescot, be considered as
a religion equivalent to Roman Catholicism and Protestantism (Magloire 1950, L.
F. Manigat 1964, 30-7, M. Smith 2009, 16-7).
If the policies above were not indication enough of Estimé’s Louverturean
orientation, his attempts to strengthen the state, establish more sustainable and
interdependent state-society relations, counterbalance American influence, and
reduce the nation’s commercial and economic dependency cannot be
equivocated. He sought to remove the chokehold of debt imposed by the United
States on Haiti by seeking to have the debt cancelled and, when that failed,
engaged in renegotiations219. He increased the state’s power and revenues by
expanding its regulatory capacity in the import/export market, implementing
taxation and a new income tax, requiring workers to invest between 10 and 15
percent of their salaries in national-defense bonds (Manigat 1964, 35-7,
Diederich and Burt 1969, 56-8). To extend the reach and services of the state, he
invested in infrastructural development across the nation, including the building
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See “Efforts to Ease the Burden of Haiti’s Foreign Debts while protecting the Interests of American
Bondholders.” File# 838.00/1-546. Memorandum prepared in the Department of State. Washington,
January 5, 1946. The Estime’s government also sought a moratorium on Debt payment to allow the nation
to re-structure its economic outlook. The request was denied by the American government. See
memorandum from the Acting Secretary of State to the ambassador in Haiti (Tittman). P-au-P, September
27, 1946 – 6pm. File #: 838.52 Cooperation program /9-2646 telegram. What is noteworthy is that every
renegotiation of loans from independent lending institutions was done with the American government
and not those institutions. The Convergence of interests between the American government and those
financial institutions cannot be overlooked. Indeed, these financial institutions were the vehicle through
which the United States imposed its infrastructure of indebtedness and protected its geopolitical
interests.
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of a dam to increase the production of electricity and foster agricultural
development220 (Nicholls 1979, M. Smith 2009, 118-99). The new Haitian
Constitution reversed the constitutional changes imposed through American
occupation by limiting investment in agricultural enterprises, restricting the
amount of land holdings, and forbidding the conduct of retail business by
foreigners221. Most importantly, he sought to remove the economic dependence
of the neocolonial clientelist state by encouraging and increasing trade with other
nations such as England and France. He also doubled the national budget from
$12 to $21 million, and freed the National Bank from American control by paying
off the national debt222 (L. F. Manigat 1964, 36-7, R. W. Logan 1968, 149, PierreCharles 1973, 34). Yet, even in so doing, asserts the Acting American Secretary
of State in his letter to the American Ambassador in Haiti, other loans remain
unpaid tied to military and Coast Guard equipment directly related to the
neocolonial infrastructure organized by occupation forces223. Ironically, the
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This was not without wrangling and conflict with the American government and its banking
institutions. Consular correspondences reflect the level of dependence and constraints face by the Estime
regime and the neocolonial clientelist state due to indebtedness (see Foreign Relations p 591-598).
221
See Ambassador to Haiti (Wilson) to the Secretary of State – P-au-P, August 18, 1946. File # 711.38/81846 – Confidential No. 1638. In this memorandum to the Secretary of state, Ambassador Wilson
informed him that he had raised the concerned of the American government to President Estime
regarding injuries these constitutional articles might cause to American capital. Given that this was the
first meeting with the elected President, the American government seemed quite focused on protecting
American investment even at the detriment of the nation’s wellbeing.
222
The government also sought to reverse the 120 hectares concession by the previous clientelist
government to United Fruit Company by breaking the monopoly of the company in the production and
importation of agricultural products. However, his decision destroyed a lucrative industry that had grown
from $.5 million in 1934 to $7.3 million as the second income earner in the economy (R. W. Logan 1968,
149, Rotberg and Clague 1971, 173-5, Pierre-Charles 1973, 125)
223
Acting Secretary of State to the American embassy in Haiti. Washington, April 16, 1948. Foreign
Relations 1948 Vol IX, 594. File #: 838.24/3-2448 – Confidential No. 44
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Haitian state was paying loans to support the structures that secured the
subservience of the nation.
Therefore, despite the efforts of Estimé’s Noirist government, it could not
pull the nation out of the web of debts and dependence imposed on it.
Nevertheless, so improved was state-society relations, and the legitimacy of the
state and Estimé’s government, that the population, as well as elected officials,
supported his efforts by contributing a portion of their salary such that 2/3 of the
loan that gave the American government veto power over Haiti’s financial
decisions was paid off. This popular action and the rise of nationalism and antiAmerican sentiments it aroused compelled the United States to cancel the
remainder of the loan (R. W. Logan 1968, Hector, Moise and Olivier 1976, 145,
Paquin 1983, 92-105). According to Lyonel Paquin, an anti-Noirist and antiDuvalierist author who would later become deeply involved in the opposition’s
planning to overthrow the Duvalierist regime,
[T]he Mulattoes would accept no consolations to make
up for their loss of power… Despite all of the money they
were making in the post-war black-market, along with
the fabulous public works contracts that Estimé had
passed on to them, they were not satisfied… Under
Estimé, the Mulattoes were given all the economic
advantages without giving anything in return, not even
gratitude. The Mulattoes were furious for being out of
government… The more Estimé tried to appease them,
the more arrogant and self-assured they became
(Paquin 1983, 96-7, M. Smith 2009, 135-151, GeorgesPierre 2010).

Despite economic concessions to neocolonial elites and attempts to ally them to
the government, he failed to garner their support (Pierre-Charles 1973, 146,
Nicholls 1979). For the first time since the Occupation, neocolonial Mulatto elites
did not control the levers of government. Lacking direct influence in Haitian
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affairs, and compelled to pay taxes and be accountable to the state, they
resorted to clandestine lobbying among the Mulatto –dominated officer corps.
Moreover, Estimé’s policies of counterbalancing American power, his populous
policies, his protection of trade unions and workers’ rights, his economic
independence, and the presence of pro-communist intellectuals in his
government made him suspicious to American policy makers concerned with the
threat of communism in the region (Gingras 1967, 81-2, Dupuy 1989, L. Dubois
2004, Georges-Pierre 2010).
The very first year of his government, President Estimé challenged
American involvement in undermining his government. Constrained to deal with
American financial institutions and seeking to create international competition
and assert the independence of the Haitian state, he sought loans from France
for state expansion and infrastructure and agricultural developments, but a weak
post world war II France, itself dependent on American largesse, was in no
position to help contravene American interests. To reaffirm the dependent status
of the new neocolonial state within which the Noirist regime had to operate,
Estime’s government was forced to rely entirely on American financial
institutions. He requested $4 million in loans for infrastructural development via
the American government and the bank dictates were clear. It was
[N]ot prepared to consider applications for credits for
improvement of water supply systems in Port-au-Prince
and Cape Haitian or to undertake the low-cost Housing
in Port-au-Prince until plans for the Artibonite valley
project have been completed and a decision has been
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reached with regard to export-Import bank assistance in
the financing of that project224.

The Haitian state, its revenues tied up in servicing loans acquired through
the Occupation was at the mercy of the State Department’s supported ExportImport Bank. The Bank decided which projects were necessary or viable for the
Haitian government and dictated the terms under which it could borrow or
build.”225 Not only did the Bank have the power to dictate the terms, but its
coordination with the American government was even more apparent when the
Bank president requested that their representatives and the State department
send an economic mission to Haiti to “help the Haitian government decide which
projects should be undertaken”226. The Haitian Ambassador to Washington D.C.
himself protested to his American counterpart that, “U.S. policies towards Haiti is
to do just enough for Haiti to keep the country’s head above water”227. The
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank, William Mc Martin
not only agreed with the Ambassador Armour, but argues that the American
government had a “moral responsibility toward Haiti, which distinguished Haiti
from the other American Republics”228. His feelings did not prevent him from
refusing to support the Estimé government request for loans necessary for Haiti’s
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The Secretary of state to the Embassy of Haiti, Washington, July 1, 1948. File 838.51/8-248 Airgram –
Also found in Foreign Relations 1948, 597
225
See (Foreign Relations 1948, Vol IX, 597)
226
Mr. Maffry, Export-Import bank and Mr. Lucien Hibbert- Director of the University of Haiti and former
Finance minister. (Foreign Relations vol VIII, 728-9). Memorandum of Conversation by Charles C. Hauch of
the Division of Caribbean Affairs. Washington, September 17, 1947. File# 838.51/9-1747
227
See (Foreign Relations 1947, Vol VIII, 733). Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Charles C. Hauch of
the Division of Caribbean Affairs. Washington, October 10, 1947. File# 838.51/10-1047
228
Foreign Relations, 1948, Vol IX, 596
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improvement. Thus, under Estimé, loans for development projects were routinely
denied while military equipment and vessels for rent and sale were readily
available229.
The neocolonial clientelist infrastructure was such that despite Estimé’s
efforts for a more independent and legitimate state, the nation was tied to
American interests through a system of indebtedness and dependence. Sidney
Mintz correctly observed that despite the advances made by darker-skinned
Haitians in employment in state and public institutions, “the Estimé regime did not
produce changes in the economic structure of Haitian society of importance
proportionate to the national cultural renascence”230. In fact, he was forced to
deepen the structure of dependence and foreign clientelism by accumulating new
debts from American financial institutions. Estimé had managed to balance out
the power and dominance of neocolonial elites and created a more independent
state and government, but the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure and the
institution designed to protect it remained intact, and on May 10, 1950, it acted,
deposing the president and forcing him to leave the country. The military that had
assumed power after the fall of Vincent and Lescot, to avert more radical
politicians from gaining power, re-asserted its role supported by both neocolonial
elites and the American government. It was not lack of popular support that
facilitated the overthrow of Estimé; it was in spite of it. As a witness to the events
preceding the overthrow of Estimé notes, while the threat of Noirist consolidation
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See file #838.24/5-1848
See Sydney Mintz introduction of Leyburn’s The Haitian People ( (Leyburn 1966, xxi)
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of power, and the permanent eclipsing of Mulatto dominance compelled the
neocolonial infrastructure into action, the threat to the Noirist Regime also sent
the population to the street,
[T]he masses felt instinctively the danger; aroused by
their leader, they began to demonstrate hysterically their
attachment to the president. The civil servants, the new
class of Black bureaucrats joined in a parade of cars,
honking their horns, raising their fits in threatening
gestures. The Iron Market, the massive hub of peasantmerchants, came to a standstill. That was an awesome
sight… (Paquin 1983, 105)

In the end, the popular support enjoyed by the Noirist regime of Estimé could not
allay the threat; the same Junta that led the transition from Lescot to Estimé now
presided over Estimé’s overthrow and another transition to avert the challenge he
posed to the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure231. Clearly. Estime’s efforts were
constrained by the very structure within which he was operating, one that limited
both the scope and nature of changes possible. The dependent neocolonial
clientelist state was crafted to be military and coercion-centered and selfprotecting. However, it cannot be discounted that the inability of Estimé to
manage the competing interests and demands of neocolonial elites and their
neocolonial infrastructure against those of the rest of the population, and his
failure to assert control over the military ultimately resulted in his overthrow.
However, Rodman suggests that it is precisely Estimé’s attempt to manage those
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By asserting a role in the political process to secure the interests of neocolonial elites by removing the
first Noirist president from power, the officer corps stood in opposition to the popular will. They sowed
the seeds for schism within the military. By making themselves accomplices of the neocolonial elites, they
also made themselves targets of national political actors seeking to upend neocolonial dominance of the
state and society.
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interests and demands, and his willingness to change the orientation and
ideology of the state that led to his demise.
Late in 1949 it was becoming apparent that Estimé
intended to go much further than public works in
changing the face of Haiti. Unions, with political as well
as economic programs, were being encouraged to
organize and demand a share in the larger industrial
companies. Political parties, with frankly socialist
programs, were starting to win converts in the cities.
Spontaneous demonstrations were taking place
denouncing not only the bourgeoisie but the Mulatto
bourgeoisie.” (Rodman 1954, 30)

It is clear that Estimé from the start sought to create a unity government capable
of addressing the competing needs of Haitian citizens. Ultimately, he did not
have control of the neocolonial clientelist state and as he sought to acquire it by
shifting its policies and orientation and extending his government, the neocolonial
military, its elites, and foreign backers acted, forcefully removing him from office
despite his popularity232. Unlike Louverturean elites who enjoyed control of the
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The scholar Jacques Barros argues that Estimé’s hesitation to address neocolonial elites’ opposition
and interference was that, himself elite, he found common cause with some of their recriminations.
Under Estimé, The problem face by the Haitian society, he suggests became clear; it was class not color,
and many Noirists came to understand that colorism or not, the social question was a proletarian,
deserting to Marxism (Barros 1984, 705-14). The father of the Indigenist movement, Dr. Price-Mars,
challenged the Noirist assertion that color rather than class has been the primary contradiction, asserting
that From Independence onward, both Black and Mulatto elites had exploited the majority for their own
benefits (Price-Mars 1967, 33-45). Thus, many Noirists, seeking systemic change and a solution beyond
state control and color-based competition for state power turned to Marxism as an ideology more
congruent with their goals. They saw in Marxism an ideology capable of transforming existing power
relations and creating a new and more egalitarian social contract to unite all citizens regardless of class or
color. For them, Estimé represented the perpetuation of social and economic inequality, not its reversal
(Bonhomme 1946, 1957, 327-31). Nichols argues, “The military coup of 1950 was made possible by a
number of factors. Estimé had not only failed to gain support from the powerful bourgeois class, but he
had alienated much Black support. In addition to this, world economic situation was not particularly
favorable to the country… The action of the army in overthrowing the Estimé government was thus
welcomed by many black politicians, like Fignolé and Saint Lot, as well as by big business, by the Roman
Catholic Church and by the Mulatto Marxists…” (Nicholls 1979, 192). Estimé faced opposition and
criticisms from Noirist adherents for not targeting neocolonial elites, from segment of labor union, which
he had championed, due to the bonds requirement, and from the left for his lack of support for a Marxist
solution to the Haitian problem, but none of these forces had accumulated enough power to undermine
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state, its centralized coercive power, and popular legitimacy, the Noirist
government of Estimé secured the legitimacy without acquiring control and power
of the state to sustain it, which would have allowed him the ability to counter
neocolonial elites’ and American’s power and influence. Moreover, despite
Estimé’s attempt to implement a Noirist agenda, he believed or rather understood
that the nation was
[D]ependent upon the good will of the United States and
upon some degree of cooperation from the business
community, which was dominated by Mulattoes, was
fearful of a slowdown and adopted a somewhat timid
ineffectual approach to the problem of Mulatto
hegemony (Nicholls 1979, 191)

Estimé did not think the nation was capable of being governed autonomously and
understood the dependent and clientelist relationship that existed between Haiti
and the United States. As the American Ambassador to Haiti wrote to the
Secretary of State, relating his first meeting with the elected Haitian President,
[T]he President told me that he realized perfectly well
that American-Haitian relations must be close, as
American economic and commercial assistance to Haiti
was absolutely indispensable to the latter’s existence233

his popular Noirist government. They needed the military. Indeed, they quickly became target of the
military and neocolonial resurgent forces after his overthrow. An alternative but doubtful view is
presented by Gingras who argued that the coup was a consequence of Estime’s left leaning politics
(Gingras 1967, 84). The reality was that Estimé sought a balance between competing forces in a volatile
political and social environment in transition, a declining economy. The refusal of Americans to offer
support through loans and grants eliminated the only option he had at maintain support and a modicum
of leverage on key constituents. His nationalism, however mild, his unwillingness to target a growing
Marxist movement meant that he received little economic support to maintain governance of the
neocolonial clientelist state. Governance of the Dependent clientelist infrastructure required foreign
support and Estimé’s inability to garner that support has to be accounted as a factor in its weakness and
ultimate overthrow.
233
Ambassador to Haiti (Wilson) to the Secretary of State. Port-Au-Prince, August 18, 1946. Received
August 22. File # 711.38/8-1846 – Confidential No. 1638
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Ironically, as the first Noirist President, he not only understood the dependency of
the Haitian state, he conceded that it was indispensable not just to the new
neocolonial clientelist infrastructure, but also to the nation’s very existence.
However, by the time he was in his second year in office, his decisions and
political maneuvers would suggest that he sought an alternative to absolute
dependency on the United States. Although Dupuy (1989, 143-154) and Dubois
(2004) are right to suggest that Estimé’s mistake was his failure to restructure the
military to ensure his control over it and their adherence to his Noirist political
agenda, the fact that he tried is an indication of the search for that alternative. His
attempt to reshape the identity, orientation, and politics of the American-created
army by rechristening it Armée d’Haïti, and promoting Black officers to positions
of leadership to create a more representative force and undermine the
supremacy of the Mulatto officer corps, fell short. Nevertheless, he recognized
the military as the primary tool of that domination and sought its re-structuring
and control. However, Estimé could not undo in four years without bloodshed
what it took the Americans thirty years to build. Neocolonial elites had opposed
his government from the start and their backlash was just a matter of time.
Unable to control the ballot box by garnering the support of the population
they had willfully neglected and marginalized, they sought the support of the
military to reassert their dominance over the neocolonial clientelist state
(Magloire 1950, Delince 1979, Dupuy 1989, 153, M. Laguerre 1993, GeorgesPierre 2010). Had Estimé succeeded in gaining control over the military, perhaps
the reorientation of the Haitian state might have been possible, but his failure
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accelerated neocolonial elites’ actions against him and his government
(Bonhomme 1957, 39).
The coup that removed Estimé from power brought neocolonial elites back
closer to the levers, if not of power and control of the state, at least influence over
it (Barros 1984). As in post-1843, in a transformed political landscape where
direct neocolonial control, whether civilian or military, to replace the Noirist
government was impossible without repercussion, neocolonial elites reverted to
their old formula by choosing a popular Mulatto sympathizer, Colonel PaulEugene Magloire, for their politics of understudy. “Magloire’s regime was a
classic case of government by understudy – the last of its type for sure,” asserts
Trouillot (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 205). As in the post-Boyer period, neocolonial
elites sought a Black army colonel to sustain their politics of understudy. Unable
to win by the ballot box, as was constitutionally mandated, or retain power
through the Mulatto-dominated officer corps, they saw in Magloire someone
capable of garnering popular support through universal suffrage and in so doing
sowed the seeds for their own destruction and permanent removal from state
power (Bonhomme 1957, 38-40, Rotberg and Clague 1971, M. Smith 2009, 135151).
The overthrow of Estimé and Magloire’s election came at a time when
American concerns about the spread of communism had compelled them to use
the militaries in the client states they had established and supported throughout
Latin America and the Caribbean to secure those nations and safeguard their
interests (Rodman 1954). Whether in the Dominican Republic with Trujillo, Cuba
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with Batista, Nicaragua with Somoza or Haiti with Magloire, “Washington was
willing to support military dictatorships” so long as they secured its interests
(Dubois 2012, M. Smith 2009, 81-94). The policy statement prepared by the
State Department makes this preference unequivocal as it pertains to Haiti. It
states,
[T]he Haitian armed forces have proved to be a deciding
factor in domestic political upheavals and they would be
essential to the maintenance of stability in the event of
an internal communist attempt to create a diversionary
disturbance or gain a strategic foothold 234.

The actions of the Haitian military in removing Estimé from power and
exiling him cannot be viewed outside of this American stated policy preference.
As discussed earlier, the U. S. did not support the Estimé government in its
efforts to acquire a $4 million loan for some major projects, which would have
deepen its support amongst the population and enhanced its legitimacy.
However, it supported a loan of $14 million for the Magloire’s government for the
same project, and provided the regime with an additional $12 million in aid235.
While the degree of American influence in the overthrow of Estimé is not clear,
we know that the military would not have acted without their acquiescence.
Furthermore, when one compares their behavior toward Estimé and Magloire,
American preference becomes quite clear. Besides financially supporting the
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“Political and Economic Relations of the United States and Haiti” File #: 611.38/4-1651. Policy
Statement Prepared in the Department if the Secretary of State. Washington, April 16, 1951. Foreign
Relations, 1951, Vol II
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See (Foreign Relations 1955-1957, Vol. VI, 954) and Memorandum from the Asst. Secretary of State for
the Inter-American Affairs (Holland) to the Acting Secretary. Washington, Oct. 29, 1955for details of the
support garnered by the Government of Colonel Magloire.
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clientelist regime led by Magloire, the American government invited him to the
United States for a state visit, gave him a ticker tape parade in New York, and
allowed him to address Congress as an ultimate demonstration of their
support.236 That these honorific treatments were reserved for an officer-President
dedicated to safeguarding the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure was by no
means coincidental.
The overthrow of Estimé and his replacement could not have been by any
other than a representative of the Black majority and this fact escaped neither
neocolonial elites nor the American government seeking the stability of the
neocolonial infrastructure (Nicholls 1979, 220). In an environment where color
was politically salient and where popular suffrage is the guiding electoral
principle, Magloire’s color afforded him a degree of support from the majority,
which facilitated his election. However, he offered nothing new; Magloire merely
continued many of Estimé’s policies without the neocolonial antagonism, and
obtained the support of most sectors of society except the hard-core of Estimé’s
Noirist supporters who rightly saw him as the vehicle for neocolonial control.
Dietrich observes,
[T]he black colonel began from an excellent position.
The elite, the army, the Church, and the United States
supported him and he had a measure of genuine
popularity… Magloire established a surface balance of
color and classes, though in fact he favored the old elite
(Diederich and Burt 1969, 60, 62).
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As Nicholls bluntly puts it, “the regime of Magloire represented the last successful
attempt by the old elite to reassert its political pre-eminence behind the mask of
the Black Colonel” (Nicholls 1979, 191). Consequently, neocolonial elites enjoyed
a resurgence in state affairs. Those who resisted the regime faced violence,
imprisonment, intimidation, and even death. For the first time since the
Occupation, state actors used violence to secure power. Yet, despite the
violence perpetrated and intimidation by Magloire and the military to re-assert
neocolonial control, the genie was out of the box. The re-emergence of
neocolonial control led to greater and more acrimonious ethnic schism. The
murders, imprisonments and closing of newspapers reproduced the old patterns
of neocolonial control and as such undermined cohesion within the officer corps,
as well as between members of the officer corps and rank and file soldiers
adherent to Noirist agenda. The military–led government of Magloire’s was not
new, it was the culmination of the military-centered neocolonial clientelist state
model. By making the military the most organized institution of the clientelist
state, the American government had structured its defense in times of threats237.
Latin American and Caribbean states from Cuba to Nicaragua had to
contend with pressures from segments of the population determined to
restructure the neocolonial clientelist state to be responsive to their needs, and
compel neocolonial elites to be accountable to the nation (Fauriol 1984, Hartlyn
1998, B. Diederich 2000). The rise of military dictatorships across the region
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cannot be interpreted as an accident or failure of the American state model. The
military was designed to protect the established order that re-oriented financial
control and political influence toward the U. S. Therefore, to take over the
leadership and protection of the neocolonial clientelist state in the face of internal
challenges to its orientation and functions is congruent with the fulfillment of the
roles they were designed to play (Langley 2002, Weeks 2008).
Using the Monroe Doctrine and its Corollaries as justifications and the
Marines as a tool, the U. S. imposed a system structured against national
interests, without popular legitimacy and strong state-society relations238. It
supported elites, concerned not about the national welfare or the responsiveness
and accountability of the state to the majority of its citizens but determined to
collude with foreign interests to expropriate and exploit the nation, which
ultimately started by force and could not be sustained without it (R. W. Logan
1968, Langley 2002). Military officers in consultations with their American
backers were using their institutions to do exactly what they were designed to do:
avert the collapse of neocolonial clientelist states. In the end, the involvement of
the military to maintain neocolonial dominance and the clientelist state meant that
both elites and the military infrastructure became targets of the forces of
contestations. In Haiti, with its history of resistance and Noirist ideology, without
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popular legitimacy, such a regime could not be sustained without direct military
intervention. However, the entry of the military into the political arena created
competition and schism within its own ranks and triggered an institutional
response from an officer corps concerned with the internal conflicts and threat to
the institution. Having an officer-President, any attack on him or the neocolonial
infrastructure was an attack on the military. Direct military control succeeded in
limiting the scope of mass mobilization, but also brought to the surface the
internal contradictions within the corps, furthering its fragmentation and
vulnerability.
Magloire’s association with and protection of neocolonial elites and his
removal of the popular Noirist regime to safeguard their interests exacerbated the
infighting (Delince 1979, Dupuy 1989, Georges-Pierre 2010). Factional fighting,
graduating-class rivalry, racial and class conflicts became as much part of the
military as it was of the society – the most coherent institution of the neocolonial
infrastructure was in crisis (Laguerre 1993). The crisis took center stage resulting
in open, armed conflicts between Noirist adherents and the more conservative
and established neocolonial officer corps. Internal schism resulting from the very
structure of the military organized by Occupation forces and accentuated under
neocolonial leadership in the post-Occupation period became the source of
national instability. Magloire would be deposed by Noirist army officers resentful
of his collusion with neocolonial elites and determine to upend post-Occupation
neocolonial Mulatto dominance of the institution, and most importantly by the
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masses who felt betrayed and took to the streets in the thousands to reclaim their
revolution.
The overthrow of Estimé had intensified the disunity based on color, class,
and ideology within all levels of the military, especially the officer corps, which the
leadership was unable to address. The crises in civil society had affected the
institution and its increasingly diversified body of interests, thus, the mostly
Mulatto officer Corps, although supportive of Magloire, was unable to maintain
support for him in the face of internal dissent and widespread popular
dissatisfaction. In order to save the institution from further disintegration, they
had no choice but to escort Magloire out of the Presidency and into exile. The
neocolonial clientelist regime established by Occupation forces, not designed to
be a representative force at the service of the nation, faced with ideological
divergences and saddled with competing allegiances that undermined its
coherence, was in crisis again.
Neocolonial elites, despite various maneuvers to retain control of the
neocolonial infrastructure, were unable to wield state power through the force
designed to facilitate it. Already exposed to recriminations, their failure would
make them, the state, and its military target for Noirist control. Segregationist
policies implemented by Occupation forces, and the continuation of those
policies by neocolonial elites had colored all institutions and state actions. The
Occupation’s unwillingness and failure to include members of the majority within
the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure became the basis for its contestation.
Yet, Magloire’s final act catalyzed the clientelist nature of the Haitian state he had
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presided over; it was the American Ambassador he informed of his plans to
resign the Presidency239.

Francois Duvalier and the Institutionalization of Noirism:
The overthrow of Estimé led to a wave of violence directed by the military
against the left, the popular sector, and its middle and working class supporters
forced Francois Duvalier into hiding (Diederich and Burt 1969, 67). As the
Minister of Public Works and Health, François Duvalier saw in Estimé’s ouster
and the regime of Magloire that the military could not be trusted to support the
Black Nationalist movement it was created to counter, and which it helped to
suppress during the occupation. A student of nationalist history, he recognized
the historical lessons of Dessalines and Soulouque’s and other Louverturean
elites; a neocolonial Mulatto dominated military in the West ran counter to Black
Nationalist interests (Bonhomme 1957). It was precisely this ethnic-based
national dynamics that led to Dessalines’ assassination, and the successful
attempt to unseat Soulouque’s nationalist regime. Duvalier was well aware of the
historical roots of the formation of the Zinglins, the paramilitary group created by
Soulouque to counterbalance the power and influence the post-Boyer Mulatto –
dominated officer corps and this realization, and knowledge would shape his
policies toward that force240 (Duvalier 1966).
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The election of Duvalier with the support of the Noirist segment of the
army represented a new development in post-Occupation Haiti. Duvalier’s
Presidency was a revival of Estimé’s Black middle, working class and peasantry
alliance that emerged to offset Mulatto dominance (Denis and Duvalier 1958,
Leyburn 1966, XV, Diederich and Burt 1969). Indeed, as Trouillot correctly
asserts,
[D]uvalier inherited a political mantle and an apparatus
that had solid support among lower level army officers
and intellectuals. Above all, he inherited a vision of
Haitian society, which, vague and poorly defined as it
was, presupposed continuity in change, the desire to
complete an unfinished revolution (M.-R. Trouillot 1990,
135).

This alliance, the backing of segments of the military241, and his loyalty to Estimé
provided Duvalier with broad support amongst the population and the legitimacy
he needed to engage in systemic institutional change (L. F. Manigat 1964, 45-7,
Rotberg and Clague 1971, 194-5). Nicholls suggests,
[T]he fierceness of the election campaign of 1956 -7 was
due largely to a realization on the part of both sides that
a victory for Duvalier would entail a final collapse of the
Mulatto hegemony in the political field and some feared
the economic arena as well (Nicholls 1979, 191).
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Heinl suggests that the support of the military was due to their belief that the American government
supported Duvalier. While this may well be partially true for the Officer Corps, since an important feature
of the new Neocolonial clientelist state is the role of kingmaker played by the American government in
countries where those states were imposed, and the deference of the economic and military elites to
their will. By the time of the elections, Noirist officers were directly in charge of the army and leading the
Junta that oversaw the elections (Rotberg and Clague 1971, 196). Therefore, it is not farfetched to suggest
that the Noirist segment of the military that supported Duvalier cannot be counted as supporters of the
neocolonial clientelist infrastructure given the fact that Noirism was a rejection of that reality. However,
the fact that they were indeed part of that infrastructure demonstrates the very nature of the new system
of dominance imposed on Haiti.

299

The election of the President by popular suffrage sapped the last
mechanism of neocolonial Mulatto hegemony leaving them with their only
remaining option, the military, and that option itself was no longer as reliable.
Duvalier found a state, crippled by debt, dependent on foreign tutelage and
oriented toward its interests (Rotberg and Clague 1971, 200-1). According to
Asst. Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, “The Haitian government is
virtually without financial resources and cannot borrow further from the national
Bank to cover its operating expenses” as the Magloire regime had left the country
with a $30 million debt242. Even by American account, Duvalier found a country
heavily indebted by supporting the Presidency of Magloire and extending loans to
it they had refused to the more nationalist Estimé regime, the American
government had succeeded in rolling back the reduction of economic
dependence achieved under Estimé243.
Neocolonial elites’ re-assertion of state power through Magloire had
increased the dependency of the state, and strengthened its clientelist structure,
which had been targeted under Estimé, by deepening the nation’s reliance on
American grants and loans. Worse, little of those resources had gone to national
development, institutional expansion and to meeting the needs of the population.
Duvalier also faced a military that, having entered into the political fray, facing
internal disintegration and seeking to protect its institutional coherence, was

242

Foreign Relations 1955-1957, Vol. VI, 933-4 & 953-4.
Memorandum from the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to
the Secretary of State (Herter). Washington, May 15, 1957
243

300

viewed with suspicion by neocolonial elites, middle class, and the masses alike,
the latter having suffered from its excesses. Moreover, as if to complicate the
political and economic environment, Francois Duvalier had to reckon with a
burgeoning Marxist movement seeking solutions to Haiti’s historical challenges
as well as United States’ concerns about the rise of communism in the region
and his Estimist credentials (L. F. Manigat 1964, Pierre-Charles 1973, 192-4,
Nicholls 1979, Delince 1979).
Despite having a clear mandate to govern, the Presidency of Duvalier had
to contend with an unpredictability and chaotic political and economic
environment, a suspicious and powerful national patron with the ability to
undermine his government, and an influential but divided military. Critiquing the
rise of Duvalier for emerging from feelings of marginalization rather than driven
by an ideology that could inform institutional reforms, the Haitian scholar Leslie
Pean argues,
[T]his search for political power by these middle classes
involved no vision of structural reforms, just a factional
struggle for a share of political power and access to the
riches historically reserve for others (Pean 2016, 3)

However, while it may be true that Estimé may have begun without a clear vision,
the implementation of some of his policies, the legitimacy and enthusiasm his
Noirist regime enjoyed, and the bitterness the military coup elicited from those,
like Duvalier, committed to Noirism, had at least taught them what mistakes not
to make. Moreover, Duvalier had witnessed the hesitation of Estimé to deal with
the military and neocolonial elites, and experienced the frustration of seeing a
resurgence of Mulatto hegemony through Magloire, and had thus been given
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time to reflect on his experience and think about his own vision and plans to
complete the Noirist program. As Nichols noted,
Duvalier came to power with certain ideals; he was
genuinely concerned to forward and complete the work,
which Estimé had begun. …His general aim, then, was
to translate into practical policy that ideology which he
had helped to develop since the time of the American
occupation (Nicholls 1979, 212)

From the onset, Duvalier set out to institutionalize the Noirist regime, to
finish what Estimé could not, and saw himself as the embodiment of “La
Revolution au Pouvoir – The Revolution in Power”. Thus, permanently
eliminating obstacles to the implementation of the Noirist Doctrine faced by the
first Noirist government of Estimé became his primary focus (Duvalier 1967). He
saw the need for intellectual rigor to address this societal challenge of reestablishing the historical link between citizens and state. “Prolonging this
revolution” he cryptically argues, “requires an internal discipline, ‘that which
govern the laws of the mind in decomposing it’, and of an external discipline, ‘that
which re-establish the link between subject and the object’” (Ulysse 1965, 73-4).
If we take Francois Duvalier at his words, he makes clear that he understood the
historicity of Blacks’ struggle for state control and the connection and
interdependence between the Black majority and the Haitian state. Stating in a
speech in 1964,
[M]y dear friends, with you I have retained the pact. It is
with the masses revolutions are made. It is with the
masses that Toussaint took the directions of his nation
for life. It is with the masses that Jean-Jacques Accau,
according to the scholar Louis Joseph Janvier, made the
revolution. It is with the masses that Jean-Jacques
Dessalines, of whom I am a student, took the Crete-aPierrot, Vertiere and proclaim the nation free and
independent. The interests of the individual and those of
society are interrelated and call to each other; the
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individual, the state and society retain their
affinity…instead of insisting on the contradictions or the
antagonisms that stand as obstacles to progress. By
reconciling the nation with itself, I have sought to
establish this interdependence between the individual
and the state. And if it has not fully materialized, should
we stop to search for the right conditions and to favor its
realization? There are common expectations for the
state and the individual, and the state must fulfill its
responsibilities toward the collective as well as the
collective must uphold its duties toward the state
(Duvalier 1967, 199-202)

He believed the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure and the
US/neocolonial alliance to be the source of these obstacles and set out to
dismantle its pillars of dependence and power. Pean, however is correct when he
argues, the Duvalierist project worked to “impose a dramatic social destructuration. In its first manifestation, he attacked five key sectors of the society:
The Elites, the army, the church, the intellectual elites, and the peasantry.” (Pean
2016, 3-4) Clearly, Pean cannot have it both ways, Duvalier, as a Noirist, either
had a vision or he did not, and without a vision, how does one engage in destructuring key societal institutions? Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that
Estimé was new to Noirism whereas Duvalier had been a leader in both the
Indigenist and Noirist movements, thus more than Estimé, he was prepared to
carry the mantle. Insisting, “What has become essential is the possibility for the
masses to find adequate nutrition, decent housing, permanent work, and
appropriate medical care,”244 he argued for the establishment of a responsive
state capable of securing those goods and eliminating those in opposition to his
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project. More importantly, it is not necessary to conjecture on Duvalier’s vision
and motivation. His speech on May 22, 1961 in front of the National Assembly
mirrors the Louverturean project.
My responsibility is to move my nation toward peace,
toward prosperity and greatness according to its
historical roots. My responsibility is to reconcile the
nation with itself; to reconcile you with the truth of your
history (Duvalier 1967, 269)

Pean’s dismissal of the notion of a Duvalierist vision and a project reflect
the symptoms of a broader challenge facing Haitian scholars, one that must
move beyond anti-Duvalierist reflexes to provide us with a clear-eyed
understanding of the Duvalierist period245. The pervasive polemical study of the
Duvalierist period cannot explain why Francois Duvalier, despite the violence,
enjoyed a high degree of popular support, and that under his regime, despite the
constraints of the neocolonial clientelist state within which he operated, access
for middle and working class social mobility increased and so did Duvalierist
support and legitimacy (Pean 2016, 4).

The Military and the Rise of the Duvalierist Regime:
Even prior to Francois Duvalier taking office, the Noirist faction of the army
had already taken up arms against their comrades, killing two officers and
forcefully retiring others (Delince 1979, M. S. Laguerre 1993). Three months
before the election of Duvalier, three of the highest-ranking Mulatto officers were
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It is important to note that Pean’s father was killed by the Duvalierist regime when he was a young
boy.
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retired and the Noirist faction re-structured the corps by creating new posts and
making appointments to assert and consolidate their control. Twelve days prior to
the elections, they reorganized the army’s retirement system to facilitate the
additional retirement of twenty-one senior officers (Laguerre 1993, 97). The
increasing pre-eminence of the Noirist faction and the consolidation of their
power started a destabilizing trend that Duvalier, although the beneficiary of their
growing power and influence would go to great lengths to exploit. By the time of
the election, the army, once a coherent and united institution, was the site of
many factions and inter-group conflicts. Laguerre notes,
[T]he ideological alignment of soldiers was a source of
Schism. Some officers who felt discriminated against
because they were black or because of their peasant
background, constituted their cliques. Other cliques
emerged because of their anti-American and prosocialist leanings. Still, others functioned because they
were pro-Mulatto and pro-bourgeoisie. The army was,
politically speaking, a divided institution and was truly a
reflection of civil society. Each one of these cliques
aligned itself with a segment of civil society… (Laguerre
1993, 89)

These factions within the coercive neocolonial infrastructure impeded its function
and ability to fulfill its role of protecting the neocolonial clientelist state (Voltaire
1988). However, these factions should not be interpreted as an indication that the
army had undergone an overall change in institutional orientation away from the
neocolonial infrastructure and its foreign backers. Moreover, despite the
dominance of the Noirist faction, the Army remained dependent on American
tutelage and oriented toward preserving its interests. Their involvement in
manipulating the electoral process by imprisoning, arresting, or exiling those
thought too radical, too leftist or destabilizing, and too much of a threat to the
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neocolonial infrastructure to participate in elections were proof that despite its
leadership change, as the most coherent institution in the neocolonial clientelist
infrastructure, it intended to protect it from collapsing (Gingras 1967, Paquin
1983). Indeed, as Voltaire keenly observes,
[I]n depriving the forces that it judged undesirable from
the political process and in imposing to the nation the
sector that harbor its sympathy, the Haitian army clearly
proved that it was the “structure-cles” of the dictatorial,
reactionary political regime (Voltaire 1988, 212).

Duvalier had witnessed the demise of Estimé by the military, gone
underground to avoid being harmed by it, and understood he could not rely on
the schism between the Noirist and neocolonial factions, that left the situation
unstable, to govern. He could neither fully trust those who facilitated his election
due to their alignment with the United States, nor forego their support, knowing
the unpredictability of their allegiance. He had seen military officers swearing
their support to Estimé, to, within a few months, overthrowing him (GeorgesPierre 2010). As Lawless points out, also “Mindful that Dessalines and other
rulers of Haiti had succumbed to plots hatched by a traditionally Mulatto –
dominated elite, Duvalier was determined to break the hold of the elite” (Lawless
1992). Wary of the military’s coercive capacity and determined to undermine its
ability to intervene in politics in support of foreign and neocolonial elites, no
sooner was he elected, that he sought to capitalize on the instability in order to
control and reform it. Could a military, organized to assist an invading force to
suppress nationalist forces, be put to the service of those same forces and the
nation against which it fought? How does one reform a military controlled by a
foreign power without upsetting its usefulness to that foreign power? Duvalier
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sought an interdependence between the army and the people; a marriage which
he coined “Armée-Peuple / Peuple-Armée”.246 Duvalier understood the role the
army had been structured to play and made clear his intention to align the
military to the nation and ensure its adherence to the popular will.
[I] have removed from the army its role of arbiter and
balancer of national life, a role that made it oscillate from
one end to the other to its own interests. I have applied
myself to amputate it of its ability to act independently,
by putting it at the service of the people. I want to make
it a popular army, convinced of the legitimacy of the
revolution (Duvalier 1967, 221)

To achieve this goal, he created a parallel force, first known as the Cagoulars
because of their masks, engagement in night time arrests, murders, and
disappearances, then formally known as VSN (volontaires de la Sécurité
Nationale) and popularly known as the Tontons Macoutes, to keep the military in
check. Samuel Huntington’s assertion that “A totalitarian system cannot tolerate
a military institution that controls substantial power but does not adhere to the
political ideology of the regime” though true, contradicts Duvalier’s action. It was
not so much that the newly re-organized force did not adhere to the Noirist
political ideology, but rather given its institutional foundation, original design,
dependence, and its institutional interests, could not be counted upon to maintain
its adherence and allegiance indefinitely.
Duvalier was concerned that, in the end, personal and institutional
interests, and American influence would supersede inclinations toward Noirist
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See Duvalier’s inaugural speech during his second election by popular suffrage (Duvalier 1967, 267).
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ideology. Indeed, Duvalier had correctly assessed the situation247. As Dumas
points out, “The systematic cleaning operated by Francois Duvalier in the army to
neutralize its interventionary capacity have decisively re-enforced the foundations
of his government” (Dumas 1994, 20). Had Duvalier not acted, he would have
been deposed. Upon assuming the presidency, he eliminated potential threats to
his government and promoted his supporters in their stead. He accelerated the
process of dismantling the army began by the Noirist faction by dismissing two
generals, ten colonels, and forty lieutenant colonels (Rotberg and Clague 1971,
21, Laguerre 1993, 108). The progression of the percentage of officers
originating from the popular and middle classes was an important aspect of
Duvalier’s Noirist politics,” argues Dumas (Dumas 1994, 20). Instead of rising
through the ranks, low-level officers were promoted and by so doing, he secured
the allegiance of these new officers to his government paralyzing the army’s
ability to overthrow his government. He re-assigned officers out of the country or
in different regions to reduce the potential for collective actions, dismissed and
retired officers he thought hostile to his regime, and sought to integrate his militia,
already more powerful, into its ranks (Gingras 1967, Paquin 1983, P. Pierre
1987, 138-48, M. S. Laguerre 1993). Duvalier’s strategic re-structuring of the
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According to declassified documents, the CIA involvement in funding, advising, and organizing coups
against the Duvalier regime was frequent. Members of the military from every level were involved in the
plotting, not to mention the multiple direct invasions by armed groups to overthrow the Regime. The
Central Intelligence Agency, Washington DC, 4/30/63. Eyes only - Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy,
Special Assistant to the President. Subject: Anti Duvalier Activity and Projected Plan of Action by Louis
Dejoie. Memorandum, March 3, 1963 “Operation Liberation” – Declassified, July 7, 2014. Both
memoranda involved the American government providing direct as well as indirect military support for
the overthrow of Duvalier while on friendly relations with the latter.
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armed forces to reduce its power and American influence over its officers led the
American Ambassador to observe,
Duvalier is determined to neutralize and preferably
eliminate, the regular armed forces. His deliberate and
systematic efforts to downgrade the armed forces and
build up the civil militia have succeeded despite the
presence and activities of our military missions and
repeated remonstraces to him with respect to the
militia… Duvalier is determined to prevent our missions
from exercising any further influence on the armed
forces… If this continues….., the prospects of these
missions exercising any influence on the armed forces
will be remote and the question will sharply arise
whether their continued presence in Haiti will serve U.S.
interests248

These actions were a departure from Estimé who did not challenge the military
and favored meritocratic and well-structured institutional military hierarchy. Within
two years in office, he had reduced American influence on the military, which had
facilitated the removal of Estime and governments before him, and sought the
transformation of all branches of the neocolonial military to bring about its
‘domestication’:







Decree of December 17, 1959, created the presidential guard to provide
protection to Duvalier against any possible military coups. The force
became the best paid within the military outranking even the military high
command.
Decree of January 9, 1959 re-structured the military by decentralizing its
leadership. The same decree called for an increase in the number of
officers in the navy and appointed new commanders and lieutenantcommanders
Decree of January 17, 1959 re-structured the medical services and the
aviation corps. For the first time females were added to the force, two as
second-lieutenant and four as sergeant majors
Decree of January 30, March 30, and September 24, 1959 decentralized
the army’s bureaucracy and gave each force autonomy
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Outgoing “secret” telegram from the American State Department to Ambassador Thurston, October
19, 1962. “Plan of Action of Action from period form Present to May 1963, p3 & 6.
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Through these decrees, the Departments of Health, Navy, Aviation, the
Engineering Corps, Military Academy, Camp d’Application,
Communication/Intelligence gathering, the Presidential Guard, and the Judiciary,
all former branches of the army under unified command became autonomous
and disconnected, receiving orders directly from Duvalier (Delince 1979, M. S.
Laguerre 1993, 107-110). The final death knell to United States’ influence over
the armed forces, was the systematic elimination of important members of the
corps both retired and active:
Table 1: Duvalierist impact on the military
Officers removed from
duty (1963)
26

Lieutenant/Second
Lieutenants
Colonels, Lt-Colonels
6
Majors
9
Captains
28
Source: (Delince, Armee et Politique en Haiti 1979, 222-225)

Officers assassinated
17
12
11
15

Following the implementation of the American “Plan of Action” in 1963, resulting
in an attempt to overthrow him, “Duvalier dismissed sixty-nine officers , roughly
one third of the officer corps. Virtually all of them, as well as the plotters, had
received American training” (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 572). Another 19 officers
were executed in June 1967 (Delince 1979, 222-224)249.
Duvalier succeeded in wresting the military out of the neocolonial
infrastructure and American control and manipulations. His actions, the
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Even General Antonio “Thompson” Kebreau, a cousin of the author, and the officer who facilitated his
rise in office was forced into exile (Diederich and Burt 1969). Beside the officers, neocolonial families
became targets of murders, imprisonments, and tortures.
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resentment of the officers, and the armed attacks and invasions of young
neocolonial elites, former military officers, and middle class Marxists on his
government allowed him a modicum of international cover from an American
government concerned about the expansion of communism but no longer in
control of the officer corps. Even while planning to overthrow him, concerns
about communism caused a level of hesitation and the lack of viable options due
to Duvalier’s dismantling of the occupation-imposed structure of control through
the military, led the Unites States to support the Duvalierist regime. Trouillot
notes, “Washington’s double-standard, which evaluated a Third World regime in
terms of degrees of Soviet influence, gave Duvalier ballast in spite of Kennedy’s
recriminations” (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 61). However, unclassified documents
show that the Kennedy administration monitored, supported opposition forces
and invasions, and cooperated with the Duvalierist regime when it became clear
the regime’s control of the military and the national sphere made its overthrow
without direct American intervention impossible250. Duvalier’s government faced
consistent armed attacks from a diversified opposition in and out of the country
and used his newly organized military and paramilitary forces to defend the state.
As Morse points out,
[He] ruthlessly bent his efforts to consolidate a then
precarious base. Threatened by invasions and coups, he
nearly fled the country twice. He systematically
suppressed all sources of opposition (Morse n.d.).
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Central Intelligence Agency, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, August 28, 1962. Papers of John F.
Kennedy, Presidential Recording, Dictabelts 19A. Conversation #1: President Kennedy with Dean Rust,
May 16, 1963 – 10am. In the recording, President Kennedy wanted to organize a force a la Bay of Pigs to
overthrow Duvalier while recognizing the need to work with the regime as its overthrow seems
improbable.
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Haitian nationalists who saw in Duvalier the continuation of the neocolonial
infrastructure, communists seeking the formation of new social arrangements,
neocolonial Mulatto elites wanting their state back, and former and active military
officers opposed to the disintegration of the armed forces, its domestication, and
seeking to avenge the murders of their comrades, all tried unsuccessfully to
remove him from office. These attempts to overthrow the Duvalierist regime often
took place with tacit American support, and at great lost in their ranks (Gingras
1967, Diederich and Burt 1969, Heinl and Heinl 2005). More than five times the
Duvalier regime was on the verge of being overthrown but his devoted followers
folded every attempt. Duvalier accomplished what the Estimé Regime could not,
due to its ability to control the coercive infrastructure of the neocolonial clientelist
state.
The patron-client relationship between the Haitian government and the
United States did not wane, but the ability of the Noirist Duvalierist regime to
control the coercive forces of the nation and secure the support of the citizenry
reduced American leverage to the economic sphere. He never sought to change
the economic neocolonial infrastructure that rendered the nation dependent since
the occupation, just to engineer national control for regime survival and
legitimacy. As such, Duvalierism was no threat to American imposed economic
clientelist system of dependence for so complete was the economic dependence
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that he sent a 7-point request for funding detailing its annual budget and
governmental goals to President Kennedy for his approval and support 251.
After 1963, he made communism a crime to allay American fear and
increase their support for his regime (Trouillot and Pascal-Trouillot 1978, 446-7).
His ability to control and expand the state enabled him to create a new power
base, a coalition of middle and working class urban Blacks and rural landowners
and peasants whose interests depended on the survival and expansion of his
regime while the regime depended on foreign economic and military support
(Pierre-Charles 1973, 57-64). As Ulysse, one of his ideologists, and disciples
correctly noted,
[T]he awakening of social conscience provoked by the
doctrine of Duvalier, constitute a major event. New social
forces coming out of the masses, the peasant, and the
middle class have benefited from promotions from which
it will now be impossible to remove them (Ulysse 1965,
33).

Nicholls also noted,
[P]erhaps the most significant result of Duvalier’s
‘revolution’ will turn out to be the sense which was given
to the mass of the peasants that they were really citizens
and that what they did was important. The actual power
which they possessed to influence the course of events
was negligible, but the rhetoric of populism, the mass
rallies and the countrywide organization of the VSN may
have led to a new consciousness on the part of the
masses. If the people are told often enough that they are
important, they may begin to believe it (Nicholls 1979,
237)
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Letter from Francois Duvalier to John F. Kennedy, July 11, 1961.
http://archive1.jfklibrary.org/JFKPOF/118/JFKPOF-118-013/JFKPOF-118-013-p0012.jpg (p0002.jpg-p0020.jpg) Ls no. 20598-A T-52/T-39/R-IV/R-XVIII - Declassified E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5 (b) department of
State Guidelines
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This consciousness was not just based on rhetorical manipulations, it was their
participation in the affairs of the state, from popular suffrage to their role in
conveying legitimacy to state actors. Long neglected by state elites and further
distanced by the Occupation and their neocolonial allies, it was their presence in
the very confine of the state itself, the Presidency’s reliance on them, Duvalier’s
affirmation of their culture and their importance in the national project that
secured their allegiance and its legitimacy. The consciousness rested on solid
ground.
Ulysse’s assertion that Duvalierist power and legitimacy rested on the
masses, the peasants, and the middle-class and that unlike previous postOccupation government, he relied on them to protect his government is not
without merit. However, the line between the peasantry, masses, and middleclass had so thinned since the Occupation. Consequently, it was the peasants
who defended his government when the insurgents landed in the south and
north252. It was under his government that the Black middle class would be
expanded through state employment and access to education. Under the
Duvalierist regime, the Catholic Church and every major state and public
institution was brought under Haitian control and Black leadership. Duvalier
effectively used the dependence on American economic support to improve the
conditions of Blacks in the state as well as their position in Haitian society
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My mother, a witness would often recount stories of when Cubans and Haitians landed to overthrow
the government were captured and summarily executed for all to see by average citizens and Duvalier’s
paramilitary. Also see (Heinl and Heinl 2005, Diederich and Burt 1969)
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(Pierre-Charles 1973, 60). Despite the coercive nature of the regime, this
success in expanding access to the state and enhancing the position of Blacks in
the society resulted in increased popular legitimacy and support.
The neocolonial state, having absorbed a cross-section of the black
populace, consolidated its legitimacy supported by a black majority who saw its
interests tightly woven with the new Black dominated neocolonial clientelist
infrastructure. The responsiveness of the Duvalierist regime to segments of the
population, and its ability and willingness to create paths of entry into the state
structure was important for both the regime and the neocolonial clientelist
infrastructure. Participation instead of alienation, responsiveness instead of
marginalization, absorption instead of exclusion from institutions capable of
supporting social mobility, and status upgrade appear to have a direct correlation
to improvement in legitimacy in the Haitian state under Duvalier.
Duvalier’s dictatorial regime reflected a characteristic distinct from
clientelism in the newly independent democratic Anglophone Caribbean states;
there were no parties to support, no neocolonial Mulatto or foreign-descended
elites for those political parties to rely on for resources to dole out. It was a new
model of ideology driven, state-directed, and foreign supported clientelism; less
flexible, more coercive, and internationally dependent. In Haiti’s neocolonial
clientelist infrastructure, entry into the state structure, institutional absorption, and
Black power ideology become the bases for clientelism and legitimacy.
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State Expansion and National Autonomy:
From the outset, Duvalier’s made his project of institution-building and
expansion clear. “I wanted to set on Haitian soil,” he said, “by creating institutions
that could be either instruments of execution or monuments of codification in the
perspective of the new Haiti that we have sworn to leave to future generations”
(Duvalier 1967, 224)253. In his zeal to secure the institutions necessary to
consolidate the politico-economic gains of the Black majority, and assure their
continuity and Black leadership, Duvalier accelerated Estimé’s policy of Black
employment and absorption by the state and public institutions. He enlarged the
middle class by expanding the state bureaucracy to absorb them, promoted
Blacks and demoted Mulattoes in the military and other institutions, and replace
the foreign clergy with a Haitian one (Gingras 1967, Heinl and Heinl 2005).
Duvalier’s success is such that few contemporary Black middle class and elites
can claim their position without referencing their entry, at some point and on
some level, in the Duvalierist infrastructure. Yet, it was not without major
deficiencies that would undermine the nation.
The Church and the Duvalierist State:
Duvalier challenged the legitimacy of Catholic Church, which was still
dominated by neocolonial elites and a foreign clergy, who, as Pierre-Charles and
Nicholls noted, displayed ferocious animosity and open scorn for the national
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Speech of Francois Duvalier, June 22, 1964
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culture and religion, and had fully supported both the Occupation and neocolonial
elites domination (Pierre-Charles 1973, 75-77, Nicholls 1979). The Church’s
refusal to select Haitian clergy for its leadership, and their clandestine support of
the neocolonial elites opposition, led them into direct confrontation with the
Duvalierist regime. He asserted the sovereignty of the nation by expelling three
bishops, the Jesuit order, the Order of the Holy Ghost Fathers, including leaders
of the Baptist and Episcopal Churches, and eliminated two religious orders,
which resulted in his excommunication by the Pope Paul VI (Heinl and Heinl
2005, 560-1). The failure of the Church hierarchy in Rome to intimidate the
Duvalierist Noirist regime, and the refusal of Duvalier to allow white dominance of
the church, forced the Vatican to send its Secretary of State to the negotiating
table with the Haitian State (Gingras 1967, 110-11). As Pierre-Charles noted
rather grudgingly,
[A] special mission of the Vatican, led by Monseigneur
Antonio Samaro, Secretary of State of the sacred
Congregation, arrived in Haiti to negotiate a treaty
between the Holy See and the Duvalierist regime to
normalize relations and establish, and re-establish an
official position for the Church in Haiti. A new Catholic
hierarchy, nominated by Duvalier, within the ranks of the
Haitian clergy, guaranteed cordial relations between the
church and the Haitian state (Pierre-Charles 1973, 77).

Many Haitians, even some in the opposition, felt pride that the rights of the Black
nation were respected and that, since the Occupation, a government finally cared
enough to demand it. In his dealing with the Church, observed a priest, Duvalier
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had brought 1804 up-to-date254 (Duvalier 1969, 314-19, Heinl and Heinl 2005,
561). The determination of the Duvalierist regime to open the Church’s hierarchy
to Black Haitians compelled Pope Paul VI to Haitianize the Church by
acquiescing to five Noirist adherents as bishops to replace the white foreigners,
thereby expanding the priesthood to the lower middle classes. Indeed, Nicholls’
assertion that “Duvalier’s vigorous policy towards the Roman Catholic Church
ended foreign domination of the hierarchy” is a gross understatement. For the
first time in Haitian history, the Archbishop of Haiti, leader of the Catholic Church
in Haiti, was Black (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 160). Duvalier also Haitianized the
Catholic sisters, expanding access to Black women as leaders of the sisterhood.
Sister Monique St Louis became the first Haitian woman to lead an all-Haitian
convent, and two Black priests led the Department of Education, Father George
and later Father Papailler. Duvalierism was not only creating opportunities in
state and public institutions, it was expanding access even in the halls of the
“sacred” to both the urban and rural Black populations (Gingras 1967, Duvalier
1969, Pierre-Charles 1973, Paquin 1983). The underside however is that it
destroyed the lives of all who stood against it, from the most important
intellectuals to the least important country dweller, from the old grandparents to
the newborn. Its terror was not particularized; it was oppressively universal,
impinging in every aspect and in every corner of Haitian society. At the end,
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While the author’s assertion of this event as an important one in Haitian history is true, it may be
considered an exaggeration as Emperor Soulouque had also compelled the Holly Sea to negotiate its
return to Haiti.
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Duvalierism was in many ways transformative because it made the unthinkable
normal.
The Business Sector and the Duvalierist Regime:
By expanding the middle class, creating access and entry points for the
urban and rural population in all areas of the society, and asserting the rights of
the Haitian state, Duvalier broadened the support for and legitimacy of his
regime. He reorganized the business sector by expanding state control over
transactions between exporters and farmers ensuring a long lost role for the state
in the collection of taxes and the protection of farmers (Diederich and Burt 1969,
Heinl and Heinl 2005). He compelled neocolonial elite merchants, who
dominated the import black-market and import sectors and engaged in
speculation, to adhere to fair practices, an area, which Estimé had left untouched
to the detriment of the urban poor. Duvalier stopped the manufacturing shortages
that served to increase food prices in the cities by sending state inspectors to
check storehouses to verify claim shortages and penalized those who violated
fair practices (Bonhomme 1957, Denis and Duvalier 1958, Paquin 1983, 103-5).
He eliminated finally, the threat of strike utilized judiciously by merchants and
their allies to create political instability and overthrow government. Under
Duvalier’s Noirist regime, the state having not asserted its control of commerce
since the demise of the Louverturean state except in the context of agricultural
export, regained its regulatory role and power. The Duvalierist regime levied
taxes on import, export, car inspections were required and taxed, businesses had
to pay taxes, and neocolonial elites, who control the economic sector and were
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accustomed to fleecing the nation, found themselves constrained to contribute to
the expansion of the state and its services to the population (Rotberg and Clague
1971, 238-41). As Gingras notes,
Duvalier frequently stated, “I consider it a duty to free the
Haitian citizen politically, economically, and spiritually, by
setting up an economic democracy, the only way for a
fair dealing of the national wealth to all classes” (Gingras
1967, 99).

Duvalier strengthened the state and created new state-society and stateelites relations by expanding state control to limit the monopoly of neocolonial
elites, and curtailing their ability to arbitrarily raise the price of goods, or threaten
the government with strikes to gain concessions. The state was no longer at the
mercy of neocolonial elites. In implementing new regulatory measures and
collecting taxes historically avoided by neocolonial elites, Duvalier boosted the
resources of the state in order to enhance its capacity to balance the interests of
neocolonial elites and those of the peasantry, as well as those of the urban
middle and working class populations. As Duvalier himself puts it,
[I] have succeeded in establishing the authority of the
state to serve the interests of the dispossessed masses
and middle classes that cannot protect their economic
interests, as well as to safeguard the interests of the
privileged classes, such that the state has revealed itself
a guide and a protector. As a result, you have all
decided to join the state… (Duvalier 1967, 266)

Duvalier’s determination to render the state strong and autonomous
enough to be able to protect the interests of all major cleavages mirror a
particular historical trajectory that should not be obscured. His attempts, perhaps,
reflected the new manifestation of Louverturean statecraft, but one constrained
by a nation that had been forced into economic dependency. Nevertheless and
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despite the nation’s economic dependency, Duvalier endeavored its political
independence. He effectively exercised the autonomy of the nation by
negotiating with communist countries, arresting foreign nationals for their
involvement in destabilizing the political environment, and expulsing the
American and British ambassadors for violating the nation’s sovereignty. This
was a first since the Louverturean state under King Henry Christophe and
Emperor Soulouque (R. D. Heinl 1967, Diederich and Burt 1969, Paquin 1983,
Heinl and Heinl 2005). He made clear that he intended to assert and defend
Haitian sovereignty and self-determination,
[A]lthough despised by all the major foreign powers –
they are beginning to understand… every nation should
have the right to manage its own Affairs. Why can’t the
Haitian people do as they please … Why? Well, let each
country develop according to its customs and traditions
(Duvalier 1967, 199-2000)

However, Duvalier’s insistence that the Haitian people and state should do as
they please was clouded by a reality of clientelism upon which he depended to
govern and upon which the state depended to function. Despite his claim and
assertion of national autonomy, Haiti depended on a foreign power for both its
international protection and economic survival. Between 1957 and 1960, the
Duvalierist regime had received “$40 million from the American government –
40% of all American aid to Haiti since 1945” (R. D. Heinl 1967, 15). The
Duvalierist regime relied on American subsidy to make its annual budget.
Although the Occupation had ended, and the regime was able to exercise some
national autonomy by controlling the armed forces, the clientelist infrastructure
remained and one might add was strengthened as the Duvalierist regime
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became even more dependent on American support than any other previous
regimes for its survival.

Duvalierism and the Consolidation of Popular Support and Legitimacy:
Under Duvalier, as under Trujillo, Batista, and Somoza, a new neocolonial
clientelist state emerged without the veneers of democracy, entirely based on
dictatorship, state expansion and absorption, coercion, and foreign dependence.
Previous neocolonial regimes, already lacking legitimacy, could not use violence
against the majority as a tool for control. However, the black–dominated
Duvalierist regime allowed it the political space, if not legitimacy, to use a level of
violence for its support and continuity never before possible or witnessed in the
nation by Haitian leaders on Haitians (Pierre-Charles 1973, 51-6, Chassagne
1977, P. Pierre 1987, 139-48). As if in revenge for their collusion with Occupation
forces and their implementation of color-based politics to usurp and maintain
power, the Duvalierist regime meted out on neocolonial elites the same treatment
American Marines meted out in the North. Duvalierism, argues Trouillot, was
something unprecedented. The regime broke through the acceptable, culturally
specific limits of authoritarianism by its level of violence. Its use of violence in the
society can only be compared to arbitrary violence committed by Occupation
forces in Northern Haiti, documented earlier. The Duvalierist regime used force
against large numbers of individuals beyond the socially accepted range for
victims of state violence: whole families were massacred for alleged or real
actions committed by one individual; entire neighborhoods were punished for the
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dissent of one family; tortures and summary executions spared neither mothers
nor children; in sum state-directed violence was institutionalized and normalized
(Diederich and Burt 1969, Rotberg and Clague 1971, Chassagne 1977, M.-R.
Trouillot 1990, 165-8). The Duvalierist regime engaged in, and normalized
behaviors and practices explicitly rejected in Haitian culture, violating the basic
tenets of a culture that believes as Trouillot so aptly notes, “moun pa fè moun sa
– There are things a human being does not do to another”. By destroying the
nationalist military infrastructure in the north and centralizing the military under a
unified command in Port-au-Prince, the occupation had removed a structure that
kept political and economic power, and coercive structures and excesses in
check. Since the demise of the Louverturean state, no leader could have used
overwhelming violence to remain in power. Moreover, societal and cultural norms
made wholesale violence against the population to maintain power unacceptable.
Duvalier, in his quest to consolidate his power and institutionalize his regime was
willing and able to transgress the basic tenets of Haitian society against not only
neocolonial elites but all who opposed him.
Yet, despite the unprecedented violence to consolidate his power and offset
American institutional influence, Duvalier’s legitimacy increased, and his support
within the population, even in the face of disagreement with his tactics, remained
strong. To maintain this level of support and legitimacy, the Duvalierist regime


Broadened the Noirist discourse within a nationalist framework going as
far as changing the flag to its original Louverturean form (black and red).
He expulsed ambassadors who disrespected the nation, its president, or
its people, which culturally enhanced his prestige and the perception that
he cared for the nation
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Identified the chief of state with the nation – “I am the state,” he exclaimed!
Thus, attacking Duvalier is the same as attacking the Haitian state. The
Black majority saw the portrayal of Duvalierist power as equal with that of
the state a source of pride
Expanded the role of the state as a mechanism of redistribution, which
extended to all levels and institutions… To be a Duvalierist was to have
access and anyone could be one. More importantly, his policies allowed
for a rise in the middle class Black population mostly through state
employment
Used the civil militia as a vehicle for inclusion and redistribution (anyone
could be a Macoute or benefit from the nation – all that was required was
to stay out of politics and keep your criticisms private Moreover, being a
Macoute or accepting access became a sign of political adherence and
consent255
Included the Haitian peasantry by explicitly interacting with and supporting
their traditions and religion and having regular listening sessions with them
at the Presidential palace. Given that, this segment forms the majority of
the population and their historical neglect along with his willingness to
elevate them and bring them into the state structure, played a major role in
strengthening his regime. Even those who regarded the peasantry as
backward regarded his interactions with and treatment of them as
praiseworthy.

In many ways, Duvalier demonstrated that the legitimacy of a regime or state
was not dependent on the elimination of the neocolonialist clientelist
infrastructure, but on its effective management to maintain or include the
interests of the population. American interests had shifted from establishing its
commercial and banking to protecting them by supporting anti-communist
government and forces, and ensuring that new politico-social and military
developments in the neocolonial clientelist state in Haiti did not run counter to
already established and entrenched interests. Thus, their support of the
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Scholars like Fatton, Pierre-Charles, and Gingras argue that one cannot consider the Duvalierist regime
as one that require or elicited consent. For them, the regime was terror, and this violence and terrorism
required and elicited silence, not consent. While their argument should not be ignored, arguing that the
regime did not enjoy a degree of legitimacy that enabled it to persist politically would be misguided
(Gingras 1967, Pierre-Charles 1973, M.-R. Trouillot 1990).
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Duvalierist regime rested on the fact that it did not change the orientation of the
dependency and clientelism of the neocolonial infrastructure. The centralization
of power and the military-centered state the occupation imposed were precisely
what was needed to protect the neocolonial clientelist states imposed in Cuba,
Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and others in the region. Duvalier had
merely shifted the paradigm and mechanism already in place by engineering a
civilian-directed military-centered dictatorial regime instead of those directed by
military officers supported by the United States throughout the region. The genius
of Duvalierism was its control of the military infrastructure that previously enabled
the United State to dispose of governments that challenged its interests.
The orientation of the new Haitian regime toward dictatorship followed
already established regional patterns and enhanced its ability to fight the
communist onslaught with American support due to the convergence of the
interests between those regimes and the United States (L. F. Manigat 1964,
Pierre-Charles 1973, Ducan 1978). Indeed with grants, interest-free loans,
military training and advisors, and direct military support to fend off
Marxist/communist attacks, American support for the regime demonstrated the
continuity of the Neocolonial Clientelist rather than the Noirist model, which it had
previously opposed and overthrew (Diederich and Burt 1969, 134-146).
Moreover, after the 1959 Cuban debacle, the American government acted more
forcefully to preserve neocolonial states throughout the region and protect its
geopolitical and economic interests (R. W. Logan 1968, Paquin 1983, Nicholls
1985, Bob 1988, Winn 2010). It had become clear that Duvalier posed no threat
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to the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. Sure it had reorganized the state
making the military impervious to American influence and eliminated the military
and political leverage imposed by the United States, but the dependency and
clientelist aspects of the neocolonial infrastructure persisted and maintained a
chokehold on the Duvalierist state.
Despite his success in maintaining the five Haitian Gourdes at par with the
one American dollar, Haiti was still economically dependent and financial at the
mercy of American lending institutions. Duvalier appears to have understood that
no matter how centralized and how much control he exercised over the state, he
could not change its orientation and imposed infrastructure. For his regime to
survive, foreign support was necessary but more importantly, a commitment to
maintain the neocolonial infrastructure and respect American national and
regional interests were necessary. He sought a balance between asserting
national sovereignty and the right to engage with other nations as he saw fit while
safeguarding American interests and its enforced structure of domination and
dependence. He makes this clear when he says,
[W]e will rise with all our energy against the pretentions
of foreign government to impose their dictates on us, to
intervene in our internal affairs, or to treat us as children,
weak and incapable. Let it be understood once and for
all, whatever the cost, that our revolution will not
compromise our national independence and we claim to
have the right to address our internal problems with the
full accord of the Haitian people, and with the greatest
respect of the political doctrine of this hemisphere
(Duvalier 1967, 230).

The Duvalierist regime not only understood American hegemony, the
implications of the Monroe Doctrine, and the nation’s subservience to American
dictates, he went to great lengths to make it clear that he respected and would
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not challenge the regional infrastructure that permanently structured Haiti into a
clientelist network now based on its political and economic dependence. Despite
this dependent clientelist infrastructure, he defended fiercely Haiti’s national
independence. Duvalier’s acquiescence to American domination cannot be
equivocated,
[W]e are aware that we belong to a sphere of influence.
We have neither the intention, nor the ill-reasoned desire
to resist it. To the contrary, we would like to collaborate
with the great American nation in its position of
leadership (Duvalier 1967, 230).

While he sought control of the state and it neocolonial infrastructure, he accepted
American dominance and sought to use his acceptance to garner American
support and offset the possibility they might openly support his overthrow (R. D.
Heinl 1967). Duvalier’s survival was dependent on convincing the American
government that his regime was not a threat, so despite the nationalist discourse
Duvalierism was constrained by the American-imposed regional and national
political infrastructure that undermined Haitian sovereignty. Nevertheless,
Duvalier sought to use diplomacy to leverage against American dominance by
using emerging states and the non-aligned movement to lessen Haiti’s political
dependence and use it as a tool to protect whatever national interests he could.
As Diederich notes,
Duvalier brought in new Communist influence to badger
the United States… he welcomed a three-man
Czechoslovakian commercial mission which had come
to study the potential for trade exchanges between the
two countries. A polish diplomatic and trade mission had
been in Port-au-Prince… (Diederich and Burt 1969, 197)
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He withheld votes against Cuba sought by the United States, hosted emerging
African leaders, and used the communist threat, and American support at the UN
and OAS to influence American action and negotiate better terms for Haiti 256. He
made his multipolar strategy quite explicit in his speech at the National Assembly
in 1964,
[W]e propose to open Haitian diplomacy to the recent
currents of countries on the path to development, and to
the new Europe on the path to reconstruction. Almost
everywhere in the world new entities are being formed
either political organizations or economic systems… It is
necessary that our country familiarise itself with its
strengths in the international political arena and take
advantage of the various centers of interests arising in
the international sphere (Duvalier 1967, 231)257

Duvalier had formulated the basis and contour of Haitian multipolar strategy and
advocated that it be leveraged in the international arena to secure national
interests and power, however limited they were. Nevertheless, despite this claim
and efforts to offset American power and dictates, and Duvalier’s so-called
control of the national sphere, the Haitian state was not only dependent on “the
political doctrine of this hemisphere” but also on the economic infrastructure all
the way to the negotiations and renegotiations of national loans. Duvalierism,
even if it wanted to secure a degree of national autonomy could not achieve the
changes that were possible under previous Louverturean regimes. His, was a
neocolonial clientelist regime dependent on the political and economic
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See Ambassador Thurston letter to the Secretary of state regarding his meeting with Duvalier on
September 15, 1962. It is clear that Duvalier understood that the Haitian state advantage was minimal
and he was determined to use whatever it could muster to secure influence American political and
economic decisions vis-à-vis his regime.
257
Speech of Dr. Francois Duvalier in front of Congress (the National Assembly), after being sworn as
President-for-Life on June 22, 1964.
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infrastructure within which it emerged with little possibility to wrest the nation from
it. The dependency of the neocolonial clientelist state and the Duvalierist regime
is even clearer when one reads Duvalier’s letter to U.S. President John F.
Kennedy requesting budgetary support, grants, loans, infrastructural
development grants, and debt payment moratoriums.
Any attempt to reduce the financial resources of the
government through the payment of amortization or
interest, or both at the same time, on the heavy
obligations owed the export-import bank would cause
the Haitian economic and financial crisis, which my
government is combatting, to become explosive. I take
the liberty of requesting your good offices and those of
your entire government to the end that a twenty-year
moratorium may be granted the Haitian State on its
debts to the Export-Import Bank, as in the case of other
countries such as Brazil, that enjoy more advantages but
are faced with problems of the same sort as those
confronting Haiti and its people258

Owing loans to an Export-Import Bank controlled by the American government,
the limited internal autonomy the Duvalierist regime enjoyed could not spare Haiti
from American control over its national destiny. Duvalier was faced with the very
reality of the neocolonial clientelist mechanism that facilitated American control.
Yet, the implementation of American control, and the imposition of its neocolonial
clientelist infrastructure, was not uniform nor did it treat all states the same way.
Despite giving a moratorium to Brazil, the U.S. government refused to do the
same for Haiti, a nation it had impoverished after more than 19 years of
occupation. Doing so would have allowed Haiti to regain its financial footing and
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Department of State, Division of Language Services, - translation – No: 20-598-B - Letters from the
President of the Republique – Palais National, Port-au-Prince, July 12, 1960, July 7, 1961 and July 3, 1962.
Declassified E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5(b).
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undo the primary and most important structure of dependence and control under
the American clientelist system. Duvalier’s loan request was no different from
that of the Estimé regime, which was also denied.
The imposition of economic dependence through indebtedness imposed
on Haiti, not only impoverished the nation, but also left every government at the
mercy of American financial institutions. For another nation to rely on a foreign
government to negotiate loans with financial institutions that it created, owns or
controls is perhaps the biggest irony, but such was, and is, the nature of the new
neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. The Duvalierist regime, despite its perceived
independence nationally, operated within a particular system of control and
dependence and was, for all intent and purposes, if not controlled, at the very
least constrained and subdued by it. However, although Duvalier’s request for
loans for structural development was denied, military aid to bolster his anticommunist struggle and to sustain his regime increased. Despite constraints, the
Duvalierist regime successfully secured more than $116 million in grants, loans,
and other types of foreign assistance mostly from the United States (Diederich
and Burt 1969, 182)
Such was the nature of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure that
escaped those advocating for a leftist revolution in Haiti or who blamed Duvalier
for the lack of economic development and national progress. Nevertheless, the
threat they represented to the American government has to be understood and
analyzed in that context. American governments had more to fear from young
communists who sought to upend existing state structures and power relations
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for new ones, than from the Duvalierist regime whose survival depended on
those loans and grants to sustain its systems of state expansion, absorption, and
regime legitimacy.
Young intellectuals throughout the region, including Haiti, enamored with
Marxist and communist ideologies, and concerned with the social power relations
and unequal distribution of resources and power in their nations sought the
reorganization of the neocolonial state for what they foresaw as a more
responsible and accountable distribution of national resources. Their goal was to
counter the monopolization of power by national elites and international capital,
which resulted in the disenfranchisement of the majority (Pierre-Charles 1973, O.
E. Wright 1979, Greene, et al. 1984, T. Wright 2001). Although driven by a
different ideology, their objectives were not far from the Louverturean model,
which sought a more equitable distribution of resources and protection of rights
(Diederich and Burt 1969, E. Paul 1976, Paquin 1983). As was the case
throughout the region, the military-centered neocolonial infrastructures imposed
by the United States became effective vehicles for resisting communism and this
time, dictatorship rather than good governance and democracy became the more
predictable option (Time Magazine 1973, Munro 1974, Harris and Nef 2008,
Wiarda and Kline 2011).
In Haiti, the centralization of power imposed by the American occupation
enabled Duvalierism to flourish nationally, uncontested and impervious to
challenges, but constrained internationally through a system of indebtedness and
threat of intervention. The claim of Duvalierism as an independent nationalist
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regime is illusory at best, and those who study the Duvalierist period without
considering the US-directed neocolonial clientelist infrastructure miss the true
nature of the regime. Duvalierism was an internationally dependent regime that
found the means to assert a modicum of national autonomy through control of
the military apparatus, but it was a permitted dictatorship given its reliance on
American military and economic support to survive.
The attempt by Estimé to orient the neocolonial state toward the
Louverturean model was continued by Duvalier in rhetoric only. Duvalier, from
the start, deviated from Estimé’s Louverturean attempt by relying on foreign
support and the use of force rather than managing internal cleavages and
interests, and securing the political and economic rights of the majority for its
survival. Although he counterbalanced American power with the threat of
communism, he did so to garner resources to support his regime, avert military
intervention and support for the neocolonial opposition forces, not to enhance the
power and reduce the dependency of the Haitian state. His government became
more dependent on American economic and military support, not less, and the
state became more dependent on the clientelist infrastructure for its daily
functioning, not less. American marines began training the Macoutes and new
military, American loans and grants funded state services, the neocolonial
clientelist model was being consolidated under a new dictatorial governance
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infrastructure259. The Noirist had managed to create a new coercive infrastructure
and its orientation was toward securing the power of the Duvalierist regime, and
maintaining American interests and the continuity of the neocolonial clientelist
state.
Far from the Louverturean model and the interdependent state-society
relationship it fostered, a predatory Noirist regime emerged, dependent
economically and militarily on foreign support for its survival and this time, with
the capacity to dominate national cleavages, or more precisely to eliminate them
without repercussion. Although Duvalier successfully subordinated the military to
his regime, rather than orienting its power to restore the sovereignty of the nation
and continue the Noirist expansion, it became his personal army, acting to
expand his control, and terrorize the nation rather than securing it. He used the
neocolonial clientelist infrastructure and the centralization of power facilitated by
the American occupation to make Haiti his uncontested fiefdom – ensuring him
the presidency for life.
Duvalier succeeded in removing neocolonial elites from the all aspects of
governance and state and public institutions by capitalizing on the political and
color-based polarization instituted by them. However, besides the cost to those
involved directly and indirectly in the political arena, the economic position of
neocolonial Mulatto elites who supported the regime solidified, protected by the
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A grant of $ 6 million was received from the American government for direct budget support. See
declassified document – The Secretary of State –Washington, August 3, 1961 – Memorandum for the
President – subject: Suggested Reply to letters to You From the President of Haiti, by Dean Rusk.
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neocolonial economic infrastructure imposed during the occupation and the
convergence of their interest with those of foreign capital (Rotberg and Clague
1971, M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 206). It facilitated the rise of competing foreign-born
Syrian elites, willing to support the regime to consolidate their own position in the
neocolonial clientelist infrastructure (Dupuy 1989, L. Dubois 2012, Pean 2016, 3).
More importantly, the Duvalierist regime’s reliance on taxation, customhouse
dues, and economic stability for state revenue and expansion could not afford to
impose the same level of control on the economy it did on political life;
Dependent on state expansion and absorption, it needed economic continuity
and growth for its survival. As such,
Duvalier had no objection to the merchants prospering;
he did not even mind if they maintained their domination
over the economy. But he insisted on the right to dictate
the economic and social price that the merchants would
pay for this domination, and he saw to it that the state’s
share of the spoils increased as to fit current political
realities.” (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 206)

The Duvalierist regime was independent of neocolonial elites, curtailing their
power while coercing them into compliance or murdering them. However, it was
dependent of the American-imposed clientelist infrastructure; it was imbedded
and subservient to it, taking attention not to challenge American economic
interests, by keeping those interests beyond the reach of his Noirist state. This
distinct model of national autonomy and external dependency would become a
major feature of the post-colonial African states markedly different from the dual
clientelist model of Anglophone Caribbean states (Bienefeld 1988, Edie 1991).
Although Duvalier lowered the economic control of neocolonial elites on the state
by creating a new state-directed and foreign supported infrastructure of
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exploitation and expropriation controlled by emergent Black Duvalierist elite and
its foreign-born Levantine elites as competitors, both dependent on the regime
for their survival, he did not undermine the American-imposed neocolonial
clientelist infrastructure. His government, argues Trouillot, has “always given the
United States the most tangible sign of its submission; unconditional support for
U.S. capital” (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 202). As elaborated previously, constrained by
the imposition of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure, his commitment to
political and military control of the state did not extend to the control of the
economic infrastructure necessary for the implementation of the Louverturean
state model. Duvalier was only as strong as his American financial and military
support allowed him to be. The scholar Leslie Pean is right, in the end,
Papa Doc did not commit crimes in a vacuum. The terror
exercised was somewhat consistent with the new
regional260 politico-economic order that had to be
imposed through fire and steel (Pean 2016, 4).

It represented the advent of dictatorial regimes supported by the United States to
sustain its dependent clientelist infrastructures and safeguard American against
the communism. The very nature of neocolonial domination and its exclusionary
practices that gave rise to noirist politics meant that the Duvalierist regime,
despite its coercive and dictatorial manifestation did not alienate the nation but
enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy due to its Noirist credentials 261. Duvalierism
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Emphasis mine
Both Neree and Diederich argue that Duvalier’s support was based on coercion and not voluntary.
While the Duvalierist regime was, by all account, coercive, he had also secured the support of a segment
of the population. They were willing to defend his regime against attacks from internal and external
forces. Due to their absorption in the state apparatus and the access given to the children of many of the
261
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was much more than a coercive dictatorial regime for the majority of Haitians; it
was the vehicle for middle class formation, social mobility, and national pride.
If as Robert Dahl maintains middle class expansion is conducive to
democratization, Duvalierism turned this notion on its head by facilitating a state
and regime-dependent middle class fully committed to the support of the Noirist
dictatorial regime as long as it offered opportunities, stability, and national pride
centered on Noirism (Dahl 1971, Krouse Spring 1982, Huntington 1993). Within a
new neocolonial framework of external dependence, hyper-urbanization,
austerity, state contraction, and free market imposition, the regime could not
sustain the absorption of its Black citizens and expand opportunities for their
children as it did in years past. Nevertheless, as long as stability persisted and
the regime commitment to protecting their interests remained unshakable, the
Duvalierist elites and its middle and working class supporters, and even the rural
majority, were more than willing to support and defend it no matter its excesses.
More than its failure to deliver leading to its demise, it was the change from
Duvalier’s Norist politics after his death in 1971 to Jean-Claudism and its focus
on the Mulatto elites that became the death nail of the regime’s social control and
legitimacy.

Black population to education, employment and upward mobility, they saw in the regime the
embodiment of their aspirations (C. J. Edie 1991, Neree 1988).
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Jean-Claudism: Continuity, Legitimacy, and the Decline of the Duvalierist State:
As early as 1969, Henry Kissinger was contemplating a post-Duvalier
transition and engaging in cost-benefit analysis regarding the continuity of the
regime262. The death of Duvalier in 1971, rather than end his regime, continued it
with the passage of power to his 19-year old son – Baby Doc; an indication that it
was the new Duvalierist elites rather than the young impressionable boy who
held the power (M.-R. Trouillot 1990). Despite Jean Claude’s claim of having
gained experience under the tutelage of his father, his ability to replace his father
as President-for-life could not have taken place without American blessings. The
legitimacy of the regime persisted because of its absorption and expansion of
segments of the Black population into the state infrastructure, but would face a
crisis beginning in 1980. Having consolidated the Duvalierist regime, the
neocolonial clientelist dictatorial infrastructure continued, albeit with less terror.
“The only difference”, argues Trouillot, “between the two regimes lay in the
deepening of relations between the state and holders of capital at home and
abroad, and in the increased support of the U.S. government.” (Diederich and
Burt 1969, Neree 1988, M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 200)
Jean-Claudism reflected a marked departure from his Norist roots, the reemergence of the military, and re-entry of neocolonial Mulatto elites into the
governance structure of the nation. The assertion of power by Jean-Claude faced
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Memorandum 70. Kissinger to the National Security Council – Washington, DC. July 22, 1969 – National

Security
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a new orientation of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure spawned by a
newfound interest by American capital and American manufacturing
entrepreneurs, and reformulation of American interests and expectation of its
clientelist regimes brought about by the election of Jimmy Carter (Vestring, et al.
2005 ). The flight of American manufacturing in search of cheap labor in
developing countries required a new governance structure, one more stable and
predictable, with more legitimate governments and a stronger coercive capacity
to manage labor demands and facilitate commerce – less dictatorship, more Law
and Order and political liberalization. Less threatened by communism and more
confident in its ability to overcome communist encroachments, American
interests had formulated a new model under the presidency of Jimmy Carter; one
less dependent on dictatorship and based on human rights protection, and
political liberalization to fit a new emerging neoliberal agenda. This shift in
American policy and the orientation of the young Duvalier opened the national
political arena for contestations. Haiti saw the re-emergence, long suppressed, of
political actors, to contest the regime whose dependence on the American
clientelist network limited its capacity to engage in suppression and human rights
violations. The regime engaged in local elections, allowing greater freedom of the
press, gradually emboldening the forces the new American neocolonial
reformulation had made possible.
It was a new era, what Baby Doc referred to as Jean-Claudism—an
alliance between Mulatto and Duvalierist elites; one fraught with competition
between old entrenched Duvalierist and technocratic elites within the regime, and
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between those regime elites and emerging Mulatto competitors. The entry of light
manufacturing following the death of Duvalier marked the beginning of a new
neocolonial reality for Haiti and the Jean Claude regime. 150 U.S. firms operated
in Haiti in 1972, which doubled by 1977, manufacturing grew by more than 10
percent a year from 1970 to 1980, and assembly industry exports, which
represented 1/3 of all exports, grew by 30 percent a year (Dupuy 1989, M.-R.
Trouillot 1990, 200-2, Dupuy 2007, 48-51). Besides the inclusion of neocolonial
elites in national politics, and the growth of manufacturing, under Jean-Claude,
the economic advantages of neocolonial Mulatto elites also increased, facilitated
by the regime and American capital. As Trouillot and Dupuy argue,
[T]he light industry solution offered those neocolonial
Mulatto elites the possibility of diversifying their
investments and increasing their income without
increasing its risks. (Dupuy 1989, M.-R. Trouillot 1990,
207, 2007, 43-52).

Jean-Claudism, neglected the regulatory capacity of the state developed
by his father as demanded by the United States under the new neoliberal free
market impositions of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. The state relaxed
the collection of taxes and facilitated inefficiency and corruption and
consequently state revenue declined. Tax evasion grew, revenue declined due to
neocolonial elites no longer fearful of crossing the Duvalierist state, and national
production decreased because of urbanization and cheaper food from abroad
(Pierre 1971). The Haitian Goudes, pegged to American currency as equal
exchange lost its footing to inflation (R. D. Heinl 1967, Heinl and Heinl 2005). The
adoption of new American neocolonial dictates undermined the agricultural
sector in order to provide a market to dump American surplus rice and corn on
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the Haitian market. As a result, the incentive for agricultural production and
peasant livelihood was undermined. One of the most damaging Jean-Claudist
policies to the peasantry was the destruction of its important sources of
investment and revenue – the Creole Pig (Clammer 2012, 24).
The decline of Haitian agricultural production due to government collusion
with American capital, and the facilitation of American food dumping schemes led
to the rise of imported foodstuffs. The once self-sufficient and export-oriented
agricultural sector was so destabilized by the flooding of the Haitian market with
cheap food that it was no longer profitable for farmers to farm thereby
impoverishing what was, until then, the most economically well off and stable
peasantry in the hemisphere. These imported foodstuffs increased from $10.7
million in 1970 to $62.1 million in 1976 and continued to increase thereafter. To
make matters worse, the price of all foodstuffs double between 1975-1985 and
the trade deficit also grew from $12.4 million in 1970 to 68.4 million in 1975, and
183 million in 1980 (Graham and Edwards 1984, 75, IHSI 1985, Hooper 1987b,
33)263.
Whereas Duvalierism distanced itself from what remained of the Mulatto
bourgeoisie, choosing an economic arrangement backed by a coercive state
rather than an alliance, Jean-Claudism sought an alliance without the constraints
established by Duvalierism that protected the interests of the urban poor against
speculations and hyper-exploitation. Jean-Claudism allowed the re-emergence of
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The figures are also quoted in (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 210-12, Dupuy 2007, 48-51)
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new and visible neocolonial Mulatto economic elite, increasingly more influential
in the nation’s socio-economic arena, but less responsive and accountable to the
regulatory capacity imposed by Duvalier. The marriage of Jean-Claude Duvalier
to Michelle Bennet, one of the few Mulatto families who had supported the
election of his father, and her subsequent influence in engineering a resurgence
of Mulattoes in state affairs, alienated entrenched Duvalierist elites and the Black
urban middle and working class population upon which the regime legitimacy
depended264.
While Duvalierism took great care to embrace Noirism and maintain its
connection with the Black population in terms of ideology and political discourse,
policies, and state absorption, Jean-Claudism distanced itself from Noirism and
facilitated, nay, feted, the visible absence of Noirism as a governing ideology.
American insistence under Ronald Regan on compliance and adoption of the
light manufacturing export-oriented neoliberal model eliminated the last vestiges
of the Duvalierist state regulatory capacity and accelerated the weakening of the
state, the decline of its revenue, its capacity for expansion and ultimately its
legitimacy. As Trouillot argues correctly, “the light manufacturing industry
strategy never brought the returns expected by those who stubbornly imposed it
on the Haitian people and the surviving Duvalierist state” (M.-R. Trouillot 1990,
209). Instead, it exacerbated the disparities between social classes by facilitating
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Jean-Claudism had relaxed the collection and regulatory capacity of the state – tax evasion grew, state
revenue decreased, and so did national production and poverty.
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a hyper-urbanization because of the placement of those light manufacturing
plants exclusively in Port-au-Prince. The influx of factory workers created
imbalance between the well-to-do and the working poor in the capital with the
state unable to service an exploding expansion of slums in the outskirts of the
capital. The influx of the rural poor in search of manufacturing work, rising
inflation, the decline in food production, and rise in food prices, coupled with the
visible opulence of the Black and Mulatto elites, brought to the surface the
contradictions of color discourse and the coercive nature of the dictatorial regime
of Duvalier had until then kept hidden.
Moreover, the propagation of technology, once unavailable, made evident
the disparities between the struggling majority and its elites. Even the established
Black middle class population felt the impact of economic disparities by seeing
the state that was once an important source of employment contract. Structural
adjustment programs forced on the Duvalierist state within the context of the
neocolonial clientelist infrastructure limited its capacity for absorption,
undermining one of the most important pillars of Duvalierist legitimacy amongst
middle and working class urbanites (Dupuis 1997). More dramatically, even the
revenue collected by Jean-Claude’s regime was not re-invested in the state to
allow it to, at the very least, maintain the level of support it had established for
those it had absorbed. Dupuy noted,
[T]he public revenues appropriated by the Duvalier
regime were not returned to civil society in the form of
increased infrastructural investments in the urban or
rural sectors; as health, education, employment,
technical, and financial services; or as subsidies
designed to promote economic growth and the welfare of
the general population (Dupuis 1997, 30).
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Whether the erosion of the Duvalierist state was caused by Jean-Claudism, or
whether it reflects a new state of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure, or
whether Jean-Claudist politico-economic choices accelerated the impact of this
new phase of Neocolonial economic imposition on the Duvalierist state is not
clear. What is unequivocal is that the economic excesses of Duvalierist elites and
their neocolonial allies in the face of mass deprivation frayed the support and
legitimacy enjoyed by Duvalier, the father, and his regime. Most importantly,
Jean-Claude’s willingness to facilitate the re- ascension of neocolonial Mulatto
elites into the neocolonial clientelist state infrastructure demonstrated a betrayal
of the basic tenets of Duvalierism. Jean-Claudism marked a resurgence of
Mulatrism infused with all its pervasive colorism and arrogance of yesteryears;
the son had turned the Duvalierist Noirist infrastructure on its head, and forced it
on its knees having undermined both its coercive capacity, its absorptive
capacity, and the sources of legitimacy (Paquin 1983, Neree 1988, M.-R.
Trouillot 1990, 140).
Under the Jean-Claudist regime, the military regained its power, relegating
the Macoutes to less important positions and roles in the regime and society
(Neree 1988, 185-6). Jean-Claude’s inability to sustain and broaden the centers
of legitimacy established by the Duvalierist regime or to create new ones capable
of addressing the dynamics of hyper-urbanization and privation capable of
meeting the needs of the population would ultimately result in its demise. Most
suggest that Duvalierism was overthrown, but the more accurate analysis is that
Jean-Claudism was overthrown, not by the military, but by a population tired of
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exploitation and continued marginalization by the state and its Black and
neocolonial elites. It was the masses clamoring in the streets, risking limbs and
lives who forced the 30-year dictatorial regime and its leader, Jean-Claude
Duvalier to go into exile leaving military officers, Duvalierist elites, and resurgent
neocolonial elites to compete for state power and American support.
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Chapter VI
DEMOCRATIC TTRANSITION: A SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

This chapter advances the argument that the refusal of the population to
participate in manipulated elections fits the pattern of their historical struggle to
secure a responsive and accountable state and regimes. Whereas nationalist
elites supported their aspirations for a responsive and accountable state
historically, the advent of democracy has place the orientation of the state in their
hands. Their refusal to participate delegitimizes regimes that are structured into
the dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure whose dominance of Haitian
politics have little to do with the popular will and to the type of democratic
accountability and state they have historically sought. The absence of a
legitimate democratic regime is directly related to their historical struggle for
accountability. The basis for legitimate democratic governance and democratic
consolidation in Haiti should rest on a model of state crafting incongruent with the
current dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure, one centered on
nationalist/noirist politics and Louverturean statecraft. Such a project would
strengthen and address the challenges of legitimacy, democratic participation,
and state-society relations or the historical État-Peuple / Peuple-État
interdependence advocated for by Louverturean, Noirist, and Duvalierist state
crafters. Unlike its counterpart in the Caribbean, Haitian democratic continuity will
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continue to lack the pre-requisite legitimacy unless it is based on a more
responsive and accountable state.

Authoritarian Crisis and Democratic Opening: Political Instability, Elite
Competition, and the Demands for Democratic Governance (1984-1990):
In our haste to counter thirty year of
dictatorship and its structures of terror in
support of democracy, we end up destroying
the state and the institutions we needed for
democratic governance. It was a mistake from
which we have not yet recovered- Dr. Susy
Castor (2013)265
The birth and growth of the Haitian democratic movement was facilitated by the
breakdown of consensus within governing Duvalierists and Jean-Claudist elites
characterized by growing conflicting interests amongst their core sectors. JeanClaude’s alliance with neocolonial elites his father had removed from state
control, his support for the re-emergence of the Army by sidelining his father’s
shock troop, the Macoutes, and the creation of new military regiments led to
competition for power and leverage between these two institutional branches of
the state (Rebu 1994, Avril 1997, Pierre-Etienne 1999). Moreover, many
Duvalierist elites saw the emphasis of certain features of Jean-Claudism,
especially its efforts at consolidating a neocolonial alliance as an affront to
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Interview and conversation between the author and Dr. Castor at CRESFED – (The Center for Economic
Research and Formation for Development) in Port-au-Prince, Canape Vert. Dr. Castor is a historian,
political activist, and leader in the anti-Duvalierist and democratic movement. She is the Director of
CRESFED, and wife of Gerard Pierre-Charles, the late Director General of OPL (Organization Politique
Lavalas, later renamed, Organization du Peuple en Lutte).
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Duvalierist Noirist ideology and Jean-Claudist neoliberal policies as signs of
declining Noirist state power (Rebu 1995). As Chamberlain notes,
The Macoutes came to despise the young Duvalier as a
traitor, and their brooding hostility exacerbated existing
divisions, contributing ultimately to the dictatorship
collapse (Chamberlain 1995, 15).

Jean-Claude consolidated his alliance with a segment of the neocolonial elites in
an attempt to form an alliance between black political elites in control of the state
and neocolonial elites in control of the national economy. This sort of alliance has
been characterized by Caribbean scholars as a dominant feature of Anglophone
Caribbean politics - an alliance between Black political elites in control of the
state and entrepreneurial minority ethnic elites in control of the national economy
(Reid 1977, Stone 1980, C. J. Edie 1991). However, the re-emergence of
neocolonial elites in political affairs and their prominence as decision-makers in
the Jean-Claudist regime was an affront to Duvalierists adherents, which resulted
in open conflicts between Duvalierist elites and neocolonial elites vying for state
control (Dupuy 1989, Casimir and Dubois 2010). Although, these new
neocolonial elites that now dominated Jean-Claude’s regime were distinct from
the oligarchs mostly killed or exiled by the Duvalierist regime, they represented
the new foreign-neocolonial alliance; the new dependent neocolonial clientelist
infrastructure. Jean-Claude’s policies had provided the U.S. an entry into the
Duvalierist national infrastructure, which had escaped them. Their support of
sectors of the economic, military, and manufacturing elites to dismantle the
Duvalierist infrastructure and re-establish control over the national sphere proved
successful. These American-supported elites posed a direct challenge not only to
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the Duvalierist military and nationalist infrastructure and its surviving oligarchs
who had become subservient to the regime, but to the Duvalierist political and
economic elites who had acquired some control over the national economy. The
growing prominence, and clout of these new technocratic and manufacturing
foreign-backed elites in Jean-Claude’s regime accentuated the internal
incoherence and dysfunction of the ruling class266 (Slavin 1995, Pierre-Etienne
1999, 75-9). These intra-elites conflicts also materialized in other areas, between
the policy-makers vying for state power, technocrats and oligarch competing for
control over policies, power, and influence. The conservative Catholic Church,
long a central component in the Duvalierist power infrastructure, saw the
emergence of Liberation Theologists within its rank challenging church leaders
and their political alliance. The importance of the poor and the Church’s policy of
non-political participation were at odds with the role of the Church leadership as
active supporter of the regime267. The decline of Duvalierist power and the open
conflicts and competition between Duvalierist and Jean-Claudist forces that
ensued validate O’Donnell and Schmitter’s claim,
[T]here is no transition whose beginning is not the
consequence…of important divisions within the
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Many Haitian scholars suggest that Jean-Claude’s marriage to the Bennet family gave the latter a level
of power and decision-making in both the political and economic arena that upended the status quo.
Their greed, and aggregation of power elevated the friction within the regime which Jean-Claude proved
impotent to address.
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The Haitian Catholic Church, having emerged as an indigenous church under the Duvalierist Noirist
regime as we noted earlier, was, by definition, an arm of the regime (Duvalier 1969). Thus, it is not
surprising that it too faced internal challenges both within its upper leadership, some of whom rejected
the Jean-Claudist approach, and within the institution itself, by members who saw the alliance with the
regime and its elites as antithetical to the values of the church and its connection with the
disenfranchised (Chamberlain 1988, Florival 2011).
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authoritarian regime itself, principally along the
fluctuating cleavage between hard-liners and soft-liners
(O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 19).

From the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, Haiti’s political, economic, military and
religious cleavages undermined the stability of the state. These internal divisions
within the Haitian ruling class, more complex and extensive than suggested by
O’Donnell and Schmitter, provided the space for the emergence of the popular
democratic movement and the development of a viable opposition to confront the
entrenched elites.268 The tension and fault lines created between state and
economic elites undermined the Jean-Claude regime’s coercive capacity, and
limited its ability to withstand the pressure from democratic forces until it was too
late to undermine their popularity and aggregated power (Abbot 1988, Dupuy
2007). The populace, watching the opulence of the elites in the midst of
economic decline and deprivation and seeing itself no longer central to the
discourse of state crafting, became increasingly disenchanted and restless
(Rotberg and Clague 1971). Its treatment by the new regime as seemingly
irrelevant to the legitimacy of the state and its leaders, and the inability of the
state system to absorb them, as it did under the Duvalierist Noirist regime, led
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O’Donnell and Schmitter suggest that the fall of authoritarianism is often preceded by economic
expansion and internal conflicts between governing elites with soft-liners seeking to expand rights to
larger segments of the population. These factors, they argue facilitate the rise of a viable opposition
capable of effectuating a political transition (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). In the case of Haiti, neither
economic expansion nor soft-liners advocacy for rights preceded the fall of the regime, the intra-elite
conflicts and the distractions it created merely provided a moment for the population to assert itself,
which once done, has been, historically, almost impossible to counter without extreme and sustained
violence. The context of state-society relations as a result of history has always depended on a degree of
legitimacy and popular support.
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the masses to seek political alternatives. Theirs was a politics of bread and
representation and their solution was a responsive state and an accountable
democratic government. Thus coercive actions only served to embolden them269
(Dalvius 1987, Dumas 1994, Avril 1997).
The inability of Jean-Claude’s regime to sustain the strong state-society
relations or more specifically, the État-Peuple/ Peuple- État interdependence
established by his father, and his failure to maintain the national autonomy and
political independence of the Duvalierist Noirist regime ultimately undermined the
legitimacy and stability of the Haitian state270. Its alliance with neocolonial elites
who had lost their power under the previous regime undercut the foundational
basis of the Duvalierist regime’s Noirist orientation (Baguidy 1986, Bob 1988).
This new Jean-Claudist Alliance reintroduced the very dependent clientelist
infrastructure with its military-dominated system that was used so effectively by
neocolonial elites and their foreign supporters, and which his father had
thoroughly destroyed (Duvalier 1967, Diederich and Burt 1969, Delince 1979).
Jean-Claudism resulted in the re-emergence and re-assertion of the
neocolonial-dominated, American-imposed clientelist infrastructure rejected and
undermined by Duvalierism. The fall of Jean-Claude’s regime thus ended a 29year attempt to permanently re-orient the Haitian state through a centralized,
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It is not by coincidence that the North was the first to rise to challenge the regime and give the
impetus to the rest of the nation.
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Some have argued that the contracting of the state which limited its strength and capacity to absorb
segment of the population are directly related to the new Clientelist infrastructure based on a free market
and IMF mandates for privatization and the elimination of the regulatory state (Dupuy 1989).
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military-centered approach. It marked a new development in Haitian politics with
a large segment of the population no longer interested in alliances along racial
lines but seeking a responsive democratic state. The fight for democracy thus ran
counter to the interest of all segments of the elites – Old Duvalierists and their
Macoutes, Jean-Claudists and its military, as well as the neocolonial elites who
saw popular democracy as the new vehicle for their disempowerment, and
American policy-makers who saw it as counter to American regional political and
interests.
As had taken place decades earlier in Latin America in the struggle
against authoritarian forces, Liberation theologians led this surge toward
democratization (Peeler 2009). In Haiti, as in Latin America, the triangulation of
elites, the Catholic Church, and the military as cohesive centers of power in
control of the state made them target as defenders of the status quo by any
forces seeking a change in the orientation of the state (Black 2011, Nef 2011).
Popular democratic forces therefore found themselves competing with forces that
sometimes allied to defeat them, and other times competed against each other
for control of the emerging democratic state. Author and journalist Amy Wilentz
best echoed the analysis of most scholars of Haiti. She captured the Haitian
context, the liberation theologian at the center of the movement toward
democracy, and the forces that both supported and opposed it. Jean-Bertrand
Aristide, the firebrand liberation theologian, despised by regime elites and loved
by the masses, “had all the right enemies”, she observed,
[T]he army hated him, because he mentioned colonels
and sergeants and lieutenants by name in his sermons,
and excoriated them for the abuses they committed
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against the people… The American Embassy hated him
because he held the United States and its economic
system responsible for much of Haiti’s economic woe,
and thus for the misery of her people, his congregation.
The Church hierarchy feared him because he did not
often miss a chance to include them in his list of
enemies of the people, and they were jealous of him,
too, for the loyal following he had attracted, and for the
attention he received from foreign journalists. The very
wealthy few in Haiti despised him also, because he
accused them of betraying their countrymen and stated
baldly that the system by which they enriched
themselves was corrupt and criminal, and an offense
against their fellow Haitians. He frightened them all with
the violent honesty of his sermons (Wilentz 1994, 7778).

Thus, the democratic movement, its leaders, and popular mobilization that
brought it into existence faced ab initio widespread resistance from all
major institutions and entrenched national and foreign interests groups.
The period of democratization it gave rise to and that persists today pitted
the masses and segments of the middle and lower middle class against
national and international forces. This has resulted in countless coups,
destabilization attempts, and when those failed, ultimately invasion led by
the United States under the cover of the United Nations to recapture
control of the client state (Shacochis 1999, 133-37).
It was the successful resistance of the masses to attempts to reimpose control over them, rescind their capture of and attempt to re-orient
the state, and their sidelining of the military, which led to American
usurpation of Haitian sovereignty lost by its client elites during the
transition. With neocolonial elites and the American government unable to
use the military to maintain their dominance over the nation and its people,
and protect the clientelist infrastructure, another invasion became the only
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option. Thus, the resulting invasion by United States-sponsored U.N.
military forces was an act of last resort to re-impose the dependent
clientelist infrastructure.

The Military:
After more than two decades of subordination and dominance by
Duvalierist para-military forces, Jean-Claude’s preference for the military enabled
it to regain its power and control over the state’s coercive apparatus. By early
1980, military officers, emboldened by Jean-Claude’s favoritism, and motivated
by institutional memory, pride, and revenge sought a permanent end to
Macoutism. Senior officers forcefully re-asserted the army’s institutional role as
the only coercive power-broker of the state. More educated and better trained
than their para-military counterpart as a result of Jean-Claude’s purposeful
neglect, the military sought the destruction of their rival having not forgotten the
Macoutes’ role as executioners of their officer corps. The Macoutes themselves,
still powerful and embedded within the Duvalierist state, resisted the military’s
growing power and infringements into a state system they had dominated. This
conflict made the Jean-Claude’s regime vulnerable and unable to respond to
popular democratic forces clamoring for a political transition271. Its attempt to use
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Beginning with the mass arrests in November 1980 and deportation of twenty dissidents, the following
events help demonstrate the masses determination and the regimes’ failing attempts to control them and
well as manage its internal conflicts:


In May 1984, slum dwellers looted care food warehouses in Gonaives and Cap-Haitian and attacked a
prison and police station. This was an act of defiance against the regime from the North; the very
center of Nationalist resistance.
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the long-neglected and disaffected Duvalierist forces to quell the mass protests
resulted in a half-hearted response, which led to military action against them.
This not only enhanced the profile of the military in the eyes of anti-regime
democratic forces, it also undermined what little support was enjoyed by the
regime and its forces. As Cedelle and Gautheret note,
[I]n 1985, the terror of the «tontons macoutes» was not
enough to suppress the revolts that broke out in many
cities and Duvalier lost control of the situation. In
January 1986, Washington, which had supported him
under the banner of its struggle against communism for
some time, counseled him to resign. On February, 7,
1986, he ceded power back to the military and flee in an
US Air Force (Cedelle and Gautheret 2014).

It cannot be considered coincidental that it was the Americans who decided it
was time for Jean-Claude to leave, negotiated his departure, and relegated the
rein of power to the military as occurred in the pre-Duvalierist era. After all, it was
the military, the primary institution of the American dependent clientelist
infrastructure that facilitated the elimination of Jean-Claude’s regime and











Beginning 1985, a series of demonstrations against hunger and in favor of social justice and
democracy took place throughout the country.
The regime’s plan to legalize political parties on its own terms failed due to popular protest and
rejection by opposition forces.
In 1985. Dealing a blow to Duvalierist forces, a high level minister and a staunch Duvalierist was
sacked by the Jean-Claudist regime, further undermining its ability to withstand pressure from antiregime forces. At a time when uniting its forces was necessary and reliance on the military was
tentative, the regime incited more division.
In 1985, the macoutes, in an attempt to suppress opposition and assist the Jean-Claudist regime
attacked a series of demonstrations killing many unarmed civilians.
The killing continued even after the fall of the regime with churches attacked in broad
daylight…According to various reports, more than 50 were killed and 80 wounded (Chamberlain 1995,
15-7, Times 1988).
At least 11 attempt to assassinate the most popular leader of the opposition, the Salesian priest, and
liberation theologian, Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
The Church itself, after various attempts to contain him failed transferred him to Rome and later
defrocked him.
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remnants of the Duvalierist infrastructure. The General and former President
Prosper Avril also acknowledged that the army intentionally precipitated the fall of
Jean-Claude’s regime by refusing to use its coercive power against anti-regime
forces. As General Avril wrote,
[The military] had participated by its silence and
complicitous inaction to the concretization of this result
for it too wished for change. No repression of the
protestors, voluntary absence where its intervention was
sought, etc. It so fulfilled its role that it was called, when
came the fateful moment, to hold the leadership of the
nation in crisis to the satisfaction and complete
approbation of all political classes, the population, and
the international community. The protesters, during their
manifestations against the regime, weren’t they chanting
everywhere “Vive L’armee”, “Hail to the Military”!
Everywhere, military personnel were considered heroes
of the day. The crowds were expressing their gratitude
with enthusiasm (Avril 1997, 176-77)!

To consolidate their power, in the months following the fall of the regime, the
military disarmed most of the Macoutes, allowed low ranking members to be
targeted for revenge killings, and arrested some of its leaders. It regained its
original role as the only coercive force and institutional power-broker in the
nation272 (Dalvius 1987). Having undermined the regime’s capacity to suppress
the masses, and destroyed its defensive capacity, the military came to be seen,
albeit erroneously, as a supporter of the emergent popular democratic
movement. It is important to note that many of the senior officers were already
paid CIA agents and as such their refusal to protect the regime may have also
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Some have argued that the presence of the police force defies the assertion of the army as the only
coercive force. What they ignore however is the fact that the Police itself was considered a branch of the
Haitian military.
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been, if not mandated, at the very least supported by the American government
(Bellegarde-Smith 1990/2004, 222).
By focusing on Duvalierist forces and specific individuals within the
military, the popular democratic movement and the military found common
cause. The support garnered by the military permitted it the space to eliminate
Duvalierist forces capable of suppressing it and undermining its dominance. Its
attempt to re-stablish order, and protect the economic and political status quo ran
counter to the interests of pro-democracy forces. Thus, it increasingly acted
against their demonstrations and demands (Chamberlain 1988). Various
attempts by ruling elites and the military to stabilize and re-assert control over the
orientation of the state and the nation failed273. The failure of ruling elites to form
an effective governing coalition allowed popular democratic forces unfettered
control of the political arena. Therefore, it was predictable that the reliance of
anti-regime forces on the military as a source of support would be short-lived.
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To following help illustrate the unsuccessful but persistent attempts of the ruling elites and the military
to re-assert themselves:








Duvalierists’ efforts to form a party failed amid political protest, foreign involvement, and other
competing elites. Instead, a law preventing their political participation for a determined period was
passed
Reactionary forces coalesced long enough to remove a liberal but that coalition did not last past his
removal
Two elections ended in bloodshed when elite elements realized the chosen candidate would not win
The military, in an attempt to limit conflict and dissent within its rank increased the number of
general from two to nine. As a Result, 7 officers were elevated to the ranks of general.
The military imposed a ban on demonstrations followed by widespread crackdowns against
democratic forces, the media, and political organizations
Despite its control over the political space and state, and its expansion of professional access to its
members, the military could not sustain the institutional coherence to effective manage the nation.
Infighting and factionalism within the military resulted in five military coups, each removing one
officer for another, the latest being to compel democratic expansion.
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Once its assertion of institutional supremacy was successful, it unleashed its fury
on the popular democratic movement trying to shape political outcomes.
Between 1987 and 1991, attempting to restrain pro-democracy forces, the
military engaged in widespread violence, targeting them in their homes,
churches, as well as polling stations in sensational acts of brutality. None of
these acts deterred the population in its demands for fair elections and
democratic accountability. However, according to General Avril, these coercive
actions taken by the military to counter the masses’ democratic demands ended
the honeymoon between civil society and the military.
The image of an army close to the people as it was
perceived at the Dawn of February 7, 1986, began to
progressively fade to give way to a sentiment of rejection
toward the institution (Avril 1997, 184).

Not only did the direct involvement of the military in the political affairs of the
state undermine its standing amongst the population, it also created friction
within the institutions itself. Much as it did, in the years following the decline of
neocolonial mulatto control of the state, the military fell prey to divergent centers
of influences, losing it institutional coherence and succumbing to internal
competition (M. S. Laguerre 1993, Avril 1997). Factionalism stemming from
personality conflicts, ideological differences between senior officers, and
antagonism between branches that competed for power under Jean-Claude’s
regime, led to violent internal schisms (M. S. Laguerre 1993, Dumas 1994,
Hallward 2007).
From the fall of Jean-Claude’s regime in 1986 to the election of a
democratic government in 1990, internal dissent and competition for power and
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control of the state undermined military cohesion and popular support. Military
officers, symptomatic of the pre-Duvalierist era, undermined the popular will, and
alternated each other in the presidential palace over the corpses of the
population seeking democracy, further destabilizing the nation. In 1988, the
Duvalierist wing of the military removed the elected president, Leslie Manigat,
and replaced it with the staunch Duvalierist, General Henry Namphy. Three
months later, left wing and democratic-leaning military officers and lower rank
soldiers arrested their high ranking Duvalierist officers and overturned the army
leadership sending General Namphy into exile and replacing him with JeanClaudist General Prosper Avril who appeared to support the Democratic
movement (Bellegarde-Smith 1990/2004, 266, Dupuis 1997). These tensions
mirrored the environment that saw the rise of the Duvalierist Noirist regime. As
Bellegarde-Smith notes,
[A] collective of about thirty non-commissioned officers
was ostensibly in charge, and their demands for a
transition to democracy resonated favorably with the
citizenry. That generals, colonels, majors, and some
‘Tonton Macoutes’ were removed from high office, gave
credibility to sergeant Joseph Heubreux and his cohort.
These men were members of Haiti’s urban and rural
lower classes, using the army to raise their social
capital... (Bellegarde-Smith 1990/2004, 226-7)

As in 1957, Progressive officers and lower ranking soldiers from working class
background sought an inclusive, more progressive politics and an accountable
system of representation. Their betrayal by General Avril and their imprisonment,
and exile of some of the higher ranking participating officers for violating the
military code, undermined their attempt to influence the formation of a responsive
government. General Avril, himself a member of the Jean-Claudist elites tied to
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the neocolonial coalition, with the support of the American embassy suppressed
the popular democratic movement and progressive forces within the military that
had brought him to power. The U.S. government demanded the elimination of the
Duvalierists still present in state institutions and most importantly in the military;
individuals who had prevented it from acquiring full control over the internal
affairs of the nation. Consequently Avril “restored the suspended Constitution of
1987, which includes a provision that bars former top supporters of the Duvalier
dictatorships from holding public office”274. It was the embassy that dictated the
members of Avril’s government and had veto power over even its military chief of
staff. As Robert Pear reported,
[T]he military chief of staff,was ruled out by the United
States Ambassador, Brunson McKinley, when General
Avril telephoned the diplomat in the hours after the coup,
as decisions were being made about who would hold the
major positions in a new government…(Pear 1988).

Congruent to its imposed clientelist infrastructure, the United States had already
re-imposed its influence over Haitian internal affairs. Thus it was not surprising
that it was they, who since the fall of the regime, demanded the prosecution of
Duvalierist elements, encouraged the overzealous anti-Duvalierist forces to
enshrine their demise in the Constitution, set the terms to prevent the re-
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See “Haiti Says 'Certain Officers' Tried To Topple the Avril Government” The Associated Press, April
3, 1989. Also the Organization of American State report “ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1988-1989, 8 September 1989” September 8, 1989
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emergence of the “macoutes”, and insisted on the protection of the
manufacturing infrastructure as conditions for the resumption of $70 million in aid
(Pear 1988, Rebu 1995, 63, Pierre-Etienne 1999, 124-8). Emboldened by
American support and seeking the resumption of American economic support,
General Avril, as did Magloire before him, engaged in arbitrary and excessive
use of force and imprisonments, and threatened to disrupt the military with
intimidation, threats, exiles, and assassinations275 (Rebu 1995). After a failed
attempt, which angered the American government276, in 1989, two of the best
trained military battalions and remnants of the officers who had participated in the
overthrow of Namphy, with the support of the population revolted. Their revolt
sent General Prosper Avril, the head of the American-supported military
government, into exile replacing him with the moderate Colonel Herard Abraham
to prepare the path for democratic elections with a civilian government led by
Ertha Pascal Trouillot (Rebu 1995, Avril 1997).

275

The Organization of American State report “ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1988-1989, 8 September 1989” September 8, 1989. Under his leadership, the mayor
of the capital, a democratic activist was arrested and tortured while the former mayor and Macoutes
leader Frank Romain was allowed to leave the country.
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The first attempt led by Himmler Rebu, Commandant of the anti-guerilla force, the Leopards, failed
which led him to take refuge in the Dominican Republic. He was extradited against his will to the United
States where he was detained for three months to prevent him from overthrowing their client
government. Given the coordination between the Dominican Republic and the United States and the fact
that they were waiting for him at the airport, one can only concur that his proximity to Haiti made him
such a danger to their client regime that the United states government was willing to intervene to protect
the regime. Nevertheless, the Leopards would strike again, this time successfully overthrowing Avril, The
General president (Rebu 1995, 150-161, Avril 1997). This attempt to overthrow Gen. Avril by the
progressive members of the military who had brought him to power, reflect the widespread disillusion
that he had betrayed their demand for a democratic government. A feeling shared by the majority of the
population (Dumas 1994, Dupuy 1997).
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This election, the most democratic ever and since, would lead to the
election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a priest, and the main leader of the popular
democratic movement. Although the infighting weakened the military, the
institution and its officer corps had re-asserted their place as the most organized
and powerful institution and group in Haitian society, and the American embassy
had, at the same time regained its pre-Duvalier role as its primary manager with
many paid CIA assets within its highest echelon (Bellegarde-Smith 1990/2004,
222).

Democratic Transition and the Search for a Responsive State:
Divisions within the ruling elites had given the mass democratic movement
full control of the political landscape. This domination of the national sphere
facilitated, not only the creation of a democratic coalition, but accelerated elite
conflict and infighting, which enabled the popular democratic movement to
capture the Presidency in the internationally monitored election in 1990 (R. J.
Fatton 2002). The Haitian democratic movement evolved and intensified in
opposition to the ruling elites and the military. It was populist as all major political
movements seeking systemic change had been since the American Occupation,
and the orchestrated violence it endured from both Duvalierist and Jean-Claudist
forces rendered it diametrically opposed to their interests.
As Kim Ives notes, the first democratic coalition was a loosely organized
platform under the banner of FNCD-(National Front for Democracy and Change)
consisting of Konakom (National Congress of Democratic Movements), PNDPH
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(Haitian National Democratic and Progressive Party, OP-17 (Popular
Organizations of September 17), MOP (Peasant Workers Party), Lavalas, a small
nationalist sector of the bourgeoisie, and the left-wing and reformist sector of the
military that placed general Abraham in power277 (Ives 1995).
In the Haitian historical context, the masses have shown flexibility toward
any regime when they believe or perceive that their core interests are being
served. No regime has acted unconstrained without popular support, unless
supported by coercive foreign powers. Authoritarian regimes, no matter their
coercive capacity, have been overthrown by the masses when their excesses
outweighed their safeguarding of the common good. Thus, the contention that,
“ultimately, the rhetoric of popular movements is in tension with the practical facts
that authoritarian regimes are almost never liable to defeat by frontal assaults”
displays unwarranted confidence in the ability of authoritarian regimes to
withstand popular pressure in Haiti, especially while experiencing internal
conflicts. Gillespie’s assertion that in political transitions,
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It is important to note that had the coalition not convinced Jean Bertrand Aristide, the popular
firebrand priest venerated by the masses, to run for President, The preferred American candidate and
neo-liberal and former World Bank economist, Marc Bazin, would have won the election. Thus the
democratic alliance and its success at the elections was a blow to American and neocolonial elites.
Historian Susie Castor, and wife of the leader of the OPL (Organization du Peuple en Lutte) argues that
besides the main political parties, the success of the democratic movement rested on women
organizations. Organizations such as Ligue Feminine d’Action Sociale, Movement Feminin Haitien,
Association des Femmes de Carriere Liberal et Commerciale, kay Fanm, Fanm D’haiti, Solidarite Fanm
Ayisyen (SOFA), Rassemblement Femmes Populaires (RFP), Fanm je Klere (FAJEK), Konbit Liberasyon Fanm
(KOLFA), Comite Feminin Contre la Torture, ASOL, FASMA, Ligue Haitienne de Defense des Droits de la
Femme Rural (LIDEFER), Syndicat du Personnel Infirmier (SPI), and neighborhood groups such as Fanm
Sen Maten, Machan Mache Salomon played a central role in both the struggle against the Jean-Claudist
Regime, subsequent military governments, and most importantly in the election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
It is these organizations that he most favored and counted upon for political support (Castor 1994).
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[T]he organized masses…must glare fiercely at the
repressive apparatuses of the authoritarian regime, and
if necessary, flex their muscles with the occasional
general strike or pot-banging protests, but then must sit
in the back seat… while political elites demobilize them
and adopt a strategy of negotiation with the authoritarian
regime, consociation amongst themselves and even
concertation with the representative of capital (Gillespsie
1991, 58).

runs counter to the Haitian experience and Haiti’s democratic transition. Unlike its
Latin American and Caribbean counterparts, the Haitian masses have always
played a central role in constraining elites, authoritarian institutions, and state
actors. While the Duvalierist regime won their allegiance by catering to their
aspirations, the betrayal of Jean-Claude’s regime had brought them out to
refashion a state responsive to their interests. Successful popular resistance and
intervention against unresponsive regimes is consistent with Haitian history,
argues Patrick Bellegarde-Smith,
Popular dissatisfaction with the status quo, lead social
groups to insert themselves into the body politic to
create ostensibly a more democratic state with equitable
access to societal resources and access to political
power (Bellegarde-Smith 1990/2004, 231).

This was true in the struggle for independence, challenges to the Boyer regime,
true in the periods of waning Northern nationalist power, the anti-Occupation and
anti-neocolonial movement that brought Noirist and the Duvalierist regime to
power, and true still in the struggle for democracy in the post- Jean-Claudist era
(Denis and Duvalier 1958, Roussiere, Rocher and Danroc 1998, Hallward 2007).
As argued in earlier chapters, the historical path to Haitian independence and
Louverturean state crafting had made the survival of any regime dependent on
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popular allegiance, and no authoritarian regime, no matter how coercive, could
survive indefinitely without this pre-requisite legitimacy.
In 1990, with a determined population having survived countless acts of
terror and intimidation, unafraid to exercise its power, 90% of qualified voters
registered to vote, the result clearly proved that the Haitian masses were doing a
lot more than banging pots. They gave Aristide a landslide victory, embarrassing
the American government by soundly rejecting its preferred candidate (Castor
1994, 57).
Table 2: 1990 Presidential Election Results
Candidate’s Name
Political Party Affiliations

Jean-Bertrand Aristide
Marc Bazin
Louis Dejoie
Hubert de Ronceray
Sylvio Claude
Six additional parties
garnered less than 5% of
the vote

FNCD
ANDP
PAIN
MDN
PDCH
MRN, PNT, MKN, MODEH,
Paradis, INDEP

Percentage of vote
received out of 90%
eligible voter
participation278
67.48%
14.21%
4.88%
3.34%
3%
4.26%

Source: The 1990 Elections in Haiti: Report of the International Election Observer Delegation
(National Republican Institute for International Affairs, 1991)

American collusion with authoritarian forces to curtail the popular sector through
coercion could not forestall the exercise of their will, nor could it prevent its
capture of the state and the presidency in a free, unhindered, democratic election
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Political Database of the Americas (1999) Haiti: 1990 Presidential Election Results / Résultats de
l'élection présidentielle de 1990. [Internet]. Georgetown University and the Organization of American
States. In: http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Haiti/90pres.html. 24 June 2000. Also see the source of
the information for greater details: "OAS Report of the Secretary General on the Organization's Support
for the Electoral Process in Haiti," 29 April 1991, p.13
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(OAS 13 December 2000, 1, Erikson 2005, Nohlen 2005, 381). As Roussiere,
Rocher, and Danroc note, “the Americans wanted a certain type of democracy,
easily controllable, that would not slide toward a truly popular awakening”
(Roussiere, Rocher and Danroc 1998, 241). Their plans were contrary to the
popular will.
After overthrowing a dictator and enduring the violence of regime elites,
the election gave the Haitian citizenry the opportunity to re-assert their control
over the orientation of the state, and secure a representative and responsive
government. Aristide’s election discredited Marc Bazin, the American client
candidate, traditional politicians, and political organizations. It demonstrated the
weakness of the officer corps in the face of external and internal pressure, and
situated the popular sector instead of the military as a primary national
powerbroker279. The first democratic transition, populist by history and
circumstance was anti-establishment, suspicious of state institutions and the
Church with their roots in the previous regime, and anti-American as all three had
attempted to frustrate their attempt to re-orient the state to secure their interests.
Faced with an elite alarmed by their loss of power, a fractured military unable to
fulfill its original role or maintain law and order, and politicians trying to secure
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By providing military equipment and training to the Haitian military despite their documented human
rights violations, the American government proved its complicity in the violent suppression of the popular
sector. Paul Farmer took notice of these weapon transactions as a way to help the military maintain
control over the popular movement (Farmer 1994). Ridgeway notes the two-faced American involvement
in Haiti; calling for democracy while at the same time undermining the popular democratic movement
(Ridgeway 1994).
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their personal interests, the popularly elected government of Aristide’s reliance
on grassroots popular organizations for support exacerbated existing tension.
By re-orienting politics toward popular grassroots organizations,
encouraging mass participation and orchestrating a devolution of power toward
mass civil society instead of foreign-funded and supported political organizations,
Aristide’s decision, whether conscious or not, became congruent with Haitian
political history. It was a deliberate attempt to rupture Haiti from its corrupt and
dependent post-Duvalierist political class to re-orient the state toward the nation
and secure his government’s popular legitimacy. As J.P. Slavin notes, mass
support and popular legitimacy were indeed his only option.
All the country’s major institutions were ill-disposed
toward Aristide: the army, because they feared for the
privileges and power they had built since the Duvalier
family collapsed in 1986; the Catholic church, because
Aristide had denounced its bishops as heartless
enemies of the people; parliament, because of Aristide’s
fragile majority; and the traditional political parties,
because he scorned their emptiness (Chamberlain 1995,
Slavin 1995, 59).

While his efforts at state re-orientation cannot be divorced from the hostility of
former regime elites toward his government, his mistrust of them, and his
unwillingness to rely on the clientelist structure for security, albeit reasonable,
also increased foreign opposition to his regime. Moreover, his actions
undermined the possibility for coalition-building, a smooth democratic transition,
and collaboration with former regime elites by accelerating the rate of structural
changes and triggering crisis responses. The following illustrates the point,


On the very day of his inauguration, he retired six of the seven military
generals and gave their successors provisional appointments.
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He forbade 160 senior level civil servants and administrators from leaving
the country under accusations of fraud
He named a cabinet composed of personal allies, rejecting members of
the coalition of the parties that facilitated his election rather than relying on
the coalition to govern.
In an attempt to further undermine the depleted military high command, he
had frequent meetings with the rank-and-file soldiers and to secure their
allegiance, allotted $6 million to improve their working conditions.
He created two independent presidential guards to secure the presidency
and reduce the possibility of a military coup, which was seen as a
counterbalance of the military thus a threat
In accordance to the constitution, he attempted to separate the police
force from the military, established since the occupation and to place it
under civilian control
Short of a legislative majority, in an ill-conceived attempt to consolidate his
power and control, he formed his own coalition party280, depriving his
former coalition party elites a position to secure their party and personal
interests
Last, but not least, he raised the minimum wage from $2.00 to $3.50 a
day, angering the Jean-Claudist manufacturing elites and their foreign
allies backers281

Aristide’s overreliance on the popular sector for security and protection rather
than existing institutions, and his attempt to monopolize the political process
reflect the fault line in popularly driven democratic transitions. His use of the
Duvalierist strategy constrained by the democratic environment represented a
type of presidential democratic model one finds in countries with unreliable or
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Aristide’s new coalition composed of APN – National Popular Assembly, MPP – Movement Paysan
Papaye, and Lavalas. The shift from coalition politics to political monopolization reflected a tendency
toward presidentialism prevalent in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa. According to democracy
scholar Shin Do, presidential democracies seem to fare better in those regions even though a
parliamentary and multi-party systems are more conducive to democracy (Shin 1994).
281

The National Republican Institute for International Affairs. The 1990 Elections in Haiti. Report of the
International Election Observer Delegation. 1991, 54-5. Also see (Slavin 1995) for details on Aristide’s
governance strategy and Elites reactions.

367

weak institutions and an entrenched elite capable of upending the democratic
transition (O'Donnel 1996). Unlike Duvalier who mastered control of the coercive
apparatus of the state to pursue political and social change and shift the
orientation of the state, Aristide erroneously relied on mass intimidation and
protests to effect the orientation of the state and offset the power of authoritarian
forces. His was a presidentialism of the weak, best characterized by Stepan and
Skach (1993, 20) as “Presidential Democracy”.
According to these scholars, presidential democracies emerge when
democratically-elected Presidents feel they have a personal mandate but lack a
legislative majority to fulfill that mandate and attack key parts of political society
and state institutions capable of subverting their mandates (legislatures, parties,
elites, and military). Faced with an unsecure environment, they increasingly rely
on “state-people” or state-society political discourse that tends to marginalize
organized groups in political and civil society and within the state itself (G.
O'Donnell 1991, Stepan and Skach 1993, 20). Determined to fulfill his mandate,
legislative obstructionists were met with threats from the popular sector rather
than negotiations and compromise. In a democratic transition where political
coalition with remnants of regime forces could have helped reduce conflicts and
instability, Aristide’s presidentialism, and his reliance on the popular sector,
enthusiastic but weak, undermined the possibility for democratic coalitionbuilding with moderate elite Duvalierist and Jean-Claudist forces. Instead, he
provided the rationale for competing elite forces to coalesce against his
government by increasing the threat factor.
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Aristide’s maximalist tendencies were symptomatic of a popularly elected
democratic regime trying to do too much too early in a post-authoritarian
institution-light environment. Even his attempt to act according to constitutional
mandates ran counter to elites’ interests, pitting it against the authoritarian
institutional norms of the previous regimes, and entrenched corporate elite
interests. The Constitutional requirement that the police force be independent of
the army, and the democratic government’s attempt to fulfill it went against
military interests. Given that the police had been its primary intelligence force, the
military high command, already targeted, saw the creation of an independent
police force, which it had controlled for more than 50 years as another attempt to
deprive it of much needed resources and undermine its power and influence (M.
S. Laguerre 1993, Avril 1997).
Aristide’s monopolization of the political space, his outward attacks on
state institutions - remnants of Duvalierist and Jean-Claudist regimes- and his
reliance on the popular sector have been criticized by scholars as the reimposition of authoritarianism. However, his actions can be better understood as
an attempt to re-establish the state-society (or as was coined by Duvalier “Étatpeuple / Peuple- État”) interdependence so central to the Louverturean model
that had been diluted by Jean-Claudism. His drive to create a new state-people
relations more accountable and responsive to the need of the majority, as well as
to expand the ‘distributional coalitions’ was designed to refashion the state itself
and re-orient it toward the population.
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The suggestion by scholars that democratic transition and consolidation in
a post-authoritarian environment requires the development of a new kind of State
and the establishment of a new distributional coalition to prevent regression
toward authoritarianism is very important in analyzing Aristide’s action during his
eight months in office (Flisfisch 1991, 9-20). Haitian elites and the U.S.
government’s reaction to his regime were directly related to his attempt to create
the conditions for a more accountable and responsive state. In this vein, James
Morrell puts it best,
[H]e took over a state administration that served chiefly
as a device for enrichment of the top families. When he
moved to trim ghost workers from the payroll, enforce
customs collection, and end monopolies, the families
staged their coup (Morrell September 1993, 1).

Thus the overthrow of the first democratic government nine months after Aristide
was elected to office is the direct result of his efforts to re-orient the state and a
response to the threat those efforts posed to former regime elites. The argument
that,
[T]he planners and perpetrators of the 1991 coup were
clearly Haiti’s old-guard elite: the oligarchic families and
their allies in the brass, who were terrified of the masses
of poor to whom Aristide and his Lavalas movement
gave voice and vote (NACLA – Haiti: Dangerous
Crossroads 1995)

may not tell the whole story. What they feared most was the capture and reorientation of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure toward those black majority
masses by popular democratic forces. The first post-Duvalierist and post-JeanClaudist democratic transitions were successful because of a coalition which it
failed to maintain, and it was overthrown because of another more powerful
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coalition by entrenched elites. The failure of the first democratic government to
maintain its coalition and prevent regime forces from reasserting their power is
characteristic of the inability of popular democracies whose overconfidence of the
power of popular forces leave them unprepared to withstand pressures and
counter-measures from more entrenched elite groups. It demonstrates the
internal organizational challenges faced by those loosely held coalitions that
bring popular democratic governments to power.
The success of procedural democracy marked by a 90% electoral
participation and overwhelming popular support lacked the foundation for a
sustainable approach to meeting popular demands and expectations. The
government that emerged, despite its legitimacy, lacked the institutional capacity
necessary to support its goals, and the unity, discipline, and flexibility necessary
in a hostile post-dictatorship environment to address its own internal problems as
well as prevent the coalescing of reactionary forces (Ethier 1986, Blais and Dion
1990). Its frontal attack on the military and failure to form alliances with moderate
sectors of Duvalierist and Jean-Claudist elites undermined its stability.
Aristide’s determination to fulfill the popular mandate and alleviate the
deprivation of his supporters, his respect for their rights and actions to undermine
structures that have disenfranchised them, although an asset to the democratic
government in securing its legitimacy, ultimately failed because his government
lacked the power and institutional depth to implement it. While some analysts
correctly argue that it was impossible to bridge the gap with an opposition that
was bent on destroying the democratic process, and that the first democratic
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government was on the defensive even before the presidential inauguration, the
failure to formulate an adequate response to the political environment cannot be
overlooked (Dupuy 1989, Yves 1995, R. J. Fatton 2002). Aristide could neither
keep its more radical members away from the decision-making process and
center of power, nor integrate the more moderate segment of regime forces into
its coalition. Thus, the first democratically elected government lacked the
constitutive elements necessary for a stable democratic transition and
governance in a nation emerging from more than thirty years of authoritarian
governments to facilitate its own survival. At its core, the post-Jean-Claudist
movement that resulted in the democratically-elected Aristide was anti-American,
just as was the Noirist movement that brought Francois Duvalier to power, and
naturally, nationalist and populist it sought to disrupt the clientelist arrangements
imposed on the Haitian state. Thus the U.S. government was happy to facilitate
and bless the military coup that upended the popular democratic movement. Yet,
it would be disingenuous to contend that the failure of the first elected
government was solely the result of foreign meddling and authoritarian elites.
The conditions for the persistence of the democratic regime were far from ideal.

The Roots of the Haitian Post-Duvalierist Democratic Experience:
Some scholars are quick to fault more than thirty years of dictatorship, and
the culture of authoritarianism it imposed on the population as barriers to
democracy (Huntington 1984, Huntington 1993, R. Fatton 1999, R. J. Fatton
2002). Others have focused on the foundation of the Haitian state as the primary
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obstacle to nation-building and democracy (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, Ruffat 1991). As
I have documented, the population has historically not only insisted on the
establishment of government accountable and responsive to their needs, but
more importantly, sought governments whose legitimacy is based on a strong
state-people interdependence. While the analysis of Haitians and the Haitian
state as obstacle may not be without merit, it is not the people and Haitian state
in its original crafting that should be the focus of critical analyses, but the
imposition of a dependent neocolonial clientelist state, historically in opposition to
the popular will (P. R. Girard 2010, Gros 2012). From the outset, the Haitian
democratic movement faced structural challenges. It sought to re-establish statesociety relations divergent from the type of unresponsive democracy possible
with the neocolonial clientelist model (Gros 1997). It sought a nationally oriented
state while an externally oriented and directed one existed. It demanded an
economically responsive state while the neocolonial and neoliberal model
imposed a coercive but institutionally weak state devoid of economic
independence and the institutional capacity to manage its economic affairs and
deliver socio-economic benefits to the majority classes.
Whereas the Duvalierist state had the capacity to meet the popular
democratic demands but did not, the dependent neocolonial clientelist state was
never crafted to serve the population282. It not only lacked the ability to expand to
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It is important to note that the Duvalierist regime was constrained by the constant military attack on
his regimes and the neocolonial state within which it emerged and operated but had subdued enough
power to meet some demands from Democratic forces, weak and themselves the targets of Duvalierist
violence.
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meet the demands of the population but its outward orientation runs counter to
the national welfare. At the time of Haiti’s transition, the regulatory Duvalierist
state had given way to the laissez-faire outwardly directed orientation demanded
by its neoliberal patrons. It had contracted, been privatized, and had been
dispossessing the population and the nation of its last resources (Dupuy 1989). It
was in opposition to this coercion and dispossession that the democratic
movement emerged. Thus, the national context within which Haitian democracy
began and flourished posed some challenges to democratic transition and
consolidation theorists (Bazin 1995, Pierre-Etienne 1999). Those challenges
must be understood within the context of the dependent neocolonial clientelist
infrastructure and the lack of political legitimacy, institutional accountability, and
economic deprivation it created. What is clear however, is that despite those
challenges, the cultural and historical inclination of the population toward
democracy and democratic accountability and their historical struggle for a
legitimate and responsive state were the driving forces behind Haitian democracy
(Danrock and Roussiere 1995, Roussiere, Rocher and Danroc 1998, Hallward
2007). Unlike democratic transitions in Latin America, it was not the middle class
or the elites that demanded democracy and state accountability; it was the
masses. It was not that the Haitians masses were not democratic, but perhaps
they were too democratic for the dependent clientelist infrastructure imposed on
them.

374

Democratic Transition: Requisites, Pre-requisites, and Assumptions:
There is consensus amongst many democratization theorists that the
existence of certain political and institutional conditions within a nation is
indicative of its potential for democratic governance (Lipset 1960, Dahl 1971,
Huntington 1996). It continues to be widely understood that the real possibility for
change in government through electoral competition, cogent political participation
and stable constitutional and institutional frameworks formed the key prerequisites for democratization (Ethier 1986, Flisfisch 1991, 13, Lipset 1993,
Lawson 1993). These pre-requisites, they advance, “constitute the lasting,
universal, necessary conditions of any democracy” (Legters, Burke and
DiQuattro 1994, 132, Tirado 1998). The consensus that free and fair elections,
inclusive suffrage, eligibility for all public office, enforced rights to freedom of
expression, free access to alternative sources of information for all, and the right
to form and join organizations unimpeded directly contradicted Haitian reality.
Much like they orchestrated the Haitian revolution and independence, at the cost
of life and limb, the Haitian polis orchestrated a democratic transition with sheer
determination. More remarkably, the absence of a significant middle-class, a
debilitating economic decline and monetary devaluation, and a comparably low
literacy rate, all of which conditions that are contrary to democratic transitions
from authoritarian rule, did not deter the Haitian populace from pushing their
nation toward accountable democratic governance (O'Donnell and Schmitter
1986, Huntington 1996, Dupuis 1997, Tirado 1998, Guo 1999).
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The characterization of democratic transitions as struggles of middle and
upper classes against authoritarian regimes for an expansion of political and
human rights and for a share in the economic decision-making and institutional
control is not reflective of the Haitian experience (G. Pierre 1971, Saint-Gerard
1988, Shin 1994, R. Fatton 1999). The explicit stipulations for democratic
transitions advanced by democratization theorists show that,
1. A strong and institutionally dense state exists to facilitate the transition
from authoritarianism to democracy. “no state no democracy” (Linz and
Stepan 1996, 14-5)
2. National institutions as stable and strong enough to withstand the shock
of democratic transition, and are able to adapt to reforms, a new statesociety relations and political environment
3. At the time of the transition, “democracy was the only game in town”,
leaving political leaders with little options but to engage in the democratic
process (Dahl 1971). In other words, authoritarian elites no longer felt
their interests threatened by a loss of political power and control over the
state
4. Demands for democratic governance encapsulated a shift from
authoritarian to democratic culture by the polis and authoritarian elites
5. Institutions are strong, respected and able to impose constraints on
participants in the democratic process, and are capable of preserving
their autonomy while serving as arbiter and rule enforcer
6. Core state institutions and state elites have the capacity to identify and
safeguard the interests of the state and the nation. They are able to adapt
to transition from maintaining the status quo of the authoritarian regime to
a new role of balancing interests and maintaining stability. More pointedly,
scholars foresaw
a. A competent military capable of securing the nation’s sovereignty
and borders
b. A reliable civilian controlled Police force with the ability to sustain
law and order
c. An independent judiciary able to dispense justice to all citizens
equally regardless of positions
d. Competent and experienced parliamentarians able to engage in
constructive debates and prescriptions
e. Core state professionals primarily concerned about preserving the
integrity of state institutions and supporting the common good
7. In sum, scholars stipulated a state with the institutional, regulatory, and
personnel capacity to both manage transition and adapt to the
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transformations it engenders (Huntington 1984, 212, Sangmpam 1996,
Gros 1997).
As we have demonstrated, none of the conditions for democratization, as
stipulated by democracy scholars, existed in Haiti. Democracy was the demand
of a population, culturally and organically democratic who by both history and
national culture had always been at the forefront of reforms and re-establishing
the legitimacy of the state by re-structuring state-society relations. Haitian
democratization began with a declining economy, contracting state, and
weakening institutions, thus a lower capacity for redistribution and state
absorption. Given these realities, the democracy demanded by the population,
and that advocated by scholars, diverged. The population did not simply seek a
procedural democracy and the preservation of existing authoritarian institutions
that supported their marginalization. They sought to transform institutions to not
only secure grassroots democratic governance but more importantly, they
endeavored to refashion a new state capable of meeting their distributional
demands and addressing their continued deprivation and dispossession
intensified by Jean-Claudism. With a failing economy, an inadequate educational
system that neglected the majority of the population, a judiciary that had long
ceased to protect it from authoritarian excesses and was no longer relied upon to
dispense justice, and a political system that had found itself disconnected from
them, the Haitian masses demanded a re-adjustment. In this context, they
challenged all those who benefited from the established order and wished to
maintain it. It has been and continues to be the Haitian masses that pressure the
society toward democratic governance and accountability at great costs.
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The orchestrated coup that brought down the democratic government
therefore was no accident. The exile of Aristide and the systematic targeting of
democracy activists, rather than deterring democratic activism and protests,
accelerated them. According to Hampton, during the week following the toppling
of Aristide, 1,500 democracy activists had been killed (Rampton 1994). As
Stephen Engelberg points out, the coup and subsequent violence cannot be
divorced from the patron of the clientelist infrastructure,
[T]he leader of one of Haiti's most infamous paramilitary
groups was a paid informer of the Central Intelligence
Agency for two years and was receiving money from the
United States while his associates committed political
murders and other acts of repression, Government
officials said today. Emmanuel (Toto) Constant, the head
of the organization known as Fraph, was still on the
C.I.A.'s payroll in October 1993 (Engelberg 1994).

This was confirmed by Rep. Robert Torricelli (D-NJ), member of the House
Intelligence and Foreign Affairs Committee, who asserted that "It should not be a
surprise to anyone that the assets of the United States include people in
sensitive positions in the current situation in Haiti" (Weiner 1993, Bernstein and
Levine 1993, Gale 1995). Haitians, and most importantly, democratic activists,
experienced widespread oppression and violence by the military aided by Front
Pour L’Avancement et Le Progress Haitien (FRAPH), the newly organized, CIAfinanced paramilitary group283 (Chan 2007, Mechanic 2009, Grann 2001). The
summary executions, torture, rapes, imprisonments and death squads, the
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The leader of The Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH), Emmanuel Toto Constant,
and the group were paid monthly for their services. See HaitiInsight vol. 6, No. 6, Aug/Sept 1996. Also see
the Press release of the Center for Constitutional Rights on October 25, 2008.
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alliance between the CIA, military, elites and FRAPH, while it decimated the
ranks of democracy activists did not succeed in undermining their resolve. It
proved historically consistent, that the Haitian populace once determined, could
not be deterred by violence and coercion.

The Post-Coup Era: The Survival of Accountable Democratic Politics:
Attempts by the democratic government of Aristide to return from exile and
assume its legitimate leadership of the state were frustrated by the Bush and
later Clinton administrations while their representatives met regularly with,
coached, organized the opposition284 and funded the military and paramilitary’s
attacks on democratic activists (Grann 2001, Dupuy 2007). Aristide’s insistence
on returning to Haiti to continue his term made him vulnerable to international
demands and influences. He was compelled to:





Agree to consider the time in exile as time served
Negotiate an amnesty that would leave military leaders who orchestrated
the coup in their post
Modernize the armed forces, thus enhancing the primary tools for foreign
and elite interventions
Nominate a new Prime minister from the opposition, one that would be
supported by the economic elites who overthrew him
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The author witnessed weekly meetings between the American embassy and high level members of the
opposition. Leaders of OPL and their emerging leadership cohorts, though they cannot be accused of
collaborating with FRAPH, certainly did so with their organizers and funders, namely the American
government through its embassy. The Bush administration undermined its own embassy who sought to
return Aristide to power (Morrell September 1993, 3). On May 17, 1994, it was reported that the
American Ambassador to Haiti Lawrence A. Pezzullo collusion with the coup leaders had hampered
Clinton policy implementation. More damming was the leaked embassy memo that demonstrated the
involvement of the American government in supporting the coup plotters and undermining the
legitimately elected government (Ridgeway 1994, 104-7).
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Reorganized the police force, which he had tried to do prior to the coup as
mandated by the constitution

The Governors Island Accords Agreement organized by the U.S., which Aristide
signed, left him without the power and leverage to effect change and be
responsive to the needs and demands of the population285. Moreover, by obliging
Aristide’s democratic government to grant amnesty and collaborate with the
forces that massacred more than five thousand democratic activists, the U.S.
sought to undermine its legitimacy while maintaining authoritarian control of the
state and of the democratic process.
As the primary sponsors of the agreement, the U.S. government sought to
contain Aristide, and redirect the democratic transition from its populist roots into
the framework of the neocolonial infrastructure (Bazin 1995, Hallward 2007,
Dupuy 2007). The most important aspect of that redirection and the conditions
that facilitated his return however, was the World Bank structural adjustment
agreement of August 1994. As a condition for re-establishing democratic
governance, he agreed to implement the neoliberal policies he had railed against
by privatizing the nine state-owned industries, the primary vehicle for
employment and state revenue established by the Duvalierist regime to absorb
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Despite the Governor’s Accord agreement, the military and elite refused to allow for a resumption of
democratic politics and the return of Aristide, which resulted in the imposition of an embargo by the
American government… See Federal Register Presidential Documents, Vol. 59, No. 113, Tuesday, June 14,
1994. Title 3—
The President, Executive Order 12920 of June 10, 1994, Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to
Haiti.
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the middle and working class population into the state system in which they
previously had no part (Dupuis 1997, Wah 1997-1998). This push by France, the
U.S and Canada to privatize these state-owned industries and deprive the state
of important sources of revenue and employment for the population, sought to
finally do to the Duvalierist/Noirist state what Jean-Claudism could not fully
achieve: undermine the last vestiges of the Duvalierist state’s political legitimacy
and independence. Aristide’s seeming capitulation, his promise to implement the
neoliberal policies so maligned by him previously, and the mandate that he
himself sell the privatization concept to the populace facilitated his return and the
show of force exercised by the U. S. to reurn him to power accompanied by the
Marines (Wah 1997-1998).
It is well documented that the U. S, France, and Canada endeavored to
delay and undermine Aristide’s government, thus their collaboration for his return
after he agreed to their demands cannot be interpreted outside of the imposed
neoliberal policies and privatization286 (Ridgeway 1994, 104-7, Rother 1995,
Hallward 2007). They sought to privatize the nation’s two banks, its primary
source of electricity, its flour company, which provided a major resource for
consumption and employment, its cement company that not only produced
cement for the nation but exported some abroad, its lucrative telephone
company, and the airport, the only hub of international transportation and an
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Why did the French and American government change their position from advocating that Aristide
should permanently step aside because he was mentally ill, and responsible for the military coup and the
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important source of revenue. Tatiana Wah, hired to facilitate the privatization
process, argues that those state entities were dysfunctional, inefficient and
produced little revenue and services to the population (Wah 1997-1998, 16). Yet,
she also maintains that the less lucrative animal feed company was ignored, and
international bids and investors poured in, suggesting therefore that the
companies slated for privatization were desirable entities that were sought after
by those seeking economic benefits. Privatization, as imposed on Aristide and
Haiti, was simply state dispossession, good for western profiteers but bad for the
nation and its citizenry. By demanding that Aristide personally advocate for the
privatization of state-owned companies, the U.S., France and Canada sought to
undercut his popularity and legitimacy and reorient him and his democratic
regime away from its populist supporters already openly wondering whether he
had betrayed them while in exile. More importantly, these so called “friends of
Haiti” sought to undermine the capacity of the state and the surviving Duvalierist
politics of national independence through dispossession and by re-establishing
the military-centered neocolonial clientelist infrastructure Duvalier had so
thoroughly demolished.
Aristide’s return also marked a turning point in Haitian history, in that for
the first time since the American invasion and Occupation, U.S. troops had
landed on Haitian soil seemingly to reinstitute democratic governance and more
importantly to curtail and constrain the brand of democratic populism required for
a responsive and accountable government. The soft-landing of U.S. forces was
not altruistic nor reflected a belief in democracy, it was instead the
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implementation of a new paradigm of dominance centered on democracy, state
weakness, and neoliberal dispossession. Whereas military-centered dictatorship
was needed to maintain U.S. interests earlier, the calculus had changed.
Democracy became the new vehicle to facilitate American neoliberal policies
within the dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. The miscalculations of
the military high command in preventing the return of Aristide following the
signing of the Governors Island Accords undermined the position of the institution
and ultimately resulted in their exile. They assumed wrongly that American
interests necessitated their presence, as negotiated, and did not foresee the
economic agreements and the landing of American armed forces. Having
negotiated the privatization agreement, Aristide recognized the strength of his
position and pressured the U.S. government through his associates, to disarm
the Haitian military. As Ira Kurzban, Aristide’s general counsel forcefully argued,
‘[T]o have true democracy in Haiti, you must disarm
those people whom the President of the United States
has called thugs and murderers,’ “If you don't disarm the
Haitian Army and the paramilitary organizations, not only
could you not have democracy, but you're putting
American soldiers in harm's way.’ (Greenhouse 1994)

He had counted on the convergence of interests to influence the process and
reshape the national socio-political landscape. It seems clear, that while
negotiating his return and making concessions, Aristide had no intentions of
making good on his privatization agreements but hoped, once in Haiti, to
refashion the political landscape. Much as neocolonial elites did at the eve of the
1915 American invasion, Aristide capitalized on the historic vulnerability of the
Haitian military. Neither the Clinton Administration, nor the military, recognized
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Aristide’s manipulation in convincing them to disband the very vehicle of their
control. While it may well have been true that a military-centered regime was no
longer necessary, the threat of military intervention and coercion was still useful.
Without the military as a political arbiter and foreign interests’ protector, the
constraints that could be imposed on a democratic regime were purely economic
without the threat of force or regime overthrow. Landing in Haiti a month prior to
Aristide’s return, and with the high command gone and the military in transition,
the American forces occupied Haitian military barracks, confiscated their heavy
weaponry, and disarmed most of the military personnel to prevent hostile actions
from rogue members of the military (Risen 1994). Whereas Duvalier offset the
power of the outward-directed military by using the Tontons Macoutes and
sustained violence, Aristide use the American government to undermine the very
institution it had depended on to secure its interest. By confiscating their
weapons and placing them in a subordinate and ineffective role, The American
government unwittingly provided the perfect opportunity for Aristide to shape the
political terrain by becoming impervious to armed threats from within and
unmitigated foreign pressure (B. Graham 1994).
Once in Haiti, the temporary alliance with the international community
would be strained by the military question287. Although tamed and temporarily
constrained by his commitment to the international community, and the presence
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of foreign military forces, Aristide wasted no time to deal a death blow to the
Haitian military, retiring the remaining senior officers and reducing the force from
seven thousands to fifteen hundred. He would later disband the entire force,
leaving the police as the only coercive state institution under civilian
leadership288. Aristide had managed to out-fox the fox and forced it to help
dismantle its primary vehicle for protecting the neocolonial clientelist
infrastructure it had imposed on the nation, and which it had been re-fashioning
since the fall of the Duvalierist regime. The elimination of the military removed
the structure of coercion capable of influencing the orientation of the state
threatening the international order. The vacuum and threat to the dependent
neocolonial infrastructure led to the imposition of a U. N. military presence under
the guise of providing security to the population. However, besides those
embedded in the management of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure or
benefiting from it, most Haitians saw the presence of U.N. forces as an
unwarranted occupation. The demise of the military also delegitimized most of
the political parties whose leaders, in various ways, collaborated with post-coup
governments giving Aristide even greater political leverage than the
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manufactured opposition289. With the military out of the way, he reneged on his
privatization agreements, forced the opposition-supported Prime Minister, a
staunch proponent of privatization, to resign, and negotiated with former political
allies now turned competitors due to foreign influence290.
The loose coalition that propelled him to the Presidency had coalesced
into a potent party, the “Organization du Peuple en Lutte – OPL (Organization of
the People in Struggle)”, led by Dr. Gerard Pierre-Charles. Its leaders sought to
curtail Aristide’s power by moving from a personalized Aristide-centered politics
to an institutional framework of party-centered decision-making. This newly
formed party whose leaders met regularly with the American embassy officials to
strategize, was, rightfully, viewed with suspicions by Aristide’s entourage as they
sought to dictate the terms under which decisions were permissible. Rather than
collaborating with Aristide to form a stable and responsive government, OPL
sought to control every aspect of decision-making and all key ministerial posts to
curtail Aristide’s power and influence. Having not acquired the popular legitimacy
enjoyed by Aristide, and having been coached and funded by the American
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embassy, OPL sought to highjack its way to power through him. Their political
maneuvering and diktats led to a schism between Aristide, his entourage, and
members of OPL. These schisms also brought to light the two main tendencies
within the party.
According to senior members of OPL, Aristide’s anti-institutionalism had to
be kept in check for democracy to survive, and this attempt to move the party
from personalization to institutionalization was resisted by the President and his
supporters. OPL strategy to block Aristide from forming his own cabinet
independent of the party he barely knew, their insistence that he conform to party
politics, and their unwillingness to support the recuperation of the three years
spent in exile, led Aristide to distance himself from the party. His capitulation to
the prime ministerial position, and his acquiescence to their demands did not
translate into his support for them. Thus, Aristide undermined his own cabinet as
he was unable to trust them to follow his mandate. This forced Prime Minister
Smack Michel, who had been thrusted upon him to pursue privatization, to resign
due to his lack of collaboration with him. Haiti was being pressured to implement
neoliberal policies and the U. S. government asserted, perhaps with too much
confidence,
[T]he Haitian government has moved to implement the
program of economic liberalization which it discussed at
the August 1994 Paris meeting of the Consultative
Group. This liberalization of its economy will provide a
freer, more competitive atmosphere for business
development. Haitian government actions to lower tariffs,
sign the Uruguay Round, reach an understanding with
the IMF on economic policy goals and consider moves
toward privatization of state enterprises provide grounds
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for confidence in the future course of the Haitian
economy291.

Aristide had not implemented the program of liberalization as suggested by the
White House Press Secretary. He saw the pressures toward economic
liberalization as an attempt to divest the state of both its resources and
independence and protected the state by disavowing the privatization
agreements. His refusal to implement policies he thought detrimental to the state
and the nation ran counter to his party and foreign mandates. As Wah confirms,
“the Fickleness on the privatization issue”, and “the lack of governmental
commitment” led to investor malaise and flight. Aristide’s public condemnation of
the agreements he had signed, which created tension between him and the
Prime Minister and fostered animus between the Prime Minister and popular
organizations was not without consequence. Wah, whose job was to facilitate the
implementation of neoliberal policies and the national privatization scheme,
observed,
[O]n October 13, 1995, the prime minister who
vigorously supported privatization resigned, privatization
disputes being central to that decision… The
capriciousness of the Haitian government and its leaders
vis-à-vis the privatization program and the antagonistic
attitude it had toward the foreign sponsored privatization
unit scuttled the program292 (Wah 1997-1998, 17-8).

291

THE WHITE HOUSE, Office of the Press Secretary, PRESIDENTIAL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MISSION TO
HAITI, Release March 2, 1995.
292

Although the author alluded to as much, the emphasis in italics .is mine

388

However, there was nothing capricious about the decisions of the Haitian
government. Aristide had successfully blocked the privatization process by
undermining the foreign-impose Prime Minister and other cabinet members who
supported the program to forestall the fleecing of the state (Rother 1995). The
subsequent two Prime Ministers, Claudette Werleigh and Rosny Smart, showed
little interest in pursuing the privatization mandate, ignoring existing bids for
those companies and allowing them to expire. His strategy angered American,
French, and Canadian policy-makers and members of OPL, but was congruent
with the Louverturean and Duvalierist strong state model. As a result of Aristide’s
strategy of frustrating privatization efforts, Tatiana Wah, hired to supervise the
privatization process argues, “Haiti may have lost all credibility vis-à-vis private
sector participants, particularly in the international community” (Wah 1997-1998,
18).
By the end of his term, Aristide had, despite the pressure, accomplished
two major goals in less than two years: 1) the disbanding of the military - the
bulwark of the dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure, and 2)
preservation of state-owned industries, therefore lessening the economic
dependence of the state and maintaining a degree of political independence and
the ability to meet popular demands. Contrary to Gros’ assertions that divergent
political tendencies within parties, lack of cohesive leadership, and internal
competition for power, undermined political stability and democratic governance,
Aristide’s leadership and vision even in such an environment, managed to create
the political space for a new social contract between the state, its political and

389

economic elites, and the nation (Gros 1997). Without a military to enforce its will
and protect its interests, refashioning a state responsive to some of the
redistributive and political demands of the population became a reality. In this
context, the prevailing narrative that he accomplished little during the remainder
of his first presidency would need re-evaluating. The failure was the inability of
neocolonial, Duvalierist, and Jean-Claudist elites to renounce their zero-sum
clientelist politics for a more nationally-oriented coalition politics centered on the
common good.
This failure created tension between the popular President and opposing
elites and OPL that persisted until the end of his term. The party’s nomination of
his friend and first Prime Minister, René Préval, as the candidate for the
Presidency, to acquire his blessings proved unconvincing. Continued conflict
between OPL loyalists and Aristide’s supporters undermined coherence in
parliamentary elections and parliamentary decision-making293. The conflict
between Aristide and OPL leadership was both a political and ideological
struggle for control and orientation of the state; Aristide for a more populist and
nationally oriented agenda, and OPL for a more centrist, institutionalized state,
and internationally oriented politics of national development through investment
and state divestment. Thus, the political disconnect can be understood within the
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historical tension over state formation and orientation. It was not therefore
unpredictable that Aristide would refuse to support the OPL candidate.
Conscious of his popular support and ability to influence electoral outcome,
Aristide’s refusal to openly support his close associate and former Prime Minister
due to the behaviors of OPL leaderships, and only publicly supporting his
candidacy two days before the elections, was both a show of force and harbinger
for greater conflicts in the horizon. Consequently, voter turnout was at its lowest.
Out of 3,668,049 eligible electors, 1,140,523 or 31.09 % participated instead of
the 90% registered voter participation in the election of Aristide (Nohlen 2005,
392). However late, the highly sought endorsement by Aristide, enabled OPL to
dominate the elections winning 17 out of 18 seats in the Senate, and 68 out of 83
in the Chamber of Deputies as well as the presidency294.

Table 3: 1995 Presidential Election Results
% of votes cast out of 31.09% of
Candidate/Party
eligible voter participation
René García Préval (OPL) 87.9
Léon Jeune (Independent) 2.5
Victor Benoît (KONAKOM) 2.3
TOTAL (incl. others)
100.0
Source: D. Nohlen (2005) Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook, Volume 1 (New York:
Oxford University Press) p. 392.

Although Aristide’s last minute endorsement had secured an overwhelming
victory, it either came too late to motivate most of the population to participate in
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the election or they too understood the power of their vote and participation,
deciding that the outcome would preserve their interests. Although Preval
garnered 87.9% of the vote, the total dominance of parliamentary elections by
OPL was in name only as it elected mostly Aristide’s supporters. The
parliamentarians were divided between Aristide’s supporters and OPL supporters
who would become the opposition. The elections and political jockeying that
surrounded them also made two things clear to national actors as well as foreign
governments with a stake in Haitian national political outcomes:
1) Aristide had the overwhelmingly support of the Haitian population and had the
capacity to influence the orientation of the nation and state
2) He could not be defeated in any free and fair electoral competition
The Preval government enjoyed neither the confidence of OPL, because of
his relationship with Aristide, nor the full support of Aristide who saw it as an
attempt to impose the U.S. agenda. With limited support from Aristide, saddled
with a Constitution that sapped the Presidency of all powers, and a deeply
divided parliament undermining its decisions, it became mired in gridlock (Gros
1997, R. J. Fatton 2002, Dupuy 2007). Vulnerable to foreign pressure and
without adequate national support, the government of Rene Preval felt compelled
to implement some of the liberalization and privatization policies Aristide had
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reneged on amidst popular resistance295. As the American diplomatic cable296
makes clear, the Preval government under the leadership of OPL wasted no time
implementing the neoliberal agenda:





It established legislation on the privatization of public enterprises, which
allows foreign firms to invest in the management and/or ownership of
Haitian state-owned enterprises.
It created the Commission for the Modernization of Public Enterprises
(CMEP) in 1996 to facilitate the privatization process by creating
strategies to privatize Haitian state enterprises.
It privatized two Haitian state-owned enterprises; the flour company
(minoterie) now Moulins d’Haiti, and the lucrative Cement factory that
produces cement for national and international consumption.
It allowed private sector investment in electricity generation to compensate
for the state electricity company's (Electricite d'Haiti - EDH) inability to
supply sufficient power.

The Preval government also sought to privatize the state telecommunications
company (TELECO), the Port-au-Prince airport, and the important national
seaports. This push to privatize, however forced by foreign powers, resulted in
widespread resistance from the masses, and some of the most popular and
reputable democratic organizations. For example, the Haitian Women Solidarity
(SOFA) wrote,
[M]any people want to make believe that we have no
other choice [but to privatize] because we have a big
budget deficit. But what measures has the state ever
taken to sustain and control those [public] enterprises?
We believe that privatization does not mean profitability
nor better service. On the contrary, privatization will
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weaken the state even more, a state which has never
taken up its responsibilities to the people. Privatization
will eliminate the possibility for the people to get
services... The state should look for ways to meet the
people's needs. We don't need a servant state, nor a
puppet state, but rather a state which is able to build a
participatory democracy where people can live in dignity,
where there is justice, and where everybody lives
equally.

The National Popular Assembly (APN) on the other hand argued,
Preval talks about promoting national production while at
the same time saying that he has to privatize all the state
enterprises. We say to Preval that national production
and the neo-liberal plan are irreconcilable [let ak sitron].
They are 2 things which can't go together [pa domi nan
menm kabann]. It is precisely because of the neo-liberal
plan that the big imperialist countries, headed by the
U.S., encouraged Jean-Claude Duvalier to open up the
country to allow imported rice from Miami to freely flood
the country and destroy rice production in the Artibonite
Valley. Under this same plan, the U.S. ordered Duvalier
to kill the Creole pigs of the peasants [in 1981-82] and
made [former Finance Minister and present Central Bank
head Leslie] Delatour close [the state-run sugar refinery]
Darbonne, [the state-run essential oils plant] ENAOL,
[the state-run sugar refinery] Welch, etc.

More importantly, APN challenged the notion of unproductive and inefficient
state-owned industries, blaming the state and its leaders for mismanagement.
“Preval says the state industries don't give good service. If Preval has a short
memory,” they argue,
[W]e must remind him that during the 7 months of his
government [in 1991], it was he himself who praised the
revenues that the public enterprises brought the Haitian
state in only 2 to 3 months. Thus, his talk today that
privatization will give better services does not mean
services for the masses but rather for big foreign
companies so they can make more money faster off the
backs of the Haitian people, while they pay peasants
and workers 36 gourdes [about $2] a day, which is not
even enough to buy food, let alone to send a child to
school, pay rent, electricity, or telephone.

394

Some suggested a re-evaluation of the logic of privatization. The Haitian Platform
for an Alternative Development (PAPDA) suggested that Haiti did not fit the
profile for privatization, because according to the World Bank,
……..[T]he process of privatization only has a chance of
success in high revenue countries which have solid state
structures capable of regulating the private agents
enjoying a monopoly position. It is pointless to stress
that this is not the case in our country....

Others, like the Committee to Defend the National Interests (KODENA) did not
mince words,
[T]he neo-liberal economic project that [Preval's]
American boss has given him to implement in the
country has these objectives: to sell the country, a high
cost of living, more unemployment, [and] to tie up the
sovereignty of the country to the foot of the table of the
big imperialist countries. If this death plan really takes
root in this society, the corrupt state will abandon more
than ever its responsibilities to the peasants and poor
who don't have the means to live as they should. Only a
policy based on the sovereignty of the country can bring
a correct solution to the country's problems.

The Collective for Mobilization against the IMF and the World Bank argued for
enhancing the regulatory capacity of the state, better management of national
resources, and greater protection against unfair competition.297 Scholar and
leader of OPL and its former Presidential candidate, Sauveur Pierre-Etienne,
blamed Aristide for the opposition to privatization and the inability of Preval’s
government to “honor its engagements with the International Community” (PierreEtienne 1999, 227). While partially true, he disregards the diversity of the
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organizations involved, and minimizes the role of the overwhelming majority of
the citizenry who opposed the privatization project imposed on the nation by the
“International Community” (i.e., the United States, France, and Canada both
directly and through the World Bank and IMF) and his own party, OPL.
The position of civil society organizations, and the popular democratic
sector was clear, privatization as was being imposed on Haiti was contrary to the
popular will and aspirations. They colluded to oppose it and undermine any
government that would support the dismantling of state industries necessary for
national autonomy, revenues and employment. These state companies and
industries represented the custom houses of 1915, whose control the American
government coveted and acquired, permanently structuring Haiti into the
dependent neoliberal clientelist infrastructure.
Their creation by the Duvalierist regime undermined this infrastructure,
thus their privatization would once and for all re-integrate Haiti fully into the
dependent clientelist infrastructure and complete the dependency of the Haitian
state. Even the U.S. government recognized the power of popular democratic
forces and their opposition to privatization, a formidable obstacle for the Haitian
government in implement the American neoliberal scheme. It sought to alleviate
the pressure by changing its own policy linking aid with privatization for the risks
it posed to overall American interests in Haiti. As the Clinton administration
argued in Congress,
[T]he Administration has strongly encouraged economic
and public sector reform in Haiti. However, the
Administration opposes new restrictions on assistance,
which condition its provision on privatization of three
public enterprises. Such an approach puts at risk
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American interests in Haiti by conditioning assistance on
a process that neither the Haitian Government nor the
U.S. entirely control.298

The Preval government also recognized the strength of the opposition to its
privatization efforts and maneuvered to maintain a modicum of state autonomy to
placate the resistance of popular democratic forces. Preval began emphasizing
the creation of state partnerships, instead of outright privatization, by advocating
partial instead of complete sale of these industries to outmaneuver popular
democratic forces. For example, he sold 70% of the State’s Flour Mill retaining a
30% share for the state. However, this approach did not allay the opposition to
privatization who saw any move to privatize those industries as the fleecing of
the state and foreign theft of national resources299. Unlike other nations whose
population holds little leverage on the state, the Haitian polis could sway the
direction of the state in the absence of a military to intimidate them into silence.
This gave their position great leverage and a veto power. Aristide’s formation of
his own political party, Fanmi Lavalas, and its subsequent electoral domination in
the parliamentary elections consolidated that power300. Popular protests and
orchestrated parliamentary resistance from elected Aristide loyalists and
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members of Fanmi Lavalas undermined the government’s ability to proceed.
Parliamentarians frustrated the World Bank and American policy-makers by
refusing to vote for a new prime minister, rejecting three nominations, following
the resignation of the first after 17 months in office thereby undermining the
ability of the Preval government to act legitimately. Without a prime minister,
[T]he long standoff slowed or blocked many national
programs including privatization and held up hundreds of
millions of dollars in badly needed international aid. An
agreement to sell Haiti's cement company has been
stalled for eight months because there has been no
prime minister to sign the deal, and privatization of
seven other enterprises-- the telephone company,
electric utility, seaports, airport, the two national banks
and the cooking oil factory-- also are on hold301.

Giving that the disbursement of funds by the World Bank, IMF and Foreign
governments was conditional on implementing the liberalization program and
privatizing those state-owned industries, the Preval government found itself
constrained by lack of resources. Unable to privatize, with no funds in state
coffers, he could neither use state patronage to attain parliamentary and mass
support or institute programs to increase his popularity. He was forced to retreat
and his capitulation caused international donors to withhold their funds.
The departure of American forces and the elimination of the military, for
the first time since the American occupation, gave the Haitian polis the power to
preserve their interests and hold the state, and the political and economic elites
accountable. Unable to be subdued by the police, the only remaining coercive
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arm of the state, they were able to stall the liberalization project and the
consolidation of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. The time was indeed
propitious for a new social contract and for the real implementation of the Étatpeuple /Peuple-État interdependence stipulated by Duvalier but undermined by
the dictatorial nature of his regime.
With the formation of Fanmi Lavalas by Aristide in 1996, in an
environment already overpopulated by political parties, the coalition project
abated for a more virulent and zero-sum game party competition. Despite the
bravado of members of the OPL, in asserting that while Aristide and his cohort
were in exile they were engaged with the population, the reality was that they
could not compete with Aristide and his party without the support of the U. S.,
France, and Canada. Even with such support, they were unable to offer much
competition for they lacked the legitimacy and popular support.
The assertion by democratization scholars like Dahl (1971), O’Donnell
(1986, 1996), and (Huntington (1996) that electoral competition and inter and
intra-party contestation are necessary for democratic transition does not account
for an institutionally weak state incapable of managing conflicts and competition
between political actors and institutions. They also assume a strong multiparty
system, and fail to consider single party dominance as an ideal outcome of
electoral competition as also reflecting a particular pattern of democratization
(Ethier 1990). A one-party dominated transition is not anathema to, but may be
indispensable for democratic stability and consolidation (Arian and Barnes 1974,
Dunleavy 2014). Although Huntington acknowledges overpoliticization of
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particular institutions such as the armed forces as an impediment to democratic
transitions, all three scholars ignore the politicization and dependence of the
state itself and the impact of institutional capacity in undermining its ability to
manage political competition and competing claims for its control (Sangmpam
1996, Gros 1997).
The notion that electoral competition rather than political participation,
stability, and state accountability and responsiveness are indispensable for
democratization seems contrary to Haitian development and trends in
postcolonial states. In fact, it is the imposition of this paradigm by national and
foreign actors that have impeded democratic stability and consolidation. By
making the state the target of democratic contestation, and overburdening its
already limited capacity, the democratizatiobn process itself may be
delegitimized. Indeed, in states with weak institutional capacity, strong civil
society and mass political involvement, a one-party dominated transition and
state responsiveness to the population may be the best and perhaps only viable
path to democratic consolidation302.
Haitian democracy, as being imposed, is a vehicle for implementing
neoliberal economic policies not one to safeguard a new social contract that
affords greater leverage to the population and demand greater accountability
from the state, state actors, and neocolonial elites. Haitian democracy, as being
impose, therefore was diametrically opposed to the type of democracy being

302

One-party dominance could indicate a weakness of the democratic process but may create a level of
stability and enough time to allow growth in state capacity and thus consolidation.

400

demanded by the overwhelming majority. As a popular newspaper astutely puts
it, “U.S. capitalists seek profits; Haitian people seek justice”303.
The ability of the popular sector to prevent the privatization and fleecing of
state resources, as they interpreted it, further discredited the other political
parties that supported privatization, making Aristide the only viable Presidential
candidate, and the success of his party in the subsequent parliamentary
elections inevitable. The dominance of his party, Fanmi Lavalas (FL), and his
subsequent win led the International Coalition of Independent Observers along
with most international observers to characterize the 2000 elections as an
“election without fear and intimidation”304 (Dupuis 1997, OAS 13 December 2000,
1, Carey 2000, MiLes and Feeney February 2001, Hallward 2007). This
assessment was supported by the Organization of American States’ observation,
[T]he day was a great success for the Haitian population,
which turned out in large and orderly numbers to choose
both their local and national governments, and for the
Haitian National Police, whose capacity had been
questioned by the political parties, by the Government
and by the press, but who had been able to keep order
quietly and effectively. Election Day proceedings on May
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Haiti progres. “U.S. capitalists seek profits; Haitian people seek justice”, Vol. 15, no. 39, 17-23
December 1997
304
Miles, Melinda and Feeney, Moira, “Elections 2000: Participatory Democracy in Haiti” February 2001. In
this Post Election Report by International Coalition of Independent Observers” the authors wrote, “It is
our observation that voters were able to participate without fear in almost all locations we visited. At
each of the sites we visited we met with observers from other organizations. Political party
representatives, or mandataires, from the Espace de Concertation, OPL (Organization de Peuple en Lutte)
and Fanmi Lavalas were present at as many as 95% of the bureaus we visited. The presence of these
mandataires was documented in each location we visited, as well as representatives from other parties
(including: MOCHRENHA, RDNP, APPA, RCP, Tet Ansamn, PLB, and independent). In nearly 100% of the
bureaus we also documented national observers from the National Council of Observers (CNO/KNO). The
preliminary conclusion of the International Coalition of Independent Observers is that the Haitian people
have mobilized in large numbers to express their political will through participation in the local and
legislative elections of May 21, 2000.”
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21 represented the high point of the electoral process.
An estimated 60 percent of registered voters went to the
polls. Very few incidents of violence were reported.
While voters had to wait in long lines, especially at the
beginning of the day, they were eventually able to cast
their ballots free of pressure and intimidation. Most
voters were able to find their polling stations with relative
ease. 305.

Aristide’s party, Fanmi Lavalas (FL) devastated the competition in May 2000 by
winning “89 of 115 mayoral positions, 72 of 83 seats in the Chamber of
Deputies306 and 18 of the 19 Senate seats contested” due to the loss of
legitimacy of the other parties307 (Hallward 2004, 8, Nohlen 2005, 380-1). The
sweeping victory is not coincidental, given the electoral dominance his support
for the previous government created. Even the margins of Fanmi Lavalas’ win
could have been predicted. Although OPL, his former party, and most of the
other parties boycotted the Presidential elections claiming it was in protest of the
parliamentary election results, it is clear that they understood and they were not
competitive and would be embarrassed by the results. Theirs was a maneuver to
protect their lack of legitimacy and a strategy supported by the U.S., Canada,
and France to cast doubts on the elections (R. J. Fatton 2002, Dupuy 2007).
Aristide himself went on to win the Presidential election by an overwhelming
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The 1987 constitution established an 83-seat lower chamber (now 119) or chamber of deputies and a
27-seat upper chamber or senate (now 30).
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See (Dupuis 1997, 170-72, R. J. Fatton 2002). Both authors argue that the collaboration of many of the
parties with the coup leaders and later opposition to Aristide has discredited and delegitimized them in
the eyes of the population. As I suggested earlier, party leaders, especially the leaders of OPL recognized
their lack of popularity and expressed openly that unless the American government forcefully intervened,
they would not win any elections in Haiti.
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majority of the vote; out of 2,871,602 or 67.6% registered voters, 2,632,534 or
91.67% voted to elect him as President (OAS 13 December 2000, 1, Erikson
2005, Nohlen 2005, 381). The lack of voter participation in the 1995 elections
that led the International Republican Institute (IRI) to note, “The massive
abstention and lopsided vote raise deeply disturbing questions concerning the
future of democratic institutions, processes, and culture in Haiti,” reflected a
deeply flawed understanding of Haitian democracy. Had Aristide fully supported
Preval in 1995, as I suggested earlier, the turnout would have been great and his
win more lopsided308.
It was not Haitian democratic institutions, processes, and culture that were
in peril, it was the American-imposed neocolonial clientelist system and the
manufactured opposition. Indeed, one could argue that IRI’s problem was not the
lopsided win but the fact that none of the right-leaning parties proved legitimate
and viable enough to command more than 2% of the vote. The Haitian population
was conscious of its interests, as it has been historically, and sought a
democracy where the government and state were responsive to their needs and
accountable to them. They exercised their democratic rights to elect candidates
they felt more represented their aspirations. In Aristide and Fanmi Lavalas, they
saw a leader and a party that not only advocated for, but also fought to secure
their interests, and their vote reflected both their confidence in Fanmi Lavalas,
and rejection of the opposition parties. The phenomena of voter concentration
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and party monopoly are not unique to the Haitian democratic transition (Arian
and Barnes 1974, Ethier 1990, Caplan 2008, Tisdall 2010). It reflects a trend in
highly unequal emerging democracies where one-party rule offers legitimacy,
accountability, stability, and the possibility for institution-building and political
coherence309. Lipset is right when he notes,
[N]ew democracies must be institutionalized,
consolidated, and become legitimate. They face many
problem, among which are creating a growing and more
equalitarian economy; reducing the tensions with, and
perhaps replacing, the old civil and military elites” (Lipset
1993, 7)

The fear of a new distributional scheme posed by Aristide’s party’s dominance of
the electoral process is precisely the context for understanding the national and
foreign opposition to his regime. With a population long awaiting the opportunity
to re-capture and re-orient the neocolonial clientelist state, using a one-party
dominated system and without a military to uphold and protect the status quo, it
was more than an ideal outcome for the Haitian populous, though a dreaded one
for both patrons and clients of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. If as
Lipset contends, “political legitimacy in a democratic system relies heavily on
legitimacy and explicit or implicit support from the citizenry,” then the “free and
fair” electoral victory was a good indication of popular support and the legitimacy
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The overemphasis on multi-party systems as necessary for Democracy obscure the pattern of oneparty dominated democracies. Countries such as Mexico, Uruguay, Singapore, Costa Rica, Kenya,
Tanzania, Ghana, and even Brazil and Argentina, experience one-party-dominated democracies, which
have provided stability and a path to democratic consolidation. In post-colonial countries who gained
their independence through armed struggle, a one-party dominated system with roots in the military
struggle retain a high level of legitimacy allowing them to dominate the electoral process. See Challenges
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enjoyed by Aristide and his party. The turnout of the population is also an
indication that Haitian citizens believed in democracy as a vehicle for addressing
economic inequality and supporting their aspirations. They were determined to
challenge the neo-liberal policies associated with the American-sponsored
democratization model. The observation that “the combination of democracy, low
income economy, and substantial inequities tend to politicize all forms of societal
cleavages,” is not without foundation. However, it is the “accumulation of
distributive claims” on the state, and the inability or refusal of those in control of
the state to address those claims, that are at the roots of democratic instability
and lack of legitimacy (Tirado 1998, R. Fatton 1999, Dupuy 2003, Dupuy 2007).
Kohli is right to argue,
[G]iven the scarcity of poor economy, the competitive
energies of many individuals and groups seeking
economic improvements tend to get focused on the
state. Thus competition over state resources often
results in intense conflicts (Kohli 1993, 677)

In the case of Haiti, it is not just national actors but also international actors who
are competing over state resources. In the end, it is the convergence of national
elites and foreign governments against popular democratic forces in control of
the state, which proved fatal to both the state and Haitian democratic stability.
Unable to win elections and impose their neoliberal privatization schemes
designed to fleece the state, the opposition and its foreign supporters decided to
undermine the democratic process by refusing to accept the electoral victory of
popular democratic forces. They did so by challenging two Senate seats on a
technicality. As Peter Hallward explains, both the OAS, who had recognized the
actual voting as free and fair, and the U.S. State Department, contested the
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parliamentary vote due to a technical vote counting model that gave the
candidates with the most votes an outright win. Instead of going into a second
round, the two candidates with 32,969 and 30,736 to their rival’s less than 16,000
votes were declared winners due to the differences in votes, which the CEP
deemed hard to overcome. This was argued to be flawed by the opposition,
OAS, and the United States as an excuse to undermine the democraticallyelected government. Although the CEP maintained that this was congruent with
past practice (Hallward 2004, 9,17).310 Despite various efforts by the elected
government to resolve the situation, including offers to redo the elections for the
contested seats, the opposition refused,311 with the backing of the U. S., France,
and Canada, leaving the nation in crisis. Their strategy was to find an excuse to
delegitimize the entire election since they could not win. To escalate the crisis,
and undermine the government’s credibility and popularity, the U. S. blocked
every avenue for the elected government to acquire funds to address the needs
of the population. As Street and Hallward point out,
[T]he Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), under
pressure from the US, halted a package of loans
amounting to US$148 million for education, roads,
reform of the public health system and for water
supplies. On the back of this decision by the IADB a
further US$470 million in loans due to be disbursed in
the up-coming years was also frozen. Few governments
could survive such sustained financial assault. The
combined effect of these measures was to overwhelm
an already shattered economy. Gross domestic product
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The opposition, Convergence Democratic and the group of 184 organized and supported by from the
International Republican Institute lack the legitimacy and support to compete in open elections.
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has declined from US$4,089 million in 1999 to US$2,983
million in 2003. Foreign exchange reserves now stand at
a mere US$72.7 million compared to US$264 million
before the crisis of 2000 (EIU 2003a, EIU 2003b, Street
2004, 4-7, Hallward 2004, 9).

These pressures compelled Fanmi Lavalas to seek reimbursement from France
for the indemnity forced upon Haiti at the eve of its independence in 1804
(Farmer 2004, Dupuy 2007). “Twenty One” became a popular chant to
emphasize the assessed $21 billion owed Haiti by France, a position that had
legal merit and supported by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the
African Union, which elicited much irritation from France. More importantly,
however, the deleterious economic impact orchestrated by France and the U. S.
forced the democratically-elected government of Aristide to make concessions to
a discredited opposition, unable to compete in open elections with little following
and legitimacy, despite the foreign funding to create and maintain party-based
clientelism312. He agreed to accept a Prime Minister from the opposition, to redo
the elections where the calculations were in contention, and requested
international security support to maintain national stability and security for all
sectors of the population. However, asserts Fatton, the U.S. was not amenable to
those concessions:
Formulated by two ultra-conservatives, Roger Noriega
and Otto Reich, Washington’s policies empowered
Aristide’s adversaries. The US encouraged and financed
the development of the opposition regrouped in
Convergence Democratique and the Groups des 184.
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According to Paul Farmer, Senator Christopher urged an investigation of US training sessions for six
hundred ‘rebels’ in the Dominican Republic, and wanted to find out ‘how the IRI spent $1.2 million of
taxpayers’ money’ in Haiti (Farmer 2004).
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Even though Aristide agreed to the terms of a
compromise engineered by Caribbean Community of
Common Market, CARICOM, which would have
weakened Aristide’s powers and generated a
government of National Unity, instead of compelling the
opposition to accept it, Washington supported its
rejection, calling into question Aristide’s fitness to govern
(Fatton 2006, 20).

Emboldened by American political and financial support, the opposition
demanded the departure of the elected President, disregarding his willingness to
create a unity government thereby escalating the conflicts313. External efforts to
destabilize and discredit the government persisted as well as assassination and
coup attempts, one of which resulted in the murder of Aristide’s cousin
(Bellegarde-Smith 1990/2004, Chomsky, Farmer and Goodman 2004, Podur
2012). As Blumenthal makes clear, neither Convergence nor the Group of 184
could have materialized and sustained their opposition politics without outside
funding, institutional support and the knowledge that U.S. support would allow
them to withstand the popular support enjoyed by Aristide and his party. They
could neither acquire the funding on their own, nor the support of the population
whose interests they opposed. It was an opposition in name only given their
trouncing in the election. Under the guise of ‘promoting the practice of democracy
abroad’,
[T]he International Republican Institute conducted a $3
million party-building program in Haiti, training Aristide’s
political opponents, uniting them into a single bloc and,
according to a former U.S. ambassador there,
encouraging them to reject internationally sanctioned
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It was in this context that popular democratic supporters ransacked the house of OPL leader Gerard
Pierre-Charles and set fire to CRESFED, the Center for Economic Research and Formation for
Development, from which he operated.
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power-sharing agreements in order to heighten Haiti’s
political crisis (Blumenthal 2004, 2).

It is can be argued that Aristide’s approach to governance facilitated the
strategies that led to his overthrow, and his willingness to depend on popular
support alone as the basis for his legitimacy and protection left him with few
collaborators. Nevertheless, and more importantly, the opportunistic nature of
those who opposed him, their reliance on foreign powers instead of popular
legitimacy, and their inability to formulate a national vision capable of garnering
the support of the population were by any measure, the most destabilizing
aspects of Haiti’s democratic transition (R. Fatton 2006, 18-21, Dupuy 2007).
Nevertheless, the pressures experienced by Aristide and his government did not
discourage him from seeking options favorable to strengthening the Haitian state
and facilitate national development.
He instituted policies to facilitate foreign investments capable of enhancing
state capacity, human capital, and improve the economic outlook and
independence of the nation314. According to the American Embassy Climate
Investment Report, hoping to garner foreign support Aristide established an
Investment Code, expanded the state’s regulatory capacity, secured natural
resources as the property of the state, worked with the World Trade Organization
(WTO), encouraged investments and provided tax incentives and exemption.315
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While Aristide’s government both created some advantages for foreign
investment and facilitated national capacity building, he resisted privatization and
cooptation, which accelerated efforts to destabilize it. His attempt to spur the
expansion of the institutional and regulatory capacity of the state and national
development without depriving the state of core resources necessary for
revenues and services, defied the neoliberal agenda and U.S impositions.
Indeed, Aristide’s attempt to secure foreign investment and a strong role
for the state can be compared to Dr. Bobo’s proposal at the eve of the American
Occupation. Gros’ assertion that “the challenge for Haiti is to find a sustainable
democratic alternative” begs an important question; Sustainable to whom?
Haitian democracy would indeed be sustainable without the imposition of
external forces and the ability of opportunistic political leaders to rely on foreign
governments to ascend to power instead of relying on their ability to garner
popular support (Gros 1997, 106-7). The challenge has not been the inability to
find a sustainable democracy but the refusal to accept the type of accountable
popular democracy demanded by the Haitian majority classes that afford a
stronger role for the state and state-society relations based on interdependence.
Haitian democratic transition, unlike most of Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa,
Asia, and Eastern Europe provides us with an alternative framework where
democracy emerged due to elite weaknesses, defeats, and capitulations316. The
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weakness of the Haitian elite makes democratic reversal only possible through
foreign intervention. The challenges faced by democratic transition in Haiti are
due to attempts by national elites and their foreign backers to repress democratic
forces and allay their demands on the state long the turf of resource competition
between elites and the target of neoliberal policies and privatization. Haitian
democracy purports to upend the clientelist infrastructure for a more accountable
and independent state thus it is not coincidental that there have been efforts to
replace it with a more predictable elite-dominated democratization that protects
foreign and elite interests rather than those of the populous (Wurfel 1990, 111).
Democracy Under Attack: The Second Overthrow of Aristide and the
Consolidation of the Dependent Neocolonial Clientelist Infrastructure:
With mounting pressures, escalating protests, armed assaults, the murder
of the President’s cousin, and internationally orchestrated destabilizing activities,
supporters of the government resulted to authoritarian tactics and violent
beatings of student protestors and professors who supported the opposition (R.
J. Fatton 2002, 184-207). This response, in reaction to escalating belligerence
and violence from a paid opposition, was used to paint the Lavalas regime as
lawless and undemocratic, which gave greater legitimacy to its local and
international enemies (Dupuy 2007, Podur 2012). A coordinated national and
international propaganda campaign ensued to undermine the national and
international legitimacy enjoyed by the democratically-elected government
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preceding its overthrow (Vastel 2003, Cooper and Rowlands 2006, 211-215)317.
The accusation of widespread killings levied against the government, if it had not
resulted in the destruction of the Haitian state, its occupation and loss of
sovereignty, and the murder of thousands of pro-democracy activists, would be
ironic. Even our intellectuals collaborated with anti-democratic forces and
supported the destabilization campaign and destruction of Haitian democracy,
fickle as they have been in the defense of the nation and its interests. Even the
intellectual and Haitian ambassador to the Dominican Republic, Guy Alexandre,
supported the destabilization campaign by resigning his posts and supporting
France’s position that Haiti should not be repaid the indemnity.318 Amnesty
International went to great length to portray the besieged democratic government
as a continuity of the patterns of state-sponsored violence. However, the fallacy
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Coordinated efforts by France, the United States and Canada to undermine and overthrow the regime
was widely reported and documented. As Engler wrote, “On Jan. 31 and Feb. 1, 2003, Jean Chrétien’s
Liberal government organized the “Ottawa Initiative on Haiti” to discuss that country’s future. No Haitian
officials were invited to this assembly where high-level US, Canadian and French officials decided that
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put under a Kosovo-like UN trusteeship.
Thirteen months after the Ottawa Initiative meeting President Aristide and most other elected officials
were pushed out and a quasi UN trusteeship had begun. Since that time the Haitian National Police has
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of this comparison is unequivocal for any scholar or lay observer of Haitian
politics and history. The death tolls themselves disprove the claim of widespread
violence by Aristide’s government: From over 50,000 killed by the Marines during
the American occupation, and at least half a million displaced319, to an estimated
50,000 murdered by both Duvaliers with thousands of exiles, to 700-1000 during
the military-led transitional period following the fall of Jean-Claudism, to over
4,000 killed following the first coup against the democratically-elected
government of Aristide, and at minimum, 3,000 killed during the Amerianimposed regime of Latortue following the second coup. Thus, no matter Aristide’s
faults, and his supporters’ violent acts, accusing him or his government of
widespread murder and comparing his government to previous violent regimes
cannot be taken seriously by any measure (AmnestyRprt2004 2004, Hallward
2007, 155, Dupuy 2007, Podur 2012, 27). As Hallward notes,
… [N]either Amnesty International nor any human rights
organization has yet risked an estimate of the total
numbers of people killed under Aristide – then from 2001
to 2004 perhaps thirty political killings can be attributed
to the PNH (Haitian National Police whose political
affiliation was often anti-government) or to groups with
(often tenuous) links to FL (Fanmy Lavalas) (Hallward
2007, 155).

According to Hallward, even the virulently anti-Aristide crusader Michael Deibert
in his 454-page assessment of Aristide’s 2001-2004 government attributed only
44 politically-motivated killings to Aristide’s supporters out of the 212 murders
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that took place during that period against his supporters and state agents
(Deibert 2005, Hallward 2007, 155, 376).
The overthrow of the popular democratic regime therefore has to be
assessed by scholars as an attempt to prevent the democratic restructuring of
the state that could have produced a lasting social contract based on the
interdependence between state and society long sought after by the Haitian
populace and crafters of the Louverturean state and its adherents. Unable to
dislodge the elected government by democratic means or by protests and
violence, the model of funded invasion defeated by Duvalier’s Noirist regime was
re-introduced (Blumenthal 2004, Blum 2014, Engler 2014). A well-trained and
well-equipped group of former military officers, in training in the Dominican
Republic for a year, invaded the country to overthrow the popularly supported
and democratically-elected government (Williams 2004, Farmer 2004, Goodman
and Barrios 2004, Podur 2012, 48-50). As documented by members of the U. S.
Congressional Black Caucus and many scholars and journalists, most of the
guns used by the invaders were recently sent to the Dominican Republic by the
U. S. government (McKinney 2004). The paramilitaries who invaded the country
had been in training, led by U.S. Marines, for almost a year in the Dominican
Republic as part of the United States ‘Operation Jaded Task’ (Buss and Gardner
2008, Podur 2012, 49). These well-armed and well-trained mercenaries were
unable to enter the capital due to the popularity of the democratic regime, and
the willingness of the population to defend their government. Their bravery forced
the U.S., Canada, and France to forcefully remove the elected government from
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power, transporting him against his will to the Central African Republic, thus
insulting not just Aristide but the proud Black Haitian nation320 (Farmer 2004,
Chomsky, Farmer and Goodman 2004, 97-130, Dupuy 2007, Hallward 2007,
Davies 2014 ).
The Marines landed again, and this time, under the cover of the U. N. to
impose a clientelist government and re-assert control over their neocolonial
clientelist infrastructure. As had taken place following the first overthrow,
wholesale suppression of the population and mass arrests, intimidation and
murders followed, but this time not by the military as it had been disbanded, but
by United States Marines and United Nations troops (Blum 2014, Doleac 2015).
The elimination of the military by Aristide now required a new model to support
the imposed neocolonial infrastructure, one with limited democratic participation,
a state deprived of its ability to absorb its working population, and a national
environment controlled by non-governmental organizations usurping the role of
the state and compromising state-society relations. The result was the removal of
the population from democratic participation.
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In a classic case of American racism a la Deep South, the former assistant of the virulently racist
senator Jesse Helm, Roger Noriega who orchestrated the military coup against Aristide, brought him back
to Africa and in one act played out the “Go back to Africa” one often hears in America. Most Haitians,
whether supporters or opponent of Aristide did not miss the point that this happened at the bicentennial
anniversary of Haitian independence in an action supported by France. It was the actualization of what
was proposed by the King of France to Petion, at the eve of Haitian independence, to rid the Island of
black revolutionaries and give limited rights to the same neocolonial elites who now contributed to the
deposition and exile of the democratically elected popular Black president.
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Democracy without Participation: Privatization, NGOs, and the Decline of the
Haitian State and Democratic Politics:
The overthrow and exile of the democratically-elected President and the
imposition of Gerard Latortue, the former U.N. consultant and a former Prime
Minister, allowed the United States and neocolonial elites to succeed in
preventing the state from being permanently captured by popular democratic
forces. With its client regime in place, the American government transferred
some 2,600 handguns and 21 long guns to the ‘puppet’ Haitian government to be
issued to the police. It also allowed American companies to sell $1.9 million
worth of arms, including 3,000 .38-caliber revolvers, 500 9mm pistols, 500 12gauge shotguns, 200 Mini-14 rifles, and 100 M4 carbines to the interim Haitian
government (Taft-Morales and Seelke 2008, 26). While it prevented the
democratically-elected government of Aristide from receiving weapons and riot
gear from South Africa under the presidency of Thabo Mbeki, it was quick to
supply its clientelist government with weapons to suppress the population.
Thus, armed and protected by international forces, the Latortue interim
government secured the support of General Abraham, retired by Aristide during
his first presidency, as Minister of the Interior, and members of Convergence and
Group of 184 as Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Justice. It arrested
members of Aristide’s party, and allowed the targeting and widespread
“disappearance” and killings of democracy activists and the re-assertion of power
by members of the military and FRAPH, with the acquiescence, if not support, of
United Nation’s forces (Amnesty_Int'l 2005, 11-20, Podur 2012, 58-65). As
Gunenwardena and Schuller suggest,
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[L]atortue was widely regarded as a puppet of the
International Community. The prime minister and
President do not speak a day with saying the
‘international Community’. You are left with the
impression that the country cannot exist, do not exist
without speaking about the ‘international community’.
The interim government obliged to the international
community for securing its position was especially eager
to please international organizations (Gunenwardena
and Schuller 2008, 193).

Faced with the refusal of the previous government to privatize state-owned
industries and liberalize the economy, the U. S., France and Canada now found
in Latortue a willing participant in the dismantling of the lasting pillars of the
Duvalierist state. Popular organizations that before resisted privatization were
violently repressed by a U.S.-directed a U. N. force that protected the regime
from its opponents. Before, fearful of the Haitian masses and without a military to
protect it, the neocolonial elite could not implement its neoliberal agenda. Now,
with the U.S.-sponsored forces to protect them, neocolonial elites and the
imposed clientelist regime of Latortue felt no need to adhere to the demands of
the population or to protect the interests of the nation. They were no longer
beholden to the population as their power was not derived from a foreign army
more than willing to kill and maim those who resisted the new clientelist regime
and internationally imposed order. According to Podur, within weeks, funds
illegally withheld from the democratically-elected government of Aristide were
released to its interim replacement and additional funding to support occupying
forces and their pacification projects were disbursed with Canada pledging a total
of $19 million and the United States $66 million (Podur 2012, 62). Taft-Morales,
the Specialist in Latin American Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade
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noted the magnitude of funds pledged, which contrary to her assertion went not
to secure the state and enhance its capacity, but primarily to support U.N. forces,
NGOs and the divestment and destruction of the Haitian state.
International organizations and governments had
pledged $1.085 billion over the next two years to help
Haiti rebuild its infrastructure, strengthen institutions, and
improve basic services. The United States committed to
provide $230 million for FY2004-FY2005 (Taft-Morales
2005, 6).

The Latortue client regime facilitated what had been rejected by both the Haitian
people and its popular democratically-elected government by assessing the
viability of the state industries in order to prepare them for privatization. Amongst
the companies assessed were the National Port Authority, TELECO, and
Electricity d’ État D’ Haiti.321 He undermined state capacity and the stability of the
middle class population to be absorbed by the Duvalierist Noirist regime by
sacking 12,000 state employees and an additional 2,000 employees from
TELECO, the phone company and one of the most lucrative state enterprises
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(Podur 2012, 62).
Under the internationally-imposed regime, state decisions were relegated
to the ‘international community’, security of the nation transferred from the state
to foreign forces, and the state, itself weakened, became supplanted by non-
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governmental organizations. It is under these conditions and the targeting of
popular democratic organizations and their leaders, as well as widespread
killings of Aristide’s supporters that preparations for elections took place. With
Aristide exiled, and Fanmi Lavalas, the most popular and only legitimate political
party prevented from participating in elections, the former president Renee
Preval was convinced to compete in the elections due to his relationships with
Aristide and his reputation with the population. The results made clear that
although suppressed, the Haitian populace could demonstrate their
dissatisfaction with the opposition by their electoral participation. Of the
3,533,430 registered voters 2.093.947 participated (59.26%) and Preval was
elected by 51.21% with the next runner up only earning 12.4% of the vote. Given
the absence of Aristide and the banning of the party, the failure of the opposition
to muster votes from significant segments of the population revealed their
precarious manufactured existence and their actual relevance to the population
they claimed to represent.
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Table 4: 2006 Presidential Election Results
Candidate

Party

#Votes
Cast

Rene Preval
LESPWA
992,766
Leslie Francois Manigat
RDNP
240,306
Charles Henry Baker
RESPE
159,683
Jean Chavannes Jeune
UNION
108,283
Luc Mesadieu
MOCHRENAH
64,850
Serge Gilles
FUSION
50,796
Paul Denis
OPL
50,751
Evans Paul
ALYANS
48,232
Guy Philippe 323
FRN
37,303
26 additional candidates
Other
189,661
Total
1,942,641
Source: Haiti’s Provisional Electoral Committee (Port-au-Prince, 2006).

% of votes cast
out of 59.26% of
eligible voter
participation
51.21%
12.40%
8.24%
5.59%
3.35%
2.62%
2.62%
2.49%
1.92%
9.76%
100%

Some scholars suggested that Preval’s connection with Aristide garnered him
some popular votes since many believed he would support the latter’s return
from exile. Almost half of the masses, discouraged and suppressed, remained
home rather than provide him with the unquestionable plurality they had provided
their preferred candidate (Dupuy 2007). Out of an extraordinary 35 candidates
and parties competing for the Presidency, Senate, and Congress, Preval’s newly
formed party LESPWA (Hope) also gained 13 out of 30 Senate seats and 23 out
of 99 congressional seats leaving him with little possibility of governing
effectively324.

323

Guy Philippe, the leader of the military invasion the American government claimed enjoyed
widespread support only received 1.92% of the vote. Altogether, the eight candidates who ran from the
opposition garnered a total of 23.43%. The dismal showing by both the OPL candidate, Paul Denis, and the
leader of RÉSPÈ, Charles Baker, demonstrates the bankruptcy of the foreign manufactured opposition.
324

See the Interparliamentary union website report on HAITI Chambre des Députés (Chamber of
Deputies): http://www.ipu.org/parline/reports/2137_arc.htm and Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections for
data and other information regarding Haiti’s elections. Copyright © 1996-2008 Inter-Parliamentary Union
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Despite the privatization of its main industries, the clientelist state still
remained the primary vehicle for wealth extraction, and competition for its control
had reverted to focusing on its meager resources rather than its orientation. Little
was therefore accomplished by the Preval government, now protected by foreign
forces, besides the furthering of privatization and the dismantling of the state,
both accelerated by his willingness to cede the role of the state to non-state and
non-national actors and allow its erosion and replacement by non-governmental
organizations (Buss and Gardner 2008).
Already weak and saddled with an ineffective government controlled by an
American-supported U.N occupation force, the January 2010 massive
earthquake of 7.0 magnitude devastated what little remained of the Haitian state
infrastructure and personnel. All state institutions, and the middle-class
population that supported them disappeared in 38 seconds. It destroyed what
little semblance of the state that had survived privatization, and resources
destined to strengthening the capacity of the Haitian state were diverted to
NGOs. If the supplanting of the state by foreign and foreign-funded NGOs was
incomplete, the earthquake became its death knell. The Haitian population,
without any strong institutions and government, found itself with over 350,000
deaths mostly in the capital, and the rest sleeping under the sky in the capital at
the mercy of NGOs and foreigners (with little expertise and understanding
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of Haiti) serving as experts, and running roughshod over surviving government
officials325. What little remained of the declining Duvalierist state and Duvalierism
adherents embedded in state institutions, evaporated, leaving little more than
rubbles and corpses. The ouster of Aristide led to foreign occupation, the
consolidation of the dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure, and
imposition of a clientelist regime.
A new model of clientelist infrastructure emerged, one based on managed
democratic elections. In post-earthquake Haiti, It was foreign governments and
NGOs that decided national policies, dictated government decisions, and
threatened to remove its President from office when he showed signs of
independence. Neocolonial elites’ participation was useful, but not required. The
veneer of legitimacy of any regime could be secured through a managed
democratic process and economic and military dependence on foreign support,
and those who refused to acquiesce to national subservience could be
threatened and summarily dismissed. The relationship between the Haitian state
and civil society further eroded state-society relations or the Etat-Peuple/PeupleEtat undermining the legitimacy of its government and democracy.
In a remarkably revealing interview with Dan Beeton from the Center for
Economic and Policy Research, the Special Representative of the Organization
of American States’ (OAS) to Haiti, Ricardo Seintenfus reported that Edmond

325

This number was provided by the Haitian government but others estimated the number of deaths to
be about 250,000 deaths.
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Mulet, the then-head of the U.N. Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and the American
ambassador Kenneth Merten threatened to remove Préval from office. They
would have done so without his objection and that of the Brazilian representative
(Beeton 2014). It is therefore not unreasonable to understand that given the
occupation by U.N. forces under the leadership of France, the U. S. and Canada,
and the impact of the earthquake on the nation with more than 350,000 deaths
and total destruction of the already weak infrastructure, the President had little
power to make important policy decisions for his own country. He was viewed
with contempt by the average citizen for his inability to stand up to foreign powers
to protect the interests of the nation326. His only success, for which he received
considerable support from the population, was his facilitation of the return of
Aristide from exile327.
The manipulation of the democratic process and subservience of the state
and its leaders were not lost on the population, and subsequent elections
reflected their rejection of the new national reality. Having historically prevented

326

While Preval was indeed constrained, it is perhaps unfair to accuse him of selling the nation. According
to one of his advisors, he resisted the impositions of foreign powers to the degree that he could. Indeed
his facilitation of the return of Aristide against the expressed wishes of the United States reflects his
refusal to be be intimidated and his willingness to brave reprisal to maintain a degree of autonomy.
327

Even after overthrowing Aristide, the United States was concerned about his popularity and possible
return to Haiti and fear a post-Latortue government led by Preval would facilitate his return. In a
telegram from the American Embassy “Latortue’s Plan for Haiti’s Future, Thoughts on Preval and Aristide”,
cable 06PORTAUPRINCE299_a, dated and timed Friday, February 10, 2006 at 18:25, American policy
makers inquired of their imposed prime minister, whether “the message from the U.S. and international
channels on Aristide being a man of the past was being heard in Haiti both among the poor and elite” to
which he responded, “we must repeat, repeat, repeat this message,” indicating Aristide’s continued
support. The French and American governments also tried to prevent his return, demanding that the
South African government prevent him from traveling out of the country, which was declined.
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Haiti from succumbing to neocolonial elites and their foreign allies, postearthquake Haiti left the masses with few avenues to exert pressure on the state
and neocolonial elites. Their ability to secure their aspirations and interests
through competitive and fair elections, which they initially supported by voting in
high numbers, proved useless. Consequently, from 2006 to the post-earthquake
elections, despite continuous electoral competitions, and the overwhelming
popular support for democratic governance, democratic participation dramatically
declined, a phenomenon unexplained by democratization and democratic
consolidation theorists (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Huntington 1996). Given
the frustrated efforts of the Haitian masses to use democracy as a vehicle to
secure their socio-economic interests and political power, and their refusal to
continue to participate in managed elections, can Haitian democracy survive
without mass participation?
The case of Haiti makes clear that the question is not whether consecutive
electoral competitions are indicators of democratic governance and
consolidation, but whether these “competitions” are relevant to the population
and the result of popular participation. In post-colonial states with weak statesociety relations, electoral competitions are not indications of democratic
continuity or consolidation. It is the ability of democratic competitors to meet the
needs, demands, and aspirations of democratic participants, and the latter’s
belief that democratic participation will have a direct impact on their lives that
leads to democratic consolidation. The failure of democracy to address the needs
and aspirations of the population, and inability of elected officials to be
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accountable to them, as is the case for contemporary Haitian democracy, has
resulted in democracy without popular participation and support. It leaves little
hope that confidence in democratic institutions and governance will grow and
facilitate its consolidation.
The following results of the 2010 and 2015 elections reflect a dangerous
trend of decline in popular participation. The election of 2010 saw a turnout from
59.26% in 2006 to 22.79%, and out of 4,712,693 eligible voters, only 1,074,056
participated, down from 1,942,641.
Table 5: 2010 Presidential Election Results
Candidate
Party
Votes
Mirlande Manigat
Jusde Celestin
Michael Joseph
Martelly
Jean Henry Ceant
12 additional parties
combined

Percentage

RDNP
INITE
REPONS PEYIZAN

336,878
241,462
234,617

31.37%
22.48%
21.84%

RENMEN AYITI
MPH, RESPE,
ACCRHA, LAVNI,
ANSANM NOU FO,
INDEPENDENT,
SOLIDARITE,
FORCE 2010,
AYISYEN POU
AYITI, MODEJHA,
KLE, KNDA, WOZO,
PLATFOM 16
DESANM, PENH

87,834
160,396

8.18%
14.94%

Blank votes
12,869
1.20%
st
Total votes (turnout: 22.79%1
1,074,056
100.00
round/22.52%2nd round)
Registered voters
4,712,693
Source: Republic of Haiti Electoral Results. 2010.
See http://pdba.government.edu/Elecdata/Haiti/o6pres.html.
Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service, Political Database of the Americas.

Nevertheless, even with the low turnout, foreign manipulation of the elections
was needed to influence the outcome. As Le Monde’s Editorial Board observed,
the Haitian Electoral Commission had informed the population,
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[T]he popular singer Michel Martelly, least educated and
qualified amongst the top candidates, who had received
21 % of the votes and consequently, did not qualify for
the runoff. However, technical considerations found in
the report of OAS experts will be considered so the runoff elections can be organized (LeMonde, 2011).

According to Ricardo Seintenfus, the Organization of American States’ (OAS)
Special Representative to Haiti, who oversaw the work of election experts from
the United States, France, and Canada,
[I]t was necessary to change the result of the first round.
The only possibility was to annul the results in certain
ballot boxes that favored Célestin. That way, he would
fall back to third place at the same time that the
candidate anointed by the international community would
go on to participate in the second round, along with
Mirlande Manigat (Beeton 2014).

As if Ricardo Seintenfus testimony was not enough, Fritz Scheuren, the head of
the OAS statistical team, also noted, “In all his years, he had never otherwise
seen an example of an election outcome being reversed without a recount”. The
statement by the then Haitian Prime Minister, Jean-Max Bellerive’s was even
clearer, “Hillary Clinton, the U.S. Secretary of State at the time, traveled to Haiti
to push for overturning the first round election. ‘We tried to resist and did, until
the visit of Hillary Clinton,’ it becomes clear that Haitian democracy was not just
constrained by foreign involvement but undermined in order to find the candidate
more apt to cater to their interests at the detriment of the nation (Johnston 2015,
2015)328.

328

According to Hillary Clinton’s emails revealed to the public and associated emails from manufacturing
magnet, Reginal Boulos, the collusion of neocolonial elites with foreign powers were evident as reflected
in communications between Boulos and State Department officials. See “Scrape #28882 (wikileaks):
PLEASE CONVEY MY THANKS TO SECRETARY CLINTON FOR THE VISIT
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While the top three candidates received 31.37%, 22.48%, 21.84%
respectively, it was the “international community”- namely the U. S., Canada and
France that decided who would compete in the run-off. They pressured the
candidate in second place, Jude Celestin, to withdraw his candidacy thereby
sending its chosen and least qualified candidate instead of the first two top
candidates329 (Weisbrot 2011, LeMonde 2011). Consequently, less voters

From: Cheryl Mills
To: Hillary Clinton
Date: 2011-01-30 18:00
Subject: PLEASE CONVEY MY THANKS TO SECRETARY CLINTON FOR THE VISIT
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05779147 Date: 09/30/2015
RELEASE IN PART
B6UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05779147 Date: 09/30/2015.
According to this document, “Boulos and 7 other prominent business people met with President Preval to
compel him to accept the false OAS report and recommendations. Preval has been pushing for
cancellation of the presidential elections, a move opposed by the United
States, the U.N. peacekeeping mission, Brazil and others."
Cheryl went on in her email to Secretary Clinton, “We believe that our "behind the doors actions" have
been so far more effective than the usual public statements of the past. The business community has
played a major role in helping to get the November 28 elections back on track, by convincing President
Preval to request the OAS mission, by publicly denouncing the results of the 1st round, and as late as
yesterday morning (3 hours meeting with Preval) by convincing him to drop the idea of annulment of the
elections.”
329

Haitian Election officials announced that no candidates met the threshold for an outright win but
Mirlande Manigat and Jude Celestin had qualified for the run-off. However, objections from the
‘international community”, specifically, the United States through OAS forced the acceptance of Michel
Martelly instead of the second candidate with the highest vote to participate in the second round.
According to the Haitian Chamber of Deputies’ report,
The OAS submitted a report concluding that Mr. Martelly had
won the second highest number of votes in the presidential
elections after Ms. Manigat. However, Mr. Célestin refused to
withdraw. Mr. Alain Le Roy, Chief of the MINUSTAH
subsequently urged the Election Commission to respect the
OAS' conclusion, warning that Haiti could face a
constitutional crisis with the possibility of "considerable
unrest and insecurity". Inité as well as President Préval urged
Mr. Célestin to withdraw his candidacy. The following month,
the Election Commission announced that it had removed Mr.
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participated in the second round; leaving little doubt about the lack of legitimacy
of the elections and the confidence of the population that 1) their voices will be
respected, and 2) the government would, when elected, represent their interests.
While Martelly won 67.57% to Manigat’s 31.75%, largely due to his popularity as
a musician and Manigat’s husband’s collusion with the military regime after the
first overthrow of Aristide, only 22.52 % voted nationally, and in some location
less than 6% participated, according to the Interparliamentary Union (Johnston
2015). The involvement of foreign governments and neocolonial elites in
manipulating the elections and dictating its results meant that 77.48% of the
voting population refused to participate in an election they deemed undemocratic.
Thus foreign and neocolonial elite’s electoral manipulations undermined Haitian
democratic transition by discouraging participation and creating a confidence
deficit in the democratic process itself. This was clearly a disruption on the path
to democratic consolidation.

Célestin's candidacy in favor of Mr. Martelly.
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2137_10.htm
According to Le Monde, succumbing to pressure, Inite, the party of Jude Celestin wrote, "Even if we are
certain that Jude Célestin received the necessary vote and as such is qualified to go to the second round,
Inite agree to remove him as a candidate for the presidency”
http://www.lemonde.fr/ameriques/article/2011/01/26/haiti-le-parti-au-pouvoir-annonce-le-retrait-deson-candidat-a-la-residentielle_1471036_3222.html#PmHSIrHsRbrpX4zy.99
This foreign intervention to circumvent Haitians’ exercise of their democratic rights in order to secure the
Clientelist infrastructure undermined the trust of Haitian citizens in the democratic process.
To date, no proof has been provided that contradict the preliminary results, which disqualified Michel
Martelly. By all accounts, the same OAS that challenged Aristide’s and his party’s overwhelming electoral
win succeeded in imposing a fraudulent candidate at the expense of the Nation, and democratic
legitimacy and consolidation. Even the electoral council made clear it would not change the results of the
first round following receipt of the OAS report indicating their disapproval of the foreign imposition to the
Haitian population.
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More importantly, besides these overt interferences, the true nature of the
U.S clientelist infrastructure was not just manifested in the manipulation of
elections and imposition of candidates. The fact that the political party of their
candidate itself was manufactured and funded by USAID, according to document
released by the State Department under the Freedom of Information Act
(Johnston 2015) was extraordinary.
The Presidency of Martelly continued the pattern, even increasing
collaboration with Haiti’s foreign tormentors, by signing mining contracts with
their companies and allowing NGOs to continue to dominate the state. With little
institutional capacity to regulate the exploitation of its mining resources estimated
at over $21 billion330 in gold deposits alone, the clientelist Martelly government
awarded multiple concessions to U.S., French and Canadian companies. It
adopted mining laws written by the World Bank, itself facing a conflict of
interests, with $10.3 million invested in Haitian mining operations over the
objections of civil society and the population331 (Johnston 2015). To make
matters worse, “policies and procedures applicable to design, appraisal and

330

See (Schuller 2015, 4). It has been estimated, after exploratory assessment, that Haiti’s goal deposits
are over 21 billion.
331

See World Bank report on investments in Haitian Mining at
https://disclosures.ifc.org/#/projectDetail/ESRS/27409 a letter from multiple civil society organizations
sent to the World Bank on January 7, 2015 requesting an evaluation of the World Bank violation of its own
institutional policies and practices in regards to Haitian mining,
http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelCases/100-Request%20for%20Inspection.pdf . The Haitian
Senate, a divided institution also saw it necessary to unite and pass a law to suspend mining permits;
Haïti—Économie: Le Sénat vote la suspension des Permis Miniers en Haïti, Haïti Progrès (Feb. 21, 2013),
http://www.haitilibre.com/article-7929-haiti-economie-le-senat-vote-la-suspension-des-permisminiersen-haiti.html;
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implementation of a project, including the safeguard policies, were not applied to
the Haiti mining laws”332. The clientelist regime allowed the World Bank and
companies involved in the mining of Haitian gold to dictate the terms under which
mining would take place, therefore, actively undermining the institutional and
regulatory capacity of the state. The Center for Global Research notes,
Martelly became quite rich from signing off on every US
decision. By the time he was forced out of office in
February 2016 by popular protests, Haiti’s agricultural
exports had dropped to a mere $29 million per year, and
its agricultural trade deficit had grown to nearly $1 billion
per year. Of the roughly 1,500 elected officials who had
populated the parliament, city halls, and local courts,
only 10 remained: a group of senators without a quorum
(Chery 2016).

The clientelist regime of Martelly undermined rather than enhanced the
regulatory capacity of the state, and disregarded its institutions. Nationalist and
opposition lawmakers who sought to block its contracts, policies and actions
were intimidated, and rather than organize elections at the end of their term, their
seats were left vacant, thus allowing the government to act by decree. It was a
democracy by decree, no different than one-man rule of the post-Occupation and
pre-Duvalierist clientelist governments that dominated the Haitian state (Doleac
2015). Indeed, Martelly’s government so represented the re-assertion of

332

The following articles give some insight on the mining activities and attempts by Haitian civil society to
do what their government has be unwilling to,; namely, regulate the activities of mining companies.
Evens Sanon & Danica Coto, Haiti Awards Gold, Copper Mining Permits, Associated Press (Dec. 21, 2012),
available at http://news.yahoo.com/haiti-awards-gold-copper-mining-232709627.html; and Jane Reagan,
Haitian Senate Calls for Halt to Mining Activities, Inter Press Service (Feb. 14, 2013),
http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/02/haitian-senatecalls-for-halt-to-mining-activities/. However, despite the
efforts of the Haitian Senate to protect the interests of the Haitian state, and restrict the wholesale theft
of national resources, their moratorium did not supersede the mining agreements between the Haitian
government and mining companies.
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neocolonial elite power that it was a common complaint heard amongst the
majority black masses, the black middle class and even Haiti’s elites. It is in this
context that the clientelist regime and its supporters tried to engineer the next
election to facilitate the victory of its candidate in 2015. Its collusion with the U.S.
to manipulate the presidential elections and secure power for its candidate,
Jovenel Moise, resulted in widespread discontent and country-wide popular
protest333.
The 2015 Presidential Election results, as reported, did little to show the
fraudulent nature of the elections, or reflect the wide-spread national protest that
engulfed the nation.

333

The United States spent $33 million to fund the 2015 Haitian elections, much of which has gone into
the pockets of American NGO staff in Washington DC and American organizations. The primary
beneficiaries were the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), Organization of American
States (OAS), National Democratic Institute (NDI), United Nations Development program (UNDP), and
United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), totaling $30.5 million of the $33 million (Johnston
2016). Also See USASpending.gov
Whereas before, the Haitian masses and Civil Society organizations would have compelled the
government to be more cautious about its decisions, the presence of foreign forces in place to suppress
them allowed the government to act unchecked.
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Table 6: 2015 Presidential Election Results
Candidate

Party

First round
Votes
%

Jovenèl Moise

Parti Ayisyen Tèt Kalé (PHTK)

508,761

32.81

392,782

25.27

222,109
108,844

14.27
7.05

298291

19.32

Against all
Invalid/blank votes

22,161
120,066

1.42
–

Total

1,553,131

100

Jude Célestin
Jean-Charles Moise
Maryse Narcisse

Ligue Alternative Pour le Progrès et
l’Émancipation Haïtienne
Platform Pitit Desalin
Fanmi Lavalas
Movement Action Socialiste, Renmen Ayiti, Organization
du people en Lutte, Konviksyon, Réseau Bouclier
National, Mouvement Patriotique Populaire Dessalinien,
Canaan, Rassemblement des Nationaux Democrates
Volontaires pour l'Unité Salvatrice, Union Nationale pour
l'Intégrité et la Réconciliation, Konbit Travaye Peyizan
pou Libere Haiti, Independent, Fusion des Démocrates
Sociales Haïtienne, Front Uni Pour la Renaissance
d'Haiti, Nouvelle Haiti, Concorde Nationale,

17 additonal parties
participated and
garnered less than
20% of the vote

Cohésion Nationale des Partis Politiques Haïtiens,
Mouvement Chrétienne pour une Nouvelle Haiti, Parti
Fédéraliste, Retabli Ayiti, Respect, Plan d'Action
Citoyenne, Pati Kreyol Nouye, Parti Socialiste Unifie
Haitien, Plateforme Politique Palmis, Mouvman
Revolisyone Ayisyen, Parti pour l'Evolution Nationale
Haitienne, Plateforme Politique G18, Konbit Liberasyon
Ekonomik, Konsyans Patriyotik, Konbit pou Ayiti, Parti
Alternative pour le Developpement d'Haiti, Coalition pour
la Convention de la Reconstruction de la Réconciliation
des Citoyens Haitiens, Mouvement pour l'Instauration de
la Démocratie en Haiti, Fwon Revolisyone pou
Entegrasyon Mas Yo, Parti pour la Rénovation d'Haiti,
Plateforme Jistis, Action Democratique pour Batir Haiti,
Mouveman pou Endepandans Kiltirel Sosyal Ekonomik ak
Politik an Ayiti, Delivrans, Rassemblement des Patriotes
Haitiens, Mouvement d'Union Republicaine, Parti Unité
Nationale, Parti Démocrate Institutionnaliste, Plateforme
Politique Entrenou, Régénération Economique et Sociale
dans l'Unité et la Liberté Totale d'Action pour Tous,
Mopanou, Independent, Olahh Baton Jenes La,
Regroupement Patriotique pour le Renouveau National,
Mobilisation pour le Progrès d'Haiti

Source : Provisional Electoral Committee (CEP Haiti)
See http://www.cephaiti.ht/files/resultats/Resultat_definitif_1e_tour_president.pdf

Despite verifiable widespread electoral fraud orchestrated by Martelly’s
clientelist regime, Jovenel Moise was selected as one of the two top candidates
to continue to the second round. This forced the Haitian masses to use the only
avenue left, braving violence from U.N forces by risking their lives in the streets
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to demand fair and impartial democratic elections334. Consequently, Martelly was
forced to leave office without a transfer of power to his patrons’ preferred
candidate. The nationalist Northerner, and former Minister of the Interior under
Aristide’s second government, and a senator, Jocelerme Privert, was named as
Interim president. A tax expert, author, and experienced administrator and
politician, he had suffered arrest and 26 months in prison for being a member of
the democratically-elected government of Aristide335. His rise to the Presidency,
however limited in scope, surprised many observers, and worried neocolonial
elites who viewed him with suspicion. He responded to the widespread claims of
fraud by establishing an Independent Commission of Electoral Evaluation and
Verification (CIEVE), against the objections of the U.S, France and Canada that
advocated for a run-off without verification. Privert sought to secure whatever
autonomy remained for the state and the Presidency, by addressing the
concerns of the majority of the population who took to the street to demand free
and fair elections without fraud and foreign interference. In a clear departure from
the subservience of previous clientelist regimes, he accepted the
recommendations of CIEVE for a re-run of the elections over the objections of
foreign powers and neocolonial elites. The “Friends of Haiti” sought to validate

334

Haitian observers: ‘Massive fraud’ in vote, October 29, 2015. Miami Herald.
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/haiti/article41860518.html#storylink=cpy

335

He was falsely accused of participating in political killings, accusations the majority of Haitian
citizens knew were to silence prominent Lavalas members and prevent them from rallying their
supporters.
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the results despite the report published by CIEVE demonstrating that “the
electoral process was marred by serious irregularities, grave inconsistencies, and
massive fraud. Only 9% of the votes were found to be valid” (Ives 2016).
CIEVE found that,
[T]he proportion of votes that could not be traced (29%)
applied to the total of valid votes (1,560 631) which
means the voting registration offices authorized 448,000
citizens to vote without filling out the required paperwork
as stipulated by the associated electoral decrees. The
second critical element is the proportion of valid National
ID cards compared to signatures and/or fingerprints. The
percentage of national ID Cards found to be false is
16.2%. For the 1,112,600 votes that could be verified,
(valid votes with ID cards, minus those written by hand)
180,250 were associated with fake national ID cards for
a total of 628,250 fraudulent votes.
The number of fraudulent votes 628,250 or 40% is more
than the number of votes received by the candidate
place as the first and more than the combined votes
received by both candidates placed in second and third
place and much higher than the difference between the
candidate who came first and fifth. When we apply the
criteria of the CIEVE based of existing electoral decrees,
the situation becomes graver as the percentage of valid
votes is reduced to only 9% of the total vote (Benoit, et
al. 2016, 6).

The most alarming concern stipulated by CIEVE was that the majority of the
fraudulent votes favored the candidate that garnered the highest votes to qualify
for the run-off. According to CIEVE, with a 2% margin of error, only 9% of the
population legally voted compared to the 26.45% recorded (Benoit, et al. 2016,
6, 49, Chery 2016). According to the Center for Research on Globalization, on
average, on each tabulation sheet, the total number of votes was fraudulently
multiplied by a factor of slightly more than two. The difference between this
multiplied total and the real total was added to Jovenel Moise’s tabulation sheets,

434

of usually zero to a few votes, to achieve an edge of more than 50 percent over
the other candidates (Chery 2016).
The following examples presented by both CIEVE and elaborated by
Chery (2016) reflect the overall verifiable vote-tabulation frauds that marred the
process and left little choice for the commission except the cancellation of the
elections:






Vote-tabulation sheet from the city of Jérémie’s Lycée des Jeunes Filles.
had Jude Célestin and Moise Jean Charles tied with 14 votes each,
Maryse Narcisse and Jovenel Moise trailing them with 4 and 0 votes,
respectively, but votes were changed from 0 to 107 in support of Jovenel
Moise.
Another tabulation from the École Nationale de Savanette had Jude
Célestin with 46 votes, Maryse Narcisse 18 votes, Moise Jean Charles 8
votes, and Jovenel Moise’s 0 vote. The votes were changed from 0 to 067
to support Jovenel Moise.
In yet another tabulation sheet from École Nationale Calbassier, 22 votes
were registered for Jude Célestin, 6 for Maryse Narcisse, 5 for Moise Jean
Charles, and 000 for Jovenel Moise’. The tabulation was changed from 0
to 088 in favor of Jovenel Moise.

By all indication, the refusal of the population to accept the election results and a
second round with Jovenel Moise as the top candidate should have been
supported by all democracy advocates336. However, it was the U.S, France, and
Canada – “The Friends of Haiti”, along with the OAS that first objected to the
creation of CIEVE and later to its findings and decision to re-do the elections.
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Amongst those who insisted that no fraud occurred was the Haiti Democracy project, an NGO funded
by USAID and other foreign sources. – See “Leaky as a CIEVE: The Commission does not find fraud”. Jun 6,
2016 - http://haitipolicy.org/2016/06/evaluation-verification-commission-report. Even the EU insisted
that no fraud took place, disregarding both the date and published voter-tabulation sheets that clearly
showed the changes written in by hand and the fake national IDs.
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Despite the documented fraud, Kenneth Merten, former American ambassador to
Haiti, and the special coordinator of the elections made clear the intentions of the
United States when he said, “we hope the CIEVE findings does not change the
results of the election” (McFadden 2016). It was the same Merten who had
threatened to remove an elected president from office unless it allowed the
American preferred candidate to qualify for the second round contrary to the
results.
Even if one disputes the fraudulent nature of the 2015 elections, which
would be incredulous, its low turnout was enough to elicit concerns about voter
confidence in the democratic process for anyone interested in democratic
legitimacy, stability, and consolidation. Out of 5,871,450 registered voters,
26.45% or 1,553,131 were reported to have participated, and 9% were found to
have done so legally (Benoit, et al. 2016, 49). Yet, despite the acknowledgement
of fraud by reputable international337 and national338 institutions, and calls for reorganizing the elections, the clientelist regime, neocolonial elites, and their
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Kolbe, Athena R.; Cesnales, Nicole I.; Puccio, Marie N.; Muggah, Robert. “Impact of Perceived Electoral
Fraud on Haitian Voter’s Beliefs about Democracy”, IGARAPE Institute – A Think and Do Tank - STRATEGIC
NOTE. NOVEMBER 20, 2015. This Brazilian institute demonstrated the impact of the fraud on voters’
confidence, suggesting an adverse impact on democratic legitimacy.
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The Commission for Electoral Evaluation and Verification (CIEVE), composed of some of the most
respected and reputable members of the Haitian Community had the full confidence of the population
and the commitment by the president to respect and implement their decisions. Their goal, to impartially
assess the elections and provide the government with both their findings and recommendations was, for
many, the only way to avert a full-fledged rebellion by the populace unwilling to let foreign government
and their client regimes undermine the nation and its path to democracy. It was in many ways, a response
to American, French, and Canadian interference in their national affairs. This is the true character and
genius of the Haitian nation, the people, not its elites sought fair elections. it is the average Haitian who
advocates for fair elections and it is to undermine their right to and call for accountable governance and a
responsive state that the clientelist infrastructure was imposed
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foreign supporters demanded the election proceed to the run-off between the two
top candidates.
Only the overwhelming show of force by the population forced the
cancellation of the elections and the departure of the client President without an
elected replacement. While the U.S. government expressed its interest in
democratic elections openly, it worked to undermine the process with financial
support for opposition forces, inviting opposition politicians to Washington for
strategy sessions, and “meetings with Congressional staff and US government
representatives” who opposed a re-run of the fraudulent elections (Johnston
2016). Thus, the American government engaged in both covert actions to
sabotage popular leaders with the ability to garner popular support, and outright
manipulations and coercive tactics by threatening financial duress to undermine
support for Privet’s government339 (Yves 2014).
It is clear from foreign involvement and neocolonial elite collusion that the
goals have not been to support a stable democratic regime, accountable
government, and democratic consolidation, but rather to ensure the election of
weak clientelist regimes that rely on foreign support for their survival instead of
securing their legitimacy and national support based on democratic accountability
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Chief amongst those working to subvert free and fair elections was Kenneth H. Merten
Special Coordinator for Haiti and Deputy Assistant Secretary, who also represented Canadian interests.
See “On-the-Record ‘TalkHaiti’ Teleconference with Haitian Americans for Progress Hosted by Dr.
Cassandra Theramène
Washington, DC, June 1, 2016
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and governance. In this context, the claim that a nationalist or popularly
supported democratic regime would threaten the neocolonial clientelist
infrastructure is not without foundation. Despite the refusal of the “Friends of
Haiti” to support the cancellation and re-organizing of the election and its
attempts to use financial constraints to force compliance, the nationalist interim
government re-organized its budget to fund the democratic elections demanded
by the populace. The re-organization of the election, in the aftermath of a
devastating hurricane ultimately resulted in the voting of the preferred clientelist
candidate as President with the majority of the population abstaining and only
18% of the population participating. Privert’s refusal to forego the democratic
process due to external pressures, and his unwillingness to disregard the
demands of the masses for a free and fair election was highly regarded by the
citizenry longing for national respectability and autonomy.
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Candidate

Table 7: 2016 Presidential Election Results
Party
Votes

Jovenel Moïse
Jude Célestin
Jean-Charles Moïse
Maryse Narcisse
The following 23
additional parties
garnered a small
number of votes

Haitian Tèt Kale Party
Alternative League for Haitian Progress and
Empowerment
Platfom Pitit Desalin
Fanmi Lavalas
Renmen Ayiti, Fusion of Haitian Social Democrats,
Randevou, Front Uni pour la Renaissance d’Haïti, Parti
pour l’Evolution Nationale Haïtienne, Konbit Pour Ayiti,
Plan d'Action Citoyenne, Unir-Ayiti-Ini, Cohésion
Nationale des Partis Politiques Haïtiens, Parti Alternative
pour le Développement d'Haïti, MOPANOU, Mouvement
d'Union République, Rassemblement des Patriotes
Haïtiens, Parti Unité Nationale, Résultat, Konbit
Liberasyon Ekonomik, CANAAN, Retabli Ayiti, Parti
Démocrate Institutionnaliste, Mouveman pou
Endepandans Kiltirel Sosyal Ekonomik ak Politik an
Ayiti, Independent, Mobilisation pour Haïti, Olah Baton
jenès la

%

590,927

55.60

207,988

19.57

117,349
95,765

11.04
9.01

43,607

3.99

None of the above
7,203
0.68
Invalid/blank votes
57,824
0.05
Total
1,120,663 100
Registered voters/turnout
6,189,253 18.11%
Source: See https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B56RZ3-JtuHxZW8zNHp4TVlwdzg/view; and
http://cepr.net/blogs/haiti-relief-and-reconstruction-watch/breakdown-of-preliminary-electionresults-in-haiti

Consequently, while it is a good sign a President was elected through electoral
competition, he lacks both the legitimacy and popular support required to
effectively govern, “with less than 10 percent of registered voters ― only about
600,000 votes — supporting him out of over 6 million registered voters. Jovenel
Moise won 55.6% or 9.6% of the 17.3% of registered voters who participated in
the elections. The drastic drop of voter participation was captured in the table
below by the Center for Economic and policy Research (CEPR):
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Table 8: 2015 & 2016 Presidential Election results
2016
2015

Year

Registered Voters
Candidate

6,189,253
Votes

Percent of
Registered
Voters
9.6%
3.4%
1.9%

5,835,295
Votes

Percent of
Registered
Voters
8.7%
6.7%
3.8%

Jovenel Moise
595,430
508,761
Jude Celestin
208,837
392,782
Jean-Charles
118,142
222,109
Moise
Maryse Narcisse
96,121
1.6%
108,844
1.9%
Valid Votes
1,069,646
17.3%
1,553,131
26.6%
Source: CEPR -The Center for Economic and policy Research – Haiti’s Relief and
Reconstruction. Johnston, Jake December 6, 2016, “Breakdown of Preliminary Election Results
in Haiti”.

The persistent manipulation of the democratic process has resulted in the
refusal of the population to participate in an electoral process they know to be
rigged. Over 89% of Haitians surveyed believed the elections were rigged and
75% said they would participate if the elections were fair (Kolbe, et al. 2015, 14,
McFadden 2016). With foreign powers determined to undermine the democratic
process in pursuit of their interests, neocolonial elites with little interest in the
autonomy of the state and the welfare of its citizens, weak institutional capacity
from years of neglect and attacks, what little remained of the legitimacy of the
Haitian state has disappeared. A new form of dependent neocolonial clientelist
infrastructure based on weak democratic participation is being established in
which the masses have neither voice nor power, and given their historical
corrective role, it is not coincidental that they have refused to participate.
However, Haitians wholesale rejection of the electoral process is not a rejection
of democracy but reflects their desire for a fair democratic process capable of
producing a responsive and accountable state.
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The Louverturean state model with its emphasis on a strong accountable
and responsive state and interdependent state-society relations reflects the
aspirations of most Haitian citizens, who seek to establish this model through
democratic means – the absence of which they deplore. Their rejection of the
dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure and its client regimes, and their
insistence on an accountable and responsive state has not yet factored into any
analyses of the decline of democratic participation and the failure of democratic
transition and consolidation in Haiti. The imposition of this dependent
neocolonialist clientelist infrastructure was not designed to create and maintain
the political legitimacy capable of fostering the emergence of a strong
accountable state and sustainable representative democracy. Such legitimacy,
based on democratic governance, necessitates a social contract to maintain the
interdependence between the state and the nation… the historical l’État-Peuple –
Peuple-État sought after by Louverturean, Noirist, and Duvalierist state crafters.
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CONCLUSION
That democratic participation declined is not coincidental but the result of
unwarranted and unparalleled outside interference. The deleterious
consequences of this interference were clear to the Lawyers’ Guild when they
observed,
[F]ollowing the 2004 coup d’état against President JeanBertrand Aristide, participation began to decline; the
November 20, 2016 turnout represented the lowest in
Haiti’s history. After the high hopes of the post-Duvalier
years, electoral violence, vote-rigging,
disenfranchisement, and repeated foreign interventions
have bred a deep disillusionment with democracy.
Paradoxically, falling participation rates have occurred
alongside massive investments by the international
community in Haiti’s electoral apparatus. The millions
spent by the U.S. and other Core Group countries on
democracy promotion programs in the post-Aristide era
have produced an electoral system that is weaker, less
trusted and more exclusionary than what came before
(IJDH 2017, 2).

For Haitian scholar Jean-Germain Gros, however, though the country has been
the target of imperialist meddling, Haiti’s problem is historical. Any analysis of
contemporary Haitian politics must account for both historical internal dynamics
and foreign involvement:
State failure has been a recurring feature of Haitian
political life for much of the country’s history, and this
inability of the Haitians to craft a viable political order is
at the heart of Haitian poverty or underdevelopment.
However, to understand the Haitian failed state,
imperialism must be brought “back in,” even while the
failings of Haiti’s rulers and institutions also take center
stage” (Gros 2012, xiv, 2).

While Gros’ assessment is not without foundation, missed by this often repeated
assertion of historical instability and state failure is a nuanced analysis of Haitian
state formation and crafting that does not solely overemphasize historical
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failures, poverty, and underdevelopment. Any serious analysis of the Haitian
state has to be centered on neocolonial elites’ capture and transformation of the
Haitian state, and the impact of the post-Occupation clientelist infrastructure in
curtailing Haitians’ potential for self-determination by undermining state capacity,
political legitimacy, national stability, and democratic accountability.
The consequence of the post-Occupation imposition of the clientelist
infrastructure resulted in constant instability characterized by the struggle of the
Haitian masses to re-claim control of the state. The emergence of Noirism and
Duvalierism and their successes in refashioning the nationalist state as a
counterweight to imposed dependency and clientelism was part of the historical
struggle for self-determination and state autonomy. The advent of Jean-Claudism
and its collusion with foreign interests accelerated the disenfranchisement of the
population.
The rise of a popular democratic movement in the post-Jean-Claudist era
represented the new vehicle in the historical struggle for self-determination and
state control. The popular democratic movement became, “the new catalyst for
self-determination to bring about the advancement of human rights and the
improvement of the general welfare” (Fan 2008, 195). For Haitians, democracy
meant much more than securing human rights and the general welfare, it was the
vehicle to recapture and reorient the state away from the dependent clientelist
infrastructure. Consequently, the resistance to the popular democratic project
that emerged from neocolonial elites’ and foreign powers and their manipulation
of the democratic transition and electoral process has to be viewed in the context
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of securing the dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. Their failure to
curtail the masses’ democratic self-determination through manipulation and
coercion has led to a second foreign occupation, and the establishment of a
democracy without participation. Such democracy has resulted in a loss of
legitimacy by political actors who could not secure the support of the majority of
the Haitian polis.
This new development of the dependent clientelist infrastructure – a
democracy without participation, though similar to Caribbean clientelism, in that it
maintains foreign financial and coercive support needed by clientelist states, is
distinct from its Anglophone Caribbean clientelist structure (Edie 1991, Gros
2012). It lacked the internal elite-mass party-based clientelism, and the statesociety relations which support political legitimacy and national stability (Stone
1980, C. J. Edie 1991, Roniger 2004). The dependent neocolonial clientelist
infrastructure’s survival in Haiti required the weakening of electoral and political
participation as a vehicle to democratic accountability and in so doing, has
undermined what little remained of the Haitian state, the legitimacy of state
actors and Haitian democracy itself. Whereas for the Haitian masses, state
control was necessary for democratic accountability, for those in opposition to
their struggle for self-determination, weakening the state and replacing its
institutions with NGOS was necessary in the face of Haiti’s successful popular
democratic struggles.
The destruction of the Haitian state was preferable to its capture by
democratic forces. Neocolonial elites and their foreign supporters have
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supplanted the state with foreign-funded or foreign-based non-governmental
organizations to prevent its capture, thus further eroding state-society relations
and the État-Nation, Nation-État interdependence sought by Louverturean
crafters and their nationalist adherents. The World Bank notes,
[M]ost basic services that in other developing countries
are carried out by the government are performed in Haiti
by NGOs, grass roots organizations, private enterprise
or missionaries – or, as is often the case in reality,
simply do not exist. According to a World Bank study
there are some 10-20,000 NGOs operating in Haiti at the
community level. Eighty per cent of schools in the
country are run either by NGOs or private for-profit
institutions (Street 2004, 18).

It is important to remember that such reality is not accidental. The inability of the
democratic system to meet the needs and aspirations of the nation, the lack of
state capacity and sidelining of the state by NGOs, worsened by the loss of
legitimacy of state actors have been the consequences of anti-democratic
manipulations by neocolonial elites and their foreign allies to sustain the
dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure.
As observed in the preceding chapter, outside interference in the
democratic process can be directly correlated to a decline in confidence in state
actors, state institutions, and democratic participation. As research from
Gélineau and Zechmeister suggests, between 2006 and 2014 confidence in
elections declined from 35.5% to 29.8% ; confidence in the national electoral
institutions declined from 37.7% to 31.4% and confidence in the national
legislature declined from 47.2% to 42.6% (Gélineau and Zechmeister 2015, 39).
Electoral participation, as I have noted, had dramatically declined from 90% in
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1990 to 18.11% in 2016340 (Orenstein 2000, IJDH 2017). McFadden argues that
this lack of confidence and refusal to participate in a democratic process they
view as rigged is not a rejection of democracy, and that “most Haitians would
vote if they saw elections as fair” (Kolbe, et al. 2015, McFadden 2016, 12)
Indeed, a recent unpublished survey on institutional trust and confidence in
political leaders and the democratic process demonstrate an even more dramatic
loss of confidence of the Haitian populace341. Their lack of confidence in national
institutions, elected officials, political and economic elites, and in the political
process itself, undermines the possibility for legitimate democratic governance
and democratic consolidation. Despite continuous electoral competition, their
refusal to participate in an electoral process they think illegitimate, managed by
institutions they do not trust, that elects people in whom they have little
confidence, counters the claims of democratization and democratic consolidation
scholars. The unwillingness of the majority of the population to participate in a
democratic process that elects governments whose accountability cannot be
assured should be viewed as their rejection of the anti-democratic manipulations
that robs them of their rights to self-determination and not of democracy itself. As
the National Lawyers Guild suggests, “Recurrent instances of external meddling
have made many Haitians suspect that the outcome of the 2015 and 2016
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http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Haiti/Squeeze_Vote.html
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See appendix for results of the unpublished survey.
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elections would be decided by foreign powers rather than votes,” compels them
to refrain from participating (IJDH 2017, 14). This was not only true of the 2015
and 2016 elections but reflect a pattern of disassociation. This loss of confidence
in the democratic process, institutions and state actors, impedes Haiti’s chance
for a successful democratic transition and consolidation. The unwillingness of the
majority of Haitians to lend the legitimacy necessary to the democratic process
that now shapes national politics. As Power and Cyr observed,

[L]egitimacy is both absent and pervasive at the same
time. Legitimacy seems absent because so few analysts
address the topic head-on, yet it also seems ubiquitous
because it appears under so many alternative guises.
Political support, institutional trust, regime consolidation
and mass consent are only several of the fragmentary
concepts through which elements of legitimacy – itself a
multidimensional concept – are routinely invoked”
(Power and Cyr 2010, 1).

This problem of legitimacy has regional characteristics due to the patterns
of state formation and state crafting and is not just a result of democratic
manipulation. Post-colonial Latin American and Caribbean states, argue Malloy
and Seligson, have historically suffered from such a deficiency in legitimacy that .
neither authoritarian nor democratic regimes are able to overcome. They
therefore vacillate from authoritarianism to democracy in search of accountability,
stability, and legitimacy (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Seligson 1987, Malloy
and Seligson 1988, 236). While their assessment is correct, the point however, is
not the constant shifts, but what those shifts represent that should be explored.
The inability of populations to secure their interests through these
governance models can lead to vacillations in search of solutions and, except in
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nations where politics are managed through clientelist networks, patterns of
authoritarianism and democracy can become permanent features of political
arrangements. In a clientelist infrastructure, analysis of legitimacy is relegated to
transactional relations between patrons and clients. Citizens participate in the
political system to secure resources; the more resource-scarce the politicians,
their parties and states are, the less support they garner, and the less adherence
there is to the governance model. The reliance on national elites and foreign
powers for resources to support transactional relations is a primary feature that
maintains the veneer of liberal democracy (C. J. Edie 1991, Stone 1980). These
patron-client relations offer scant possibilities for the masses to orient the state
toward their interests for their politics is confined to bread and access (Edie
1994). Such a system is based on the historical relationship between the state
and its citizens. For these states, citizenship has meant political participation.
The immediate post-independence relationship between the Haitian masses and
the state had been historically based on interdependence instead of clientelism.
Haitian clientelism is anti-national, serving as a vehicle for popular
disenfranchisement rather than a tool for political participation and integration.
The assertion that democracy is possible when all national political and economic
players see democracy as the only game in town contradicts Haiti’s path to
democracy (Dahl 1973). In Haiti, it is the Haitian masses not the elites who seek
accountable democratic government.
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The Search for Solutions: Can the Dependent Clientelist Infrastructure Foster the
Legitimacy of the Haitian State?:
Haitians’ quest toward democratic self-determination, and their struggle to
establish representative democracy and state control as a counterweight to the
dependent clientelist infrastructure, is precisely the cause for democratic
instability (Dupuy 2003). Their quest for accountable democratic governance
runs counter to the dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. Far from a
lack of belief in democracy, it is the Haitian masses’ faith in democracy that has
left them disillusioned. Haitians’ insistence on a strong, regulatory, accountable,
and centralized democratic state is antithetical to the weak, liberal decentralized
state dominated by non-govermental organizations that is in existence today.
A non-participating voter put it bluntly,
[W]hen there will be a serious leader, a leader who is
really thinking of changing the country, a leader who will
not be the puppet of the international community and its
neoliberal policies of selling off public enterprises piece
by piece, then I will go vote (IJDH 2017, 14).

Their conception of state is congruent with the Louverturean model; strong,
regulatory, and democratic - an arbiter of interests and a protector of its citizens,
national sovereignty342. They seek a strong Ètat-Peuple / Peuple-Ètat with the
state interdependent with the nation but not dominated by it, in direct opposition
to the constraints imposed by the dependent clientelist infrastructure.

342

See tables appendices J & K
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Despite the commitment of the masses to democracy and various
attempts to orient the Haitian state towards democratic accountable
governments, neocolonial elites and foreign powers have succeeded in
undermining their participation in and enthusiasm for the democratic process by
imposing a democracy incongruent with the popular will and aspirations. Haitian
democracy, as it has been imposed, runs counter to the wishes of the majority of
the Haitian polis. Their continued insistence on a social contract that maintains
the Ètat-Peuple / Peuple-Ètat interdependence, supports an evaluation of
Louverturean statecraft as a model for democratic accountability and
consolidation. In the end, it is not Haitians we should be concerned about, but
neocolonial elites and their foreign supporters who are all too willing to thwart the
quest for a responsive state and an accountable democracy. The persistence
and consolidation of democracy in Haiti require crafting a new state; one not
based on clientelism, but on legitimacy and the interdependence between state
and nation.
The historical struggle to craft a responsive state has been central to
understanding Haitian contemporary politics, the causes of instability, and
addressing the needs and demands of the Haitian masses. To solve the nation’s
endemic instability and address the dramatic decline in democratic participation
without understanding their foundation would continue to lead to a futile search
for solutions ungrounded in Haitian historical and socio-political realities and,
therefore, doomed to deepen the national crisis faced by the Haitian people and
the state itself. In the end, Fatton is right to suggest that solving the Haitian
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problem “requires a credible and legitimate government that can speak in the
name of the population…, and include the marginalized in the making of a new
and responsible Haitian state” (R. J. Fatton 2010, 1-2). The marginalized,
however, is the majority, the very population whose insistence for a legitimate,
responsive and accountable democratic state has been systematically rejected.
The central question is what type of statecraft and state would have the
legitimacy to speak in the name of the population and be responsive to its
citizens? If the research is any indication, the population’s criteria for the type of
state they want seems clear343.
The type of state required for political, economic, and social stability in
Haiti was obvious to the Haitian founding fathers and state crafters and demands
a more sophisticated understanding by scholars and political elites alike in order
to re-examine its usefulness in addressing the nation’s present condition. This
work asserts that, to date, Louverturean statecraft offers the most compelling and
historically-based model for addressing and solving Haiti’s challenges and for
establishing authentic and viable democratic governance.
This study offers Louverturean statecraft as a framework for analyzing
Haiti’s lack of state responsiveness and accountability, and conflict-ridden statesociety relations face by the Haitian state in particular, and postcolonial states in
general. It explores the nature of Haiti as a neocolonial state and the role of
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See Appendices H through K for results of the unpublished qualititative survey.
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statecraft in addressing their state-society challenges and state responsiveness
in congruence with the aspirations of its population. The undermining of the
Louverturean state and its État-Peuple / Peuple-État interdependence has led to
historical instability and lack of state responsiveness and accountability. Future
research and scholarship need to deepen the analysis of the Louverturean state,
explore its relevance and application of its key features in the contemporary
national and international space in which Haiti operates. The role of state
institutions and institutional reforms in building confidence and democratic
accountability without diluting the power of the state remains elusive344. More
importantly, given the lack of responsiveness of the Haitian state and the refusal
of the population to participate in the electoral competition, Haitian scholars
would have to study the role of the state in building the confidence necessary for
democratic participation.

344

See Appendices B through F for Haitians Views on the state and national institutions.
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APPENDIX A
SURVEY QUESTIONAIRE
This research was executed through Surveymonkey and was followed by field
interviews, which encompassed a cross-section of the population reflected in the Survey
as well as a cross-section of those who may not have had access to computers or the
internet.
Objectives: The goal of this survey was to collect the responders’ assessment of the
Haitian state, its institutions, elected officials, and government. It also probed
responders’ views on the legitimacy of the Haitian state. The targeted population include
Haitians living in Haiti and abroad, and Haitian-Americans who travel regularly to Haiti
and maintain family connections there, NGOs working in Haiti, specifically, those who
have worked with Haitian institutions or Haitian political and economic elites.
Directions given to Survey participants: This survey is part of a research project from
a Haitian Scholar seeking answers to Haiti’s past and contemporary challenges. Your
participation will be helpful in that endeavor. Please read the questions carefully before
answering. I appreciate your frank response. (Moise St. Louis)
Demographic information:
Age

Gender

Profession

What is the highest educational level you have attained?
No formal education
Incomplete secondary school
Degree from university

Incomplete primary school
Complete primary school
Complete secondary school
Some university

What language do you speak at home?
French

Creole

Spanish

English

Other

Please choose from the following list
Are you currently?
Married

Living together as married
Widowed

Divorced

Separated

Single
Do you have any Children?
No children
Four Children

One Child
Five Children

Two Children
Six Children

Three Children
Eight or more children

If you were describing your social class, what would you say?
Upper class
Upper middle class
Working class
Lower class

Middle class

Lower middle class
Poor

Are you:
Haitian living in Haiti

Haitian-born Living Abroad
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Haitian Americans with relatives in Haiti

Representing an NGO in Haiti

None of the above

Ethnic Background:
White

Black

Mulatto

Middle Eastern

Latino

Asian

Haitian

Do you currently work with?
Haitian Government
NGO
Self-employed
Private sector (US)

Haitian institutions (explain)
Non-religious International NGO
Public sector (US)

Private sector (explain)
Religious NGOs

Haitian

Not working
other

Social Dynamics
For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
There are no differences between elites and average Haitians except access to resources.
Class is not a factor in Haitian society.
There are no links between color and class in Haiti.
Colorism does not exist in Haiti.
Color is not a factor in Haitian politics.
Color is not a factor in Haitian economy.
There are no racial differences between Haitians.
There are no differences between elites.
There are no racial animosities within the elites.
There is only one group of elites in Haiti.
There are multiple racial groups within the elites.
There is no political tension between the Haitian majority and the elites.
There is no racial tension between the Haitian majority and the elites.
Elites cannot be placed in one group.
Middle-class Haitians identify the same way.
There are not tensions between middle-class Haitians.
There are no racial tensions between middle-class Haitians.
Elites control the politics of the country.
The Haitian masses control the politics of the country.
Different groups of elites compete against each other for power.
There is only one ethnic group in Haiti.
Haitians see themselves as belonging to one race.
Foreigners see Haitians as belonging to one race.
Haitians do not see a link between color and class in Haiti.

Economic Confidence and effectiveness
For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
I am satisfied with the direction of the country.
The government responds to the needs and demands of the population.
I am satisfied with the pace of economic development in Haiti.
Fighting rising prices is important
With the right policies, Haiti can be economically stable.
With the right policies, Haiti can become economically self-sufficient.
With the right policies, Haiti can produce enough food to meet the demands of the population
I am satisfied with the amount of employment available to people in Haiti.
The government has done a great job fighting rising prices
The government has enough resources to meet the demands of the population.
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Political Participation/involvement
For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
It is important to me for Haiti to be governed democratically.
The country is being governed democratically today.
Giving people more say in important government decisions is important.
Civil society is strong in Haiti.
Civil society can impact national policies.
Protecting freedom of speech is important
I voted in Haiti in the recent presidential election.
I am affiliated with a political party.
People have a say in important government decisions.
The government protects freedom of speech.
Haitians respect human rights.
For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
I am confident in:
The electoral system
The fairness of the presidential elections
The Electoral system is not being influenced by other countries

The best way for me to voice my discontent is through:
Protests / Demonstrations
Elections
Revolutions
disobedience

Coup d’état

Civil

In my experience it is more effective to effect change in Haiti through:
Protests
Violent demonstrations
Civil disobedience
Elections
Writing letters
There is no way to effect change
None of the above
(explain)

Assessment of Haitian Institutions
For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
The Haitian State maintains a balance between interests of the masses and the interests of the
elites.
The Haitian State maintains a balance between interests of the country and the interests of
foreign powers.
Maintaining order in the nation is the most important
State institutions maintain a balance between the masses’ interests and the interests of the elites.
State institutions maintain a balance between the country interests and the interests of foreign
powers.
The Haitian government acts in the best interests of the nation.
The Haitian government acts in the best interests of its people.
Members of the Haitian Parliament act in the best interests of Haiti.
Members of Parliament act in the best interests of Haitian citizens.
I am satisfied with the effectiveness of the government to provide services.
I trust government officials.
The government is independent.
The government is dependent on NGOs to function.
The government has done a great job maintaining order
If the government had resources, it would use them to the benefit of average Haitians.
I am confident in the Haitian government’s ability to protect the interest of the nation
I am confident in the Haitian government’s ability to protect the interest of Haitians.
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For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
The Haitian government is:
Very corrupt

Not corrupt

Mildly corrupt

No more corrupt than governments in other countries

The Haitian state serves the interests of:
The people
power

The nation

The elites

Foreign powers

The leaders in

Trust and Confidence in Officials and institutions
For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Elected officials care about the future of the Haiti.
The president makes good decision as a leader.
I have confidence in the competence of the president.
I have confidence in the competence of the prime minister.
I have confidence in the competence of elected officials in parliament.
I am satisfied with the conditions of the roads where I live and travel.
I am confident in the judicial system and courts.
I am confident in the government financial institutions
I am confident in the private financial institutions.
Corruption widespread in business practices in Haiti.
I am confident in the services I received in the hospitals and clinics.
I have confidence in the educational system.
The education I receive in Haiti prepares me for the future.
I have confidence in Haitian state institutions.
The United Nations Security force is doing a good job in Haiti.
Health services and hospitals are available
Equal justice is available to anyone regardless of economic status.
For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
I would entrust my family and my security to:
The Police
Neighborhood groups UN forces
Private security None of the above
I have confidence in the following organizations in Haiti
The churches The armed forces
The press
Television
Labor unions
The police
The courts
The government in Port-Au-Prince
Political parties
Parliament
Major companies
Non-Governmental Organizations – NGOs
The United Nations
Environmental organizations Women’s organizations
The
MINUSTA
For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
If I have to go to court in Haiti, I would be treated:
Very fairly

Fairly

Somewhat fairly

Not fairly

Not sure

Elected officials look after:
Personal/self

Haiti/the nation

Family

Party

Constituencies

The groups most likely to protect my interests are my:
Church
Neighborhood
Political party/leaders
The Country’s Intellectuals
The Country’s Business My country’s NGOs
Foreign NGOs
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Haitian institutions are:
Weak Non-existent
Ineffective
Effective
Haitian elites Controlled by foreign NGOs

Improving

Control by

Haitian institutions:
Not sure Work for all Haitians Only work for Politicians and Elites
Work well if you have money to bribe employees
The following state institutions serve the population well:
Health
Justice

Public Works
Security

Contribution
Postal

Commerce
Education

Custom
Media

For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
The following departments are very useful:
Health

Public Works

Contribution

Commerce

Postal

Education

Media

Customs

Justice
Security

Security and Community
For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
The police force is competent.
The police are able to provide security for the nation.
The police can be trusted to assist a citizen when requested.
If bandits threatened me or my family, I would you go to the police.
For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
If I felt threatened by people while on the street, I would rely on:
The police

Passerby

No one

Myself

If my wallet was stolen in Haiti and someone found it, it would be returned to me if it were
found by:
The police

Your neighbor

A stranger

Would not be returned by anyone

If my house was being burglarized, I would you seek help from:
The police

Family member

For my security I rely on the:
Haitian police MINUSTAH

Friends

A stranger

Family members and friends

If I had an accident, I would you expect to be assisted by:
The police
A stranger
Family member

Myself

Neighbors

Friends

National outlook
For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
I am proud of Haiti.
Haiti is the best country in the world.
I am worried about the future of Haiti.
I am proud to be Haitian
Haiti is a failed nation.
The earthquake brought Haitians closer together.
A stronger leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections are best for Haiti
Haiti will recover and become a stronger nation.
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Haitians are capable of solving Haiti’s problems.
Haiti should have experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best
for the country
It is very important to live in a democratic country
A stronger state is necessary to solve Haiti’s problems.
The military should be recreated.
Democracy is the best political system for Haiti
NGOs are good for Haiti.
NGOs undermine the State in Haiti
Haiti is being governed democratically
A strong parliament to limit presidential power is best for Haiti
NGOs should be controlled by the Haitian State.
NGOS should only work in areas decided by the state
NGOs should have a say in the future development of Haiti.
NGOs undermine economic development in Haiti.
For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Haiti’s problems are the result of:
Culture

History

Religious beliefs

Elites

Masses

Politicians

Foreign countries

Those responsible for the problems in Haiti are:
Current Leaders The masses
UN
Not sure
No one

The elites

Past leaders

Open-ended Questions
What are your thoughts on the Haitian State?
Does Haiti need a new social contract?
What can Haitians do to address their country’s challenges?
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Unites States

France

APPENDIX B
CONFIDENCE AND TRUST IN GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES IN HAITI
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
disagree

Total # of
participants

Elected Representatives act in the best
interests of Haitian citizens

3.04%

9.13%

36.88%

50.95%

342

I am satisfied with the efficiency of the
government to provide services

1.94%

14.73%

33.72%

49.61%

342

I trust the government officials.

2.77%

11.46%

37.15%

48.62%

342

The government is independent.

2.38%

10.32%

29.76%

57.54%

342

The Haitian government is dependent
on international non-governmental
Organizations to function and subsist.

25.20%

42.52%

25.20%

7.09%

342

If the government had resources, it
would use it to benefit the
marginalized population.

7.51%

21.74%

40.71%

30.04%

342

I have confidence in the capacity of
the Haitian government to protect the
interests of the nation.

7.87%

13.78%

42.13%

36.22%

342

I have confidence in the capacity of
the Haitian government to protect the
interests of all Haitians

4.74%

13.04%

43.87%

38.34%

342
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APPENDIX C
CONFIDENCE IN STATE INSTITUTIONS
Whose interests does the state
serve?

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
disagree

Total # of
participants

A. Personal interests of state elites

31.10%

44.09%

16.93%

7.87%

342

B. The interest of the nation

6.53%

13.88%

43.67%

35.92%

342

C. The interests of the elites

26.34%

49.79%

15.64%

8.23%

342

D. The interests of foreign powers

34.60%

45.99%

13.92%

5.49%

342

E. The interests of those in power

40.49%

42.51%

9.31%

7.69%

342
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APPENDIX D
CONFIDENCEIN NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
Strongly
agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
disagree

Total # of
participants

I have trust in the judicial system
and the tribunals.

4.71%

8.24%

43.14%

43.92%

342

I trust the Public Financial
Institutions.

3.23%

11.69%

47.58%

37.50%

342

I trust the Private Financial
Institutions.

4.13%

30.58%

40.50%

24.79%

342

There is widespread corruption in
business in Haiti.

36.44%

36.44%

17.00%

10.12%

342

I trust the services I receive in the
hospitals and clinics.

1.20%

18.80%

46.00%

34.00%

342

I trust the educational system.

4.76%

23.41%

46.03%

25.79%

342
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APPENDIX E
TRUST IN RELEVANT NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
Strongly
agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
disagree

Total # of
participants

I trust the government in Port-auPrince

3.25%

15.04%

50.41%

31.30%

342

I trust the political parties

0.00%

6.48%

57.09%

36.44%

342

I trust the parliament

0.81%

9.72%

53.85%

35.63%

342

I trust the private commercial
companies

2.02%

30.36%

43.72%

23.89%

342

I trust the ONGs

3.24%

19.03%

42.51%

35.22%

342

I trust the environmental
organizations

7.08%

25.83%

44.17%

22.92%

342

I trust women’s rights organizations

11.84%

33.88%

33.88%

20.41%

342

I trust the United Nations

2.05%

17.21%

36.89%

43.85%

342

I trust MINUSTAH

0.80%

8.40%

28.80%

62.00%

342
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APPENDIX F
VIEWS ON SOURCES OF NATIONAL CHALLENGES
Strongly
agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
disagree

Total # of
participants

Culture

9.21%

24.69%

40.17%

25.94%

342

History

12.81%

26.86%

38.02%

22.31%

342

Religious beliefs

12.92%

22.50%

40.42%

24.17%

342

The elites

29.22%

44.03%

20.16%

6.58%

342

The masses

13.75%

21.67%

41.25%

23.33%

342

The politicians

49.80%

36.55%

5.62%

8.03%

342

Foreign powers

39.20%

34.00%

16.00%

10.80%

342
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APPENDIX G
TRUST IN ELECTED OFFICIALS
Strongly
agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
disagree

Total # of
participants

Personal business

50.61%

37.65%

6.07%

5.67%

342

The Nation’s business

7.88%

12.03%

47.72%

32.37%

342

Their family’s business

43.15%

47.30%

6.64%

2.90%

342

The business of their political parties

21.94%

56.12%

18.14%

3.80%

342

The business of their electors

6.94%

27.76%

49.80%

15.51%

342
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APPENDIX H
VIEWS ON THE ROLES AND EFFECTIVENESS of NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
Strongly
agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
disagree

Total # of
participants

Haitian institutions work for all
Haitians

10.74%

21.07%

47.52%

20.66%

342

Haitian institutions functions only for
the politicians and national elites

17.43%

37.76%

32.78%

12.03%

342

Haitian institutions function well if
you have the money to bribe
employees

27.85%

50.21%

13.50%

8.44%

342

Haitian institutions are ameliorating

6.69%

27.20%

50.21%

15.90%

342

Haitian institutions are controlled by
foreign NGOs

15.81%

44.02%

30.77%

9.40%

342

Haitians institutions are controlled by
Haitian elites

21.52%

54.85%

17.72%

5.91%

342
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APPENDIX I
VIEWS OF THE ROLE OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT

The Haitian state maintains a
balance between the interests of
the masses and those of the elites
The Haitian state maintains a
balance between national interests
and the interests of foreign powers
State institutions maintain a
balance between the interests of
the masses and those of the elites
State institutions maintains a
balance between national interests
and the interests of foreign powers
The Haitian government acts in the
best interests of the nation
The Haitian government acts in the
best interests of its people
Members of parliament act in the
best interest of Haiti

Strongly
agree
4.45%

Agree

Disagree
42.91%

Strongly
disagree
42.11%

Total # of
participants
342

10.53%

3.02%

14.66%

47.84%

34.48%

342

4.64%

10.55%

48.95%

35.86%

342

4.31%

18.97%

45.26%

31.47%

342

3.81%

9.32%

41.53%

45.34%

342

3.39%

10.59%

41.95%

44.07%

342

1.69%

8.86%

37.97%

51.48%

342
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APPENDIX J
HAITIANS VIEWS ABOUT THEIR NATION AND THE FUTURE

I am worried about the future of
Haiti
Haiti is a failed nation
Haiti will be reborn and become
a strong nation
Haitians are able to resolve the
problems faced by Haiti

Strongly
agree
37.08%

Agree

Disagree

45.00%

6.03%
24.45%
32.49%

467

13.33%

Strongly
disagree
4.58%

Total # of
participants
342

24.14%
49.78%

50.00%
20.09%

19.83%
5.68%

342
342

51.05%

10.13%

6.33%

342

APPENDIX K
HAITIANS SEEK A STRONG REGULATORY STATE

A strong state is necessary to
resolve the problems faced by Haiti
The Haitian armed forces must be
recreated or reconstituted
Non-governmental organizations
are good for Haiti
The NGOs weaken the Haitian state
The NGOs ought to be controlled
by the Haitian state
The NGOs ought to work only in the
areas decided by the state
Les ONG devraient avoir leur mot à
dire dans le développement futur
d'Haïti.
The NGOs undermine the economic
development of Haiti

Strongly
agree
37.02%

Agree

Disagree
14.47%

Strongly
disagree
11.49%

Total # of
participants
342

37.02%

30.90%

46.78%

11.59%

10.73%

342

5.15%

21.89%

36.48%

36.48%

342

36.68%
49.56%

31.00%
39.47%

20.52%
7.89%

11.79%
3.07%

342
342

49.35%

35.93%

8.66%

6.06%

342

9.96%

40.26%

28.14%

21.65%

342

18.67%

41.78%

29.33%

10.22%

342
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